James Buchanan

Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania

A Connected and Chronological Record of the Commercial, Industrial and Educational Advancement of Pennsylvania, and the Inner History of all Political Movements since the adoption of the Constitution of 1838. . . . . .

BY

A. K. McCLURE, LL.D.

Illustrated with Portraits of over one hundred distinguished men of Pennsylvania, including all the Governors, Senators, Judges of the Courts of to-day, leading Statesmen, Railroad Presidents, Business Men and others of note.

VOLUME I

Library Edition

Philadelphia
THE JOHN C. WINSTON COMPANY
1905

Yours Alexander K. McClure

P

[illegible]

[illegible] that it is an appl[illegible] the mastery of [illegible] in making our C[illegible] ment. Our p[illegible] their great [illegible] they called a Stat[illegible] the grandest railwa[illegible] world created [illegible] energetic [illegible] another great [illegible] roduced and [illegible] to the homes and sh[illegible] is now one of the [illegible] railway organization [illegible] tributary [illegible] extending into every [illegible] develop the wonder[illegible] wealth of the State. They see the [illegible] advanced and lib[illegible] educational system in the world maintained by their commonwealth, offering free education to the humblest child of every community. They see great corporate interests reaching [illegible] every channel of industrial development adding millions upon millions to the wealth of the [illegible] a very few have [illegible] years to [illegible] the [illegible] ignor[illegible] and [illegible] and industrial development.

INTRODUCTION

PENNSYLVANIA has ever been in the forefront of her sister States in field and forum, and in industrial and educational advancement; but while every era of progress is portrayed in our literature, it is fragmentary and so widely scattered in the records of Pennsylvania achievement that it is an appalling task for any student of to-day to undertake the mastery of the varied movements which have culminated in making our Commonwealth foremost in progressive development. Our people to-day look at their great empire, by courtesy called a State, and see the grandest railway system of the world created by our authority and energetic people, with another great railway system that introduced anthracite coal to the homes and shops of the city, that is now one of the great railway organizations of the country, and tributary railways extending into every center of industry to develop the wondrous wealth of the State. They see the most advanced and liberal educational system of the world maintained by their Commonwealth, offering free education to the humblest child of every community. They see great corporate interests reaching into every channel of industrial development adding millions upon millions to the wealth of the people, but only a very few have any conception of the long, earnest and often desperate struggles made by brave, progressive men in early years to remove the barriers of ignorance and prejudice which steadily and vindictively resisted every effort for educational and industrial development.

The author of these chapters has had more than a half century of experience in political struggles of the State, in which were involved every phase of commercial, industrial and educational advancement, and his personal acquaintance with the leading political factors whose public service was rendered before his participation in political affairs enables him to present, in connected chronological order, the commercial, industrial and educational advancement since the adoption of the amended Constitution of 1838, and to give also, not only the story of the political struggles which advanced or retarded the advancement of the Commonwealth, but the inner history of the political movements of the times and the desperate conflicts created by the interests of individual ambition and often conflicting industrial, educational and commercial policies. This period covers the heroic decade of Pennsylvania and of the Nation, when Civil War called for countless sacrifices of life and treasure to maintain the unity of the Republic, and in that struggle Pennsylvania, although second in population, furnished more soldiers to the war than any other State of the Union, suffered in war's spoliation, and on her hills at Gettysburg was fought the decisive battle between the blue and the gray that proclaimed to the world that "government of the people, by the people and for the people shall not perish from the earth."

The author was, for nearly half a century, actively engaged in the political struggles of the day, and aroused the full measure of antagonism that aggressive men ever must expect. He is thus called upon in these chapters to write much of men with whom he was not in political accord, and with some of whom he was in aggressive, factional or partisan hostility. This experience enables him to present the inner history of political movements which are not to be found in the ordinary political

annals, and having outlived the often embittered asperities of the past, and when most of his contempories, friend and foe, have crossed the dark river, he has been studiously careful to suppress every vestige of resentment, and to give generous justice to those with whom he was in conflict in the long ago.

The aim of these chapters is to present to the people of Pennsylvania, who are so justly proud of their great Commonwealth, a connected chronological story of the advancement of our great State since the adoption of the reform Constitution in 1838, presenting with absolute candor the many and earnest struggles made for advancement beginning more than half a century ago, and portraying the leading actors as they rose and fell in political conflicts, with their capabilities and methods, giving to the student of to-day in a single publication the inner history of Pennsylvania politics, and the desperate battles fought for the advancement that makes our grand Commonwealth to-day the richest and most progressive of all the States of the Union.

In several works previously issued by the author, some of the incidents presented in this work have been given to the public, but their omission in these chapters, which present a complete and chronological record of political and other important events, would leave it imperfect.

The Governors of the State chosen under the several constitutions are given in portraits by groups, the first presenting Governors Mifflin, McKean, Snyder, Findley, Heister, Schulze, Wolf and Ritner, chosen under the Constitution of 1790. The second presents Governors Porter, Shunk, Johnston, Bigler, Pollock, Packer, Curtin, Geary and Hartranft, elected under the Constitution of 1838, and the last gives Governors Hoyt, Pattison, Beaver, Hastings, Stone and Pennypacker, chosen under the Constitution of 1874.

Pennsylvania had varied methods of government prior to the establishment of the Constitution of 1790. The Dutch rule began with 1609 and continued until 1638; the Dutch and Swedish rule prevailed from 1638 to 1655, and the Dutch rule again became omnipotent and lasted until 1664. The chief executive was then known as Vice Director, and many changes were made. The conflict between the English and Dutch led to the establishment of the English rule from 1664 to 1673, when the Dutch Deputy Governor re-established the rule of his race, and the English regained their rule in 1674 and continued it until 1681, when the proprietory government under Penn was established. It continued under various Deputy Governors, including several of the Penn family, until 1777, when the Supreme Executive Council was organized with Thomas Wharton, Jr., as President, who was succeeded by George Bryan in 1778, and he in turn was succeeded by Joseph Reed at the close of the same year, who was succeeded by John Dickinson in 1782, and Benjamin Franklin succeeded Dickinson in 1785, and served until the adoption of the Constitution of 1790.

These chapters tell of the creation and death of the Anti-Masonic party, of the Whig party, and of the American party, all of which were important political factors in our Commonwealth, and they present the interesting story of the origin and strange development of the Republican party that has practically ruled the country for nearly half a century. It is known to all of ordinary intelligence that these parties existed, but the causes which led to their creation, and the struggles and victories and defeats of each, form interesting chapters in the annals of the Commonwealth.

The author has been scrupulously careful to present the political movements herein recorded with entire accuracy, and with

absolute freedom from partisan prejudice, and in discussing public men who have risen and played important parts for more than half a century, the aim has been to err on the side of generous or charitable judgment. The work is presented to the public in the expectation that it will meet an important want, telling the people of our great Commonwealth the story of its leading actors, and how the overshadowing grandeur of Pennsylvania advancement has been achieved.

A. K. M.

CONTENTS.

I.—Old Time Political and Social Conditions.

II.—Governors Ritner and Porter.

III.—John Bannister Gibson.

IV.—The Buckshot War.

XII.—Advent of the Locomotive.

XIII.—The Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

XIV.—Pennsylvania Railroad Presidents.

XVIII.—Governor Bigler.

XIX.—The Know Nothing Party.

XX.—Governor Pollock.

XXI.—Sale of the Main Line—Erie Riots.

XLIV.—Repeal of the Tonnage Tax.

XLV.—Hasty Preparations for War.

XLVI.—Political Conditions in 1861.

XLIX.—The State Draft of 1862.

L.—The Emancipation Proclamation.

LI.—The Battle of Antietam.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

VOLUME I

Old Capitol.

I.

OLD TIME POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS.

Not a Steamship on the Seas, Nor a Locomotive Drawing Cars when the Writer was Born — The Battle for Free Schools — The Brave Dutch Governor Wolf Defeated for Approving the Measure — The Beautiful Neighborly Qualities — Partisan Intolerance Greater Then than Now, and Political Frauds often Boldly Practised — Our Improved Civilization.

IN PRESENTING the series of "Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania" to the public, I do not propose an autobiography, as the historical events to be given will be of much more importance to the public than the personality of the writer, but as I shall deal wholly with events of which I had more or less personal knowledge, or in which I have more or less personally participated, it will be impossible to repress the little perpendicular pronoun.

They will deal largely with public men and measures which figured prominently in the annals of the Commonwealth, and they will give the inner history of public movements, and of the triumphs and failures of public men, that histories and biographies are usually compelled to ignore.

For many years I was in an humble way aggressively active in the political movements of the State, and like all aggressive men was honored with many enemies, but those struggles, with nearly all of the men who were factors in them, have passed away, and the enmities which they created have long since mellowed into forgetfulness. I feel now that I can safely write even

of the bitterest foes I have made in the conflicts of the past, without a shadow of prejudice.

While I shall endeavor to make these chapters both entertaining and instructive by truthfully portraying important public movements and the men engaged in them, the presentation cannot be entirely complete. Many interesting events happen in a long political life which could not be frankly given to the public. Most men of intelligence and close observation in public affairs become cognizant of movements which cannot be made public while certain actors are living, and of course cannot be made public after their death. The careful student of public men during periods so appallingly eventful as the last forty years in this country, must accept the conclusion that infirmity, differing only in degree, is an invariable attribute of greatness.

It was my good fortune to know more or less intimately all of the great military chieftains and statesmen of the terrible trial that both endured in our Civil War and Reconstruction, and I recall the names of but three men who grow greater as you more closely approach them. They were Abraham Lincoln, General George H. Thomas and Commoner Thaddeus Stevens, and none would pretend that they were perfect in all the great qualities which make up human character. Of all these men whose names stand out in such lustrous distinction in the annals of the Republic saved in the flame of battle, it would be safe to summon the sinless to accuse, and the world would thus be summoned to silence.

When I was born there was not a single steamship on the seas of the world, nor a single train of cars drawn by a locomotive. Ohio was known as the "back woods," and there were vague traditions of boundless fertile prairies beyond stretching out to the Father of Waters. True, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Missouri had been admitted as States, but they were all very

sparsely settled without any means of conveyance but the mud roads which were often impassable. A journey from eastern Pennsylvania to any one of the Western States was then a vastly greater and more perilous undertaking than would be a journey around the world to-day. The entire population of the Republic did not exceed 12,000,000, and Pennsylvania had about 1,250,000, or less than one-fourth of our present population. What was then justly regarded as the great line of public improvements between Philadelphia and Pittsburg, had just been completed and opened a new avenue of trade that was inexorably closed during the winter season, when the only public highways for trade and travel were the turnpikes, chiefly built by the State, over which Conestoga wagons with their six-horse teams handled the trade between Philadelphia, Baltimore and Pittsburg.

Free schools were unknown, and the few who dared to advocate them did not venture to seek political preferment. The cross-road schoolhouse was found in every community, but it was usually the center of a neighborhood five or six miles in diameter. Every schoolhouse had its teacher during the winter season, for which he was usually paid so much by the parent for each scholar, and "boarded around" with his patrons. Teaching was confined to reading, writing and arithmetic, and I well remember the hostility aroused among a large portion of my school district when the violent innovation was made of teaching grammar. It was long resisted, but finally succeeded to the extent of permitting the teacher to teach it, although there were very few who accepted what was generally regarded as such a needless feature of education for their sons. The one green memory I have of the occasional schools of that time is that of the holiday frolic. It was then

that the school children had not only absolute freedom to bar their teacher out and keep him out even with hot pokers if he tried to climb through the window, until he compromised by giving them a liberal supply of apples and nuts. If the teacher had walked away, as he presumably might have done, without undertaking to force his way into the schoolhouse, he would have been promptly dismissed by the school authorities, and, while a majority of the parents of children would have flogged their boys severely at any other time for the antics they played upon the teacher in the holiday season, they were expected even by the strictest of parents to take a full hand in the holiday battle, and the boy who gave the teacher the bravest fight was the hero of the hour. If the teacher fought his way into the schoolhouse or entered it by compromise with the boys, the moment he was within the sanctuary of his authority discipline was instantly resumed, but there could be no punishment for the scholars who were in the fight.

I well remember the early battles made in the neighborhood in which I lived for the acceptance of the free school system. The original free school law was very crude, but it was the best that could be obtained at the time, and it cost the brave Dutch Governor (Wolf) who signed it, and many who had supported it, defeat before the people. It was not compulsory, and at any spring election a certain number of citizens could call for a vote on the acceptance of the free school law, and many times did the few Scotch-Irish in the neighborhood make a brave struggle for the acceptance of free schools, but they were voted down half a dozen times or more by the united vote of the Germans and others who opposed taxation for free education. Our school system was thus of little value, and advancement in it was very slow until Curtin

became secretary of the commonwealth, in 1855, when it was made a distinct department and placed in charge of the assistant secretary of the commonwealth, the late Henry C. Hickok, who had heart and soul in the cause, and under Curtin's direction gave the free school system of our State a standing that commanded general respect.

It was not an uncommon thing in those days to find whole families grow up without a single member of it being able to read or write. Ner Middleswarth, of Union County, who acquired more than State fame as a political leader, and who was speaker of the house for a number of terms, openly and earnestly opposed the school law, and gave as a reason that he had never been to school in his life. Some of his own children grew up without even the ordinary education given in our schools. To exhibit the sentiment of that day on the subject of education there is no better illustration than the defeat of Thaddeus Stevens, in Adams County, for the house of representatives, for the single offense of having carried an appropriation from the State for the Gettysburg College. Not only was the prevailing sentiment of the State against free education for children, but at that time it was implacably hostile to any appropriation for colleges.

The only library to which the young people had access in the rural sections of the State was that consisting of a few books which the Sunday school could manage to get together, and given out to the scholars from week to week. They were few in number, and generally of a cheap but clean class, and the few scholars who were ambitious to learn were thus enabled to indulge to a limited extent their taste for reading. The household library of well-to-do homes consisted of the English or German Bible, and among the Presbyterians the Confession of Faith, and the more ad-

vanced would have Scott's Commentaries and Fox's Book of Martyrs. Beyond these the opportunities of young people for reading were limited to the county newspaper, where any newspaper was taken at all, and the more prosperous families added a religious weekly. School boys and girls learned more at the night spelling school that was always conducted on a sharply competitive principle. It was considered the highest honor of the neighborhood to be at the head of the class, and as a rule the children of that day who were at all inclined to acquire an education were excellent in orthography. Night schools for reading and singing were also common, and were a great source of diversion, as well as of improvement for the young people. It was seldom that a vigorous young man who was able to perform manual labor on the farm or in the shop was ever thought of for any of the professions. If there was a cripple or an invalid in the family the rule was to give him a fair education and make him a teacher, or sometimes he was accorded a collegiate education to devote his life to a profession, chiefly because he was not able to wield the grain cradle and the flail.

The memory of the people of those days that comes to me with the sweetest incense is that of the serene content that prevailed among all classes and conditions. No one possessed great wealth, but none were so poor that they could not have food and raiment unless hindered by serious illness. In such cases there were always prompt and generous ministrations. The sick and the sorrowing of every community were known in almost every household, and where there was want there was always a most willing supply. No matter how people differed in politics or in religion, or on any of the other questions which at times divided rural communities, the duty of caring for the children of sorrow was accepted by all. Religion was the com-

mon law, and Sunday was made a day of most tedious and laborious worship. The neighborly feeling that was cherished by all was one of the most beautiful attributes of human nature, and it is a misfortune that it has almost wholly perished as the railroad, the telegraph, the newspaper and all the other many agencies of progress have transformed our rural communities of the long ago into the unrest of modern and better civilization. There can be no great transformation of the tastes and habits of a people without some loss of that which should have been preserved; but, discounted by all the unrest that modern civilization has brought, it has made men and women stronger and nobler, and has vastly greater sources of restraint than were thought of in the quiet days of the contented rural life. The house in which I was born and reared, although a brick building and comfortably furnished, never had a lock on door or window, and the burglar, or even the petty sneak thief, was entirely unthought of.

It is a common and very erroneous belief that the political battles of the early days were much more dignified, and much more free from dishonest manipulation than the political contests of the present. The student of our history who carefully studies the early political contests of Pennsylvania will find that a degree of political intolerance prevailed even among the more intelligent citizens that would not now be tolerated in any community. Party leadership as a rule was more blindly followed than it is to-day, as few even of the more enlightened people accepted any political literature but that which came from a country party organ, or from other partisan sources. Party revolts were as common then as now, and often precipitated the most desperate and defamatory contests, and the State political struggle of 1838 between Ritner and Porter has never been approached in any modern

political struggle in reckless prostitution of the ballot or in malignant, wanton defamation. No political journal with any pretension to decency could print to-day against a candidate any of the many defamatory articles which swept over the State like a tempest in 1838. A larger measure of fraud has doubtless been perpetrated in modern elections, but as far as the limited opportunities of that day offered, the game of fraud was played to the limit. One township in Huntingdon County returned 1,060 majority for Ritner in a district where there were not 200 citizens. The excuse given for the vote was that there was a breach in the canal and that some 800 laborers had been employed, when it would not have been possible to give employment to half the number. The new railroad in Adams County for which Stevens had obtained State aid, and that was commonly known in political circles as "the tapeworm," swelled the majority in Adams up in the thousands, and dual returns for members of the Legislature in the county of Philadelphia led to the creation of two houses at Harrisburg and wrote the history of the Buckshot War to shame the annals of the State.

Political intolerance became very general in the early struggles between Jefferson and Adams, and the desperate methods which party leaders adopted in those days prove that defiant disregard of the popular will is not a modern invention. One of the most disgraceful records made by the Pennsylvania Legislature was when in 1800 it literally stole seven electoral votes from Jefferson and transferred them to Adams. It did not affect the result, and, therefore, it was a political crime without compensation. The Federalists dominated the senate and the Jefferson Republicans controlled the house and had a majority on joint ballot. There was then no general law providing for the choice of electors in Pennsylvania, but at each of

the previous presidential elections the Legislature had passed a special act authorizing the people to vote for electors. Governor McKean summoned the Legislature in time to provide for a popular election, but the Federal senate, knowing that Jefferson would carry the State, refused to pass an act authorizing the people to vote.

Under the Constitution it is within the power of a State to choose electors as the Legislature shall direct, and in the absence of a popular vote it is competent for any Legislature to choose presidential electors. Not only did the Federal senate refuse to permit the passage of the bill providing for an election, but it refused to go into joint convention to choose presidential electors, because in the convention the friends of Jefferson had a majority. The State was entitled to fifteen electors, and the Federal senate finally proposed to the house that its members would go into joint convention upon the condition that each house should first name eight candidates for electors and that in the joint convention none should be voted for but the sixteen thus presented. The friends of Jefferson were compelled to accept the proposition or to lose the entire vote of the State, and they accepted the terms and thereby got eight of the fifteen votes for Jefferson, while Adams received seven.

Probably the most aggressive display of intolerance in early days was exhibited by the Jackson Democrats of Pennsylvania. How it happened no one can tell, for there seemed never to be any special reason given for it, but it is none the less true that Jackson was more reverenced and more blindly worshiped in Pennsylvania than in any other State of the Union. For scores of years after his death it was a common saying that the Democrats of the Tenth Legion section of the State never stopped voting for Jackson. It was the

Jackson ticket all the time, even long after he was dead, and at the Fourth of July celebrations of those times, the militia reviews, the corn huskings and other occasions which brought the people together, knock-downs to clinch political arguments were inevitable.

A fair illustration of political ethics of that day is given in the vote of one of the river townships of the Juniata Valley, where out of nearly one hundred votes there was but one Federalist. He was a highly respected citizen, an excellent neighbor, a large landowner, and was so highly esteemed that he was allowed to vote the Federal ticket without offensive criticism. In 1824 Jackson received the entire vote of the township with a single exception, and as that was the vote of John Light, a respected neighbor, everything went off harmoniously. In 1828, when Adams and Jackson ran again, the township was canvassed as usual, and it rounded up all for Jackson except John Light. The election was held at a stillhouse, and the Jackson rooters were enthused by fresh whisky. Nearly all waited for the vote to be counted and, to the utter consternation of the Jackson people, there were three Adams votes in the box. One vote for Adams was all right, but the entire Jackson force at once started in for an aggressive search to find the two others who had betrayed the party. One was soon discovered as a laborer who had been discharged some time before by a prominent Jackson man, and he was whipped on the spot. After a most careful search they were unable to fix definitely upon the other criminal, but strong suspicion attached to two persons, and in order to make sure of it the Jackson boys whipped both.

When it is remembered that John Adams, when defeated by Jefferson in 1800, refused to remain in the President's house to receive his successor, the common people of that day should not be harshly blamed for

their political intolerance. The universal diffusion of the newspaper in almost every home and the rude song of the iron horse that is heard in almost every valley and hillside, have enlarged the intelligence and broadened the generous attributes of men, and to-day it is most uncommon to see political differences, even among the most aggressive gladiators, lessen their courtesies or impair their friendships. Great and good as were the fathers of the Republic, our civilization of to-day is vastly better, and men and women nobler than they were in what we so often mistakenly refer to as the better days of the past.

II.

GOVERNORS RITNER AND PORTER.

Two Ex-Governors Who Survived Their Official Terms Nearly a Quarter of a Century — The Two Most Desperately Defamed Men of Our Political History — The Porter-Ritner Campaign of 1835 — The Most Malignant and Desperate of All Our Great Contests — The Personal Qualities of Two Ex-Governors — Whittier Embalmed Ritner in Poetry for His Anti-Slavery Views — Porter Rescued the State from Repudiation.

IT HAS been my good fortune to know more or less intimately every Governor of Pennsylvania from Governor Ritner to the present time, with the single exception of Governor Shunk, whom I met only once in a casual way. Of course, I did not know Governor Ritner while he was the chief magistrate of the State, as he entered his office when I was seven years of age, nor did I know Governor Porter personally until after his retirement, but both of them lived to a ripe old age, and both were recognized as important political factors during our Civil War.

These two men furnish more interesting chapters to the early annals of the State than have been written by any of their contemporaries, and neither of them is justly estimated by the people of to-day. They were direct competitors for the gubernatorial chair in the most absorbing and desperate political contest ever known in Pennsylvania, and their administrations cover crucial periods in the establishment of our school system and in the maintenance of State credit.

In those days the people had little opportunity to make the personal acquaintance of their prominent men. Almost every citizen of the State can personally

see the Governor now some time during his term with little inconvenience, but in those days, with no means of transportation but the mud wagon, state candidates made no canvass and met but a very small proportion of the people whose votes they sought, and the rural population very rarely reached the centers where the acquaintance of public men could be made. There was thus some measure of safety in assailing important candidates even to the high-water mark of defamation, and most of the people who opposed Ritner in his various contests believed him to be an ignorant Dutchman, incapable of speaking the English language with anything approaching propriety, and stupid to a degree beneath mediocrity, and most of those who opposed Porter believed him to be entirely destitute of moral attributes and utterly unfitted for responsible public trust.

Many stories were published giving circumstantial illustrations of the ignorance of Ritner. One I recall tells of a prominent citizen of Centre County who visited him in the executive office to obtain an appointment as prothonotary, as the Governor then appointed all the county officers connected with the courts. Governor Ritner was reported as saying that he was taking the counties up alphabetically and that whenever he came to the S's he would make the appointments for Centre. Porter was not charged with ignorance, as he represented a family of scholarly distinction in the State, but there was hardly a crime in the decalogue, excepting murder, with which he was not distinctly charged, and even murder was remotely intimated.

I had an intimate acquaintance with Ritner and Porter for twenty-five years before their deaths, and they were among the most interesting, entertaining and instructive of men. Ritner had been born in Berks County in 1780, and was brought up on his father's farm. He had little opportunity for educa-

tion, but he was a very close student and had a strong partiality for German literature. He learned to speak the English language as near perfectly as possible for one who had not the advantage of a collegiate education, but the German accent was plainly visible. His father removed from Berks County to Cumberland, near Newville, at an early age, where he married, and later removed with his wife's family to Washington County, where he became farmer for his wife's uncle, who was an excellent German scholar and possessed a fine German library. The prospective Governor devoted all his leisure hours to the study of the library of his uncle, and very soon became a man of affairs.

In 1820 he was elected to the house of representatives and was re-elected for five consecutive years, making a service of six years in the body, during two of which he was speaker of the house. The fact that he had been so long chosen to the house by one of the most intelligent counties of the western part of the State and had been twice called to the speakership should have been sufficient answer to all the scandals about his ignorance; and when it is remembered that soon after his retirement from the Legislature in 1829 he was unanimously nominated as the Anti-Masonic or opposition candidate to Governor, Wolf, solely because he was regarded as the ablest man to lead in such a battle, it must seem unaccountable to intelligent readers of the present age that Ritner was heralded all over the State as an utter ignoramus. He was not a political manipulator and his nomination for Governor was made entirely without any effort of his own.

The Anti-Masonic party was then in its infancy, and Ritner was defeated by about 16,000 majority. He was renominated against Wolf for the same office in 1832 and was again defeated by about 3,000 majority. In 1835 he was again unanimously nominated and was

elected by a plurality of nearly 30,000, although he was in a minority of 10,000 on the whole vote. The Democrats had a bolt on the nomination of Governor Wolf for the third term, chiefly because of Wolf's approval of the free school law, and Henry A. Muhlenberg of Berks was nominated as an independent Democratic candidate and polled 40,000 votes to Wolf's 65,000. In 1838 he was given the fourth consecutive nomination for Governor, when the Democrats united on Porter and defeated him by about 5,000 majority.

Ritner had able men about him while Governor of the State. Thomas H. Burrowes, who afterward became conspicuous as one of the great educational leaders of the State, was his secretary of the commonwealth, and Thaddeus Stevens was canal commissioner. Stevens was an able, sagacious and rather desperate political leader. I well remember the general judgment of his political friends when he afterward became prominent in politics as a Whig and Republican. They regarded him as a matchless leader of a minority opposition, but a dangerous leader of a majority. Ritner was thoroughly honest and intelligent, but of a confiding nature, and certainly permitted Stevens to shape some of the most objectionable features of his administration, although Ritner always denied it and I am sure died in the belief that Stevens had never dictated any important feature of his administration policy. I remember meeting Ritner when we were both delegates to a Republican State convention, of which Stevens was also a member, and he and Stevens were not in accord on some important question that was submitted. In a pleasant chat with Ritner after the adjournment he spoke with some earnestness about Stevens' great ability, but added with emphasis: "He's a dangerous leader, and useful as he was I never

permitted him to control my administration when I was governor."

On the absorbing issue of that time Ritner, Stevens and Burrowes were in hearty accord. The new free school law had just been passed, but was not yet in practical operation, and it was so hindered in some localities that its enforcement seemed to be next to an impossibility. Ritner took the boldest stand in favor of perfecting and executing the free school law, and as it was Stevens' own measure the Governor had very hearty support from his canal commissioner. Stevens certainly controlled the Legislature and the Governor against all reason to involve the State in the construction of a railroad in Adams County that became one of the important factors in the defeat of Ritner. A large amount of money was expended on it, but it was abandoned after the defeat of Ritner and never was utilized until within the last few years, when it was found to be useful in perfecting a line to Gettysburg.

Ritner's administration was clean and free from any corrupt profligacy for individual benefit, but under the leadership of Stevens and Burrowes, who was chairman of the Anti-Masonic State committee, every public and private measure was shaped to serve political ends, and often without much regard to the interests of the State. The one distinctly creditable feature of the Ritner administration was the courage and sagacity exhibited in fighting the battle for free schools, and, had the administration at that time been opposed to the system, or even indifferent to its success, its defeat would have been overwhelming.

One of the most notable of state papers which have come from the Governors of Pennsylvania was Ritner's message of 1836, in which he discussed the slavery question. There was then no slavery issue to

Governors under Constitution of 1790

Thomas Mifflin

Thomas McKean Simon Snyder

William Findlay

be solved in the territories, and the only agitation on the subject was made by the anti-slavery societies, which demanded the abolition of the institution. In this message Ritner arraigned slavery fiercely, and with such exceptional force that the credit of the paper was generally awarded to Stevens. It attracted so much attention that the Quaker poet Whittier published one of his best anti-slavery poems congratulating the Pennsylvania executive. It began:

> Thank God for the token, one lip is still free,
> One spirit untrammeled, unbending one knee,
> Like the echo of the mountain, deep-rooted and firm,
> Erect when the multitude bends to the storm.

I have referred in the previous chapter to the unexampled bitterness and defamation exhibited in Ritner's contest against Porter for re-election in 1838. The new Constitution, or what was commonly called "the reform Constitution," was adopted at the same election. It made sweeping changes in the fundamental law, reducing the judges from a life tenure to a term of years, and taking from the Governor the appointment of all the important county officers and justices of the peace. The returns were slow in coming in those days, but in the course of two or three weeks it was known that Ritner was defeated by Porter by some 5,000 majority. Mr. Burrowes, of the Ritner cabinet and chairman of the Anti-Masonic committee, issued an address stating that a majority of 5,000 had been returned against Ritner, but charging all manner of political frauds and declaring that there must be careful examination into them before the verdict could be accepted. After stating that it was the duty of all to bow to the supremacy of the people, he added: "But, fellow-citizens, until this investigation shall be fully made and fairly determined, let us treat the

election of the 9th inst. as if we had not been defeated, and in that attitude abide the result."

This was simply playing desperate and bungling politics. It was an invitation to revolution, and naturally aroused the Democrats to take such measures as would protect their majority in the State and Legislature. The bloodless Buckshot War was the natural result, and in the end the verdict of the State was accepted and the fairly-won supremacy of Porter and his party was acknowledged.

In 1839 Ritner retired to a farm in Cumberland County, where he lived a farmer's life in very comfortable circumstances for thirty-one years, and there was no more highly respected citizen of the county. He was a frequent visitor to Chambersburg, where some of his children lived, and always called upon me there to talk over the political situation. His interest in politics was unabated until the last. He was a frequent delegate to both county and State conventions, and I met him in the first Republican national convention in 1856, where he served as a delegate. He was a man of very general intelligence, unusually familiar with all public questions, and was a delightful conversationalist. His rugged honesty and kind neighborly qualities made him beloved by all who knew him, and even when he had reached the age of fourscore and ten his face would brighten as he spoke of the progress of our common schools.

He always attended the teachers' institutes in his own county and was generally presiding officer, and he journeyed to Erie County in 1861 when eighty-three years of age to inaugurate the first State normal school of that section at Edinboro. He always pointed with pride to the fact that when he became Governor of the State the appropriation to free schools was but $75,000 annually, and that it had been increased to

$400,000, while the common schools had increased from 762 with seventeen academies and no female seminaries to 5,000 common schools, 38 academies and seven female seminaries in permanent operation. Pennsylvania has had many more brilliant Governors than Ritner, but it has never had one of more sterling integrity, and his memory should ever be gratefully cherished as the man who laid the broad foundations for our present most beneficent system of free education. On October 16, 1869, he passed across the dark river, after having braved the storms of ninety winters.

David R. Porter was unlike Ritner in mental and physical organization. Ritner was short, stout and dumpy, while Porter was a man of superb physical proportions, and was a born aggressive leader, while Ritner gave more heed to the men around him. Porter was a man of fair education, and instead of entering college when he was fitted to do so he preferred to go into the surveyor general's office with his father as a clerk with Francis R. Shunk, of the same neighborhood, who later became Governor. He was a man of broad intelligence, aggressive in his ideas, a most sagacious politician, and in every emergency he was his own arbiter of his line of action. When he left the surveyor general's office he located in Huntingdon County, where he was prothonotary and clerk of all the courts for a number of years. His wife aided him in the labors of his office, and the records of deeds and mortgages in that county give many evidences of the legible handwriting and careful work of Mrs. Porter.

He was elected to the house in 1819 and in 1836 was chosen to the senate. There he made himself felt with such emphasis as a leader that Democratic sentiment rapidly gravitated toward him as a candidate to make the desperate battle against Ritner in 1838. The unex-

ampled desperation of the campaign and the equally desperate efforts made to prevent him reaching the office after his election I have already portrayed. He was re-elected in 1841 over John Banks, his Whig competitor, and by more than double the majority he received three years before. His term as Governor was comparatively uneventful, with the single exception of the desperate effort made during his first term to stamp the ineffaceable stain of repudiation on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The State debt had grown to enormous proportions by the construction of our public improvements, there was universal prostration in commerce, business and trade, and demagogues were plenty to tell the people that they could not and therefore should not attempt to pay the interest on the debt.

The people of to-day can hardly understand how a great State like Pennsylvania, with 2,000,000 of people, could think of repudiating the interest on a debt of less than $40,000,000, but there is no doubt that repudiation would have run riot throughout the State and triumphed in the Legislature but for the heroic stand taken by Governor Porter. He had to resort to extraordinary and more than doubtful constitutional measures to save the credit of the State, but he felt that anything was preferable to repudiation, and it is safe to say that that great act, defying the tempest of popular passion, rescued our great Commonwealth from the terrible stigma of repudiation.

Porter retired from his office in 1845, largely estranged from his party, chiefly because his great business interests had brought him in conflict with its views on the protective tariff question. He was one of the first men to introduce the manufacture of iron with anthracite coal in the interior of the State and for some years had a season of great prosperity, but when

the troublous times came he was bankrupted by heavy losses.

Porter was one of the most familiar figures on the streets of Harrisburg during our Civil War, and one of the most patriotic of our citizens. I met him many times in the dark days of the conflict, and although his head was silvered and his eyes dimmed by the infirmities of age, he would become aroused to enthusiasm when the question was discussed, and never despaired of the Republic. His life in Harrisburg was very quiet, but he never ceased to have interest in all public affairs and was regarded as one of the clearest-headed and safest counselors among the people. On August 6, 1867, his life work ended and he was borne to the city of the silent profoundly lamented by all who knew him.

III.

JOHN BANNISTER GIBSON.

Pennsylvania's Greatest Jurist—The One Error of the Great Jurist's Life—His Name a Household Word in the Rural Community Where He was Born—His Only Attempt at Poetry—Elected to the Supreme Bench in 1851, and Vacated Chief Justiceship to Black, and Died before it Reached Him again.

THE YEAR 1838 inaugurated a new epoch in the history of the State, and it was revolutionary in its nature. The gubernatorial contest of that year stands out single and alone as the most reckless and defamatory political struggle in Pennsylvania politics, and the adoption of what was then called the "Reform Constitution" changed the whole political system of the State. Under the old Constitution the Governor was given almost unlimited power. He appointed all the judges of the State, and they were commissioned for life or during good behavior. He appointed all the important county officers connected with the courts, including associate judges, of whom there were then two in each county, and all the justices of the peace, thus extending his patronage into every township of the Commonwealth.

The earlier Governors found this patronage a most important political factor, and it was vigorously employed to accomplish a succession of terms in the executive office, but gradually the patronage of the Governor became a source of discord and disturbance as the disappointed were always very many more than the successful applicants. The saying of Jefferson that an appointment to office often made one ingrate and nine enemies was pointedly illustrated at times in

the disposal of patronage, but the Governors invariably wielded their immense, almost boundless, patronage for their own individual advantage, or for the advancement of the political interests with which they were identified.

The amended Constitution of 1838 was adopted by a very small majority, and it was so far-reaching in its political transformations that political leaders and especially officeholders, whose tenures were limited, had great difficulty in adjusting themselves to it. It was opposed by the judges of the State not only with very general unanimity, but in many instances with intense and aggressive hostility. Prior to the adoption of the new fundamental law every judge felt entirely secure in his position for life, and the judges of the supreme court exhibited their hostility to the new Constitution in a manner so offensive to the public sentiment that the agitation began at once for the election of all our judges by the people, and it was consummated just thirteen years later. Any careful student of the political conditions existing in 1838 must reach the conclusion that if the new Constitution had been cordially accepted by the judiciary of the State, and interpreted and enforced with generous respect, an elective judiciary would have been postponed many years beyond 1851, when it was adopted by a large majority. As a limited tenure was provided for all judicial offices, it was necessary to adjust the termination of the existing commissions, and it was provided that the senior supreme judge in commission should retire at the end of three years, and the others follow according to seniority every three years until all were retired. The result was that some of the judges in the State were guilty of very awkward political trickery to extend their terms, and it has always been profoundly regretted by the Pennsylvania bar,

and other intelligent citizens who appreciate the incomparable qualities of John Bannister Gibson as the greatest of our jurists, that he was persuaded to resign his commission as chief justice soon after the adoption of the new Constitution and accept the new commission for a full term from the Governor.

There was no political purpose in this error of Chief Justice Gibson nor in the action of the Governor. The Governor was not his political friend, as Gibson was a pronounced Democrat and headed the Jackson electoral ticket even when he was on the supreme bench, while Governor Ritner, who appointed him, was as pronounced an opponent of Democracy. It is proper to say that the new commission received by Gibson was given him with the approval of his fellow-judge, who was thereby retired three years earlier than he would have been if Gibson's term had not been renewed, and it is also just to say that Governor Ritner was advised to accept the resignation and reappoint the chief justice because his retirement from the bench, which might occur in three years, would strip that tribunal of its ablest interpreter of the law. Nevertheless it had all the semblance of political trickery, and it grieved the venerable jurist during his entire career.

Like some others of the great jurists of the world, Gibson was not a successful lawyer and advocate. In a letter written to W. M. Roberts soon after his appointment he frankly told the pathetic story of the necessities which compelled him to yield to a movement that did not comport with the dignity of the highest judicial tribunal. In that letter he said: "To me who for a bare subsistence have given the flower of my life to the public instead of my dependent family, a continuance in office for the longest period was a matter of vital importance, but the arrangement of the convention, unintentionally severe to me or to any one

John Bannister Gibson

else, proposed to consign me to penury and want at a time of life when I could scarcely expect to establish myself in practice, which under the most favorable circumstances requires several years. This was known to my brethren and felt by them as men." He was thus continued as chief justice until 1851, when by special amendment of the Constitution every judicial office in the State was vacated in a single day. He had represented Cumberland, his native county, in the Legislature, and as early as 1813 he was appointed president judge of the district composed of Tioga, Bradford, Susquehanna and Luzerne. Three years later, in 1816, he was appointed an associate justice of the supreme court, and on the 18th of May, 1827, he was commissioned as chief justice. Although his vigor was much abated, he was nominated as one of the five Democratic candidates for supreme judge by the Democratic convention of 1851, being the only member of the court nominated by that party The Whigs nominated Judge Coulter as an Independent Democrat, and he was the only candidate on the Whig ticket elected, defeating the late Judge Campbell, of Philadelphia.

Judge Collins, of Lancaster, was another of the judges who decided to extend his term of office by resignation and reappointment. The legality of his new commission was disputed in the courts and Justice Kennedy, who delivered the judgment of the supreme court (8th Watts, 344), made a most insolent attack upon popular government because the people had adopted the new Constitution. In a solemn judicial deliverance he declared the expected reform of the new Constitution to be "the product of a delusion that has been the ruin of nations in times past quite as wise, intelligent and virtuous at one time of their existence as we have any right to claim to be," to which he added, "it would

seem as if the empty pride and incorrigible vanity of our nature was without fail either sooner or later to consign us to some such unhappy destiny as ever ought to be deprecated." The people of those days viewed the judicial position with a much larger measure of sanctity than is common at the present time, and any act of our judicial tribunal that brought reproach upon the administration of justice was regarded as an unpardonable offense. The people had chosen to amend the fundamental law and to take to themselves much of the powers which they had conferred upon their executive. They did not assume to select judges by popular vote, but they simply limited the judicial tenure because they believed that the judges needed at times the restraining influence of intelligent public sentiment.

It was in sorrow rather than in anger that they witnessed Chief Justice Gibson's questionable method of extending his term of office, as they all appreciated his unblemished integrity and his masterly ability, but when another member of the same court, in a judicial deliverance from the bench, denounced the people as vain fools who must sooner or later destroy their government and their own liberties, they were goaded to active and earnest resentment. In addition, the judges generally, high and low, viewed the new Constitution with disfavor and availed themselves of every opportunity to expose its alleged errors and to bring it into contempt. It was this feeling that aroused the people to steadily enlarge their own powers by withdrawing from the Governor authority they had delegated, as is exhibited in the action of the Legislature making the auditor general, the surveyor general and the district attorney elective officers, and by 1850 the Legislature passed by an overwhelming majority in both branches an amendment to the Con-

stitution making every judicial office in the State the creation of the people by popular vote.

Chief Justice Gibson is one of the most notable characters of Pennsylvania, and no one character is so carefully and so kindly studied by the legal profession of the State as is that of the great jurist. He stands in the annals of the Commonwealth head and shoulders above his fellow great jurists, and his decisions are not only quoted in his State and country by judicial tribunals, but they have been quoted and commended in the courts of England. I did not know our great chief justice personally until within five years of his death, as he was chief justice of Pennsylvania a year before I was born. His name was a household word in the community of my boyhood, as his place of birth was only a very few miles from my own home. His name was referred to with a pride that is natural in a primitive rural community when one of their own number has reached the highest distinction in the State, and among my early recollections I recall the chief justice's brother, Frank Gibson, as the man who played the fiddle for nearly or quite all the dances, corn huskings and butter boilings of the neighborhood. The chief justice, like his brother, was passionately fond of the violin, and even until the latest years of his life he would retire to his room alone and enjoy his own music on his favorite instrument.

He was a man of most commanding presence and perfect physical proportions. In a letter written to a friend some time before his death, he said: "I was born among the mountains of Cumberland (now Perry) County. Fox hunting, fishing, gunning, rifle shooting swimming, wrestling and boxing with the natives of my age were my exercises and amusements." In such a strenuous life it is not marvelous that he developed superb physical proportions, and his magnificently

chiseled face ever arrested the attention of even the most casual observer. I had few opportunities in my brief acquaintance with him of seeing him alone, but I sought every opportunity to do so because he was one of the most delightful conversationalists, and being from the same community that had given him birth he loved to talk about his own people and his neighbors for whom he cherished the liveliest affection. The only attempt he ever made at poetry was when late in life he visited the dilapidated home of his birth after an absence of many years. It is not a great poem, but it shows the simple tastes of the great jurist, and the heartstrings of love which went out to his old home surroundings. It might be said of Gibson's poem as Horace Greeley said in reviewing the poems of John Quincy Adams, that they show "what middling things a great man may do." I quote the first and last of the six stanzas:—

The home of my youth stands in silence and sadness,
  None that tasted its simple enjoyments are there,
No longer its walls ring with glee and with gladness,
  No train of blithe melody breaks on the ear.

But time ne'er retraces the footsteps he measures;
  In fancy alone with the Past we can dwell,
Then take my last blessing, lov'd scene of young pleasures;
  Dear home of my childhood—forever farewell.

I saw him frequently on the bench, but his great work was then done and his faculties somewhat abated. When hearing arguments he rarely manifested interest in the case, and it was a common complaint of lawyers that he was in the habit of dozing in utter forgetfulness of their arguments, but when a case interested him, or when a great deliverance was to be made by the court, he seemed to be able to summon all his old-time faculties and to be fully himself. He was a man of the

sweetest disposition and as unpretending as he was great. He did not succeed at the bar. He first located in Carlisle, the seat of his native county, but soon became discouraged and located in Beaver, Pa., whence after an unsuccessful effort he removed to Hagerstown, Md., where he remained for several years, but without attaining professional success, when he returned to his old home in Carlisle, and that remained his home until his death. He was very sensitive about his age. He was often twitted by his associates on the bench about making himself younger than he really was, and one time when the subject was under discussion in a playful way one of his associates asked him to enumerate the places he had lived and how long he had lived in each. He recited all but Hagerstown, when he was reminded that he had omitted that place where he had spent several years, to which the veteran chief responded, that it would be unfair to charge him with the number of years that he had lived in that village.

When the justices were made elective in 1851 he had served thirty-eight years continuously as a judge and thirty-three of that period as a justice or chief justice of the supreme court. He was then past the patriarchal age, and exhibited evidences of feebleness, but the leading members of the bar felt that it would be a dishonor to the Commonwealth to cast aside her greatest jurist. The position of supreme judge was sought by many aspirants, and but for the struggles of competitors for the place he would have been given a very cordial nomination, but those who wanted judicial honors pleaded his age and infirmities to advance their own cause, and he was finally nominated by a very small majority, chiefly through the efforts of two prominent young members of the bar of the State, both of whom afterward served on the supreme court, viz.,

Chief Justice Mercur, of Bradford, and Justice William A. Porter, of Philadelphia.

The Democratic ticket was successful by about 8,000 majority with the single exception of the late Judge Campbell, of Philadelphia, who was defeated by Justice Coulter, one of the Whig candidates, although a Democrat, and the five new judges—Gibson, Lowrie, Lewis, Coulter and Black—were required to ascertain by lot which should serve the three, six, nine, twelve and fifteen-year terms, the one choosing the shortest term to be accepted as the senior member of the court, and chief justice. Judge Black, the youngest of all the members of the court, drew the short term and became chief justice. Gibson drew the nine-year term, and when he did so he said that that would just about round out his life and enable him to die as the chief of the court, but he seemed to have lost interest in his judicial work, and he performed his labors in the most perfunctory way. He gradually became more and more infirm, and on the 3d of May, 1853, in the 73d year of his age, John Bannister Gibson, the greatest of Pennsylvania jurists, passed away to join the great majority beyond.

IV.

THE BUCKSHOT WAR.

A Disgraceful Chapter in the Annals of Pennsylvania—Fraudulent Election in Philadelphia County was the Primary Cause—Two Delegations Returned as Elected to the House—Two Speakers Elected—The Militia Ordered to Harrisburg to Preserve Order—Penrose, Stevens and Burrowes Escaped from the Senate Through a Window—Problem Solved by Anti-Masonic Senator John Strohm Voting to Recognize the Hopkins Democratic House.

THE "Buckshot War" is now at times referred to by those interested in the history of Pennsylvania in the misty memory that mingles tradition and history. I cannot recall a single history of that interesting event that has ever been given to the public. It was threshed over in political campaigns for many years after it had cast its shadows upon the annals of the State, but there are very few who to-day could give intelligent answer to the question, "What was the 'Buckshot War' of 1838–9?" It was called the "Buckshot War" because in one or more orders of the State Government calling upon the military companies to report at Harrisburg were instructions to them to be supplied with the regulation ball and buckshot cartridge of that time. It consisted of one ball and three buckshot, and continued to be the regulation cartridge of the old smooth-bore musket until after our Civil War began, when the rifled musket, in which only a single ball could be used, soon became a necessity.

There would have been no "Buckshot War" and no serious trouble during the Legislature of 1838–9 but for the fact that after the full returns for Governor in

1838 were obtained, Porter was given a majority of some 6,000 on the face of the returns, and they were disputed in a revolutionary spirit, although when the time came for the inauguration of the new Governor no opposition of any kind was interposed and Porter was qualified with imposing ceremonies. Immediately after the official returns had been ascertained and given to the public, Thomas H. Burrowes, of Lancaster, then secretary of the commonwealth, and chairman of the State executive committee of the Anti-Masonic party, published an address to the people of the State declaring that if the returns presented had been fairly produced all good citizens should quietly submit to them, but he declared that "there was such a strong probability of malpractice and fraud in the whole transaction that it is our duty peacefully to resist it and fully to expose it."

If he had adhered to the proclaimed policy of peacefully resisting and exposing alleged frauds there would have been no disturbance, but the concluding sentence of his address made it a revolutionary proclamation. It was in these words: "But, fellow-citizens, until this investigation be fully made and fairly determined, let us treat the election of the 9th instant as if we had not been defeated, and in that attitude abide the result." Even this revolutionary deliverance would not have caused serious apprehension under ordinary circumstances, but when it is remembered that Ritner, the defeated candidate for Governor, was in office and exercising all the powers of the government, and that Burrowes, who had inspired revolution, was his secretary of the commonwealth, and the official head of the party organization, the declaration was accepted as a defiantly avowed purpose to violently resist the inauguration of Governor Porter and the admission of his friends to the control of the popular branch of the Legislature.

Governors under Constitution of 1790

Joseph Hiester J. Andrew Schulze

George Wolf Joseph Ritner

It must be remembered that this address of Mr. Burrowes was delivered to the people of Pennsylvania in the midst of the most intensely inflamed partisan bitterness. The contest had been entirely unexampled in vituperation and in the desperation of political methods on both sides, and what was accepted as a revolutionary declaration from Mr. Burrowes aroused the Democrats to the most intense and aggressive resistance. Not only was the governorship involved, but the control of the house of representatives became part of the dispute, as the opposing Democratic and Anti-Masonic candidates for the house from the county of Philadelphia both claimed to be elected, and the admission of either decided the political control of the house.

Considering the opportunities for the perpetration of fraud in those primitive days, there was fearful pollution of the ballot, and neither side could claim exemption. In Huntingdon County, where Governor Porter resided, the vote for President in 1836 was 1,340 for Van Buren and 2,623 for Harrison. Two years later the vote for Governor was 2,761 for Porter and 3,637 for Ritner. Porter nearly doubled his party vote, chiefly because he was highly respected by the people of the county, who became well acquainted with him during his long service in the county offices, and while he certainly received the votes of over a thousand of those politically opposed to him, the vote against him was increased a thousand over the vote cast for Harrison in 1836. This vote was obtained almost wholly by the return of nearly or quite one thousand majority for Ritner in Morris Township, where a convenient break in the canal was made the pretext for employing a large number of men on public works.

Adams, the home of Stevens, also gave Porter 400 more votes than were given the Democratic candidate

for President two years before, but the vote for Ritner was more than double that given to Harrison. This vote was excused on the ground that a large number of men were employed on the Gettysburg Railroad. In Lycoming County, the vote of Youngwomanstown, where there was another convenient break on the canal, returned 500 majority for Ritner, the majority being much more than the entire legal vote. This return was regarded as entirely too flagrant to be received and was rejected. In Philadelphia both sides gave a pretty free range to election frauds, but the Democrats fully held their own. So intense was the political bitterness of the time that party advantage was sought by leaders and excused by followers generally, regardless of the methods adopted to attain it.

Philadelphia County was naturally Democratic. The vote for President in 1836 in the city proper, then limited by the two rivers east and west, and South and Vine Streets, gave Harrison 5,747 and Van Buren 3,028, while Philadelphia County gave Van Buren 7,975 to 6,536 for Harrison. Philadelphia city elected the Anti-Masonic legislative ticket, and in Philadelphia County the Democrats claimed that their legislative ticket was chosen by about one thousand majority, while the Anti-Masons claimed that such frauds had been perpetrated that their ticket should be returned as successful. In those days the return judges of each election precinct met on Friday after the election to compute the returns and certify the result. The Democratic return judges of Philadelphia County unitedly computed and certified the election of all their candidates, and the Anti-Masonic judges manipulated the returns and certified that all their candidates were successful.

These returns under the law were sent to the secretary of the commonwealth, who was Mr. Burrowes, and who was also chairman of the Anti-Masonic State

committee. It was his duty to present the returns to the Legislature at its meeting, but it soon became understood that he would only present the Anti-Masonic returns from Philadelphia County, which, it was assumed, would admit the Anti-Masonic representatives on a *prima facie* right to hold their seats. The Democrats well knew that if the Anti-Masonic delegation from Philadelphia County was admitted, thereby giving that party the absolute control of the house, there would be no possibility of successful contest for the Democrats. It thus became a rather clearly defined issue, revolutionary action on the part of the Anti-Masons to hold the control of the government and of the popular branch of the Legislature, and of the Democrats to prevent their party from being defrauded out of their victory, that would give them possession of State authority.

The worst element of Philadelphia politics was appealed to, and open declarations were made that violence even to murder would be committed if necessary to prevent the Anti-Masons from grasping the power that had been denied them by the people. Many private conferences and even public meetings were held at which most thrilling revolutionary deliverances were given, and there is little doubt that there would have been riot and murder at Harrisburg when the Legislature convened had the Anti-Masons not finally determined to accept the election of Porter, and to permit his inauguration without interference. But that only scotched the revolutionary snake without killing it. The control of the house depended upon the admission of one of the two disputing delegations from Philadelphia County, and both sides avowed their determination to make it a fight to a finish. Bands of armed toughs in Philadelphia openly proclaimed their purpose to attend the meeting of the Legislature

and to resist, by riotous measures if necessary, the refusal of the house to seat the Democratic delegation from the county. That there was danger of riot and murder at Harrisburg there can be no doubt, and the riotous purpose of the leaders, who meant to fight and kill, was justified or excused by their party leaders because Secretary Burrowes had given notice by public address that he would treat the election as if it had not been held.

Governor Ritner was brought face to face with a condition that threatened to plunge the Capital into anarchy, and instead of giving the assurance to the public that both the returns from Philadelphia County would be transmitted to the house, leaving that body to exercise its supreme right as judge of the election and qualification of its members, which would have greatly, if not wholly, allayed the riotous sentiment, he summoned a number of companies of militia to Harrisburg to protect the capital and officers of the government. He must have been very seriously alarmed at the threatened invasion of the capital by thousands of Philadelphians bent on revolutionary and probably murderous action, as he appealed to the President of the United States for military aid, but it was very properly refused.

The militia companies ordered to Harrisburg were on hand, but they simply marched up the hill and then marched down again, as they really had no duties to perform, nor did they in any way restrain the Democratic revolutionists. They ascertained that the battle for the Philadelphia County delegation could be fought out in the house without war, but the rioters remained to see that their side had fair play, and they did not consider anything fair play but a victory for their side. The presence and movements of the militia were fearfully ridiculed throughout the entire State, and the

whole movement would have been regarded as farcical but for the serious attitude in which it placed a great commonwealth as summoning its own militia to preserve order at the Capital for the inauguration of a Governor and the organization of a legislature. The troops remained for only a brief period, as the peaceful inauguration of Porter was conceded, and the Legislature assumed to solve the problem presented to it in its own way.

Secretary Burrowes in presenting the returns to the house, as is the duty of the secretary of the commonwealth at the beginning of each session, sent only the return of the Anti-Masonic candidates from the city of Philadelphia, but the Democrats were fortified with a certified copy of the return under the seal of the court, and that return was also presented by a member of the house. Both the delegations from Philadelphia County were present in the hall of the house when the clerk called that body to order, and the Democrats, with the aid of the Democratic representatives from Philadelphia County, proceeded to elect William Hopkins speaker, while the Anti-Masons, with the aid of their Philadelphia County delegation, elected Thomas S. Cunningham. The singular spectacle was thus presented in the house of representatives of two speakers, and each having received what purported to be a majority vote of the house.

The possession of the chair became at once a question of might and not of right, and the Democrats, having an immense outside support with which it was very dangerous to trifle, managed to get Hopkins in the chair, while Cunningham, when he attempted to take his seat on the speaker's platform, was assisted down to the floor of the house by anything but gentle methods. All the legislative business was at an end, and the executive and State departments were closed.

The appearance of the military had little effect, as the mob was discreetly careful to avoid conflict with the troops. With the mob practically controlling the legislative halls inside, and the militia keeping peace outside, the house kept up the farcical contest between the two speakers until, after a considerable period of disorder, Senator John Strohm, of Lancaster, an Anti-Mason of high character and intelligence, deserted his party and gave the casting vote in favor of recognizing the Hopkins house.

That practically ended the controversy, as when an Anti-Masonic senate had recognized a Democratic house there was no longer any basis for continuing the contest. Strohm was bitterly denounced for what was regarded as an act of apostacy, but he lived long enough to be generally and earnestly commended by all good citizens of every political faith for having had the courage to be honest, at the expense of party favor, in the severest crisis that ever confronted the State. Stevens moved to Lancaster some years thereafter, and I remember seeing him there in 1851 when I was a delegate to the Whig State convention, and aided in nominating John Strohm as the Whig candidate for canal commissioner. I met Stevens soon after the convention adjourned, and asked him how he regarded the nomination of Strohm. He answered in his curt, grim way: "He's our candidate now and I forgive him." He was in Congress during the Mexican War, and one of the thirteen Whigs of the body who had the courage to vote against an appropriation to the army in Mexico because the act began by declaring that "we are at war by the act of Mexico." The Whigs moved to strike the offensive, and as they believed untrue, statement from the bill, but were defeated by a party vote, and when they had to meet the question of voting for the bill containing the false statement of historical

facts, or vote against appropriating money for the army, all but thirteen supported the measure, but John Strohm believed it to be untrue, and he resolutely voted against the bill. He lived to a ripe old age, and died universally beloved by his people.

It was during this struggle at Harrisburg that an interesting episode occurred in which Thomas H. Burrowes, Thaddeus Stevens, and Charles B. Penrose were the actors. Penrose was a member of the senate from Cumberland County, Burrowes was secretary of the commonwealth, and Stevens was canal commissioner. They were all in the senate chamber along with a great crowd one evening during the most angry period of the "Buckshot War" trouble. A number of men were there known to be of a riotous character, and one of them jumped on a senatorial desk and declared: "We are in the midst of a revolution, bloodless as yet," and almost immediately afterward the lights in the senate were put out by the mob. Stevens, Penrose and Burrowes at once retreated into a little committee room that was connected with the senate chamber, hoisted a window and jumped out to the street, some six or eight feet below. It is quite likely that they did a very wise thing, as they were regarded as the active leaders in the political efforts to prevent the Democrats from reaping the fruits of their victory. Penrose was speaker of the senate, and was one of the ablest of the political leaders of any party in the State. He was ambitious to win a cabinet position under Harrison and was very strongly supported for it, as was Josiah Randall, father of Samuel J. Randall, then a leading Whig or Anti-Mason, but Pennsylvania was denied a position in the cabinet, and Penrose was appointed to the position of Solicitor of the Treasury. He resigned his seat in the senate to accept the Washington office, and afterwards removed to Philadelphia, the place of

his birth, where he was again elected to the senate in 1856, and died while a member of that body. He was the grandfather of our present United States Senator, Boies Penrose, whose political ambition and ability come honestly from his distinguished ancestor.



Hendrick B. Wright

V.

RESCUED FROM REPUDIATION.

Pennsylvania with $40,000,000 of Debt was Unable to Pay Interest in 1841 — Loans Were Authorized but Not Taken — For Months the Cloud of Repudiation Hung Over Our Great State—Porter Rescued It by a Forced Loan from the Banks Authorizing Them to Issue the $3,000,000 Needed by the State in Relief Notes — The State Credit was Saved by the Courage and Ability of Porter.

ONE of the most interesting chapters in the varied annals of our great Commonwealth is that presenting the story of the desperate struggle made in 1840–41 to prevent the State from being plunged into the maelstrom of open repudiation. Those who know only of Pennsylvania's history during the present generation can have no just conception of the terrible prostration of industry, commerce and trade that gradually followed the financial revulsion of 1837. There were then few private corporations in the State outside of the banks, and, with the exception of the brief period of the Ritner administration, they were not regarded with favor. The Democrats of that day were more or less earnestly opposed to all banking institutions, and constantly clamored for an utterly impossible specie currency.

Banks were indispensable to the business of the State, and many were chartered from time to time, but usually under most exacting conditions. All of them were organized under special charters varying in their franchises and responsibilities, and a large portion of them were what came to be known as "wild cat" banking institutions. A large majority of the country banks were under par, varying from 1 to 10 per cent., and

utter failures of banks were quite common. The land of the farmers was taxed because there were no great corporations from which to demand tribute for the support of the State, and as the debt increased and the ability of the people to pay diminished under the severe strain of the financial revulsion that continued from '37 to '42, the financial condition of the State grew worse and worse until finally in 1841 there was very general popular clamor for open repudiation.

Our system of internal improvements, beginning at turnpikes and ending with the main line of canal and railroad between Philadelphia and Pittsburg, and other canals, began as early as 1820, when the debt of the State was $530,000. The revenues that year were $440,000, and the expenditures $453,000. Public sentiment was imperative in demanding the rapid prosecution of our public improvements, as nearly every section of the State was directly benefited by the main line and the various canals. The result was that the debt steadily and rapidly accumulated until in 1840 the funded debt of the State reached $36,168,528.10, and it continued to increase until 1852, when it reached the high-water mark of $41,534,875.37.

On a large portion of this debt 6 per cent. interest was paid in lawful money, then confined to gold and silver. There was but little specie in circulation even before the suspension of the banks after the crisis of 1837. Silver dollars were then worth a premium, and were entirely withdrawn. One and two dollar bills were issued by the banks, and generally kept in circulation until it was almost impossible to distinguish what bank had issued them, and the final destruction of such notes was a source of large profit to the bank. The silver currency in circulation was almost wholly Spanish coins of 6¼ cents, commonly called "fips," 12½

cent pieces, commonly called "levies," and a coin somewhat like our 25 cents, that passed freely as a quarter, although intrinsically worth less, and many of them were worn so smooth that it was impossible to make out any inscription.

The life of the people generally throughout the State was one of severe economy, and they were illy prepared to maintain their great debt when industry and trade were terribly prostrated. Governor Ritner retired from office within a year after the revulsion began, and before it had been seriously felt throughout the State. When Governor Porter succeeded him he found that the grave problem before him was how to maintain the credit of the Commonwealth. He was inaugurated on the third Tuesday of January, 1839, and the third act passed by the Legislature and presented to him for approval was a loan bill of $1,200,000 to be applied first to the payment of interest on the public debt, next to such claims due on account of internal improvements, with the residue to any deficit in the internal improvement fund, and on the 30th day of January he was called to sign another act of the Legislature authorizing a loan of $602,250 to be applied to the payment of the interest on the public debt. This was a temporary loan obviously passed because there were grave doubts about the success of the larger loan approved only a week before, and the temporary loan was to be repaid out of the proceeds of the permanent loan when realized. It happened, however, that the loan was not realized, and thus debt was being piled upon debt with the sources of payment diminished.

It was not difficult for the Legislature to pass loan bills, but it was soon discovered that taking the horse to the water was an easy thing, but to make him drink was an entirely different proposition. The credit of the Commonwealth was practically exhausted, and

loans could not be negotiated. It was finally decided that as the banks were at the mercy of the State, all of them having suspended specie payments, a heavy hand could be laid upon them, and force them to give financial aid to the State. By an act approved April 3, 1840, it was provided that all the banks of the State must resume specie payments on the 15th of January, 1841, and pay all their liabilities in gold or silver coin "under the penalty of forfeiture of their charters, to be declared forfeited as hereinafter provided of any and all banks refusing to do so." The same section legalized the suspension until the time fixed for resumption. Detailed provisions were then made for the forfeiture and closing up of all the banks which failed to resume according to the statute.

In consideration of the State legalizing the suspension of the banks until April, 1841, they were required to loan to the Commonwealth in proportion to their capital, within the period of one year, by instalments in such sums and at such times as the wants of the State required, not exceeding in the whole the sum of $3,000,000 at interest not exceeding 5 per cent., and the amount of the loan anticipated by this act was to be appropriated by the Legislature to the payment of the interest on the debt, and to such other purposes as the Legislature deemed proper. In accordance with that law the Legislature by an act approved June 11, 1840, appropriated money to all the various improvements then in progress in the State.

The banks were thus held up and invited to stand and deliver the money needed by the State, but instead of financial conditions improving they continued to grow worse and worse until the meeting of the Legislature in 1841, when the treasury was without means to pay the interest on the debt, public sentiment was highly inflamed against the cost of the improvements which the

people had imperiously demanded, and repudiation was very generally accepted solely on the assumption that increased taxation could not be borne, and that it was impossible for the great State of Pennsylvania to maintain her credit. There were strong advocates of repudiation in the Legislature. Fortunately Governor Porter stood resolutely in favor of maintaining the honor of the Commonwealth, and he was ably supported by such well-known Democratic leaders of that day as James X. McLanahan, then senator from Franklin, who made a heroic and masterly appeal for maintaining the honor of the State at any cost, and William F. Johnston, later Governor, and Hendrick B. Wright, were among the most active supporters of State credit, and Johnston was generally regarded as the author of the act that finally saved Pennsylvania from ineffaceable dishonor.

When the Legislature met there was intense anxiety in business circles, and especially in Philadelphia, to know the contents of Governor Porter's message. The magnetic telegraph was then unknown, and railroad speed rarely exceeded ten miles an hour, as all the railway lines were then constructed with wooden strips laid on the ties and little more than heavy strap iron spiked down upon the wood. The anxiety to get the message from Harrisburg to Philadelphia led to what was regarded as the greatest railroad achievement of that day. The best locomotive was selected, put in complete condition, and was fired up all ready to start when the message was delivered, and it was brought through to Philadelphia in five hours. It was heralded over the whole country as indicating most marvelous progress in railroad development that an engine could be run continuously for five hours at the rate of twenty miles an hour.

The tone of the message was all that the friends of

State faith could have desired. It did much to inspire those who were earnestly in favor of paying the State interest, and it halted many who were strongly inclined to fall in with the repudiation procession. The third act passed by the new Legislature provided for a loan of $800,000 at a rate of interest not exceeding 6 per cent. "to be specifically appropriated to the interest on the public debt falling due on the 1st of February next." The Legislature had done its part in authorizing the loan, but $3,000,000 of debt had accumulated in the face of all the various actions employed by the Legislature to force loans to the State. The 6 per cent. securities payable in coin, that was then the only legal tender, sold for little more than half their face value, and of course it was impossible to obtain the needed $3,000,000 on any sound business basis. Banks had been tried by the previous Legislature by threats of forfeiture of charter to compel them to supply the treasury with needed money, but the measure failed, and it was not possible for the Legislature to attempt to enforce the penalty of forfeiture upon the banks which failed to resume in April, 1841, as a single bank in Pittsburg was the only one in the State that had not suspended, and its circulation was but limited. To have destroyed the banks by forfeiture of charter would have only multiplied misery and brought utter financial chaos.

The problem was finally solved by an elaborate act passed by the Legislature on the 30th of April, 1841, that was so violent in its disregard of all constitutional limitations that Governor Porter, although himself earnestly desiring to sustain the credit of the State, vetoed the bill. He vetoed it, however, with the full knowledge that it would be passed over his veto in both branches, and was doubtless quite willing that it should be done, as there was no other possible way of

providing means for the payment of State interest and the indebtedness for public improvements.

The State simply made use of all banks to furnish $3,100,000 to the Treasury, and authorized the banks to issue in proportion to their capital, and in addition to their regular circulation, a special currency of denominations of one, two and five dollars, and only one-fourth to be of the highest denomination, for the redemption of which, in addition to the responsibility of the banks, the State pledged its faith, and these notes were made fiat money to the extent of being receivable for all dues to the Commonwealth and to the banks. They were commonly known as "relief notes," and on their face specially declared their distinctive quality. A number of the banks which issued these notes failed during the decade in which the relief notes were in circulation, and in case of a bank failure when the regular notes of the bank were worthless the relief notes passed as currency because the State was responsible for their redemption.

As the banks were utterly hopeless there was every reason why they should comply with this demand of the State and the State made it to their interest to do so by allowing them simply to manufacture money and loan it to the Commonwealth. As these relief notes were furnished to the State by the banks, they received certificates of indebtedness on which they were paid 1 per cent. interest, but they also received release from tax on stock and dividends, thus making it a most profitable operation for the banks.

This extraordinary measure by which a loan of $3,100,000 was obtained for the State by simply manufacturing that amount of circulating notes through the medium of the banks saved the credit of Pennsylvania, and it was the only way by which the money could have been obtained. It was entirely without warrant

under the Constitution, and under all ordinary conditions would have been regarded as most reckless financial legislation, but it served the great purpose in view, and the repudiation feeling speedily died out, and even people who were most clamorous for repudiating the interest on the State debt were glad to learn that the honor of Pennsylvania had been preserved and without excessive taxation upon the people.

The money to pay the interest and other indebtedness of the State was really created out of nothing. The notes were printed, signed, made receivable for debts to the State and to the banks, and the faith of both the banks and the State was pledged for their ultimate redemption. Some of the unfinished public improvements were necessarily halted, but as soon as the financial condition improved they were speedily resumed, and the entire great network of canals was fully completed. The only additional source of revenue was an income tax provided for in the same bill taxing persons, trades and professions according to their revenues, and levying heavy taxes on merchants and other vendors, including liquor licenses. The same act appropriated $3,100,000 to various indebtedness of the State and started it with a clean sheet. The fearful peril of repudiation had perished before the heroic efforts of Governor Porter and a few brave men in both parties, and no one took pause to inquire to what extent the limitations of the fundamental law had been invaded. It was enough to know that Pennsylvania had escaped a blistering stain upon her escutcheon, and it is only just to say that, but for the courage, patriotism and fidelity of David R. Porter, Pennsylvania would have been a colossal suicide in 1841.

Contrast the position of the State of Pennsylvania in 1841 with her position to-day. The population is now double that of the entire United States when the Re-

public was founded, and her annual revenue and balance in the State treasury to-day nearly equal the entire debt of the State in 1841 that brought us to the very verge of repudiation. We now appropriate more for public schools alone than was ever expended in any one year under our great internal improvement system of the olden times, and ten times as much as the entire revenues of the State three-quarters of a century ago. All this is accomplished with taxation wholly removed from real estate for State purposes, and the entire debt that was once nearly $41,000,000 has been practically paid, the securities in the sinking fund being nearly sufficient to liquidate the last dollar of public debt. Such is the wonderful progress made in Pennsylvania since the cloud of repudiation was dispelled in 1841.

VI.

ADVENT OF THE WHIG PARTY.

Federalism and Anti-Masonry Having Perished, the Whig Party Had Its Birth in 1834 — Senator James L. Gillis of Ridgway Tried for the Murder of Morgan — First Whig National Convention Held at Harrisburg in 1839 — The Harrison Hard Cider and Log Cabin Contest — The First National Convention Ever Held Was by the Anti-Masons in 1830 — The First Whig Triumph in 1840.

THE epoch that was inaugurated in Pennsylvania by the revolution of 1838 extended even to the creation of a new party that was destined to play a very important part in the politics of both State and nation. The battle for Ritner in 1838 was the last that was made by the Anti-Masons in Pennsylvania. That party was an accidental creation to meet the necessity of an opposition political organization. Federalism was practically eliminated from the political struggles of the country, and the way was open to crystallize a very widely diffused sentiment then cherished against all secret societies, and especially the Masonic fraternity. Archbishop Hughes, the ablest Catholic prelate this country has produced, had done much to prepare the public mind in New York for aggressive hostility to secret organizations, and he turned the scale in favor of the election of William H. Seward as Governor in 1838, the same year that Ritner was defeated. The party had then existed for a full decade, and Ritner was the candidate for Governor in four contests in which it was the only organized opposition to Democracy.

The Anti-Masonic party would probably never have reached its formidable proportions but for the fact that in 1826, just when its organization had been effected,

William Morgan, a citizen of western New York, mysteriously disappeared, and a very plausible circumstantial story was given to the public by the Anti-Masonic leaders that he had been murdered by the Masons in northwestern New York for having divulged the secrets of the order. A body in such advanced stage of decomposition as to make positive recognition impossible, was found some time afterward and declared to be the body of Morgan, although the identity was vigorously disputed. It was told of Thurlow Weed, the Anti-Masonic leader of New York, that when the identity of the Morgan body was discussed with him by some of his political friends, he said: "Well, it's a good enough Morgan for our purposes."

Intense personal and political bitterness was engendered by the discussion of the alleged killing of Morgan. Finally several prominent Masons were indicted for murder, and among them was James L. Gillis, who afterward attained considerable prominence in Pennsylvania politics. After having served creditably as a soldier in the second war with England and retiring with promotion, he located at Ridgway, then in the northwest wilderness of Jefferson County, and became the agent of the large Ridgway estate in that section owned by a prominent Philadelphia family. He served twice in the house of representatives, one term in the senate, and later one term in Congress. I became well acquainted with him when he was a member of the senate, where he was a universal favorite, and I more than once heard him tell the story of his long journey through an almost unbroken wilderness from Ridgway to New York to stand his trial for murder. He did not wait to be summoned by requisition, but when informed of the indictment he voluntarily threaded his way through the forests, requiring nearly a week's

journey, to appear before a jury of his peers where he was promptly acquitted as were his associates.

He carved out the new county of Elk, made Ridgway, his home, the county seat, and was for a full generation altogether the most influential citizen of that region. He was a man of imposing presence, heroic in every fibre, sternly honest and most delightful in companionship. I have heard him say that it was not an uncommon thing in the very early days to stand in front of his home in Ridgway and see the panther cross the road almost within gunshot of his house.

As the banner of Anti-Masonry had summoned the opposition to Democracy after the death of Federalism, so the Whig banner summoned the opposition after the death of Anti-Masonry in 1838. The Whig party had a straggling organization, beginning in 1834, and its national leaders, known as National Republicans, including some of the ablest men of the Senate, who had a final breach with Jackson, adopted the party name of Whig. Anti-Masonic candidates were nominated for a year or two after 1838, but they received only a few hundred votes. In December, 1839, the Whigs held the first National convention at Harrisburg to name national candidates for the contest of 1840, when Harrison and Tyler were elected, and thenceforth the Whig party absorbed the entire opposition to the Democracy that had been baptized by Jackson.

The new party, like the Anti-Masonic party that preceded it, had a brief career, but in that time it elected two Governors in Pennsylvania and two Presidents of the United States. In 1841 Governor Porter was re-elected over John Banks, the Whig candidate, by a majority of 23,000, but soon after he had entered upon his second term he became estranged from a considerable portion of the leaders of his party, and when he

retired, in 1845, he was not in full political fellowship with his old-time friends.

The Democratic Legislature of 1842 passed a congressional apportionment on the basis of the new census returns, but Porter vetoed it ostensibly on the ground of injustice to the majority party of the State, although it was a Democratic measure, but in point of fact he was incensed at the deliberate shaping of the new congressional districts to make it impossible for two special friends of the Governor—John Snyder, of Union, and A. Porter Wilson, of Huntingdon—to be elected to Congress.

The Legislature adjourned without passing another apportionment bill, and the Whigs held elections in some of the congressional districts in the fall of '42 in which but few Democrats participated, and no one even claimed a seat on the returns of that year. In the session of 1843 a new district apportionment was passed in which Snyder and Wilson were given Democratic districts, but the irony of fate made the strange sequel of both of them having been twice nominated and twice defeated in the districts specially fashioned for them. A full congressional delegation was elected in October, 1843, in ample time for the members to take their seats at the opening of the new Congress in December.

The revolution in favor of popular power steadily advanced until in 1843 the canal commissioners were made elective, and William B. Foster, Jesse Miller and James Clark were elected by about 15,000 majority. Foster's nomination and election was a thorn in the side of the men who had charge of our main line and other public improvements. The management of these works had become grossly corrupted, and especially on the portage road crossing the Alleghenies, where, as was proven on one occasion, it was at times common for a contractor furnishing wood for locomotives and engines

to take the same wood from station to station, and have it ranked, measured and paid for half a dozen times.

Foster was a man of great ability, but extremely quiet and unassuming in manner, and the men on our public works had very little conception of his character until he became the head of the canal board, as he was nominated and elected for the term of three years, with Miller for two years and Clark for one.

He had a desperate undertaking, as the State railroads and canals extended to almost every section of the State, and his two associates on the canal board were not at all inclined to revolutionary reform in what was deemed political interests of the State. He made no issue with any of his associates, but quietly and earnestly strove to inaugurate better administration in which he was measurably successful.

In 1846, when his successor was to be chosen, the leaders did not dare depose him, although many of the more audacious canal plunderers made a desperate battle for the nomination of Thomas J. Power, of Beaver, who was, however, defeated by a large vote. When the Whig convention met, there were several candidates named for the position, as it was believed that the Democrats would not give a hearty support to Foster, and it was finally deemed expedient to nominate James Power, brother of the defeated Democratic candidate, as the man who could command the dissatisfied Democratic vote which supported the brother of the Whig candidate.

The result was the defeat of Foster and the election of Power by a majority of about 9,000, and the new Whig canal commissioner united with one of his Democratic associates to give the patronage of the canal board almost wholly to the Democrats who had opposed Foster's nomination and election.

Mr. Foster's public services were so highly appreciated

by the best men of the State that he was, soon after his defeat for canal commissioner, called to the important position of first assistant engineer and later and then only vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, that had been chartered the same year that Foster had suffered his defeat. He rendered very great service to the struggling Pennsylvania corporation, but died a few years after he had assumed his new position. He was not in any sense a politician, had no taste for political management, and was resolutely averse to corruption either in politics or public trust, and his early death was profoundly lamented.

The political conditions of Pennsylvania were in a transition state when the reform Constitution of 1838 was adopted. The Anti-Masons had made their last rally for the re-election of Ritner, and they had the co-operation of a considerable number of Whigs who were unwilling to accept the organization and faith of the Anti-Masons. Among these were some high-class Masons of whom the late Joseph R. Chandler, one of the prominent Whig editors of the country, was recognized as the leader. A number of them published an address over their own signatures disavowing the Anti-Masonic features of the opposition to Democracy, and giving their reasons why they supported Ritner in preference to the Democratic candidate. In the national contest of 1836 Van Buren defeated Harrison in Pennsylvania by the small majority of 4,364, and Porter's majority over Ritner was only a thousand greater.

The reform Constitution was adopted by the slender majority of 1,212, out of a poll of 225,000, and the majorities given in the different counties indicated an utter disregard of partisan sentiment in voting for and against the measure. Adams County gave 300 votes for it and 4,420 against it; Armstrong gave 2,597 for it and 949 against it; Bradford gave 4,116 for it and

188 against it; Butler gave 2,383 for it, with 712 in the negative; Crawford gave 3,344 for it to 517 against it; Erie gave 3,175 for it, with 454 against it; Greene gave 2,399 for it and 74 against it; Lancaster gave 2,355 for it and 10,059 against it; Lebanon gave 807 for it and 2,503 against it; Somerset gave 556 for it and 2,029 against it; Susquehanna gave 2,085 for it to 412 against it, and Tioga gave 1,974 for it and 16 against it, while Union gave 452 for it to 3,185 against it, and York gave 1,233 for it and 5,500 against it. It will be seen that some of the strongest Anti-Masonic counties along with some of the strongest Democratic counties voted largely against the new Constitution.

The vital feature of the reform Constitution of 1838 was the resumption of power by the people in taking from the Executive nearly all his patronage, and making most offices elective. It was not a clean sweep, as it left associate judges, district attorneys and the important offices of auditor general and surveyor general to be appointed by the Executive, but the start made by the new fundamental law rapidly extended popular power until finally every office in the State, excepting the Governor's cabinet and some inspectors, who could not be made to represent any particular constituency, were made elective, including the judges themselves in 1851.

The new Whig party rapidly gathered into its fold all the elements of opposition to the Democracy, and the severe financial and industrial depression that began in 1837 and continued for four years, rapidly increased its numbers. In 1839 there was universal confidence among the leaders of the opposition to President Van Buren that he could be defeated in 1840 if the opposing elements could be united, and it was obvious to all that that union could be effected only under the Whig organization.

Pennsylvania was regarded as the battleground, and the Whigs, under the lead of such men as Josiah Randall, Joseph R. Chandler, Morton McMichael and others, and the Anti-Masons, under the lead of Stevens, Penrose and Burrowes, made earnest efforts to consolidate the opposition elements, and they succeeded in getting the Whig leaders of the country to unite in a call for a Whig National convention to be held at Harrisburg in December, 1839, nearly a full year before the Presidential election.

It was the first fully representative national political convention that had ever been held. The Anti-Masons held the first national convention in Philadelphia in 1830, two years before the Presidential election, but adjourned to meet later in Baltimore, when they nominated William Wirt for President and Amos Ellmaker for Vice-President. The Democrats followed in 1835, when they nominated Van Buren in the first Democratic National convention in Baltimore on the 20th of May, being a year and a half before the election, but the convention system was accepted with great reluctance by the Democrats, and while there were 600 delegates in attendance, more than half of them were from Maryland alone.

The meeting of the Whig National convention in this State in 1839 made Pennsylvania the central figure of the great political revolution that was about to be wrought. The greatest deliberation was displayed in selecting a candidate. The individal preference of a majority of the delegates was for Henry Clay, then the acknowledged leader of the opposition, but he was a Royal Arch Mason and that made him an impossible candidate, as a very large portion of the opposition elements was made up of men who had been desperately fighting Masonry for a full decade.

Harrison had been both a soldier and Senator, hero

and statesman, and Stevens, who was one of the active factors of the convention, won out in the nomination of Harrison, only to be denied a promised seat in the cabinet after Harrison became President. The battle in Pennsylvania was a roystering rollicking affair on the part of the Whigs with the Democrats on the defensive at every point, and Harrison carried the State by a majority of 349, as was ascertained some three weeks after the election.

The very small majority by which Harrison won in Pennsylvania clearly indicated that while the State was not for Van Buren it could not be classed as a Whig State, as was demonstrated by Democratic success over the Whigs in every contest during the existence of the Whig party, with the exception of 1846 and 1848, when Democratic divisions gave the Whigs the victory.

VII.

ASA PACKER AND DAVID THOMAS.

Thomas, a Welsh Miner, Settled in the Lehigh Region and the First Man to Manufacture Anthracite Iron — His Great Lead in the Iron Development of Pennsylvania — Known and Revered as "Pap" Thomas until he Died at the Age of Eighty-eight — Packer Developed the Transportation System of the Lehigh Valley — A Journeyman Carpenter, he Became the most Successful and Richest of our Railway Presidents in his Day — Packer's Gubernatorial Contest of 1869 — His Defeat by a Small Majority, and by his Friends it was Charged to Fraud.

FROM 1840 to 1844 there was nothing specially eventful in the political records of Pennsylvania. Porter's re-election in 1841 by a very large majority established the ascendancy of the Democrats of the State, and the Whigs made no vital effort to win until 1844, when they followed the tall plume of Henry Clay with a devotion entirely unexampled in the history of American politics, and thousands of them shed scalding tears over his defeat, but a new industrial era was suddenly developed by the successful manufacture of iron with anthracite coal.

There had been a great struggle to introduce anthracite coal for domestic purposes, but most of those who first attempted it abandoned it in despair. The prejudices against it gradually disappeared as the people came to understand how to use it to obtain the best results, and when it was finally demonstrated, after many unsuccessful experiments, that iron could be made with hard coal the Lehigh region received a wonderful impetus, and speedily developed the countless millions of wealth which have been poured out of that section during the last half century.

This development was largely due to two men, one of whom mastered the production of anthracite iron and the other mastered the question of the wealth of the Lehigh reaching the markets of the country. These men were David Thomas and Asa Packer.

David Thomas, for many years known in the Lehigh region only as "Pap" Thomas, was born in Wales, November 3, 1794, and died in Catasauqua at the ripe age of 88 years, with his home surrounded by matchless monuments of his genius in the great iron establishments of the Crane and Catasauqua corporations.

It was my fortune to be his guest in 1860, when I was in charge of the Lincoln campaign in Pennsylvania, and spent a most delightful and instructive night with him. He was then approaching the patriarchal age, and was actively engaged in the direction of his great enterprises. He was a man of fine presence, with his unusual natural forces polished and ripened by study and experience rather than by education in the schools, and he was so unassuming and modest in all things relating to himself that it was somewhat difficult to get from him the inner story of his life.

He was then the most widely known and certainly one of the most beloved of all the men in the Lehigh region, and his home was a sanctuary of generous hospitality.

He had experience in Wales in his early life as a miner and as a worker in iron establishments. He emigrated to this country in 1839, when just in the full vigor of middle life, and located in the heart of the iron region of the Lehigh Valley. He gave exhaustive study to everything relating to the manufacture of iron, and he soon became satisfied that anthracite coal could be successfully employed for the manufacture of iron. When it became known in the Lehigh region that he was experimenting with a view to manufacturing

anthracite iron as a commercial enterprise, he was roundly ridiculed by all his neighbors. He told me that he had many discussions on the subject with his family physician, who was one of the most intelligent men of the neighborhood, and he made exhaustive efforts to induce Mr. Thomas to abandon what the doctor regarded as an utterly unpromising phantom.

Just before Mr. Thomas had completed his experimental works which succeeded in establishing the feasibility of producing anthracite iron as a commercial success, he expressed to his doctor his entire confidence in the theory, to which the doctor curtly answered: "I will obligate myself to eat all the iron you make with anthracite coal."

When he had thoroughly mastered the method of producing anthracite iron, and it became understood that it would be manufactured with much greater profit than charcoal iron, he was able to command any amount of capital he needed, and began by building the furnaces which developed into the great Lehigh Crane Iron Company. He conducted these furnaces for nearly a decade when he withdrew from the Crane Company, and with the several sons who had grown up, and a few other friends, he organized the Thomas Iron Company, that for many years was known as not only the largest but the most successful of the iron establishments in Pennsylvania.

In addition to the Thomas Company, which he largely owned, he became connected with the Catasauqua Manufacturing Company, and established one of the largest rolling mills in the State. He proved himself altogether the most capable iron man in the country, and his furnaces and mills were regarded by all as models in method and management. It was his genius that added the powerful blowing engine to the working of blast furnaces which added immensely to their

producing capacity and the reduction of the cost of iron.

He was a very close observer of iron interests in every part of the country and of the world, and his judgment was next to infallible when he had studied any problem relating to that great industry and reached his conclusion. A few years before his death he saw that the iron interests of Pennsylvania must at no very distant day meet with very dangerous competition from the iron centers of the South. He and Asa Packer visited Birmingham and other iron centers in Alabama when the iron business there was in its infancy, and he was so fully convinced of the probability of the cheaper production of iron in Alabama that he invested in iron lands, not with a view of developing them himself, for he had then passed the period of active business life, but because he believed that his sons and other successors would eventually turn to the sunny South as the most promising of the iron fields of the country.

He was not mistaken in his judgment, for to-day Birmingham produces iron cheaper than it can be produced any place in this country or in any other country of the world, and the great iron establishments which stood as the crowning monuments to Mr. Thomas' genius at the time of his death have passed their season of prosperity and are no longer pointed to as among the most successful iron enterprises of the New World. He died at his home in Catasauqua on the 20th of June, 1882, and was more widely lamented than any other citizen of the Lehigh Valley.

Asa Packer was born at Croton, Conn., December 29, 1806, and received only the very ordinary rural school education of that time. When sixteen years of age he journeyed westward to Susquehanna County, many of whose residents were from "the land of steady

habits," and his entire worldly possessions were tied up in a bandanna handkerchief.

He first apprenticed himself to learn the carpenter's trade, but he was a close and intelligent observer, tireless in industry, and he was among the first to appreciate the possibilities in developing the wealth of the iron and coal of that region. In 1832 he settled at Mauch Chunk, and soon became interested in the development of coal lands, and that necessarily led to the development of means for getting the coal to market. Early in the fifties he conceived the scheme of constructing the Lehigh Valley Railroad, and he devoted many years of the most exhaustive labor, and often under the severest possible strain, to consummate that great enterprise.

I remember meeting him many times at the Merchants' Hotel, Philadelphia, after the financial revulsion of 1857, when he was harassed almost beyond endurance by the difficulties he encountered in maintaining the credit to prosecute his pet enterprises.

Few men could have maintained the contest as he did under the severest discouragements, but he was resolute in purpose, and I heard him even in the darkest days of his financial troubles predict that the Lehigh Valley Railroad, when completed, and its resources under fair development, would be the most successful railroad enterprise in the State, and he lived to see the fulfilment of even his wildest dreams. For fully a quarter of a century the Lehigh Valley Railroad stood first among all the railroads of this State in point of credit. It was regarded as the one railroad enterprise that must ever maintain a high measure of prosperity.

I met Mr. Packer frequently before I became a resident of Philadelphia, and thereafter I spent many evenings with him at his home on Spruce Street, above Ninth. He was a man of excellent presence, with a

finely chiseled face that was almost a stranger to visible emotion, and he was severely quiet and unassuming in conversation. He and his devoted wife, who had married the carpenter of the Lehigh Valley, never changed their simple tastes when they had millions to expend for luxuries. She continued to the end of her days to knit her stockings, to fashion many of her own garments, and it was with great difficulty that she could be persuaded to ride in her own carriage. They both loved the quiet of their home and were sternly severe to ostentatious display.

He had been somewhat in politics, but it was not to his taste. Political honors were thrust upon him rather than sought by him. He served in the Legislature, was twice elected to Congress, and in 1868 had the unanimous vote of Pennsylvania for the Democratic nomination for President. In 1869, without seeking or desiring it, he was nominated as the Democratic candidate for Governor against Governor Geary, then a candidate for re-election. Philadelphia elections were then run quite as recklessly as they are now, and a vigorous and powerful Democratic organization was maintained with variations in ballot corrupting methods quite equal to those of the Republicans.

The majority returned for Geary over Packer in the State was 4,596, and more than that majority had been given to Geary in Philadelphia. Packer's friends believed, and they certainly had plausible grounds for the belief, that their candidate had carried a majority in the city of Philadelphia. Geary was at variance with a considerable element of his own party. A sensational contest in which Mr. Diamond, the Democratic candidate for senator, contested the seat of Mr. Watts, who was returned as elected, exhibited the most flagrant frauds by changing returns even after they had been computed and certified, but the partisan majority

Asa Packer

of the senate sustained the candidate in political sympathy with it, and the Legislature being largely Republican, a contest by Packer for the gubernatorial chair was regarded as utterly hopeless.

It was a common thing in those days for leading Republican politicians of both parties to gather at the Girard House, and Room No. 42, one of the largest in the house, was a political rendezvous almost every day, and especially on Sunday. I was a frequent visitor at these meetings of Republican leaders, and had very pleasant personal relations with most of them, although not regarded as soundly in sympathy with their methods.

On the Sunday after the first week of the new Legislature that had organized and received the Governor's message I happened to stop in at the Girard House to see many members of the Legislature from different parts of the State who were there, and finally called at No. 42, where I found ex-Treasurer Kemble and State Treasurer Mackey, with John L. Hill and Sheriff Elliott. The table was covered with papers on which there had been elaborate figuring, and I inquired what it meant. Kemble, who was vastly more frank than discreet, blurted right out that Geary in his message had insisted upon taking the $3,000,000 or $4,000,000 of surplus in the Treasury and appropriating it to the public debt, which would have made the office of treasurer valueless, reduced Mackey to the starvation point, and deprived Kemble and his bank of large profits.

Kemble said that "Geary didn't know any better and supposed that he was really elected Governor, when in point of fact he wasn't, and we have just been figuring over the Philadelphia situation to ascertain whether the abundant facts we have could defeat him in a contest without sending a lot of our own people to the penitentiary."

The flood-gate had been opened by Kemble and all of them expressed themselves as most desirous of putting Geary out. They knew how he had been elected, and they assumed that he had given them a very poor return for the risks they had taken to secure his success. It was finally decided that the developments of the contest would be quite as dangerous to them and their friends as to Geary, and it was abandoned.

I have no personal knowledge of the facts as to the election of that year, but I simply state that the men who were there in consultation all declared, and I do not doubt believed, that Packer was elected Governor of the State.

Packer was a man of unflagging energy. He had no taste for society; indeed all formal social duties were extremely irksome to him. His greatest pleasure was to have three friends join him in the evening at his Philadelphia residence, play euchre until about half past ten, and then join him in a drink of good old rye and adjourn. I frequently tarried with him at his own request after others had gone, and heard him talk when his heart was on his sleeve. He then regarded himself as worth about $14,000,000 and I never knew a man to agonize as he did about the peril of large fortune to a family. He feared that his many millions would unfit his children for usefulness and true enjoyment of life, and it was this apprehension that made him entail his entire estate at the death of his children without issue to the Lehigh University.

After his death his two sons were not long in following him across the dark river, and both died childless. One daughter had married an estimable gentleman, and specific bequests were made to her and her children, leaving them without interest in the residuary estate, and the other daughter, married some years after his

death, is also childless and is now well advanced in years, so that the last of the Packer estate must soon at the latest revert to his favorite university.

Fortunately Packer passed away before financial reverses overtook his great railroad organization, and it is now, like the great iron monuments erected by "Pap" Thomas to which he pointed with such pride until the day of his death, one of the broken reeds of our great network of railroads. He died in Philadelphia on the 17th of May, 1879. He and Thomas lived to see as the fruits of their efforts the wonderful transformation in the Lehigh region that poured its matchless wealth into the marts of commerce and trade, and both joined the great majority beyond before the shadows of misfortune had clouded their great life's work.

VIII.

THE POLK-CLAY CONTEST OF 1844.

Democrats Rejected Van Buren After a Long Struggle—Nominated the First Dark Horse for the Presidency in James K. Polk—Clay Nominated Unanimously by a Convention and Party That Idolized Him—Pennsylvania Was the Pivotal State—The Death of Muhlenberg, the Democratic Candidate for Governor, United the Democratic Factions on Shunk and Defeated Markle, the Whig Candidate, by a Small Majority—The Birth of the Native American Movements—Lewis C. Levin and His Career.

THE Presidential contest of 1844 is memorable with the great mass of intelligent American people as the struggle in which Henry Clay, the most brilliant of all the great men of his day, and certainly the most beloved of any popular leader in the history of American politics, was defeated by James K. Polk; but its chief importance in shaping the destiny of political parties, and of the Republic as well, is not well understood. The nomination of Polk is generally regarded as an accident, as he was the first "dark horse" who succeeded in obtaining a Presidential nomination, but his selection was in no degree accidental, as it was most deliberately planned, in which the Virginia Democratic leaders, then the ablest of the South, were important factors. Nor was the nomination of Polk conceived and executed simply to defeat Van Buren or any other candidate, or to advance any personal favorite. It was carefully planned to inaugurate a new but unavowed policy of the Democratic party to nationalize the issue of slavery extension.

Van Buren had been defeated in 1840 by a large majority, but the general conviction of the Democratic

David Thomas

people regarded him as entitled to be made the candidate in 1844 to retrieve the disaster he suffered in the tidal wave of business and industrial despondency of 1840. There were many who regarded him as unavailable, but the majority of his Democratic supporters looked upon his election as reasonably certain if again made the candidate of the party. The opposition to his renomination was not, as a rule, openly declared. There were murmurs here and there against Van Buren. but the important work that accomplished this overthrow was subtle, searching and earnestly directed.

The advocates of slavery extension saw that the time had come when they must strengthen themselves by some very important advancement in their cause, or finally surrender the contest for the maintenance of the institution; and their purpose, as very carefully considered and decided upon, was to force the annexation of Texas, a slave republic, with the right of division into four additional States, and to follow that by the acquisition of additional slave territory from Mexico.

The year 1844 and its Presidential battle, therefore, inaugurated the policy of nationalizing slavery extension, and it thereby dated the decline and fall of the Democratic party that had ruled the nation, practically without interruption, since the triumph of Jefferson in 1800.

Van Buren was not in sympathy with this policy and a short time before the meeting of the National convention he published a letter declaring distinctly against the annexation of Texas. He was one of the shrewdest political leaders and he saw that if the annexation policy ruled the National convention he must not only be defeated, but he must be retired as a leading factor in the national Democracy. The convention had a clear majority of delegates pledged or instructed for Van

Buren, but the real test of Van Buren's strength in the convention was on the question of adopting the two-thirds rule, which was carried by 148 to 118. Every supporter of Van Buren knew that while he had a majority of the delegates he could not under any circumstances command a two-thirds vote, and every vote cast for the adoption of the two-thirds rule by a professed friend of Van Buren was simply a deliberate stab at his own candidate.

On the first ballot Van Buren received 146 votes to 120 for all others, and Polk did not receive a single vote until the eighth ballot, when Virginia, the "Mother of Presidents," pointed the way to the dark horse, and he received 44 votes, with Van Buren dropping to 104. On the ninth ballot Polk received the entire vote of the convention with the exception of 2 for Van Buren and 29 for Cass.

While the great mass of the Democratic people did not understand the real purpose of Polk's nomination, Van Buren was in no measure deceived, and he and his friends hesitated long before they finally agreed to give their support to Polk under satisfactory conditions relating to their recognition by the party. Polk openly declared for the annexation of Texas, and Clay, knowing that the annexation cause was very strong in the South, declared against the immediate annexation of Texas without the consent of Mexico, as otherwise it would inevitably involve us in war. There were thus two great issues involved in the Polk-Clay contest of 1844—first, the issue of protection to our industries by maintaining the tariff of 1842, or a return to a revenue tariff, and, second, the nationalization of the policy of slavery extension.

Pennsylvania was the arbiter in the great trial of 1844 and decided in favor of nationalizing a slave extension policy and going back to a revenue tariff.

On the final result the transfer of the electoral vote of Pennsylvania from Polk to Clay left Polk a small majority in the Electoral College, but the October contest for Governor in this State was as decisive in determining the defeat of Clay as was the battle of Gettysburg in deciding the fate of the Confederacy, and all parties well understood that the vote of Pennsylvania in October would unerringly indicate the successful candidate for President. Pennsylvania was the keystone of the Federal arch and no President had ever been chosen by the Electoral College against the vote of Pennsylvaina. Adams had been elected by the House when Pennsylvania gave Jackson a large majority, but no President was ever chosen in the Electoral College against the vote of Pennsylvania until the triumph of Cleveland in 1884. New York was an equally important State, but did not choose State officers until November, so that it was not a fingerboard for the final judgment on the Presidency.

The leaders of both sides realized the vital importance oı the contest in this State, and I well remember how earnestly and desperately it was contested. I was a boy not more than half way through the teens, but I was living in the political center of the mountain forests of my native county, and cherished a devotion for Clay that has never been repeated in all the many political struggles I have seen. The supporters of Clay as a rule literally worshiped him. He was their idol, their political deity, and they believed him to be the noblest, the grandest, the ablest and the most chivalrous of men, while his opponents met him with a tempest of defamation, publicly charging him on the hustings and through every newspaper opposed to him as a gambler, a libertine, a horse racer, a Sabbath breaker and a murderer. The Whigs responded by

charging Polk with disgraceful littleness, studied hypocrisy and the offspring of a traitor.

In no national contest before or since did the people so nearly universally participate in the work of the campaign. The Whigs and Democrats of every community were ready to respond to the drum-beat that called them to assemble, and no man's defeat in the entire history of American politics brought anything approaching the agonizing sorrow that was felt by the friends of Clay when Polk's election was finally accepted.

The Democrats were not in a fortunate position to strengthen themselves for a State contest for Governor. Muhlenberg, who had run as a bolting candidate against Wolf in 1835, and thus elected Ritner, was very strong in the State, and there was a desperate struggle between his friends and the friends of Francis R. Shunk for the nomination, but Muhlenberg finally triumphed, leaving a very wide feeling of unrest and distrust throughout the party. Only nine years before he had defeated the regular Democratic candidate for Governor by running against him, and that certainly would have weakened him to an extent far beyond the small majority that was finally given to Shunk. In the very heat of the campaign the sudden death of Muhlenberg was announced, and it relieved the Democrats of the chief peril that confronted them, as Shunk was then nominated by a practically unanimous vote, and with his clean political record and high personal character there was no reason why the Democrats should not support him.

The Whigs chose General Markle as their leader, a gallant soldier of the War of 1812, and a man who commanded the enthusiastic support of his party. He was not a politician, but was all the stronger because he was called from his farm in Westmoreland to lead the Whigs in their greatest conflict. There have been many

intense and earnest political struggles both before and since 1844, but there was no contest in which the whole people of the State were so directly face to face and man to man as they were in the struggle for the election of Shunk or Markle as Governor, but Shunk was elected by a majority of 4,397, and that was decisive against the success of Clay.

Hopeless as the battle was, the Whigs followed their great leader through a struggle of another month, but Polk carried the State in November by 6,332. Had Pennsylvania elected Markle in October it would have assured the success of Clay in Pennsylvania by an increased majority, and Polk's small November majority of 5,106 in New York would undoubtedly have been reversed in favor of Clay.

The contest of 1844 developed an entirely new political factor in Pennsylvania, although it was confined almost entirely to the city of Philadelphia, and it was not felt as an organized body in the contest for Governor or President. A brilliant adventurer named Lewis C. Levin, a native of Charleston, S. C., and a peripatetic law practitioner, first in South Carolina, next in Maryland, next in Louisiana, next in Kentucky and finally in Pennsylvania, was the acknowledged leader of the Native American element that had erupted during the summer of 1844 in what is remembered as the disgraceful riots of that year in which Catholic churches and institutions were burnt by the mob. He, with other less able and conspicuous associates, led the Native Americans to their bloody and destructive demonstrations, and he became their candidate for Congress against Thomas B. Florence, the old war-horse of the wharf section of the city.

He was one of the most brilliant and unscrupulous orators I have ever heard. He presented a fine appearance, graceful in every action, charming in rhetoric

and utterly reckless in assertion. I have heard him both as a temperance and political orator, and I doubt whether during his day any person in either party of the State surpassed him on the hustings. He was elected by a good majority and was re-elected in 1846 and '48, thus serving six consecutive years as a representative from the city.

After his third election the leaders were unable to hold the majority in Levin's district, but they had become a compact political organization in the city and for some years thereafter they held the balance of power, and by combination with the Whigs gained a number of important local victories. Colonel Wallace, editor of the "Sun," the Native American organ of the city, one of the most genial and delightful men I have ever met and one who justly deserved the appellation of the "handsome editor" that was generally accorded to him, was a very important leader of the Native organization, and when the Whigs came into power by the election of Taylor in 1848 he was rewarded with a comfortable and well-paying position in the Custom House.

It was through this organization that William B. Reed, one of the most accomplished men and one of the ablest members of the bar of Philadelphia, attained his political mastery. He was the accepted leader of the Whig party and he was absolutely autocratic in his leadership when he once defined his plans and purposes. He was twice elected district attorney by a combination with the Natives that he most adroitly managed.

It was this Native element that gave the Whigs practically the control of the Legislature in 1849, when James Cooper was elected United States Senator, and it was this remnant of the once powerful Native organization that placed the late Judge Allison on the

bench. The Whigs kept in such close relations with the Native Americans that they nearly always fused on local tickets. In 1851, when the judges were first elected, it was arranged that the Democrats, the Whigs and the Natives should each name a candidate for the common pleas court and that they should be supported as an independent judicial ticket. The Whigs named Thompson, the Democrats named Kelly, both then on the bench, and the Natives named Allison, who was then a young lawyer in the Northern Liberties district, and a leader of the Native element. He was accepted with much reluctance, but as the Natives were resolute in adhering to him he was finally accepted, although with grave apprehensions as to his fitness for the position.

The Independent ticket was elected and Allison continued on the bench until his death, and no one of his associates during his judicial term of service was more widely or sincerely respected by the bar and the public. This Native organization was maintained, although steadily depleting in numbers, until it was galvanized into new life and huge proportions by the advent of the Know Nothings in 1854.

IX.

CAMERON ELECTED SENATOR.

Buchanan Appointed Secretary of State in 1845 and Cameron Elected to Succeed Him for Four Years in the Senate — By a Combination of Protection or Cameron Democrats with the Whigs Cameron Defeated Woodward, the Democratic Candidate — Cameron's Ability as a Political Strategist — Cameron as a Democratic Senator — A Thorn in the Side of the Buchanan Administration — He Rejects Judge Woodward for Judge of the Supreme Court.

THE election of Polk in 1844 brought Simon Cameron to the surface as one of the political leaders of the State. He gave lukewarm support to Polk, although all his affiliations had been Democratic. Rising from his printer's case in his native county of Lancaster, he had attained prominence as a newspaper publisher in Doylestown and Harrisburg, had been appointed to the office of adjutant general by Governor Schultz, and his shrewd and broad business instincts had given him wealth, and made him practical manager and chief proprietor of the Middletown Bank. He had large iron interests for that day, and his reluctance in the support of Polk was because of his apprehension that the protective tariff of 1842 would be overthrown by the success of the Democratic candidate. He was naturally anti-slavery, and thus, on the two great questions which were at issue in the struggle, Cameron was not in hearty accord with his party, although he made no ostentatious proclamation of his faith. He was the recognized leader of a faction within the Democratic party that usually managed to control the canal board and the political plunder of the State,

and his political methods were generally regarded as offensive by the Whigs, and made him distrusted by a large portion of his Democratic associates.

Senator Buchanan was called to the cabinet of Polk as premier of the new administration, and his resignation from the Senate left a vacancy for an unexpired term of four years to be filled by the Legislature. The Democrats had a moderate majority in both the senate and house, and it was not doubted that any candidate upon whom the Democratic caucus united would be chosen. The Democratic party of that day had a very able and generally respected leadership, and its high places went to the soaring eagles rather than to the mousing owls, as has since been many times common in Democratic management of both city and State. There were a number of prominent candidates for the senatorship to succeed the ablest representative of the party, as Buchanan was then acknowledged, and the leaders naturally sought for the man who would stand abreast with the great men of the first legislative tribunal of the nation.

This purpose, and this alone, led to the nomination of George W. Woodward. He was then only thirty-four years of age and entirely untrained in political management. He would not have known how to conduct a campaign to elevate himself to the Senate, but the Democratic leaders did not err in choosing him as the man who could most nearly maintain the high honors won for the State by Senator Buchanan. He was a man of most commanding presence; six feet three in height, with a face of unusual beauty and strength, superb physical proportions throughout, and all the graces of a cultured gentleman. No man in the State had a cleaner record. He was born at Bethany, Pa., March 26, 1809, and after receiving an academic education studied law, and was admitted

to the bar in Wilkes-Barre, where he practised until 1841, when he was appointed judge of the Centre judicial district.

He had also been a member of the constitutional convention of 1837–8, where he had distinguished himself as an able disputant and an intelligent counselor, and when he was nominated for Senator to succeed Buchanan, his friends in the Legislature and throughout the State pointed to him with pride as the future leader of the Pennsylvania Democracy.

When the nomination was made for Senator there did not seem to be a ripple on the political surface, and his election was regarded as absolutely certain, but Cameron saw his opportunity and he alone shrewdly understood it. He and tne Democrats in sympathy with him, wielding the political power of the canal board, were tireless and adroit in controlling the local Democratic nominations where it was possible to do so without unfurling their factional flag, and every Legislature of those days contained a number of senators and representatives who were in more or less open accord with Cameron and his associates. He had more than enough in the Legislature of '45 to hold the balance of power between the Democrats and the Whigs, and he conceived and successfully executed the plan of uniting the Cameron Democrats and the Whigs to elect himself to the Senate.

When it was first proposed by Cameron and his friends it was regarded as an utterly hopeless movement, as the Whigs as a party were specially at war with the more profligate element of the Democracy of which Cameron was the confessed leader. The Democratic leaders were entirely in the dark as to the number of Democrats Cameron could control, as his ablest and most effective lieutenants in the Legislature rarely uncovered their devotion to Cameron

to avoid losing prestige with the regular organization. When Cameron's strength was finally mustered for roll call it appalled the Democratic managers. It was an absolute necessity to have more than enough Democrats openly in line for Cameron to enable him to negotiate with the Whigs, and it soon became evident to all that he had the Democrats sufficiently divided to secure his own election if he could command the entire Whig vote.

At first the Whigs seemed quite unpromising, as they were rather less in sympathy with the Cameron element of the Democracy than with the regular Democratic organization, but they were environed by peculiar conditions and pressing necessities, and a formidable element in the Whig party was soon crystallized to advocate the election of Cameron. Personal considerations and prejudices were largely dwarfed by the peculiar and vital issues which confronted them. The national campaign of 1844 in Pennsylvania was conducted by the Democrats on the theory that the protective tariff of 1842 would not be disturbed. A very shrewdly framed letter was obtained from Mr. Polk, the Democratic candidate for President, addressed to Judge Kane, of Philadelphia, from which it was entirely plausible to assume that the protective policy would not be overthrown. There was no positive declaration on the subject, but its important statement was in the single sentence that declared in favor of a permanent tariff policy to give stability to the business and industrial interests of the country.

This was claimed by the supporters of the tariff of 1842 as a specific assurance that Polk, if elected President, would not change the tariff policy of the country. Of course, many of the leaders knew better, but they also knew that if the people of Pennsylvania

believed that the defeat of Clay would overthrow the tariff of 1842, Polk could not carry the State. The Democrats marched in procession in many sections of Pennsylvania under banners inscribed with "Polk, Dallas, Shunk and the tariff of 1842," and Judge Myers, of Clarion, one of the prominent Democrats of that portion of the State, and a large ironmaster, had a flag floating from his works bearing the inscription just quoted. After the repeal of the protective tariff and the substitution of the revenue tariff of 1846, Judge Myers resented the betrayal, ran successfully as an Independent Democrat against the regular Democratic candidate for senator, and thereafter acted with the Whig party that made him its candidate for surveyor general in 1853.

Two months had elapsed between the Presidential election and the election of a United States Senator at Harrisburg. In that period the Democratic leaders of the country generally, and even in Pennsylvania, had unmasked on the tariff question, and a revenue tariff was the accepted and proclaimed policy of the party. This condition produced great alarm among the Whigs of the State, as well as among the protection Democrats, and they felt that it was their paramount duty to prevent the repeal of the tariff of 1842. Judge Woodward was too honest to mislead his party on the subject. He was heartily in accord with the proclaimed purpose of the Democratic national leaders to overthrow the protective system, while Cameron was undoubtedly sincere in his devotion to protection, as probably his largest interests were at that time in the manufacture of iron.

On what the Whigs regarded as the most vital issue involved in the election of Senator, Cameron was undoubtedly in sympathy with them, and could be trusted to maintain his individual interests which

Simon Cameron

were in harmony with the general interests of the State. The Whigs believed the slavery question was not so vital, although there was much apprehension felt by them at the assured annexation of Texas, as the proposition was pending in Congress. By the terms of the Texas annexation measure that State was given the absolute right to be divided into four new States, making ten new Southern Senators to promote the interests of slavery and to oppose the interests of free industries. The bill had not yet passed Congress, but it was finally successful in both branches, and it was approved by President Tyler two days before he retired from the Presidency.

Cameron was open in his professions of hostility to slavery extension, and I doubt not that he was sincere, as his subsequent career proved. Thus on the two questions which were regarded as the supreme issues involved in the selection of a Senator, Cameron was regarded as very heartily and aggressively in accord with the Whigs in favor of a protective policy and sentimentally, at least, in harmony with them in opposition to the extension of the slave power. The Whigs were smarting under the defeat of Clay, the most idolized leader of American history. They were entirely united in the belief that the State had been wrested from them and from Clay by a deliberately conceived and executed fraud on the tariff question and they were quite ready to avenge their wrongs in any way that promised success. Thus, while the Whigs at first blush resented Cameron's candidacy, they finally saw that it was the only opportunity presented to them to save the policy of protection, and all but a dozen or so were speedily enlisted in the Cameron combination, but the dissenting dozen or so were obstinate and some of them apparently implacable.

One of the notable features of the contest was that the Harrisburg ministers were generally in favor of Cameron, as he was a liberal supporter of churches, regardless of creeds, and some of them were very actively enlisted in his cause. Men from different sections of the State were sent for by express messengers and hurried to the capital to remove the prejudices of those who stood out against the combination, and finally all were gathered in with the exception of Jasper E. Brady, of Franklin, an old Scotch-Irish Whig, who was defiant in his hostility to Cameron's political methods. Presbyterian ministers were summoned to beset him and finally with tears streaming down his cheeks he yielded his own views to the demand of the united Whigs of the Legislature. The result was Cameron's election to the Senate by a clear majority on the first ballot, and thus came into public life in Pennsylvania a man whose career is entirely unexampled in the history of the Commonwealth. From the time he became a United States Senator in 1845 until his death, nearly half a century later, there is not an important complete chapter of political history in the State that can be written with the omission of his defeats or triumphs, and even after his death until the present time no important chapter of political history can be fully written without recognizing his successors and assigns in politics as leading or controlling factors.

Cameron entered the Senate on the 4th of March, 1845, with an unfriendly environment. President Polk and Secretary of State Buchanan were both greatly disappointed and discomfited by his election, and neither the Whigs nor the Democrats of the body could accept him in full fellowship, but he proved to be a most valuable friend and most dangerous enemy. At an early period of his service, and during the entire

four years of his term, he was recognized as an important factor alike in politics and legislation. The Democrats of the State appealed to the President as did his Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, to vindicate Judge Woodward by his appointment to a vacancy on the Supreme Court of the United States. The Senate was Democratic by a narrow majority and it was not doubted that Woodward could be confirmed. The President nominated Woodward, but Cameron proved his omnipotence in the body by accomplishing the rejection of Woodward. It was a defiant answer to the President and to Secretary Buchanan and a cruel blow to Woodward, who, if he had been called to the supreme bench, would doubtless have made a most lustrous national judicial career, but Cameron, while doubtless gratifying a personal resentment, assumed that Woodward would be a dangerous judge of the political questions which must sooner or later demand judicial solution, and when Judge Greer was finally proposed for the place, Cameron heartily supported his confirmation.

Cameron made the Whigs think more kindly of him by the only important speech he made during his four sessions of service in the Senate. It was in 1846, when the tariff of that year, by which the protective policy of the State was overthrown, was on final passage before the Senate, having already passed the House, where all revenue measures must originate. After considerable discussion and a careful lining up on both sides of the Senate, it was discovered that an equal number of Senators favored and opposed the new tariff bill. George M. Dallas, of Pennsylvania, was the Vice-President and presiding officer of the body, and just a short time before the vote was taken, Cameron arose and made a personal appeal to the Vice-President as a Pennsylvanian to save his State and its

great interests by giving his casting vote against the new tariff bill. It was a plain, practical, earnest appeal, brief, but fervent and incisive, and the response of Dallas was the passage of the bill by his casting vote after the Senate had been declared a tie.

Such was the beginning of Cameron's public career, and thereafter his life was one of perpetual political struggle. He was felt more or less as a power in every important contest. He was a candidate for re-election in 1849, but neither party would accept him, and the Whigs, with the aid of the Native Americans, elected James Cooper. He was again a candidate as an American or Know Nothing in 1855, but was defeated after a wrangle that exhausted the session without electing a Senator. In 1857 he defeated Forney in a Democratic Legislature by the votes of Lebo, Maneer and Wagonseller, three Democratic members. In 1863 he was again a candidate, when Buckalew triumphed by a single vote. In 1867 he was again elected after a desperate contest, and in 1872 was re-elected, practically without a struggle. He served until 1877, when he resigned to give the place to his son, J. Donald Cameron, each of whom was four times elected to the United States Senate by the Pennsylvania Legislature.

X.

GEORGE M. DALLAS.

Nominated for Vice-President with Polk in 1844 after Senator Silas Wright Had Been Nominated and Declined — Had No Knowledge of the Honor Until a Delegation from the Baltimore Convention Made Him a Midnight Visit — His Casting Vote in Favor of the Tariff of 1846 — Thrice a Candidate for President Against Buchanan — Bitter Factional Feuds Between Buchanan and Dallas — Many Pennsylvania Presidential Candidates.

THE national election of 1844 brought to the front in Pennsylvania a new and important factor in the Democratic politics of the State in the person of George Mifflin Dallas. He had attained national prominence long before that period, but he was practically unfelt in the management of the party. He was an able, accomplished and courtly gentleman, who had little taste for the rough and tumble involved in the struggle for political mastery.

He was born in Philadelphia in 1792, graduated at Princeton and was admitted to the bar in 1813. Soon thereafter he accompanied Albert Gallatin, as his secretary, to the court of Russia, and later became an assistant to his father, Alexander James Dallas, who was Secretary of the Treasury under Madison, and the successful financier of the second war with England. Returning to the bar, he was made deputy attorney general for Philadelphia county, an office, now known as district attorney, and was later elected mayor of the city. After the election of Jackson, whom he supported, he was appointed United States district attorney, from which office he was elected to serve a brief unexpired term in the Senate in 1831.

He was attorney general under Governor Wolf and became Minister to Russia by appointment of President Van Buren in 1837. Two years later he was recalled at his own request and resumed the practice of his profession.

When the National Democratic convention met in Baltimore in 1844 the party leaders, who had decided on the overthrow of Van Buren, fully appreciated the fact that the controlling States in the great battle the Democrats had to accept with Henry Clay, were New York and Pennsylvania. The defeat of Van Buren, when he had a majority of all the delegates in the convention, and whose friends believed that he had been deliberately betrayed and sacrificed, made the friends of Mr. Polk, the nominee for President, anxious to conciliate the Van Buren element, and they unanimously awarded the nomination for Vice-President to Silas Wright, then Senator from New York and Van Buren's ablest lieutenant. The Morse magnetic telegraph had just then got into operation between Washington and Baltimore, and he was advised of the nomination by message, to which a prompt, peremptory declination was returned.

Finding that the national ticket could not be strengthened by a New Yorker in the second place, the leaders naturally turned to Pennsylvania. The names of George M. Dallas and Commodore Stewart were presented by the Pennsylvania delegates. The first ballot exhibited a scattering vote, largely complimentary, in which Commodore Stewart received 23 and Dallas 13, but on the second ballot Dallas received 220 votes to 36 for all others, and was unanimously nominated as the Democratic candidate for Vice-President on the ticket with Polk.

There was no telegraph line between Philadelphia and Baltimore, and Mr. Dallas was entirely ignorant of

the fact that his name would be presented to the convention. It was generally expected that Van Buren would be nominated for President, and that would necessarily throw the Vice-President to one of the Southern States. After the convention a special committee was charged with the duty of personally visiting Mr. Dallas and informing him of his nomination. His home in Philadelphia was not reached until a very late hour in the night, when he was called up and appeared in his library gown, and received the midnight notice that he had been chosen as the Democratic candidate for the second office in the Republic. The information was as unexpected as it was gratifying to Mr. Dallas, and he gave a very cordial acceptance.

The success of the Polk and Dallas ticket, and the prominent part that Mr. Dallas was compelled to play in passing the revenue tariff act of 1846 by his casting vote as Vice-President, strengthened him with the party generally throughout the country, and also with the party leaders at home, who were all compelled to accept the new revenue tariff policy. Every Democratic member of Congress from Pennsylvania voted against the new tariff with the single exception of David Wilmot, who represented a purely agricultural district, with but little manufacturing interests, and he was re-elected. But the Whigs gained largely on the tariff issue immediately after the passage of the new revenue bill, and carried a decided majority in the congressional delegation.

Mr. Dallas was severely criticised by some of the Pennsylvania Democrats for having given the deciding vote in favor of a tariff policy that was regarded as very injurious to Pennsylvania, and that resulted in the disastrous defeat of the party in the State, but he met his critics in a manly and heroic manner, declaring that as Vice-President he did not represent the State

of Pennsylvania, but represented the Democracy of the nation, and he regarded it as his duty to accept the proclaimed faith of the organization. He stated that his duty might have been different had he represented a single State as a Senator or as a Representative, but as his position was one distinctly national in its character, his duty to the nation was higher than his duty to the State.

James Buchanan was then altogether the foremost Democrat in the State. He was eminently able, severely discreet, thoroughly honest, and was well trained in the details of Pennsylvania politics. When he entered the Polk cabinet he had already figured in the National Democratic convention of 1844 as a Presidential candidate, receiving as high as twenty-six votes, and he at once became an aggressive candidate for the succession. He was universally respected rather than beloved, as he did not win the sympathy and affection of the masses as he might have done had he been more genial in his qualities, but those who knew him best respected him most for his sober and conscientious convictions, and the fidelity with which he adhered to them. A number of leading Democrats in the State wanted a more flexible type of man for President. They saw that he was strong with the party in the nation and that all he needed was the cordial support of his own State to give him success sooner or later.

It became necessary to find a Democratic opponent of Buchanan in Pennsylvania who would contrast favorably with him in character and qualifications, and Dallas was the one man who filled that bill. They had no hope of making Dallas a successful candidate for President, but he was the strongest man who could be pitted against Buchanan, and from 1844 until 1856, when Buchanan was finally successful, there was a

George M. Dallas

constant struggle between a large majority of the Democratic leaders and followers supporting Buchanan, and an able and most aggressive but small minority that supported Dallas.

One of the leaders in this struggle against Buchanan was Reah Frazer, of Lancaster, where Mr. Buchanan lived.

He was able, tireless and even desperate in his denunciations of Buchanan as the "favorite son," and as the acknowledged leader of the anti-Buchanan forces, that was magnified in importance by the fact that Buchanan and Frazer were townsmen and members of the same bar, he crystallized a very formidable organization, sent the Pennsylvania delegation to the National convention shorn of its power by Democratic division in the State, and in 1848 Buchanan received only fifty-five votes for President, while Dallas received three.

The strength of the supporters of Dallas against Buchanan culminated in 1852 when thirty-two of the 133 delegates to the State convention presented an address to the body protesting against the nomination of Buchanan for President. It was an able paper, and made a profound impression not only upon the convention, but upon the country.

It was signed among others by John Scott, of Huntingdon, afterward Republican United States Senator, and by Wilson Riley, of Franklin, Buchanan's native county, who was later elected as a Democratic congressman. The delegation to the National convention, however, was instructed to adopt the unit rule, and Buchanan received the vote of the State. The contest in the National convention opened between Cass and Buchanan, Cass starting with 116 votes and Buchanan with 93, and on the twenty-second ballot Buchanan reached his highest vote at 104, when Cass had fallen

to 53. On the thirty-fifth ballot Cass reached his highest vote of 131 and Buchanan had fallen off to 39, and on the forty-ninth ballot, after a struggle of several days, Pierce was nominated by a practically unanimous vote.

In 1856, when the convention met to elect delegates to the Cincinnati National convention the Buchanan men had practically stamped out the Dallas movement, as there were but few and feeble dissenting votes in the State convention on the Buchanan issue. Every delegate elected was required to give a written pledge to vote for Buchanan until a nomination was effected or his name withdrawn by his friends, and for the first time Buchanan appeared before a National convention with a practically united party, not only in the delegation, but in the Democratic sentiment of his State. His nomination and election logically followed, and Dallas was thenceforth unfelt in the political struggles of the State.

Buchanan asked to be recalled from the English mission in 1856, to which President Pierce had appointed him, to become Pierce's competitor for the succession, and Pierce exhibited his appreciation of Buchanan's new political attitude by appointing Mr. Dallas to succeed him as Minister to England. When Buchanan became President he exhibited a high measure of political manhood by continuing Mr. Dallas as Minister to the Court of St. James during his entire term.

Mr. Dallas figured conspicuously in three contests in his State as a candidate for President, but was never regarded even by his most enthusiastic friends as within the range of success. He was made simply the leader of a minority opposition, but his great ability, his unblemished character and his ripe experience in statesmanship fully warranted his friends in

pressing him as a Presidential possibility. I never met him until 1861 after his return from the English mission, and then only in a casual way. He was a very attractive personality with his wealth of silvered locks, finely moulded features and courtly manners and a genial smile and cordial greeting that bespoke pleasant companionship. He lived in quiet retirement after his return from England until the 31st of December, 1864, when at the full patriarchal age he passed away, profoundly lamented by good citizens of every faith.

Pennsylvania had never been honored with a President or Vice-President until Mr. Dallas reached the Vice-Presidency in 1844, and he is the only Pennsylvanian who was ever chosen to the position, although Richard Rush, John Sergeant and Amos Ellmaker had been candidates before the people and received a minority electoral vote. Mr. Buchanan was the only Pennsylvanian ever nominated for the Presidency with any hope of success, with the single exception of General Hancock, who was a close second to Garfield in 1880. James Black, of Lancaster, was nominated by the Prohibitionists in 1872, and Wharton Barker, of Philadelphia, was a candidate of the Populists in 1900, but neither figured in the ballots of the Electoral College.

It must not be assumed, however, that Pennsylvania had not a number of other more or less pretentious candidates for the Presidency. Governor Pollock, who had won the governorship in 1854 by 40,000 majority, and who was in hearty sympathy with the American sentiment of that period, planned an aggressive campaign to make himself a Presidential candidate in 1856, but the Republican sentiment, inspired by the Kansas-Nebraska issue, subordinated the American mastery, and he fell with his cause, and his name

never appeared before a convention. John M. Read, who was the first Republican to carry the State in the contest of '58, was made an anxious Presidential candidate by his friends. I had been in the convention and aided to nominate him, and soon after the election I was invited to a confidential meeting of his friends at his house to consider the question of launching him in the Presidential race, but Cameron entered the field aggressively and his power of organization made it a hopeless battle for Judge Read. General Cameron was a very earnest candidate for President in 1860, but while he had the instructions of his State on a direct vote, the delegation was largely divided, making his cause a hopeless one.

Asa Packer had the cordial nomination of the Democrats of Pennsylvania for the Presidency in 1868. He had little taste for the contest, but his friends were very earnest, and at one time thought it possible that he might be nominated. He received the vote of the Pennsylvania delegation on the first six ballots, when his name was withdrawn. Governor Curtin and Thomas A. Scott were both discussed in the circle of their friends, and with their own knowledge, as possible candidates before the Liberal Republican convention in Cincinnati, in 1872, and both were quite willing that their names should be presented if favorable opportunity offered.

Scott would have been a very dangerous candidate for Grant if he had been nominated, as he was specially strong on two points on which Greeley was fatally weak. Greeley lost the business interests because of his uncertain financial policy as to resumption, and the Democrats refused to support him because he had mercilessly lampooned them for thirty years. Scott would have commanded the entire confidence of the business interests, and as his political sympathies were

Democratic he would have been enthusiastically supported by that party. He knew that he could not enter into an open contest for the nomination, but as it was a convention of political free lancers, liable to be confused and possibly deadlocked in its councils, a condition was possible in which his name could be introduced and his nomination carried by a whirl.

He was a very practical man and knew that he had only a remote chance, but he thought it was worth taking, and he arranged with me as chairman of the Pennsylvania delegation a special cipher by which he could be safely advised if opportunity offered for a dark horse.

I have never known a more earnest candidate for the Presidency than Governor Geary, who received the largest vote on first ballot in the National convention of Labor Reformers at Columbus, O., in 1872, but on the third ballot David Davis, of Illinois, was chosen. Governor Hartranft also regarded himself as a Presidential possibility, and in 1876, when he was Governor of the State, he received practically the unanimous instructions of the Republican State convention in favor of the delegation voting for him as a unit in the Cincinnati convention of 1876, and was sixth on the list for six ballots, when Hayes won.

Mayor Fitler, of Philadelphia became an active candidate for the Presidency in 1888. His name was presented to the Chicago convention by Charles Emory Smith, and he received twenty-four votes on the first ballot, but there his candidacy ended. Senator Wallace and Congressman Randall were both active and earnest Presidential candidates for nearly a decade, and Randall narrowly missed the nomination at Cincinnati in 1880 and also had the vote of his State as a unit in the Chicago convention of 1884.

Wallace never made an open battle as a Presidential candidate, but he long dreamed of reaching the Presidency, as had many hundreds before and since his day. The era of dark horses as Presidential candidates began with Polk, was repeated with Pierce, with Lincoln, with Hayes, with Garfield and with Bryan, and it is not surprising that many public men who have had no prominence in Presidential struggles have dreamed the sweet dream of ruling the Republic.

XI.

AN ELECTIVE JUDICIARY.

The Causes for the Agitation of Making Judges Elective—Judicial Hostility to the Reform Constitution of 1838 an Important Factor—The Protracted Struggle Between Governor Shunk and the Whig Senate over a Judge for White's Indiana District Aroused very General Hostility to Executive Appointments—Several Nominations Rejected, and after Shunk's Re-election the Whig Senate Dictated the Appointment of John C. Knox and Confirmed it—The Earnest Battle in the Legislature to Defeat an Elective Judiciary—The People Appreciated the Trust and have Presented a Generally Creditable Record in Judicial Elections.

FRANCIS R. SHUNK was inaugurated as Governor in January, 1845, and his administration, had he lived to complete his second term, would doubtless have been generally creditable and not specially eventful but for the fact that in 1846 a Whig hurricane swept the State, because of the repeal of the tariff of 1842, and the Whigs elected enough senators that year to enable them to hold the control of that body for three years. The Whig senate locked horns with the Governor on several judicial nominations, and an agitation was thereby quickened that carried the amendment to the Constitution making all our judges elective.

I never met Governor Shunk but once, and then had little opportunity to form any judgment as to his personal qualities. He was tall, with a large, angular frame, and a face that exhibited unmistakable evidences of strength and sincerity. He was not a brilliant man, nor was he graceful in personal accomplishments, but he possessed a large measure of natural intellectual force that brought intelligence, careful

study and unblemished integrity. Although elected in the white heat of the Polk-Clay battle of 1844, the Whigs generally respected him for his blameless character, and he had every opportunity to make a successful administration.

The terrible strain upon the credit of the State in 1841 had entirely perished, and under the impetus given to industry and trade by the tariff of 1842 the State was rapidly approaching a high degree of prosperity. There were no complicated State issues to embarrass him, and he possessed the universal and absolute confidence of his own party with a large measure of respect from his political opponents. He called to the head of his cabinet Jesse Miller, a product of my own native mountains of Perry, who had served as a member of Congress, and stood high in the confidence and respect of the best Democratic leaders of the State. There was no legislation during Shunk's term as Governor to cast reproach upon the Commonwealth, and he died soon after his re-election, in 1847, leaving as clean a record, outside of mere partisan dispute, as was written by any of our Pennsylvania executives.

At the election of 1846 the Whigs chose nearly every State senator returned that year, and also carried a majority of the house, making Charles Gibbons, of Philadelphia, speaker of the senate, and James Cooper, of Adams, later United States Senator, speaker of the house, and John Banks, of Reading, who was Porter's opponent for Governor in 1841, state treasurer. There was much unrest throughout the State arising from the general dissatisfaction of the people with the attitude of the judiciary of the State. As a rule, the judges whose tenures were limited by the new Constitution of 1838 often defied and openly blasphemed the new fundamental law, and it required

Thomas White

but a spark to kindle the dissatisfaction into revolution. The spark came from the Indiana judicial district, where Judge White, the father of the present ex-Judge White, of the same county, had long been the president judge in the district comprising Indiana, Armstrong and several other adjacent counties.

It was a primitive rural community then, sparsely settled, and chiefly forest. Judge White was not only an able judge, but his genial intercourse with the people generally attached them very strongly to him, and when his term was about to expire 16,000, embracing nearly an equal number of Whigs and Democrats, signed petitions to Governor Shunk asking for his reappointment. There was no blemish on Judge White's judicial record that could be urged against him, but Governor Shunk, in obedience to the imperious demand of party interests, refused to renominate the Whig judge. At different times he sent several names of Democrats to the Senate to fill Judge White's place, and all of them were admittedly eminently qualified, alike in character and attainments, to fill the judicial chair, but the Whig senators decided with entire unanimity that they would not be a party to the sacrifice of one of the ablest and most popular judges of the State simply because of his political faith, and every nomination sent to the senate was promptly rejected.

The agitation became intense in Judge White's district, and the contest naturally attracted very general attention throughout the State. The senate claimed that it was part of the appointing power as a co-ordinate branch of the government, and that it could not consistently permit a competent and faithful judge to be smitten because he happened to harmonize with the senate in political faith rather than with the Executive. It was the burning question

of the State for a year or more, and it started in every section of the Commonwealth an organized effort to strip the Executive of the appointment of judges in the interest of a non-partisan judiciary.

In the meantime Judge White's district was without a judge, and great inconvenience was suffered by the people. The result was, after Shunk's re-e'ection in the fall of 1847, the Whig senators regarded the contest as hopeless, and they finally indicated a Democrat who could command an affirmative vote in the senate. John C. Knox had been several sessions in the house as a representative from Tioga County, and was accepted as the Democratic leader of the body. He was young, delightful in companionship, able in council or debate, and personally popular with both sides of the chamber. He was indicated by the Whig senators as the man they would confirm, and he was nominated by the Governor, who was glad to emerge from the conflict with a Democratic judge, and Knox was continued on the bench until he was called to the supreme court of the State. He was a highly respected member of the court of last resort, but after serving a part of his term he resigned to accept the attorney generalship under Governor Packer in 1858, when he moved to Philadelphia and was a very successful member of the bar until his death some years later.

The breach between the Democratic Governor and the Whig senate extended into several judicial districts. He nominated Judge Nill, of Chambersburg, to be president judge of the Chester and Delaware district, but the bar resented the invasion of a foreign judicial officer, and successfully appealed to the senate for his rejection. A like dispute arose in the Bucks and Montgomery district, where the senate and the Governor locked horns, finally ending in a compromise. It was these judicial contests between the Executive

and the senate which strengthened and quickened into aggressive action the widespread conviction that the selection of judges should be remanded to the people to escape the power of a partisan Executive who regarded party interests as paramount to the proper administration of justice. Governor Shunk did not live to see the revolution reach its consummation, but the Legislatures of 1849–50, by a very large majority, passed resolutions submitting a constitutional amendment to the people, and when the issue finally reached the people in the fall of 1850 it was carried by an immense majority.

I watched with much interest the contest for an elective judiciary, and had a very humble part in it. As a boy editor I shared all the inflamed prejudices against the arbitrary power of the Executive in the appointment of judges, and heard most of the more important discussions on the subject in the Legislature. When the resolution to amend the Constitution to make judges elective was first passed by the Legislature it aroused the conservative elements of the State, and they made a very desperate struggle to prevent the Legislature of 1850 from giving the necessary second approval to the measure, as a proposed legislative amendment to the Constitution must be passed, without any modification whatever, by two consecutive Legislatures before it can be submitted to the people.

A very earnest effort was made to control the Legislature, and some of the ablest men of the State were chosen to the house solely for the purpose of defeating it. Among them was James M. Porter, a brother of the Governor, who had been judge and was leader of the Easton bar; Conyngham, of Luzerne, who afterward served with great credit on the bench, was another, and with him was Buemont, from the same

county, and a man of high character and influence. These, with Cornyn, of Huntingdon, and others, made a very earnest struggle to prevent the passage of the amendment.

William F. Packer, of Lycoming, afterward Governor, was speaker of the house, and was one of the most accomplished parliamentary leaders of the State. He was very shrewd and able, and he exhausted the power of the speaker to prevent the house reaching a vote on the question. By careful management in halting the action of the committee, and afterward in halting the action of the house, the measure was delayed until near the close of the session, when it was confidently expected that, with the aid of the speaker, the proposed amendment could not be reached. It was possible for any member of the house to call it up at certain times, but Packer was scrupulously careful when such opportunities offered not to recognize any member of the house without knowing that he did not propose to call for action on the judicial amendment. With all his ability he was finally outgeneralled by Representative Schwartzwelder, of Allegheny, who was the wag of the body, a universal favorite, and quite as shrewd as the speaker. He understood the desperation of the struggle, and one day when under the rules any member could call up a measure he made a personal appeal to Speaker Packer to recognize him and give him the floor to call up a divorce bill. Packer had no doubt that Schwartzwelder meant a bill to divorce some man and wife, but he was appalled when, after recognizing Schwartzwelder, he called up the proposed amendment to the Constitution, and forced it to successful passage. Packer was terribly infuriated, and as soon as he could leave the chair he went to Schwartzwelder and charged him with deliberately deceiving him. "Oh!" said Schwartzwelder, "I called

up the most important divorce bill of the session, a bill to divorce the judiciary from politics."

The legislative amendment to the Constitution was largely ratified by the people and was a very radical measure. It was assailed with great force as arbitrarily terminating the tenures of all the judges in a single day, regardless of the high commissions they held from the Commonwealth for a term of years. It was admitted that very few of our judges, high or low, merited such a sudden and terrible humiliation, but the juggling that had been exhibited by some of the judges after the adoption of the Constitution of 1838, to extend their tenures beyond the clearly defined purpose of the new fundamental law, made public sentiment demand that the whole judiciary of the State should be swept out in a single day, and let the people begin with a clean sheet to elect their Supreme and district judges.

Both the great parties realized what a revolutionary departure had been made, and that they must prove to the State and nation that the change was a beneficent one. The Democrats, then the dominant power of the State, strengthened their organization by calling an entirely distinct judicial State convention to nominate the five candidates for the supreme court, while they held another general political State convention at different time and place to nominate candidates for Governor and canal commissioner. The Whigs nominated both judicial and political candidates by the same convention, but exhibited their appreciation of the necessity of non-partisanship in the election of judges by nominating Judge Coulter, a pronounced Democrat and a member of the old court. The Democrats had nominated no member of the old court, excepting Chief Justice Gibson, and the wisdom of the Whigs was exhibited by the success of

Coulter, who was the only man on the Whig State ticket elected.

It is needless to say that the judges of 1851 felt no more friendly to the judicial amendment than did the judges of 1838. I remember meeting the old supreme court in Harrisburg the last time it sat there, and heard some of the expressions from the judges on the subject. Chief Justice Gibson had no reason to complain, as he was nominated to be continued on the bench, and Coulter and Chambers were both on the Whig ticket, but Burnside and Rodgers gave full vent to their contempt for what they regarded as an angry eruption of the people that was likely to degrade the courts of the State. Burnside was then well advanced in years, and at times, when in a jocular mood, was inclined to boast that he was the ugliest man in the State. He was ruthlessly blunt at times, both on and off the bench, and I well remember his prediction that with the people electing judges it wouldn't be long until Joe Barker, then a labor leader, who had inspired riots in Allegheny, for which he was convicted and imprisoned, might reasonably expect to reach the chief justiceship of the State. Force was given to the suggestion by the fact that when in prison Barker had been elected mayor of the city, and Governor Johnston was compelled to pardon him out of prison so he could assume his new official duties.

The general sentiment of political leaders of both parties was so strong in favor of maintaining a high judicial standard that the judicial nominations generally were very creditable, and I am free to say that, after having watched with more than ordinary interest the election of judges in Pennsylvania for over half a century, I believe the people have maintained quite as high a standard of judicial ability and fidelity as could have been maintained by appointments of par-

tisan executives. Only a very few, indeed not more than can be counted on the fingers of a single hand, have brought actual reproach upon the administration of justice, and, while partisan politics has in many instances interposed to prevent the election or re-election of men pre-eminently fitted for the judicial office, as a rule even those who won the judicial chair by purely partisan methods have generally appreciated the sanctity of their high calling and made creditable records for their courts

The people must be credited with having exercised an unusual degree of political independence and of fidelity to the proper administration of justice in the election of judges. In Philadelphia at the first election the demand for an independent court became so strong that after the Democrats Whigs and Native Americans had all presented candidates for judges the leaders were compelled to make up an independent judicial ticket, consisting of one Whig (Thompson), and one Democrat (Kelly), then serving on the bench, and Allison, who represented the Native Americans. A desperate fight was made against this independent judicial ticket, but it triumphed by a large majority. Thus Philadelphia set the pace for independent judges.

In order to understand to what extent the people have been independent in the election of judges it must be remembered that in every Republican judicial district in the State, with the single exception of Lancaster, the Democrats have at one time or another elected judges, and also that in every Democratic judicial district in the State, with the single exception of Berks, the Republicans have at one time or another elected judges. Philadelphia and Allegheny, the two Gibraltars of Republicanism, have many times elected Democratic judges in square contests between the Republican and Democratic candidates. Just

now we have exceptionally severe political conditions with omnipotent power on the part of the majority party of the State, and little force or organization in the minority party, but, reviewing the record made by the people of Pennsylvania for more than half a century of an elective judiciary, it must be said of them that they have been quite as faithful to the honest administration of justice as would have been the Governors of the State had their power to commission judges been continued.

XII.

ADVENT OF THE LOCOMOTIVE.

The Philadelphia and Columbia Railroad Ran by Horse-power until 1834 —The First Train Drawn by the Locomotive "Black Hawk"—The Trip From Lancaster to Philadelphia Made in Eight Hours and a Half — Protest of the Conestoga Teamsters and Wagon Taverns against Steam Railways — Building the Cumberland Valley Railroad — Shinplasters Issued to Financier It — The First Pennsylvania Railroad Charter Prepared and Presented by a Lobbyist Without the Knowledge of the Philadelphians — Desperate Struggle Between the Baltimore and Ohio and the Pennsylvania Companies — Both Obtained Charters, but the Baltimore and Ohio Franchise had Severe Conditions which Made it Unacceptable, and the Pennsylvania was Given the Field in 1847 — Senator Gibbons' Battle with His Constituents, and the Controversy with Judge Conrad.

THE administration of Governor Shunk dated the advent and mastery of the steam railway in transportation. The question of constructing railways was earnestly agitated in Pennsylvania some years before the locomotive had been developed, and when the railway line was expected to be merely a tram road with cars to be drawn by horses.

John Stevens, of New York, a man of broad, progressive ideas, who was abreast with Fulton in the development of the steamboat, was the man who first urged the construction of railways. His steamboat, the Phœnix, that ran on the Delaware and Connecticut rivers, was brought to the Delaware by sea, and was the first steamboat to brave the waves of the ocean. As early as 1812 he publicly advocated the theory of carriage by rail, and predicted the practicability of using steam. He appealed to his own State of New

York, but was turned down as a pestiferous crank, just as Professor Morse was when he first went to Congress for aid to construct a telegraph line.

In 1823, after having been repelled in several other States, Mr. Stevens, then at the advanced age of seventy-four years, made a personal appeal to the Pennsylvania Legislature to construct a railway from Philadelphia to Columbia. He named such men as Stephen Girard, Horace Binney and John Conley, of Philadelphia, with Amos Ellmaker, of Lancaster, among his incorporators, and Conley was made president of the company. The franchise was given for the period of fifty years, and preliminary surveys were undertaken, but it is evident that the men named as incorporators were not heartily enlisted in the work, as Stevens was never able to raise the sum of $5,000 to complete a mile of the road.

Another charter was granted by the same Legislature for the Columbia, Lancaster and Philadelphia Railroad, but no attempt was ever made to vitalize the enterprise.

The necessity for a railway from Philadelphia to connect with the canal at Columbia became more generally appreciated each year, and as all individual and corporate efforts had failed, the board of canal commissioners ordered a series of preliminary surveys, and the Legislature of 1828 authorized the construction of the road from Philadelphia through Lancaster to Columbia by the State.

It was not a popular measure throughout the Commonwealth, as the great mass of the people believed that the investment of State money in railways was little less than extravagant waste, and the appropriations were very grudgingly made for the construction of the road, and it was not until April, 1834, that a single track was completed between Philadelphia and Columbia.

The locomotive had just made its appearance and the first train that passed over the new line from Columbia to Philadelphia on the 16th day of April, 1834, had secured a locomotive known as "Black Hawk," then regarded as the finest engine that had been constructed. They did not venture to make the entire trip in one day, but on the 15th the run was made from Columbia to Lancaster, where the party rested overnight. On the morning of the 16th the train left Lancaster at eight o'clock and arrived at the head of the Schuylkill incline plane at 4.30, making the trip from Lancaster to Philadelphia in eight hours and a half.

So little confidence had the managers in the endurance of the locomotive that an empty horse car followed the locomotive train with relays of horses at different points to rescue the party in case the locomotive gave out. They had much difficulty with the locomotive and at times the passengers had to get out and give a healthy push to aid it in starting.

It is difficult for our people in this progressive age to understand the desperate resistance made by the people generally throughout the State to the introduction of railroads. When Pennsylvania at an early day had given liberal assistance to the construction of turnpikes, making continuous lines from Baltimore and Philadelphia to Pittsburg, it was accepted that our Commonwealth was in the very front of progress, and our turnpikes developed an immense industry in what was known as the Conestoga wagons. Hundreds of six-horse teams, with immense covered wagons, were constantly on the highways, as they transported commerce and trade between the East and West, and they created what formed a very powerful political factor in opposing the introduction of railways, in the "wagon tavern."

Every few miles along our through turnpikes was

found the wagon tavern. There was one or more in every village, and well-to-do farmers whose homes were on the turnpikes ran the wagon tavern as a side industry. All of them had very capacious yards about the barn to accommodate the teams during the night. Excepting in extremely inclement weather the horses always stood out securely attached to their wagon. Hay and oats were furnished for the horses at very moderate prices, and the driver could obtain a "snack" or cold lunch in the evening, a bed, hot breakfast and an evening and morning drink of whisky for 25 cents.

The proprietors of the wagon taverns were generally men of influence in the community and when the proposition to construct railways was seriously urged the wagon drivers and wagon tavern keepers made a most aggressive battle.

Mass meetings were held along the lines of the turnpikes to protest against the introduction of railways, which were declared to be of doubtful utility and which could be successful only by the destruction of one of the important industrial interests of the State, that had immense sums of money invested and which would certainly be destroyed. Political orators, always ready to cater to popular prejudice, delivered most fervent harangues against the proposed injustice of bringing ruin to the great industrial "interests," which centered in wagon transportation. In some instances senators and representatives were elected solely on that issue.

Fortunately the progress of the railroad was so gradual that there was no violent destruction of the wagon transportation interests and the grand old Conestoga wagon, with its team of six magnificent horses, usually elegantly caparisoned, gradually perished in Pennsylvania.

As early as 1829 the public-spirited business men of Baltimore appeared before the Pennsylvania Legis-

lature and asked for a charter for a road from Baltimore to the Susquehanna River, thence to the Borough of Carlisle in the Cumberland Valley. The committee of the senate reported that it would be against sound public policy to grant the franchise, and the measure failed. The chief reason given for excluding the Baltimore railroad was that the board of canal commissioners had authorized a survey for a road from Harrisburg to Chambersburg and thence by way of Gettysburg to York, and in 1831 an act was passed for the incorporation of the Cumberland Valley Railroad Company.

The progress of the work was very slow, and the franchise was forfeited for want of subscriptions to the stock, but the Legislature extended the time, and on the 2d of June, 1835, sufficient stock had been subscribed to warrant the Governor in issuing letters patent creating the company. The bill rechartering the United States Bank as a State institution required the bank to subscribe $100,000 to the capital stock of the company, and Mr. Nicholas Biddle, president of the bank, not only paid the $100,000 subscription, but gave an additional $100,000 to aid the enterprise, but when the bank failed in 1839 the stock of the Cumberland Valley Railroad was hardly worth enumerating among the assets.

The men engaged in the enterprise were confronted time and again with almost insuperable obstacles for want of means, and finally it was completed by a large issue of 50- and 25-cent paper money, then commonly known as "shinplasters." Money was extremely scarce after the financial revulsion of 1837, and the people were willing to receive anything in the similitude of money that had any fair semblance of credit.

When this issue of small bills was made they commanded a reasonable degree of confidence because the

directors of the company, most of whom were men of large means for that day, published a statement over their signatures, declaring that they individually, jointly, and severally guaranteed the payment of these notes. Among the signers was Charles B. Penrose, grandfather of the present United States Senator, Boies Penrose, who was then a State senator from the Cumberland district.

The road was opened with great ceremony from Harrisburg to Carlisle on the 16th of August, 1837; on the 10th of November the same year, it was formally opened to Newville, and on the 16th of the same month the shrill scream of the iron horse was first heard in Chambersburg, where there was a great military and popular display. The road was later extended to Hagerstown, but it was not regularly operated and only horse trains were run over it. It is now an important link in the Cumberland Valley Railroad's extended line to Winchester.

The interest exhibited by the people of Philadelphia and of Baltimore for the creation of railroad facilities in transportation was quickened by the heroic achievement of New York in the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825. Until that time Philadelphia was the metropolis of finance, commerce and trade, and possessed the largest population of any city in the country, but the completion of the great water highway from Lake Erie to the sea gave an advantage to New York that steadily drained Philadelphia of her money and commerce, and this decline of Philadelphia was greatly hastened by Jackson's withdrawal of $8,000,000 of government deposits from the United States Bank, by the financial crisis of 1837, and by the later failure of the great banking institution.

Baltimore shared the apprehensions of Philadelphia, and both cities appreciated the necessity of reaching

westward to divide the rapidly growing trade of the new States then extending to the Father of Waters, with the State of Missouri on its western shore.

Strange as it may seem, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, then completed from Baltimore to Cumberland, was in advance of the people of Philadelphia in pressing for an all-rail line from the eastern coast to the waters of the Ohio at Pittsburg, and the first bill providing for the incorporation of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, proposing to construct a line from Harrisburg to Pittsburg, was prepared and presented to the Legislature without the knowledge of the Philadelphia business men. The Baltimore & Ohio had obtained from the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1845 a franchise for the extension of the road from Cumberland to Pittsburg. As there was then no proposition to construct any other railway line in the State, little opposition was exhibited to the project of the Baltimore & Ohio.

The man who first conceived and prepared the bill for the incorporation of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was Captain Samuel D. Karns. He was jolly and companionable, and one of the most popular of the captains of the packet boats on the canal during the summer season, and in the winter he made his home at Harrisburg, and paid the expenses of what would now be regarded as rather a frugal livelihood, by picking up small fees as a lobbyist. He did not pretend to debauch legislators, but gave such attention to little matters of personal legislation as made parties willing to pay him the small fee he demanded.

He was very popular with most of the men in the Legislature, and could readily accomplish little special legislation that was unobjectionable. He saw the proposition of the Baltimore & Ohio for an extension of its lines through Pennsylvania to Pittsburg, and he

concluded that there should be competition, chiefly for the purpose of enlarging his income by an arrangement with the Baltimore & Ohio. He prepared a bill for the incorporation of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, but failed to enlist any general interest in it, and it made no figure in halting the Baltimore & Ohio, but it finally awakened the people of Philadelphia to the importance of Philadelphia having a central line through the State to Pittsburg. The franchise asked for by the Baltimore & Ohio was granted, but with severe conditions, and the franchise was forfeited within a year by failure to comply with its requirements.

When the Legislature of 1846 met Philadelphia had become thoroughly aroused to the importance of having a through railway line, and the only through line in the State, from the Atlantic coast to Pittsburg, and the charter of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was ready when the Legislature opened, and a large and powerful lobby of Philadelphia business men on hand to press its passage.

The Baltimore & Ohio was there also with influential backing to obtain a renewal of the franchise it had forfeited. These two great interests were face to face and locked horns for a desperate conflict. The struggle lasted through nearly the entire session, and the debates in both branches became extremely bitter. The Baltimore & Ohio was logically backed by all the southern counties of the State on the line of the road.

Both sides believed that it would be midsummer madness to attempt to make two roads through the State, and that the successful party in the battle would have the only railway line through the State for all time. So desperate was the conflict, with both sides lacking absolute confidence of success, that it

Governors under Constitution of 1838

David R. Porter — Francis R. Shunk

William F. Johnston

William Bigler — James Pollock

finally ended in the passage of both bills, but with such limitations on the Baltimore & Ohio charter that it was within the power of the Pennsylvania corporation, by advancing rapidly in its work, to render null and void the franchise to its competitor. The bill for the charter of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was approved on April 13, 1846, and on April 21, 1846, being the day before the final adjournment, the Baltimore & Ohio bill was approved.

The Baltimore & Ohio bill provided that if the Pennsylvania Company should have $3,000,000 of bona fide subscriptions to its stock, and 10 per cent. paid in, it would secure letters patent from the Governor, and if thirty miles or more be put under contract for construction to the satisfaction of the Governor, and $1,000,000 of stock subscription in its treasury on or before the 30th of July, 1847, the Governor should issue his proclamation declaring that the right of way of the Baltimore & Ohio through Pennsylvania should be null and void.

The business people of Philadelphia appreciated their opportunity, and the sentiment was so strong in favor of the new enterprise that the city authorities made a liberal subscription, which, with the action of a number of stockholders paying their installments in advance, gave the company the required money in the treasury, and on August 2, 1847, the Governor issued his proclamation declaring the franchise of the Baltimore & Ohio to be null and void.

One of the many interesting episodes of this contest brought into prominence one of the most brilliant and promising of the young men of Philadelphia. Charles Gibbons, then quite a young man, took his seat as a senator from Philadelphia at the session of 1845, and naturally desiring the construction of a railway in Pennsylvania he heartily supported the proposition to

XIII.

THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY.

The Baltimore and Ohio having been Forced from the Field by Conditions of its Franchise, the Pennsylvania Railroad had the Exclusive Right to Cross the State Westward with a Railroad Line — Had $1,000,000 in its Treasury July 30, 1847 — Interesting Meeting between Chief Engineer Thompson and Chairman of the Canal Board, James Burns — The Work of Construction began at Meadow Lane, Harrisburg, July 7, 1847 — The First Train in the Juniata Valley — Struggle for the Presidency between Patterson and Thompson — Why Thompson was Successful — A Prohibitory Tonnage Tax in the Pennsylvania Charter — The Advent of Thomas A. Scott — Interesting Episode of Scott's Efforts to Repeal Tonnage Tax in 1860—The Repudiation Eruption in Allegheny.

THE Pennsylvania Railroad Company, after a desperate struggle of many months and direct aid from the City of Philadelphia, was able to report on the 30th of July, 1847, that $1,000,000 had been paid into the treasury on account of stock subscriptions, and the franchise of the Baltimore & Ohio became null and void and the field was clear for the Pennsylvania through line.

The company had been organized on the 31st of March, 1847, with Samuel V. Merrick as president, and J. Edgar Thompson was appointed chief engineer to locate the line, with William B. Foster, Jr., formerly canal commissioner and later vice-president of the company, and Edward Miller as his associates.

The great engineering feat of crossing the Alleghenies at grade was accomplished by Chief Engineer Thompson, although very many of his own profession doubted the practicability of attempting

Samuel V. Merrick

to carry passengers and traffic over the mountains at grade.

James Burns, of Lewistown, was then president of the canal board, and believed that there was nothing about transportation that he did not understand. He was a man of strong individuality and very limited education, but eminently practical. I have heard him tell the story many times of his visit to Chief Engineer Thompson when he reached Lewistown in locating the line. He had heard that Thompson had conceived what he regarded as the impossible theory of crossing the Alleghenies at grade, and as Thompson was a stranger in the city of Burns' home, Burns thought it his duty to exhibit his courtesy by calling upon Thompson.

Thompson was an extremely reticent man. It was a common saying around the Pennsylvania Railroad office when he was its president that he usually spoke about twice a day, and when Burns called to pay his respects to the chief engineer he found that he had to take the laboring oar in maintaining the conversation. He finally came to the point and asked Thompson how he expected to cross the Alleghenies, to which Thompson answered in his very quiet way that he would cross the mountains at grade. Burns said that he then knew that Thompson was a damned fool, but didn't think it his duty to undertake to contradict him.

Burns knew all about the Alleghenies, had run its incline planes for several years, and the idea of crossing the mountains at grade was to him the very height of absurdity, but he was too courteous to dispute the proposition. After considerable pause Burns again ventured to inquire what time the Pennsylvania Railroad, when completed, would occupy between Philadelphia and Pittsburg, to which Thompson blandly answered that they would go through in fifteen hours. Burns

said he then knew that Thompson was such a hopeless damned idiot that he would not waste further time conversing with him, and he rather frigidly bowed himself out.

Burns lived to make the journey from Philadelphia to Pittsburg in ten hours, and was one of the most devoted friends of Thompson during the remainder of his life.

With the million dollars in the treasury, that then seemed to the managers of that day as tenfold more money than seemed the $90,000,000 that the same company had in its treasury after its recent increase of capital, the work of constructing this great artery of trade began at Meadow Lane, Harrisburg, where ground was broken, July 7, 1847, and the company had a perpetual struggle to find resources to prosecute the work, but in a little more than two years the first train passed over the line up the Susquehanna and Juniata to Lewistown.

I then resided in the Juniata Valley, and could not forget what was the greatest occasion of a century when the first song of the iron horse was heard at Mifflin station. The country people were out by thousands to see the railway train to which nearly all of them were entire strangers. A dense mass was packed in the little level close to the road, and the high hills close by the western side were literally covered with intensely anxious and wildly enthusiastic people. The shriek of the locomotive announced its coming, when within a mile or two of the station, and the whole audience moved as if electrified, and when the train came into the station with its majestic sweep, deafening shouts responded to the weird cry of the engine.

It was a new epoch and entirely new condition for the people of the community, but they speedily adjusted themselves to it, and in a little while the song

of the locomotive was heard repeatedly each day, and became one of the accepted advanced conditions of the age. The road was completed to the Allegheny portage railroad September 16, 1850, making a through connection from the Eastern sea to the waters of the Ohio. President Merrick bore the brunt of the exacting duties in the construction of the line, but he voluntarily retired in September, 1849, when the success of the enterprise was assured, and was succeeded by William C. Patterson, a prominent business man and financier.

Patterson was a man of progressive ideas, and well appreciated the great career and achievement of the new company. He startled the stockholders during the second year of his presidency by purchasing, for $260,000, the Powelton tract in West Philadelphia, for the purposes of the company, and where for many years the chief Philadelphia station was located. The stockholders, especially those in the country, where there were many immediately along the line, had severe ideas of economy, and I well remember how the rural stockholders were greatly alarmed at what they regarded as President Patterson's reckless extravagance, although the portion of that ground now owned and absolutely needed by the company would cost many millions.

He also purchased the O'Harra tract in Pittsburg, where his intelligent forecast rendered a like service to the company, but the idea of flinging hundreds of thousands of dollars from a company with an always depleted treasury into real estate that the average stockholder could not believe would ever be needed, started an agitation for reform in the management of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and Chief Engineer Thompson was made the opposition candidate to Patterson.

The struggle was a very earnest one, but the country stockholders gave an almost solid vote for Thompson for two reasons: First, they wanted to arrest Patterson's profligate policy, as they regarded it, and second, it was openly urged, and considered as a very powerful argument, that $5,000 a year, the salary of the chief engineer, could be saved by electing him president, as he could perform the duties of both offices. These arguments prevailed, and in the fall of 1852 J. Edgar Thompson was placed at the head of the company, where his ripe experience as an engineer and his admirable business qualities gave the great corporation steady progress, and he lived to see it not only one of the great trunk lines of the country, but the most important railway system on the continent.

He died on the 27th of May, 1874, when he was succeeded by Thomas A. Scott, who at his death was succeeded by George B. Roberts, who died in office, and was succeeded by Frank Thompson, who also died in office, and was succeeded by A. J. Cassatt. The public career of these men will be given in a later chapter and will tell one of the grandest stories of achievement in the annals of the Commonwealth.

There are few people of to-day who have any just appreciation of the constant and at times apparently almost hopeless battle the struggling corporation had to make to maintain itself. The people of Pennsylvania were very strongly prejudiced against all corporations and there was not a single advance step necessary to be taken by the company that was not met with a most determined and at times desperate opposition.

The State owned the line of canals that the railway paralleled between Harrisburg and Pittsburg, and in the bitter conflict in the Legislature between the Pennsylvania and Baltimore & Ohio, each trying to impose the heaviest burdens upon the other, it was not difficult

William C. Patterson

for the Baltimore & Ohio, and all who were prejudiced against corporations, to force into the charter of the Pennsylvania Company a provision that was utterly fatal to anything but local trade, and severely extortionate upon it. Ostensibly for the purpose of protecting the State canals, a tax of 5 mills per mile was required to be paid to the State for every ton of freight transported by the company. Of course, the line was then but a local road, and it simply taxed the transporters that much more as the tax was added to the ordinary freights.

When the railroad got into operation it soon became so oppressive that the Legislature was forced to reduce the tax to 3 mills per mile, and as that proved to be prohibitory in the coal and lumber traffic on the line, the Legislature later repealed the tax on these products of our industry.

The tax was a direct imposition upon the industry and commerce of the State and it was absolutely prohibitory on through traffic. On the north of the Pennsylvania line were the New York Central with its Lake Shore through connection and a great Canadian line, and on the south was the Baltimore & Ohio, all reaching for the trade of the West, and all free from tax upon tonnage. It was impossible, therefore, for the Pennsylvania Company to compete with these strong lines for through traffic, and Philadelphia was in the position of having expended many millions for the construction of a line to bring the commerce to Philadelphia, while the State imposed a prohibitory tax upon it.

In 1855 the Legislature passed a bill for the sale of the main line, including the canals from Philadelphia to Pittsburg and the Philadelphia and Columbia Railroad, and it provided that if purchased by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, as there would be no

competition between the State works and the railway, the tax on tonnage should be repealed. The same provision of the act released the property of the company from taxation for State purposes in consideration of the payment of a given sum of money. The supreme court held that section of the act to be unconstitutional, and the Pennsylvania Company became the purchaser of the main line with the tonnage tax remaining.

After the purchase of the main line Boyd Cummings, who was the last collector of tolls on the State road in Philadelphia, and who had Thomas A. Scott in his service as clerk for several years, called upon President Thompson, and told him that there was a young man in his employ who would certainly be needed by the railway corporation, and Scott was immediately engaged by Thompson and placed in charge of the construction of the Western division. That was the introduction and beginning of Colonel Scott's great career.

The company appealed to the Legislature year after year to maintain the faith of the State, plainly given in the act for the sale of the public works, by repealing the tax on tonnage, but public sentiment was so strong against any legislation in favor of corporations that the only reward received was a succession of humiliating defeats.

This continued until 1860 when Scott had succeeded to the vice-presidency made vacant by the death of Foster. He understood the situation and fully realized, as did President Thompson, that if the tax was not repealed the railway company could not compete for Western traffic. The company refused to pay the tax, and fought it desperately in the courts, but in 1859 the supreme court gave final judgment against the company for nearly $900,000 of accumulated tax. It may seem strange to those familiar with the present collossal financial power of this great corporation, that

at that time it was next to an impossibility for it to pay that judgment, and yet it was in the power of the State treasurer and the attorney general to issue execution on it any day.

I was then a member of the senate and in hearty accord with Thompson and Scott in their efforts to enlarge the commerce in our State, and restore Philadelphia, in some degree at least, to her former grandeur as a commercial metropolis, but a great national battle was to be fought for the election of Lincoln, who had not yet been nominated, and also for the election of Curtin, who was nominated while the Legislature was in session, and if a Republican senate and a Republican house had then passed the bill for the repeal of the tonnage tax it would have cost them the State; indeed, they would have been utterly overwhelmed by the people.

Curtin had placed the management of his campaign in my hands, and I was compelled to accept it, although with much reluctance. I was thus directly responsible for the management of a political conflict in the pivotal State where judgment was final in declaring the judgment of the nation, and it would have been midsummer madness for me either to have supported the repeal at that time, or permitted it to be accomplished if I could prevent it.

Scott passed the bill through the house, and had many very earnest conferences with me, hoping to reconcile me to its passage in the senate. With the votes of Senator Finney and myself he had ample margin to win out in the senate, but Finney, who was the ablest member of the body, and romantically attached to Curtin, joined me in saying to Scott that it would be a betrayal of the highest political and personal trust for us to support the measure.

Desperate as was his condition, he fully appreciated

the supreme political necessities which governed the situation, and I remember one night in my room, after it had been finally decided that his bill could not be passed in the senate, he seemed to be in utter despair, as he said the company could not meet the large tonnage tax judgment that would doubtless be carried to execution when legislation failed. I said to him that I would most heartily support the measure at the next session, and Finney had joined in that promise, and I added that I would answer for the State treasurer (Eli Slifer), with whom I had the closest relations, and who was, like Finney, a most devoted friend of Curtin, for his assurance, to be accepted in the strictest confidence, that he would not, as State treasurer, demand the collection of the judgment for a year.

I said that I would go immediately to see him, and told Scott that he knew the attorney general, the only other officer who could enforce the collection, and that he should submit the matter frankly to the law officer of the government and return to my room. An hour later we were together again. He had the pledge of the attorney general (John C. Knox), and I gave him the pledge of the State treasurer that no process should issue upon the judgment for a year.

Scott was most indefatigable in that contest, and left no means untried to accomplish the control of the senate. He managed to get Curtin and Foster, who was Curtin's opponent, together in Philadelphia, and after explaining the situation and earnestly pressing the subject upon them, their amiability and their sympathy for Scott induced them to sign a paper stating that the tonnage tax question should not enter into the gubernatorial contest.

Scott telegraphed me that this paper had been given to him, and that he would come to Harrisburg on the

night train. I immediately telegraphed to Curtin that if he did not want to defeat himself for Governor he had better go home and remain until after the Legislature adjourned, which he did. When Scott presented the paper to me I handed him the despatch I had sent to Curtin, and that was his last effort that session to release his line from a most unjust and oppressive tax.

When the next Legislature met Curtin was Governor and pledged to Scott's relief, and his close friends generally in both branches of the Legislature were in sympathy with the movement. With all of that advantage, it was one of the most desperate and demoralizing contests that ever occurred in the history of Pennsylvania legislation. Scott devoted the summer and fall between the two sessions to organizing his friends in every county in order to reach legislators, and he published at liberal prices a vast amount of literature on the subject in nearly all the papers of the State, whether friendly or unfriendly to the measure; but while none could dispute the necessity of removing the tax to give our great artery of trade and our great commercial city enlarged commerce, the measure was fought with an earnestness and desperation that I have never before or since seen exhibited in legislative struggles.

It was an absolute necessity for the measure to succeed unless the Pennsylvania Railroad, that had already perfected its connection with the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne & Chicago Road, should surrender the idea of making it a trunk line and of giving Philadelphia a fair share of Western trade. The measure passed the house early in the session, but it was not until within a very few weeks of final adjournment that it could command sufficient votes in the senate to give it a majority.

It was finally passed in that body within ten days of the adjournment, which placed it in the class of bills that the Governor was not required to act upon during the session. He held it until a week or ten days after the adjournment when he signed it, and the great tax battle was won, and the Pennsylvania Railroad was enabled to start on its matchless career. The company did not profit in freight charges by the repeal of the tax, as the act required that the freight charges in Pennsylvania should be reduced the full measure of the tax.

For nearly half a century the Pennsylvania Railroad has been the central figure of Pennsylvania progress. It has been the safety of the State in war and its greatest inspiration to progress in peace. If the State had given it its charter with all securities and property entirely free from taxation, it would have been repaid in score of millions by the wealth it added to our great State, but it has steadily paid a very liberal proportion of taxes, and often taxes which were alike unjust and oppressive.

For a period of nearly a quarter of a century no legislator from Allegheny could cast a vote approaching justice to this great corporation without making himself a political suicide. Allegheny, like Philadelphia, had subscribed to the capital stock of the company, and issued bonds to raise the money paid for the shares, expecting that the company would pay dividends on the stock and thereby relieve Allegheny from any taxation for interest on the bonds. It was not possible for a company, struggling with an always depleted treasury to construct a great railway line, to pay dividends on its stock, and the prejudice of the people against the company in Allegheny County became so inflamed by the appeals of repudiation leaders that the authorities of the county

refused to levy taxes for the payment of the interest on the bonds, and when finally ordered to do so by the supreme court of the State, the commissioners preferred being committed to prison for contempt of court to providing means of paying the over-due interest.

Men climbed into Congress and into the State senate and house as repudiation leaders in Allegheny, and the prejudices of that contest asserted their mastery in legislation relating to the company. Indeed, from the day that the struggle began in the Legislature, in 1846, for the passage of the charter for the company, until after its release from the oppressive tonnage tax in 1861, this now great corporation, then in feeble infancy, was compelled to brave intense prejudices against all corporation progress, no matter how beneficent were the fruits promised.

After 1861, a new epoch with entirely new conditions and entirely new duties of the gravest character, confronted our people, and the supreme necessities of war, with the wonderful progress born of such necessities, gave for the first time something like a fair field for our great corporation to develop the untold millions of wealth it has given to Pennsylvania.

XIV.

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD PRESIDENTS.

Mr. Merrick, First President, Wearied of the Labor and Retired—Patterson, his Successor, the only President of the Company Defeated for Re-election—J. Edgar Thompson's Great Work in Completing the Line—The Fortunate Combination of Thompson and Scott—Scott was a Master Builder and Conceived and Largely Created the Great Pennsylvania System—Roberts, an Accomplished Engineer and Thorough Operator of the Great System, Succeeded Scott—Frank Thomson, One of the most Accomplished Transportationists of his day, Succeeded Roberts, and Cassatt, First Great Railroad Man of the World To-day, Succeeded Thomson.

TO attempt to present the history of the wonderful progress that has been inspired in this State by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company without presenting the names and records of the men who have literally created the matchless achievements of this great corporation, would be like presenting the play of "Hamlet" with Hamlet omitted.

The company has always been fortunate in the choice of its presidents. Mr. Merrick, whom I remember when he conducted the business of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company chiefly or wholly in two second-floor rooms with the aid of a secretary and several clerks, was well adapted to plan and enforce the severe economical methods which had to be adopted to get the great enterprise fairly launched on the road to success. He voluntarily retired before the completion of the road, but after its success had been practically assured, and was succeeded by President Patterson, whose more progressive ideas laid some of the important foundations of the future success of the corporation.

J. Edgar Thompson

Patterson was the only president who retired from office defeated in a contest for re-election, as I have already explained in a previous chapter. Well equipped as he was as a business man and financier at that time, the period had been reached when the ripe railroad experience of J. Edgar Thompson was needed wisely to direct future development. He was regarded as one of the most accomplished engineers of the country, and not only well schooled in his professional attainments, but had liberal experience in the important work of operating railways. His election to the presidency dated the first great epoch of advancement in the history of the corporation, but for ten years he had a perpetual struggle against the aggressive hostility of the dominating prejudices in the State against all corporations.

I was brought into somewhat close relations with him because of the earnest support I gave, in both the house and senate, to inaugurate a more liberal State policy that would increase our railways, multiply wealth and add immensely to the prosperity of the State. The financial revulsion of 1857 continued to paralyze industry and trade until business was quickened soon after the inauguration of the Civil War.

Some time about 1861 when I was a member of the senate, he sent for me to explain the utter impossibility of operating the Philadelphia & Erie Railway to enable the company to pay expenses and the fixed charges on the mortgage of $3,000,000 held by the State. There was no desire on his part to take any advantage of the Commonwealth for the benefit of his company, but the outlook for business was exceedingly discouraging, and while the Civil War was not generally expected, it was assumed in all channels of industry and trade that there would be

continued sectional agitation and distrust for years, which must result in continued restraint on any advancement toward prosperity.

He said that he believed it to be his duty to allow the State mortgage to be foreclosed and the road sold, which would have resulted in a very large loss to the State. It was at a period when the struggle for a more liberal railroad and corporation policy was making substantial progress, and I assured him that the sale of the Philadelphia & Erie, and the failure of the State to realize the full amount of its mortgage that had been so distinctly promised by all who advocated the sale of the State canals to the Erie corporation, would cause such a popular revulsion against railways and corporations generally, and especially against the Pennsylvania, that it would be much less costly to his corporate interests to suffer serious loss in the Philadelphia & Erie for years, than to foreclose with heavy loss to the Commonwealth.

He was most profoundly impressed with the danger to all his great railroad enterprises, and I remember him telling me that it seriously disturbed even his sleep. He said that it had lately brought to him a dream that greatly distressed him, as it presented him facing a bottomless chasm with no hope of escape. Colonel Scott was then vice-president, and Mr. Thompson's close adviser. After a full discussion of the subject he took a more hopeful view, and Mr. Thompson reluctantly assented to dismissing the idea of foreclosing the Philadelphia & Erie.

There never was a more fortunate combination than that of Thompson and Scott in the many struggles which confronted the Pennsylvania Railroad Company after Mr. Thompson's election. Thompson was naturally conservative, but his conservatism was well leavened with practical progress. He rendered a

service to the great corporation that no other man could have given at the time. He was thoroughly equipped for all the varied needs of the railway, alike in engineering, operating and financiering, and when he began to reach the fruition of his wise direction after a decade of service he was accepted throughout the country as the foremost of our great railroad men.

The elder Vanderbilt had won fortune and success by the combination of weak railways and the intelligent perfection of a great system, but Thompson controlled only a single line in the State and was compelled to create all the tributaries needed to make it the great artery of Pennsylvania traffic. He lived to see his great corporation attain an unexpected measure of prosperity, and its profits became so great that a large extra stock dividend was declared.

Thompson was the conservative balance wheel that carefully regulated Scott's rapid development of a great trunk system. He kept his great corporation in the very forefront of railway advancement. So comprehensive were his plans for increased betterments and extensions in 1874 at the time of his death, all of which had been planned before the revulsion that began in 1873 was seriously felt, that one of the first acts of the board of directors after his death was to suspend some ten to twelve millions of improvements then in progress.

They had not been inconsiderately undertaken. The revulsion that began in 1873 was generally believed to be but a temporary disturbance in financial circles, and it was upon that theory that President Thompson proceeded, but in the early summer of 1874 continued liquidation throughout the country and in Europe created serious revulsion in finance and trade that continued to increase, paralyzing all the channels of industry and commerce, until it culminated in the terrible

riots of 1877, when a mob burned several millions of railroad property in Pittsburg, and Philadelphia narrowly escaped anarchy.

President Thompson finished his great work during several years of seriously broken health, and he stands to-day in the history of the corporation, and in the convictions of the great State whose wealth and grandeur he so largely aided in developing, as the man who laid the broad foundations for the wonderful superstructure that is now the greatest railway system of the world.

Thomas A. Scott was the logical successor of President Thompson, as they had stood shoulder to shoulder in advancing their great railway system for nearly half a generation, and he was chosen president at the first meeting of the board after the death of his predecessor, June 3, 1874. I knew Colonel Scott at an early period of his career, and I feel safe in saying that when occasion came to call out all his great attributes, as was the case in the Civil War, he developed as the greatest administrator of the age, and he was as keen in perception as he was great in execution.

He, and he alone, revolutionized the corporation policy of the State, and he did it because he possessed all the qualities necessary to crystallize men about him in every section, and enlist their earnest efforts in support of a beneficent system of progress. He may be justly credited as the one who first conceived and mainly executed the extension of the Pennsylvania system by lease and purchase until it had a completed through line, with superb terminal facilities, from New York to Chicago.

Looking over his work at this day and the remarkable progress that has grown out of the system he inaugurated, his extension of the Pennsylvania corporation would not seem to be an extraordinary

George B. Roberts

achievement; but when it is considered how feeble were the resources of the Pennsylvania Railroad at that day, and what grave responsibilities had to be assumed on the faith of future development of trade, the extension of the Pennsylvania was one of the most heroic business achievements of the century.

When he finally accomplished the lease of the Camden and Amboy, giving a through line to New York with terminal facilities, which could hardly have been acquired outside of that corporation, he startled business and financial circles, and President Thompson hesitated many weeks before he signed the lease; but he was finally induced to hasten its execution by the well-founded apprehension that even a larger rental would be offered by the Reading for the lines to New York.

While Thompson was a master in planting the firm foundation for our great railway system, Scott was the tireless and heroic architect who hastened the creation of the structure, and is fairly entitled to the credit for the conception and execution of the policy that has made the Pennsylvania Railroad Company the greatest of all our railway systems.

Colonel Scott was a man of wonderful versatility. His capabilities thoroughly equipped him to make a great military commander or to reach the highest rank of statesmanship or diplomacy, and he was one of the most sagacious of politicians.

The night after the battle of Bull Run, when all were demoralized in Washington, Scott, then Assistant Secretary of War, was the one man who stood in the forefront with President Lincoln, General Scott, Secretary Cameron and others around him, and his heroic movements for the safety of the Capital, usually without waiting for advice or consultation, commanded such a measure of admiration from General Scott that he urged the assistant secretary to accept a high com-

mand in the army. He was a man of wonderful physical vigor, of compact and symmetrical form, and capable of most extraordinary endurance.

I remember when the North was cut off from Washington by the Baltimore riots, and the State authorities were without information from Washington for two or three days; troops were hurried forward over the Pennsylvania, and I saw him sit by a single battery in the State Capitol for thirty-six hours, without sleep or rest, during which time he ran every train of the Pennsylvania Railroad west of Harrisburg out on schedule time, exclusively by his own orders, and never kept a record of the location of different trains.

Sleep was impossible at a time of such appalling peril, but the severe strain of running every train on 250 miles of railroad by telegraphic orders would have broken an ordinary man. He was a master politician, and for nearly twenty years, beginning with 1860, he enjoyed the personal confidence of the leaders of State and nation of every political faith, and neither of the two great parties ever nominated an important State ticket without very full conference with Scott.

His career as president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, beginning in 1874 just when the revulsion of 1873 was making itself severely felt, and ending in 1880 before there was any recovery of material prosperity, marked no great advance in the progress of the corporation, as existing conditions required a scrupulously careful and economical direction of the railway interests.

His great work had been accomplished with Mr. Thompson, and as president he was compelled to struggle continuously with prostrated business and industrial interests. Sadly broken health compelled him to resign his office June 1, 1880, and on the 21st of May, 1881, death gave him the rest that life had long refused to him.

George B. Roberts was the natural successor of President Scott and was unanimously chosen on the 1st of June, 1880. He held the position commanding the unbounded confidence of his railway associates and of financial interests throughout the world. He was a trained engineer, strongly inclined to conservatism, and was certainly the most capable man to fill the presidency during the particular period in which he served.

The strain on railway interests had been very severe, requiring the most conservative direction, and with the exception of a brief period of somewhat improved industrial conditions beginning in 1882, he was confronted with the drags of the revulsion of 1873, and was compelled to pass through the more severe general paralysis of industry and trade beginning in 1893.

He was a man of different type from Colonel Scott, and probably would not have conceived and executed the extension of the great corporation when Scott did, but he was the ablest man of all to operate the great railway system in times of severe trial, and yet when occasion clearly demanded heroic action he was fully equal to it, as was exhibited in his successful capture of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad, when young Garrett, of the Baltimore & Ohio, believed that he was about to consummate its purchase; and also in his building of the Pennsylvania line through the Schuylkill Valley, as not only a measure of protection, but as a warning to competitors who were continually breaking faith and reducing the revenues of the company by unnecessary and ruinous reductions of rates.

He was a man of the sternest integrity, pre-eminent in all the qualities of an engineer, and his ripe experience in administrative affairs enabled him to write a record as president of the company for the period of

seventeen years, that will make his personality and his achievements long memorable in railway and business circles. His special attention was given not only to the wise and careful financing of the interests under his charge and to their protection against the assaults of rival systems, but to the development of the territory tributary to the main line and the construction of feeders, that built up its enormous local traffic and have made its prosperity largely independent of the fluctuations of through business.

Frank Thomson, then first vice-president of the company, was unanimously chosen to succeed Mr. Roberts as president on the 30th of February, 1897, but his untimely death, within a very few years after he had entered upon his new duties, gave him only a brief career to display his abilities in the direction of the greatest railway enterprise of the country.

He was not in any degree a kinsman of J. Edgar Thompson, and won his rapid advancement in the corporation by exhibiting in every position to which he was called the highest measure of administrative qualities. He had served a regular apprenticeship in the Altoona shops of the company, and was thus able to master all the varied details of equipment and transportation. When the Civil War began he was not yet twenty years of age, but Colonel Scott, who had been called to Washington to take charge of the military railways and telegraphs of the United States, chose Mr. Thomson as his chief assistant, and he exhibited extraordinary ability. He was often compelled to act without opportunity for consultation, but no emergency arose to which he did not appear to be equal, and often regardless of the limited resources at his command. He was soon accepted as absolute authority in all railroad movements for military purposes.

He exhibited all the quick perception and swift

Frank Thomson

execution of his great chief to whom he was romantically attached. When desperate movements were made in the early part of the war which might require the rapid repair of railways, Mr. Thomson would accompany the army, sharing every privation. When an army of 20,000 men had to be transported from the East to rescue our besieged forces at Chattanooga, Mr. Thomson was put in charge of the lines south of Nashville, where the greatest difficulties and dangers were to be met, and he startled the besieging enemy that regarded Rosecrans as absolutely within its grasp, by suddenly hurling a great army in itself to the relief of our cooped-up and starving soldiers.

In 1864 he resigned his direction of the military railways, as he had trained a very competent force equal to all the duties required, and took his first position with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company as superintendent of the Eastern division of the Philadelphia & Erie. Later he headed the management of the Oil Creek Railroad, one of the most important lines in the State; in March, 1873, became superintendent of motive power for the Pennsylvania Company; was promoted to general manager of the entire Pennsylvania system east of Pittsburg, to the second vice-presidency in 1882, to the first vice-presidency in 1888, and on February 3, 1897, succeeded Mr. Roberts as president of the company.

He was a thoroughly trained master alike in the construction, operating and mechanical departments of his railway, was familiar with the most minute details and workings of every channel of his great enterprise, and was accomplished and tactful in meeting all the many great questions presented for solution by one of the greatest corporations of the world. No condition arose during his presidency offering opportunity to test his ability in meeting any great departure in the

railway policy of the country, but he fulfilled every duty of his high office with consummate ability, and his unexpected death brought sorrow not only to the community generally, but a profound sense of personal bereavement to all of the scores of thousands connected with the great corporation from the highest to the humblest.

Alexander J. Cassatt, who succeeded Mr. Thomson, has developed the third great epoch in the history of the Pennsylvania corporation. The first was created by J. Edgar Thompson, who laid the great foundation for the present grandest of all railway systems, after a full decade of desperate struggle against adverse prejudice which at times exhibited malignant hostility. The second was largely the creation of Colonel Scott, who inaugurated the immense extensions of the Pennsylvania lines, and the third has been created by President Cassatt, who has made a new departure as heroic, even in the present progressive age, as was Colonel Scott's conception and execution of his great trunk line policy forty years ago. Like all the great architects of the greatest and best organized railway system of any country, Mr. Cassatt started at the lower round of the ladder in his work, and won his advancement solely by his pre-eminent abilities.

I first met him when he was a rodman on the Philadelphia division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, but he soon won the title of assistant engineer, then resident engineer, superintendent of the Warren & Franklin Railroad, superintendent of motive power and machinery on the Philadelphia & Erie and later on the Pennsylvania, general manager of all the Pennsylvania lines east of Pittsburg and Erie, third vice-president and first vice-president, in all of which positions he exhibited the highest tvpe of administrative capacity.

A. J. Cassatt

In 1882 he resigned the office of first vice-president, not because of any difference in the direction, but because, as he stated at the time, his only object was to be released from the exacting responsibilities which he had seen destroy the vigor of a number of his associates. He loved his home, his farm, his horses, and he wanted rest. I well remember his discussion of the subject at the time of his retirement, when he spoke most feelingly of the sacrifices which had been made of health, and even of life, in building up the great Pennsylvania Railroad, and he had decided to escape the penalty of such incessant and wearing service. He continued as a director of the company, and was the close adviser of Presidents Scott, Roberts and Thomson.

The death of President Thomson occurred at a time when new and most important problems were forming and had to be solved by the great railroad men of the country, and Mr. Cassatt was compelled to give a reluctant consent to assume active railroad duties as president. What he has accomplished need not here be presented in any detail. He has gone through the greatest railway struggle of modern times, and has emerged from it with his great system in the most complete condition it has ever been in, with its financial strength equal to all the heavy exactions made upon it without impairment, and the long, fretful and costly problem of cut-rate confusion, that has been so disastrous to solvent railroads for many years, has been finally solved.

The new epoch that President Cassatt has created required a call for $90,000,000 to tunnel into New York and make his great system safe for fair dealing and fair rates. It was a movement at once heroic in conception and execution, but the absolute confidence of his security holders, of financiers and of the general business public, gave him prompt and complete suc-

cess when very many of the great corporations of the country were in need of financial aid and unable to command it. His new policy is now an accomplished fact, and his 11,000 miles of transportation lines, whose annual earnings are nearly treble the entire revenues of the nation when Lincoln became President, are to-day more securely anchored to assure permanent and liberal results to the security holders, than it has ever been in all its past history, under the leadership of the first railroad man of the world.

XV.

THE PHILADELPHIA AND READING.

Originally Chartered in 1833—Designed Solely as a Coal Line—Originally not Constructed for Passenger Traffic — John Tucker, the Thomas A. Scott of the Reading — Charles E. Smith's Presidency — Service Rendered the Government During the Civil War — Stock Fluctuated from 82⅞, in 1864, to $1.25 in 1896 — Franklin B. Gowan, the Brilliant Railway Man, Ahead of his Time — President McLeod's Struggle — Chief Justice Paxson Resigns to become a Reading Receiver in 1893 — Rescued from Bankruptcy and Restored to a Sound Basis by President George F. Baer.

I HAVE stated that the administration of Governor Shunk witnessed the advent of the railroad to assert its mastery in the matter of transportation. He signed the charter for the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the first through line that was ever attempted on a solid basis. There were several railways constructed before that period, including the Philadelphia & Reading, the Philadelphia & Columbia, the Philadelphia & Norristown, the Cumberland Valley and other fragments which have since been absorbed in great lines, but none of them contemplated a through line of railway from the eastern seacoast to the waters of the Ohio.

Of these the only one of vital importance in the development of the industry and trade of the State was the Reading. It was originally chartered in 1833 with authority to build a railway line from Philadelphia to Reading. The single object of this railway was to reach the anthracite coal region. The line was expected to be completed from Philadelphia to Pottsville by connection with the Little Schuylkill

Navigation Railroad and Coal Company chartered in 1826, with a supplemental charter in 1829, authorizing it to extend its railroad to Reading.

By merging with several local companies, and an enlargement of its charter in 1838, a continuous line from Philadelphia to Pottsville was completed in 1842. No thought of making the Reading part of a through line, or of adapting it to general passenger business, seems to have been entertained by those who labored so industriously against fearfully adverse circumstances to create it.

The road bed was graded only twenty-two feet wide, sufficient for a double track coal road, as passenger traffic was regarded as simply an incident, and the entire line was constructed on dead level or downgrade from the coal mines to the city of Philadelphia, so that the motive power required to take the empty cars back from the city to the coal mines was sufficient to bring the same cars loaded to the market. So rapidly did the coal trade increase that the early laying of a double track became a necessity.

The space between the tracks was only four feet, which did not permit of the passage of ordinary passenger cars. As the passenger traffic grew into some importance, special passenger cars had to be built with a seat for two on one side of the aisle, and one on the other. It was not until 1862 that the tracks were moved sufficiently apart to permit the passage of passenger cars of ordinary width, and in 1885 an additional foot was added between the lines.

The necessary increase in the trackage of the line involved the company heavily in debt, and Mr. John Cryder, president of the company, went to Europe to obtain a loan of several millions, but was unsuccessful in his efforts. Mr. John Tucker, whom I met many times as president of the Reading, and well

remember the distinguished service he rendered the country as successor to Colonel Scott in charge of the military railroads and transportation, was then the active salesman of a large Philadelphia importing house, the head of which was interested in the Reading, and he advised President Cryder to send Tucker to England as the best man to accomplish the loan.

When he appeared in London the financial men of that staid, conservative city were extremely shy about meeting a boy unknown in finance in a transaction of such importance, but he gradually won his way with them, and secured the loan in 1844, and was soon thereafter elected president of the company. In one year he had the second track completed, and two years thereafter, in January, 1847, the Reading paid its first dividend of 10 per cent. to its stockholders.

There was a gradual paralysis of business beginning early in the 50's that culminated in the panic and general suspension of 1857. President Tucker was regarded by the more conservative investors as somewhat reckless as a financier, and the result was his retirement in 1856, when Richard D. Cullen was elected president, and in October, 1857, the Reading Railway suspended payment with the general suspension that followed the closing of President Alibone's Bank of Pennsylvania.

In 1860 Asa Whitney succeeded to the presidency, but served only a single year. In 1861 Mr. Charles E. Smith succeeded to the head of the corporation just after the attack on Fort Sumter, and he held the position during the entire period of the war, and for several years thereafter. He rendered a very great service to the government by his prompt supply of anthracite coal for government purposes.

At one time in 1862 when both anthracite coal and

transportation were not equal to the demand, as the government was using 10,000 tons a day, he had to give preference to the government contractors, often to the sore experience of manufacturers, and had to trust the government until the indebtedness for transportation reached nearly $1,000,000, which was finally paid in seven-thirty bonds.

The war period brought the high water-mark of prosperity to the Reading Railway. On April 7, 1864, its stock sold on the market at 82⅝ per share. A 15 per cent. dividend had been declared in November of that year, which was paid in stock as the money, although fully earned, was needed to increase the facilities of the corporation.

The strange fluctuations and ragged career of the Reading Railway Company is exhibited in the sale of its stock in 1864 at 82⅝ on $50 paid, and on January 10, 1896, after an assessment of $10 per share had been paid in a former reorganization, the stock sold in Philadelphia at $1.25 per share on $60 paid. President Smith did not lose sight of the fact that he was dealing with an inflated currency, and when he issued stock dividends he paid out the shares on the basis of $50 in gold.

His financial policy was severely criticised, and he then adopted the policy of giving his shareholders the choice of accepting the dividends in cash paid in lawful currency, or receiving the dividends in stock on a gold basis, and nearly all of the shareholders accepted the stock. So successful was his corporation that in 1865, when the government was willing to receive money on call and pay 6 per cent. for it, he made a deposit of $2,500,000 with the United States Treasurer, and some time thereafter, having occasion to purchase some $300,000 worth of rolling stock, he called upon the United States Treasurer for that

George F. Burr

proportion of his deposit, and was greatly surprised when the Treasurer informed him that he couldn't pay it. He begged President Smith to try and make other arrangements.

It is not surprising that the government was short of money at that time, notwithstanding its extraordinary resources from bonds and taxes, as the war was then costing nearly or quite $4,000,000 a day. Smith's company was in excellent credit, and he made a temporary loan from the Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, and paid it at expiration of sixty days. It stands out very distinctly to the credit of President Smith that this loan from the Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank was the only floating debt he ever contracted as president of the Reading Railroad Company during his management of that great corporation, beginning May 1, 1861, and ending with his resignation in July, 1869, when he was succeeded by Franklin B. Gowen.

President Smith was a man of very quiet manners, of the sternest integrity, and certainly proved his great capacity as the manager of what had become a most important railway corporation. He retired because pressure came for a new departure in the Reading railway system, one of wild expansion that could not but be fearfully dangerous when undertaken in the high tide of inflation, and from the time of his retirement until his death he had no release from the distress that the new policy of the company gave him.

He was a constant visitor at the Union League, where he was a prominent member, and in the highest tide of apparent prosperity under President Gowen, he constantly and with intense interest deplored the headlong strides of the new policy to destruction, and he lived to see his worst prophesies crystallized in the saddest annals of our financial revulsions.

The retirement of President Smith brought to the surface one of the most brilliant and most unfortunate of our great railway men in the person of Franklin B. Gowen. He had been eminently successful at the bar and had his training in the heart of the anthracite region. He was a man of unusually fine presence, with a face of uncommon manly beauty, heroic in purpose and brilliant in execution, and all who were in immediate contact with him soon fully shared his grand anticipations of future wealth by the expenditure of many millions in the purchase of coal mines, and organizing a coal company that has rarely if ever presented a gratifying balance sheet to the shareholders.

In 1875 when I was chief editor of "The Times," and giving special attention to the paralysis that was creeping upon all business and industrial channels since the beginning of the panic of 1873, I called upon President Gowen and urged him to reduce his dividends. I had been entirely convinced from many conversations I had had with ex-President Smith that the Reading Company could not continue to pay 8 per cent. dividends unless there should be a speedy revival of business.

Many of our industrial establishments were then curtailing their production. The wages of labor were being gradually reduced, and I made an earnest appeal to President Gowen to reduce his dividends on the single ground that the industries of the country could not afford to make such contribution to his corporation as would enable him to pay the large dividend. I well remember the silver tone of his laugh as he informed me in his fascinating way that he owed it to his stockholders, who had not received regular dividends, to pay at least 8 per cent., and he closed his remarks by saying that at a certain season of the year he could earn it in a month or six weeks.

In addition to becoming the owner of immense beds of coal to furnish future freights, he extended his line by the lease of the North Pennsylvania Railroad in 1879, and as that company then held the Delaware & Bound Brook Railroad under lease, he reached the New York market with terminal facilities in Jersey City, but one year later, on May 21, 1880, the long gathering storm broke, and he gave up the road to a receivership.

Franklin B. Gowen wrote a very remarkable record in the history of Pennsylvania progress. Like many other men he was in advance of his time, and but for the large coal properties the corporation now owns, and which precipitated the company into bankruptcy, the present comparatively prosperous condition of the corporation, and its great promise of permanent prosperity in the future, would not exist.

He was one of the most accomplished trial lawyers of the Pennsylvania bar, and his prosecution, conviction and final execution of the Molly Maguire murderers, whose political power had given them every promise of immunity when they were prisoners at the bar, stands out high over all the legal attainments recorded in the jurisprudence of the State.

Notwithstanding his failure in 1880, there was universal confidence in the personal integrity of Gowen, and a decided majority of those interested in the corporation re-elected him president in 1882, but his resources were impaired, his credit broken, and he was compelled to retire again in 1884, and George DeB. Keim was chosen president, but in six months thereafter was compelled to yield to a second receivership.

In January, 1886, Mr. Gowen was again, for the third time, called to the presidency. There was faith in the man, faith in his unfaltering belief, in his great

work and in himself, but he was confronted with insuperable obstacles, and after serving nine months he was compelled to confess that he could not rehabilitate his great corporation. He retired and was succeeded by Austin Corbin, whose advent was followed by an assessment of $10 a share. This simply gave a little fresh financial vigor to the corporation, without placing it anywhere in sight of a solid basis.

Corbin struggled for four years without success, when he gave way to A. A. McLeod, who started out on what seemed to be a most brilliant career, leasing the Lehigh Valley, Central Railroad of New Jersey, extending his lines throughout the entire length of New England, and making himself president of one of the largest systems of the continent, but he had a very brief season of apparent success, as in less than three years from the time he entered upon the office of president, the third financial storm broke over the ill-fated Reading, the share and security holders of the Reading alone losing $40,000,000 in a single week.

The corporation was then placed in the hands of receivers, and Chief Justice Paxson, of our supreme court, resigned his position to serve as president of the board of three receivers, as it was then generally accepted that the corporation must remain in the hands of receivers until it could be placed upon a sound financial basis. In December, 1895, another assessment of $10 a share was levied upon the stock, and in 1896 the whole property of the corporation was sold by order of the United States Circuit Court, and reorganized under the franchise of its old charter, and the name changed to Reading Railway Company.

After President Gowen's second attempt to rehabilitate the company, and after he had been called to the presidency for the third time, he seemed to have

given up all hope of ever reaching the fulfillment of his bright dreams of the success of the enterprise to which he had devoted the best years of his life with unfaltering fidelity. He ceased to be a factor in Reading affairs and was unknown and unfelt in its direction.

I saw him many times in the retirement that he then sought as he quietly devoted himself to the practice of his profession, when he would visibly struggle to bring the old fascinating smile back on his finely molded face, but he could not conceal the heartsore that was steadily draining his vitals, and I was not greatly surprised one morning, when on a visit to Washington, where I met him the evening before, to learn that in a moment of utter despair, with his own hand, he had sent the deadly bullet crashing into his own brain.

In 1893 the Reading Railway went into the hands of Chief Justice Edward W. Paxon, Joseph S. Harris and John Lowber Welsh, as receivers, with Harris as president of the company. Two unsuccessful attempts had been made to obtain control of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, and thereby secure a line of railway to New York. Both Mr. Gowen and Mr. McLeod failed in their efforts, because the plan of leasing was declared illegal. In the winter of 1900 Mr. George F. Baer advised a purchase of a majority of stock of the Central Railroad of New Jersey by the Reading Company. This was done in December, 1900.

Mr. Harris continued as president of the company until 1901, when he was succeeded by George F. Baer, the present incumbent, who brought to his position preeminent ability and executive qualities, the ripest legal training and practical business experience, with a thorough knowledge of all the ramifications of the Reading system.

He was born in the mountains of Somerset County in 1842. At the age of thirteen he learned the printing trade in the office of the Somerset "Democrat." Later, with his brother Henry, he became the owner of the paper. His brother enlisted when the war began, and he remained at home for a year, during which time he conducted the paper and studied law at night. A year later, when he was twenty years of age, he raised a company of volunteers, was chosen captain, hastened to the front, and served in Humphrey's division of the Army of the Potomac, and participated in all the engagements of that army, beginning with the second battle of Bull Run and ending at Chancellorsville, where he was detailed as adjutant general of the Second Brigade.

He returned from the war in 1864, resumed his legal studies, was admitted to the Bar, and in 1868 he removed to Reading, where he rapidly rose to distinction in his profession. In 1870 he became local counsel for the Reading Company, and for a number of years managed its great iron property in that city with great success. He soon became a director of the company, but he differed from President McLeod in his rapid expansion policy and resigned from the management. He had for years been the confidential legal adviser of J. Pierpont Morgan in all matters relating to his Pennsylvania interests, and when the new reorganization was completed, in April, 1901, he was chosen president of the Reading Company and also of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey.

He is in hearty accord with the general railroad policy of the country that has perfected railroad combinations which give some assurance of safety to the thousands of millions of railway securities held by the people of this country, and with him at the head of this corporation the highest measure

of public confidence is commanded for its future. He has been more largely in public evidence during the labor and railway troubles of late years than any of the other railroad magnates, and he was made so not only because his company was more immediately interested, but because he was regarded as the safest representative of his class to meet the new and threatening conditions which confronted it.

He was at times criticised as needlessly bold in his utterences, but he has not given a public expression relating to the trouble which confronted transportation companies that was not well considered, and that was not wisely made. He is very thorough in all the details of whatever business is entrusted to him; thoroughly safe and conservative, without the narrowness that is so often associated with those qualities, and there is not a railroad president in the country who more thoroughly understands the resources and capabilities of his corporation, or who could give more intelligent, tireless devotion to the performance of his official trust.

With his important system protected from the policy of irresponsible cut-throats, as now seems to be accomplished, the holders of Reading securities have the best assurance that their great property is certain to advance steadily in prosperity, assuring the best results alike to the public and to investors.

The Reading Railway, although in advance of the Pennsylvania Company, was a close second to the now greatest of our railway corporations in establishing the mastery of railway transportation in Pennsylvania, and the company that was founded with the single idea of having a downhill railway from the anthracite coal region to the Philadelphia market, now not only ramifies into every center of the anthracite region, but has its through line to the lakes, to

the great commercial emporium of New York, and to the seashore at Atlantic City.

With all the rapid growth of railroad development it stands second in our great Commonwealth in the wonderful achievements begun in 1846 to change our transportation system from the turnpike and canal to the railway train, until the song of the iron horse is heard in almost every valley and on every hill top of Pennsylvania.

Governors under Constitution of 1838

William F. Packer

Andrew G. Curtin John W. Geary

John F. Hartranft

XVI.

GOVERNORS SHUNK AND JOHNSTON.

Shunk Re-elected in 1847—Johnston Chosen a Whig Senator at same Election—Whig Contest for Governor between General Irvin and Representative Cooper—Irvin Nominated and Defeated—Shunk's Health Broken into Hopeless Decline in Winter of 1848—Johnston made Speaker of the Senate at close of his First Session because he was Preferred for Governor—Shunk Resigned on a Sunday, the Last Day he could Resign to bring an Election the Same Year —Johnston became Governor—Nominated by the Whigs and Elected over Morris Longstreth by 297 Majority.

GOVERNOR SHUNK was unanimously nominated for re-election in 1847. His strength with the people was confessed by the Whigs, as Shunk was well known throughout the State as a thoroughly honest Governor and he commended himself to public favor by his severely unostentatious exhibition of authority. He was averse to innovations of any kind; would have been appalled at any suggestion of violent progress, and he taught and sincerely believed that the simplest government, the government that governed least, was always the best. The Democrats, still smarting under the severe defeat of 1846, realized that they had a desperate battle before them to re-elect Shunk in 1847. The Democratic organization of that day was led by men of great ability with ripe experience in politics, and with a fidelity to the party interests that is seldom seen in the modern management of the organization.

The Whigs were very confident of defeating Shunk and winning control of the State government, and a very animated contest was made for the Whig

nomination by the friends of ex-Congressman James Cooper, of Adams, and of ex-Congressman James Irvin, of Centre. Cooper was then speaker of the house and had previously served in Congress. He was a very ready and much more than ordinarily strong debater and was pointed to by the Whigs generally as one of the few able campaigners of the party. His cause was championed by the more aggressive Whigs, who insisted that the old rule of keeping candidates under cover during campaigns should be abandoned and that Cooper should be given the flag of the party with the assurance that he would canvass the State on the hustings from Lake Erie to the Delaware.

Cooper was a native of Maryland, but had located at Gettysburg soon after he was admitted to the bar, had practised there when Stevens was at the zenith of his power, and he very heartily entered into the contest for the Whig nomination, openly declaring that the candidate should make his plea directly to the people in every part of the State. General Irvin was an ironmaster of considerable wealth at that time, although he died poor some years later. He was a man of high character, of broad, practical intelligence, but painfully modest on public occasions, and could not deliver a campaign speech.

The contest between Irvin and Cooper was one of the most earnest in the history of the Whig party. It was conceded that Cooper could take the stump, while Irvin could not, but it was clained by Irvin's friends that he most distinctly represented the industrial interests of the State which had been prostrated by the tariff of 1846, and that sentiment finally prevailed by a decided majority. The election of delegates in the city of Philadelphia was held but a short time before the meeting of the con-

vention; the business men of the city gave nearly a united support to Irvin and he carried nearly, if not quite, a solid delegation. The decision of Philadelphia ended the contest and Irvin was nominated on the first ballot. Cooper appeared in the convention and declared that he would look above the candidate to the flag of the party and give his best efforts to win the victory.

The Whig party had many highly respectable leaders, but at no time in its history in Pennsylvania could the Whig leaders cope with the Democratic leaders in practical politics. Indeed, the Whig party was the most delectable organization that ever existed. It was so highly respectable that it seldom won elections, but was pre-eminent in leading an opposition to Democratic authority. Had the Whigs made an aggressive campaign in 1847 it is quite likely that they would have won out, but they committed the strange and fatal blunder of deciding upon a very quiet canvass, assuming that the industrial people of the State were sufficiently interested to vote without great demonstrations, and hoping thereby to get the Democratic party at an advantage, as it would be lulled into security by the apparent inactivity of the Whigs.

Thomas E. Franklin, of Lancaster, later attorney general, was chairman of the Whig State committee, and did little more than send circulars to the county and district leaders of the State, advising them to make no demonstration of aggressive interest in the campaign, but to quietly see that the Whig voters were brought to the polls. The Democrats were then, as they have always been when the Democratic party was in anything approaching a hopeful condition, natural voters, and voted much more readily than the Whigs. The result was that the Democrats

aroused their voters, brought them squarely into line, and re-elected Shunk by over 17,000 majority.

This election brought very prominently into public life William F. Johnston, of Armstrong County. He was originally a Democrat, and was elected to the house in 1840 as an Independent Democrat opposed to the financial policy of Van Buren. During the session of 1841, when the credit of the State trembled in the balance, he became the most aggressive leader of those who battled for the maintenance of State credit, and he was largely the author of the novel relief measure that was passed in 1841, and which solved the problem of maintaining the credit of the Commonwealth. He acted with the Whig party after that period, and in 1847 was nominated by the Whigs for the senate in a district that was strongly Democratic, but his personal popularity and adroit political management gave him the victory.

I well remember the attention that his appearance attracted in the senate when the body met in January, 1848. He was altogether the most imposing and attractive personality of the body, and, although there were many other able Whig leaders in the senate, he was deferred to as a leader from the first, and he became the practical leader of the majority of the body rather by invitation than by assumption.

The senate at the close of the session elected a speaker to serve during the recess, so that in case of a vacancy in the office of the Governor the speaker of the senate could succeed to the executive chair. It was an almost universal custom to elect as speaker at the close of each session one who had served two terms, and thus would be eligible to re-election at the meeting of the next Legislature and serve his last session as speaker of the body.

In no instance that I can recall had any party in

the senate before that time chosen as speaker at the end of the session a senator who was serving only in his first year; but new conditions arose soon after the meeting of the Legislature by the evident rapid decline of the health of Governor Shunk. Soon after his re-election, in the previous October, he developed an affection of the lungs, and the disease ran a rapid course, so that before the close of the session in the spring of 1848 it was universally accepted that in choosing the speaker of the senate to serve during the recess the man so chosen would become Governor of the State.

It was a rare compliment to Senator Johnston to find the old Whig leaders, with ripe legislative experience, give way to him for the speakership solely because he was regarded as the man most eminently fitted to fill the executive chair. This consideration, and this alone, called Johnston to the speakership of the body at the close of the session, and within two months after the adjournment the death of Governor Shunk called Johnston to the executive office.

Shunk had rapidly declined in health until the 9th of July, when a sudden and severe hemorrhage of the lungs utterly prostrated him and indicated unmistakably that he had but a few hours to live. It was Sunday and the last day on which Governor Shunk could vacate the Governorship to assure an election for his successor at the next annual election in October. The Constitution required that the vacancy must occur at least three calendar months before election day to enable the people to fill the office at the next general election, and July 9 was just three calendar months before the October election.

Governor Shunk was in the possession of all his mental faculties and fully understood that his end was close at hand, and he dictated his letter of resigna-

tion. It was written, I believe, by the Rev. Dr. DeWitt, then the leading Presbyterian minister of Harrisburg.

The following is the text of the resignation:

To the People of Pennsylvania:

It having pleased Divine Providence to deprive me of the strength necessary to further discharge the duties of your Chief Magistrate, to lay me on a bed of sickness from which I am admonished by my physicians and my own increasing debility that I am in all human probability never to arise, I resolve, upon mature reflection, under a conviction of duty, on this day to restore to you the trust with which your suffrages have clothed me, in order that you may avail yourselves of the provisions of the Constitution to choose a successor at the next general election. I, therefore, hereby resign the office of Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and direct this, my resignation, to be filed in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

The resignation was promptly filed with the secretary of the commonwealth, and the office of the Governor at once became vacant. Had Governor Shunk not resigned that day Johnston would have served as Governor for a year and a half, and the resignation met the universal desire of the Democratic leaders to choose a Governor at the coming October election, not doubting that they could succeed in a Presidential year; but the result proved that the year thus fixed by Shunk's resignation for the election of Governor was the only one in many years when Johnston could have been successful.

Although the gubernatorial office became vacant on the 9th of July, Speaker Johnston did not appear at Harrisburg until the 26th, leaving a period of seventeen days in which Pennsylvania was absolutely without a Chief Executive. The same provision of the Constitution that provided for an election of State officers where vacancies occurred three months before the general fall election, was mandatory upon the

acting Governor to issue the writ for an election, and the statute enacted to carry these provisions of the Constitution into effect also provided that "the writ must be issued at least three calendar months before the election." Thus while Governor Shunk's resignation was fully three calendar months before the October election, there was no acting Governor on that day to issue the writ, and any day thereafter the new Governor could issue the writ only in direct conflict with the act of assembly.

It is quite probable that Governor Johnston could have been entirely successful in taking advantage of this statutory conflict with the fundamental law to continue himself in the office of Governor for one year beyond the time he would serve as speaker of the senate if an election were held at the October election. He could not issue the writ until after he had qualified as Governor, and after giving the subject careful consideration he decided that the Constitution was paramount and that it was his duty to issue the writ on the assumption that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the rights of the people.

When Shunk died and Johnston became Governor the universal Whig sentiment of the State called for his nomination. Under all ordinary conditions Mr. Cooper, who had been defeated the year before by General Irvin, would have been the Whig candidate for Governor without a serious contest, but the fact that the Whigs of the senate had departed from the established custom of the body to make a senator, in his first year of service, speaker of the body solely because he stood over all in qualifications for the gubernatorial chair, prevailed universally among the people, and Johnston was nominated as the Whig candidate for election by a unanimous vote.

He showed his disposition to harmonize the Whig

element by appointing James Cooper attorney general, in which position Cooper served until the next Legislature met in January, 1849, where he appeared again as a representative from Adams, and was again chosen speaker.

The contest for Governor in 1848 was one of the most earnest struggles in the history of the State. It was conducted on both sides on a very much higher plane than had been common in Pennsylvania politics. Johnston was his own leader and his own party manager. He was the first candidate for Governor who planned and carried into execution a systematic canvass, meeting the people and speaking in nearly every county. His presence was most commanding, his excellent knowledge of the people enabled him to fraternize with them much to his advantage, and his plain, incisive presentation of both State and National questions made him one of the most entertaining and instructive of public speakers. He was a man six feet two inches in height, and largely but symmetrically proportioned, with a florid countenance and features exhibiting exceptional individualty and strength.

Some of the partisan newspapers which felt that a campaign for Governor could not be run without personal scandal invented and published the story that Johnston was a drunkard. I heard him speak in one of the Juniata counties where an immense audience surrounded him on a beautiful afternoon, and after discussing State and National issues, he referred to the scandal that had been invented and published against him. His only answer was, as he drew his magnificent proportions up to their fullest height: "They call me a drunkard; ecce homo." No further argument was needed to settle that scandal.

The Democrats had nominated as his competitor

Morris Longstreth, of Montgomery County, who had been born and reared in the same community with Shunk. He was then canal commissioner, was a competent, faithful and eminently useful member of the board, and his Quaker faith was regarded as greatly in his favor as a canditate. He was a man whose public and private records were absolutely blameless, and the contest was singularly exempt from defamation.

On the ticket with Johnston was Middleswerth as the Whig candidate for canal commissioner. Both were members of the State senate when they were nominated by the State convention, and Johnston had steadily and earnestly supported a measure demanded by the mining and manufacturing regions, for a ten-hour labor law, while Middleswerth had as earnestly opposed it. When the question was before the senate Johnston appealed to Middleswerth to stand with him in support of the measure. Middleswerth represented the German community of Union County where a day's labor was accepted from all as from daylight to dark, and he stubbornly refused to favor any legislation on the subject.

There was then very aggressive agitation in the mining sections of the State for a ten-hour labor law, and Middleswerth's opposition to that law defeated him. Seth Clover, the Democratic candidate, succeeded by some 3,000 majority. The contest for Governor was regarded as in doubt for nearly a week after the election, but Johnston kept very close watch on the returns wherever there were danger signals, and when the counties were all in and finally figured up he was elected by 297 majority, with a Whig Legislature that precluded the possibility of ousting him in a contest.

While the Democrats of the State were divided on

the Presidency, as Wilmot and others of the Free Soil Democrats of the northern counties made an open fight for Van Buren, the Free Soil Democratic candidate against Cass, the regular nominee for President, they were entirely united in support of Morris Longstreth for Governor. Wilmot and his followers took open grounds in favor of Longstreth, and it was a fair, square fight between two highly creditable candidates for Governor. Johnston's personal and aggressive leadership doubtless told materially in his favor, while Longstreth's quiet absence from the forum and the people naturally inspired no enthusiasm in the personality of their candidate.

It was the first political battle in the State in which a candidate for a State office had carried his own cause directly to the people, and Johnston was so superbly equipped for that duty that he certainly wrung victory from defeat by his own individual efforts in the campaign. His administration and general public career will require another full chapter of these notes.

XVII.

GOVERNOR WILLIAM F. JOHNSTON.

One of the Greatest and Ablest Administrators ever Elected Governor—Cooper Elected United States Senator—Early and Bitter Estrangement between Senator and Governor—Interesting Episode in Deal with Senator Best, who Voted for Himself for Speaker—Johnston Unanimously Nominated for Re-election—He made the First Thorough Canvass of the State—Defeated by the Christiana Riots.

THE great victory achieved by Governor Johnston made him the central figure of Pennsylvania politics. He was the first Whig Governor ever chosen by the people of the State, and the only other Whig who filled the gubernatorial chair was Governor Pollock, who was elected by a combination with the new secret American organization, commonly called the Know Nothings, when his two associates on the State ticket, George Darsie for canal commissioner, and Daniel M. Smyser for supreme judge, were both defeated by a large majority. He was looked to as the man who had organized and won his own triumph, and he was very generally accepted by his party as its acknowledged leader and chieftain.

When he was nominated for Governor by a unanimous vote, James Cooper, of Adams, who had been an aggressive candidate against General Irvin in 1847 for the Whig nomination, seeing that his gubernatorial aspirations were utterly hopeless, withdrew from the field, and it was generally understood by the Whig leaders that if Johnston won out and carried the Legislature Cooper should become United States Senator. He was then attorney general under Johnston, but

became a candidate for the house, was elected and was chosen speaker.

The Whigs controlled both branches of the Legislature by moderate majorities, but they had as allies a number of Native American members from Philadelphia, and they for some reason exhibited hostility to Cooper's election. Cooper appealed to Johnston to throw the influence of his administration in favor of Cooper's nomination and election, but Johnston refused, and maintained a strict neutrality in the contest. There were a number of Whig candidates, the most prominent of whom was Thaddeus Stevens, who had been a fellow-practitioner with Cooper for many years at the Adams County bar, but who had just then been elected to Congress from Lancaster, and Cameron, whose place was to be filled in the Senate, was also an earnest candidate, claiming that his support of the tariff policy should command the indorsement of the Whigs.

Cooper was naturally inclined to magnify the movements of those who were not cordially co-operating with him, and to cherish strong resentments. He was very sore over his defeat for Governor in 1847 by General Irvin, and certainly did not relish the sudden advent of Johnston, who burst upon the Whig horizon like a dazzling meteor and thrust all competitors to the rear.

Johnston maintained a dignified neutrality in the senatorial contest, and when Cooper won the nomination, and finally, with much difficulty, attained an election, his hostility to Johnston at once erupted like a fiery volcano.

I called upon him the morning after his election to the Senate to congratulate him on his success, and was surprised to find him break out in passionate denunciation of the Governor. He said it would be a strange

story to tell to the Whigs of Pennsylvania that a Whig United States Senator had to be elected without the aid of a Whig Governor.

From that time until both disappeared from public life Johnston and Cooper moved in unbroken estrangement. It was wholly the fault of Senator Cooper, who could, and certainly should, have co-operated with the administration; but he was a weak man, and speedily proved to all that he was unbalanced by the distinction he had attained. He was a fluent and adroit speaker, but he was not a man of forceful intellect and was greatly lacking in the important attribute for a political leader of well-balanced judgment. He petulantly opposed everything that Johnston proposed, and was naturally defeated in the selection of William M. Meredith for the Taylor cabinet.

Soon after the inauguration of Taylor he nominated William D. Lewis, certainly the foremost merchant of Philadelphia in his day, for collector of the port, and Cooper arrayed himself in desperate hostility to Lewis' confirmation. He was the only Whig Senator from the State, and he felt that he had the power to wreak vengeance upon Governor Johnston by defeating Lewis, but after delaying the confirmation for many weeks and exhausting himself to secure an adverse vote in the Senate, Lewis was finally confirmed by a decided majority, and that defeat of Senator Cooper reduced his influence to the minimum among his fellow Whig Senators.

He was practically unfelt in the Senate during the first eighteen months of his term, when he acquired new importance by the death of President Taylor and the succession of Fillmore. As Johnston and the Whigs generally of the State were hostile to the extension of slavery, and earnestly hostile to the compromise measures, Senator Cooper became at open variance with

his party by supporting the compromise measures of 1850, including the offensive fugitive slave act. As Johnston was defeated for re-election in 1851, Cooper was enabled to exert considerable influence with the Fillmore administration until its close in 1853, but he had neither support nor sympathy from the great mass of the Whigs of Pennsylvania.

At the end of his term, during which there was little in his record to be memorable, he left the State, and resumed his residence at his old home in Maryland. I last saw him at Harrisburg in the early part of the Civil War, when he appeared in Governor Curtin's office wearing a brand new brigadier's uniform. He was evidently broken in health, and had received the appointment of brigadier general of volunteers without expecting to assign him to a command, because it was believed that he might exert some influence in Maryland in the then desperate struggle for secession.

He appealed to Governor Curtin to exert his influence to have him assigned to duty, but the Governor had no position for him, and certainly could not ask for his appointment to the command of troops in the field, and General Cooper returned to Maryland, where he remained awaiting orders for a considerable period, and was finally assigned to duty at Camp Chase, Ohio, where he died in 1863.

Governor Johnston's political mastery in the State was never even seriously threatened by Senator Cooper's hostility, and he was all-powerful with the National administration until the death of Taylor, in July, 1850. When Fillmore suddenly changed the policy of the administration on the question of slavery, by supporting and forcing the passage of the compromise measures of 1850, Johnston did not in any degree conceal his hostility to the entire theory of the measures, and he denounced them openly and defiantly. He

was not only a man of unfaltering courage, but he was a man of the clearest and soundest judgment, and commanded the unbounded confidence of his political followers.

Soon after the passage of the compromise measures Webster, who was Secretary of State, visited Harrisburg and was received by the Governor and State authorities generally with becoming ceremony. Webster had become thoroughly infatuated with the idea of succeeding Fillmore as President, although his chief was a candidate for the same position, and he visited different sections of the country for the purpose of making speeches in defense of the compromise measures.

When Webster was received in the hall of the house of representatives before a large audience the Governor stood up in all the majesty of manhood as he introduced Webster, highly complimenting the great intellectual power of the guest, but distinctly asserting the great principles of freedom which were then regarded by himself and his followers as antagonized by the compromise measures. Webster spoke in a listless manner, lacking the usual force of the Great Expounder, evidently chilled by the visible fact that he was addressing an unsympathetic assembly.

Johnston's administration was one of the cleanest and best in the history of the Commonwealth. I regard him as the ablest administrator who has ever filled the gubernatorial chair, and he was called to that position just at a period when his thorough knowledge of the complicated affairs of the State and his sagacity in suggesting remedial measures were most needed.

He would not have made as great a war Governor as Curtin did because he did not possess the boundless sympathetic attributes which made Curtin's career so lustrous, but he would have met every great problem of the war with equal wisdom and courage. He was

the administration himself, and beyond his attorney general, to whom he looked at times for legal direction, he personally decided every question relating to the policy of the government.

He startled the Legislature and the people of the State by proposing the gradual reduction of the State debt, and he was successful in carrying the measure providing a sinking fund that, if maintained, would ultimately make the State free from the crushing debt that had only a few years before driven the great Commonwealth to the very verge of repudiation. It is his beneficent financial policy that has been maintained until to-day, when not only the entire debt of over $40,000,000 in Johnston's time, but all the added debt of the Civil War, has been practically paid, as the securities in the sinking fund that was of Johnston's creation would now liquidate the debt within a few hundred thousand dollars, and the surplus in the treasury could readily spare the balance needed to make Pennsylvania absolutely free from all indebtedness.

The elections of 1849–50 were adverse to the Whigs in Pennsylvania, and Johnston had to deal with a Democratic house. The senate of 1851 had one Democratic majority. While the senate was Whig his administration was safe in its important financial and other progressive measures, but when, in the last year of his term, he was confronted with a Democratic senate, the power of the administration was seriously threatened. With the senate in harmony with him the house was impotent, and by a very shrewd political maneuver he won the control of the senate from the Democratic majority.

There had been a long battle between Columbia County and what is now Montour County over the question of dividing old Columbia and creating the

new county of Montour. The two sections had become intensely inflamed against each other, and Valentine Best had been elected senator from Danville, the Montour end, three years before, chiefly on the issue of erecting the new county. It was his last session and his last opportunity to win out on his new county scheme. If he remained in opposition to the State administration it was possible for him to pass the measure on a partisan issue by Democratic votes, but in that event he would have to run up against the Governor, who knew exactly how to defeat such political movements.

It was finally suggested to Senator Best that there was one way by which he could get his new county, and that was to make himself speaker of the senate by voting for himself and giving the administration the control of the finance and several other important committees. Senator Best well knew what such a political movement involved, and it was most humiliating for him to desert his party and make himself speaker by his own vote, but he felt that the end justified the means, and he accepted the contract.

It became whispered around that there would be some queer political doings when the senate was called to order, and the hall was crowded when the clerk rapped on his desk and called the new senators to be sworn. The Democrats had nominated J. Porter Brawley, of Crawford, for speaker, and the Whigs, to cover their contract with Best, nominated Senator Darsie, of Allegheny, the oldest of the Whig senators in service. I was fortunate in obtaining a seat quite close to Best, as I knew he was to be the central figure of the show.

Brawley came into his seat with a most unsteady gait. He knew that his defeat was inevitable, and he fortified himself for the ordeal by a copious supply of

stimulants. Brawley would not have been required to vote for himself if the Whigs had not made the combination with Best, as the courtesy was always observed in that body, when the contest for speaker was a square one between the two parties, and the dominant party had but one majority, for the two candidates for speaker each to vote for the other. The old-time senate many times stood 17 to 16, and the majority speaker was always chosen by the vote of the opposing candidate.

The first ballot gave Brawley 15; Darsie, 15, with Brawley, Best and Darsie scattering their votes, and on the second ballot the Whigs voted solidly for Best, and Brawley received 15 Democratic votes, but Best had not answered when his name was called, and just before the clerk was about to compute and announce the vote, Senator Best rose in his place in very obvious confusion and asked that his name be called.

The clerk called "Valentine Best," to which the senator responded "Valentine Best," and thus made himself speaker of the body. Some hisses came from the crowded lobby, and Brawley sat sullenly in his chair and refused to exhibit the usual courtesy of conducting his successful opponent to the chair, but Darsie, the defeated Whig candidate, promptly arose and led the new Speaker to the platform.

The result was that the administration controlled the senate, that the Montour County bill passed the senate by a single vote, and finally commanded sufficient Democratic support in the house to carry it through, when Governor Johnston promptly gave it his approval.

Best was burnt in effigy in the Columbia portion of his district, but he was heartily supported by the Montour people. He was refused the regular Democratic nomination for re-election, and Charles R. Buckalew,

then a young lawyer of Bloomsburg, in old Columbia, was made the regular Democratic candidate. Many of the Whigs of old Columbia and nearly all the people of Montour supported Best, who received within one or two of a unanimous vote in Danville, and close to a unanimous vote in the new county, but Luzerne, with a large Democratic majority, was part of the district, and Buckalew was brought to the senate to begin a great career as long the leading Democrat of the senate, as United States Senator, as foreign minister and finally as Congressman.

The campaign of 1851 for Governor aroused very general interest throughout the State. While there were a few Whigs who supported the Fillmore administration on the slavery policy, they were absolutely powerless in every section of the State.

I was a delegate in the convention that renominated Johnston. It met at Lancaster and was one of the ablest State conventions in the history of Pennsylvania politics. Johnston was there in person, and did not hesitate to declare that unless the compromise measures were denounced, and General Scott declared the Whig candidate for President, he would not accept the nomination. He was not an arrogant political master, but he knew that it was his own battle, and he wisely decided how it could best be won. He had nothing to expect from any voter who could be controlled by the National administration, but he had something to expect from the anti-slavery sentiment of the State.

He was unanimously nominated, and it was his own suggestion that made John Strohm, of Lancaster, his associate on the ticket as the candidate for canal commissioner, as Strohm represented more conspicuously than any other man who could have been taken the policy of unfaltering honesty in public trust.

When the platform was presented by Attorney

General Darrah, of Allegheny, a very prominent and fearless leader, a single voice was heard in opposition to it, and that came from the brilliant Jack Ogle, of Somerset, who had been beaten for re-election to Congress at the previous election, and had accepted a foreign mission from President Fillmore. He was an unusually handsome product of the glades of the Alleghenies, but he was generously convivial, and when he arose in his shirt sleeves, the summer heat having made his coat an uncomfortable appendage, he was allowed to be heard, and his protest was quite as jolly as it was earnest, but then the platform was adopted without a division.

Johnston entered into the battle in superb shape, and made a thorough canvass of the entire State. His competitor, Senator Bigler, of Clearfield, was a clean and able man, but lacking Johnston's positive individuality. Both were heard from day to day by great assemblies of people, and Johnston had his battle fairly won until the Christiana riots.

A few weeks before the election Mr. Gorsuch, of Maryland, with his son and a posse, came to Christiana, in Chester County, to capture several of his slaves, who were then fugitives. The result was a riot, in which Gorsuch was killed and his son seriously wounded. It was proved in the trial of Castner Hanway and others for treason, growing out of that riot, that Gorsuch had madly braved a negro mob, after having been notified by the mob that they would kill him if he attempted to enter the house in which the slaves were hiding, but the murder of a claimant for his own property, acting in accordance with the laws of the nation, caused a very serious revulsion in the commercial and business circles of the State.

Philadelphia then had the largest Southern trade of any of the Northern cities, and interwoven with it

were large business interests throughout the entire Commonwealth. It called to the front a class then known as Whig "Doughfaces," who regarded commerce as more important than political faith, and they went bodily to the support of Bigler. Johnston bravely struggled to stem the tide by issuing a proclamation offering a liberal reward for the detection and conviction of the murderers of Gorsuch, but the breach could not be healed, and Johnston was defeated by 8,000 majority.

He retired from office standing head and shoulders over all the Whig leaders of Pennsylvania, and was recognized throughout the entire country as one of the great men of the Whig organization. Had he been patient and bided his time he would have been called to high official trust, but he became engulfed in the Know Nothing political maelstrom of 1854. In 1858, after a few years' residence in Allegheny, he staked everything in a contest for the nomination for Congress, but was defeated by J. K. Moorehead, and thereafter his political career was erratic and his business career ended.

His last appearance in politics clearly indicated that he had ceased to be a political factor. He was nominated for collector of the port of Philadelphia by President Johnson, but was rejected by the Senate. He had outlived the great career for which his uncommon abilities so eminently fitted him, and he was unknown and unfelt in the political movements of the State of which he was once the grandest of masters.

On the 25th of October, 1872, the bruised reed was broken, and the once great administrator of Pennsylvania passed to the unknown beyond, that, like the Pontic Sea, has no returning ebb.

XVIII.

GOVERNOR BIGLER.

Chief Justice Gibson, Governor William Bigler of Pennsylvania, and Governor John Bigler of California, all in Office at the same time, Born in the same Immediate Community — Judge Campbell Defeated for Supreme Judge and made Attorney General, and later Postmaster General — His Appointment Strengthened the Native American Element that was Opposed to Catholics — Bigler's Early Career — Thrice Elected Senator — His Heroic Veto of Bank Bills — The Know Nothing Legislature of 1855 — Battle between Cameron and Curtin — Failure to Elect a Senator — Bigler's Defeat for Governor made him United States Senator.

WILLIAM BIGLER became Governor in January, 1852, when the conditions of trade and industry were greatly improved, giving him unusual opportunity to make a successful administration, and no Governor in the history of the State could have more intelligently directed the government to the best interests of the people.

He was born in the little community of Shermansburg, now Perry County, close to the home of my boyhood. It was a very primitive and sparsely settled section, but the eyes of the people always brightened when they spoke of the distinguished public men it had furnished to the country in Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson, Governor William Bigler, of Pennsylvania, and Governor John Bigler, of California, all of whom were in office at one time.

William Bigler was elected Governor of Pennsylvania in 1851, and on the same ticket with him was John Bannister Gibson, then chief justice of the State, who was continued on the elective supreme

court, and just one month before the election of Bigler and Gibson in Pennsylvania, John Bigler was elected Governor of California. John Bigler became foreign minister after serving two terms as Governor, and William Bigler became United States Senator. It was certainly a remarkable development of the greatness achieved by these bare-footed boys of Sherman's Valley.

Pennsylvania has had Governors of stronger intellectual force than Bigler, but I never knew a public man who had better command of all his faculties or could apply them to more profitable uses. He was a man of very clear conception and unusually sound judgment, with a severe conscientiousness that made him heroic in defense of the right. He was a man of unusually fine presence, of a most amiable and genial disposition, and delightful in companionship, but no influence or interest could swerve him from his convictions of duty in official trust.

He was a careful student, an intelligent observer of men and events, and thoroughly mastered every question that confronted him in the discharge of his political duties. He was not an aggressive man in the general acceptation of the term, but his conservatism never restrained him in aiding legitimate progress, and no cleaner man ever filled the executive chair of Pennsylvania.

When Bigler entered the office of Governor he had a very serious political problem to solve arising from the defeat of Judge James Campbell, of Philadelphia, who was on the State ticket with Bigler in 1851. Judge Campbell was then on the common pleas bench of the city, and justly regarded as a man of high legal attainments. He was rather a profound than a brilliant man, and his sagacity as a political leader was confessed by all the prominent men of his party.

There was factional opposition to him within the Democratic ranks, and that opposition was strengthened, if not largely created, by the fact that he was a Catholic, and the Philadelphia riots of 1844, which gave birth to the Native American party, had left religious prejudices which often outweighed political fidelity. At that time the Catholics of the State were nearly uniformly of the Democratic faith, and it was deemed not only a wise but a necessary policy to have one Catholic out of the seven candidates on the State ticket, as there were a Governor, canal commissioner and five supreme judges to be chosen. Considerable opposition was manifested to Campbell's nomination, but he was successful.

I was a member of the convention that nominated the Whig State ticket, presenting Johnston for re-election as Governor, John Strohm for canal commissioner, and Meredith, Jessup, Comley, Chambers and Coulter for the supreme court. I well remember the discussion of the best method for the Whigs to utilize in the opposition to Judge Campbell. If they nominated five Whig candidates for supreme judge, the opposition to Campbell would be scattered along the line of five, or perhaps simply strike Campbell from the ballot, and it was decided to nominate as one of the Whig candidates Justice Coulter, then on the bench, but not nominated by the Democrats. Although a Democrat in faith, he was not a partisan, but an unusually able and faithful judge, and by placing him on the Whig ticket the opposition to Campbell was concentrated on a single man, as they would naturally prefer to vote for a Democrat, and Coulter was the only man on the Whig State ticket who was elected.

The defeat of Judge Campbell threatened serious results to the Democratic party, and Bigler made

James Campbell

the best atonement for the wrong done to Judge Campbell within his own party household by making him attorney general, a position that Campbell filled with great credit. When Pierce was inaugurated President in 1853, the Democratic leaders of the State thought it wise to emphasize their religious tolerance by making Campbell a member of the new cabinet, and he became Pierce's Postmaster General, and discharged the duties of the office with great fidelity and ability, but his appointment to the National cabinet, and especially to the one position that controlled tens of thousands of appointments, aided very materially in the second Native American eruption that came in the shape of Know Nothingism in 1854.

Campbell lived many years after his retirement from the cabinet and was one of the most accomplished and trusted leaders and advisers of the Democratic party, but he never sought further political favors. He was a most energetic man, even when he reached the patriarchal age, and he filled such important positions in the city as a member of the Board of City Trusts and in the direction of Girard College, in all of which he gave the most assiduous devotion to public duty.

Governor Bigler's training had been well calculated to develop the very best attributes of manhood. He graduated as a printer's apprentice, and with his brother John published the Bellefonte "Democrat" for some time, but a village newspaper in what was then almost a wilderness was not sufficient to support two able-bodied men, and William finally, with the aid of friends, got together a few hundred dollars, purchased a very crude second-hand printing outfit, loaded it upon a wagon and walked most of the way with the team to Clearfield, where he established the Clearfield "Democrat."

It was a difficult undertaking, but he did all the work himself with the aid of a single apprentice, and attained for his paper the highest success that was possible within its field. He was a thorough forester, loved the woods, and soon learned to put something approaching a fair value upon the vast amount of fine lumber in that region. In a few years he became one of the largest lumber merchants of the West Branch, and I well remember the admiration he aroused among his political friends, when he was a member of the senate and a prospective candidate for Governor, by making the entire journey from Clearfield to Harrisburg on one of his own rafts. He was well equipped for the practical duties of the gubernatorial chair. He was a thoroughly good judge of men and as thoroughly familiar with every public question relating to the interests of the State.

Governor Bigler did more than any other one man in his day to save Pennsylvania from the scourge of an inflated wild-cat currency. Pennsylvania had entirely recovered from the terrible financial depression of 1841 when repudiation was narrowly escaped. Commerce, industry and trade were generally quickened, and the discovery of gold in California, although then in its infancy, seemed to be furnishing an amount of the precious metal that must diffuse wealth into every channel of business enterprise. The few millions of gold that California produced in 1851 were regarded as tenfold more important than all the twentyfold increase of gold and silver now produced in the West. The feeling was very general that a sweeping tide of prosperity was approaching, and a deluge of applications for bank charters came upon the Legislature during Bigler's first year.

The legislators were fully in sympathy with the prospective tide of wealth that was dazzling the

people, and they passed bank charters by the score, and all without any individual liability or security for depositors beyond the capital stock. In a single message Governor Bigler vetoed eleven bank charters, and during the session he sent to the senate or house thirty messages vetoing bank bills. He was thoroughly familiar with the industrial interests of the State and knew how easily the people would be tempted from the ordinary channels of industry by hope of suddenly acquired wealth, without pausing to consider that the floodtide of irresponsible banks, practically without limit as to the issue of currency, would produce a most unhealthy inflation that could end only in terrible disaster.

He was the first Governor who made an appeal to the Legislature to halt what was known as log-rolling or omnibus legislation, by which a bank charter could be made an amendment to a bill for the removal of a local schoolhouse, and insisted that he should have the right to consider every different feature of legislation upon its own merits. He proposed also in the same message two amendments, which have since been adopted in our Constitution, relating to legislation, requiring each bill to contain but a single subject, and to be passed by a majority vote of each house on a call of ayes and nays.

Bigler had served three terms in the Senate, elected each time practically without a contest, and although he peremptorily declined at the end of his second term, and sent delegates from his county in favor of another candidate, the delegates from the other counties of the district gave a unanimous vote for him and he was compelled to continue legislative service. The prominent position he occupied in the senate had thoroughly familiarized him with all matters relating to State government, and, next to Governor

Johnston, I doubt whether any man ever filled the position who was more completely equipped for shaping legislation and administering the State government. His administration commanded not only the respect, but the hearty approval of his party, and even his political opponents, however earnestly they may have differed with him, held in high esteem his ability and integrity, and when he was nominated for re-election in 1854 by the unanimous vote of the convention, given with the heartiest enthusiasm, there did not seem to be a cloud on the Democratic horizon even as large as a man's hand to threaten him with the tempest that swept him out of office by nearly 40,000 majority.

The repeal of the Missouri Compromise by a Democratic Congress aroused the anti-slavery sentiment that largely pervaded the Democratic ranks in every section of the State and brought out the first distinct murmurs of revolt, and the sudden organization of the American or "Know Nothing" party, with the Whig party practically on the verge of its death throes, found a wide field with loose aggregations of both Whigs and Democrats, and these elements were adroitly combined against Bigler in favor of James Pollock, who succeeded him.

It was a most humiliating defeat, and at the time seemed to bring hopeless destruction to his political career, but just as the defeat of Judge Campbell for supreme judge made him attorney general and Postmaster General, the defeat of Bigler for Governor made him United States Senator and one of the great national leaders of his party during the Buchanan administration.

The Know Nothing triumph of 1854 practically ended the Whig organization, as probably three-fourths of its people had become involved in the new

American party. It had made a somewhat earnest battle for General Scott for President in 1852, but it was hopeless from the start, and I do not remember any one, excepting General Scott himself, who believed it possible for him to carry Pennsylvania or to win the Presidency.

I saw him in the heat of the battle, even after Pennsylvania had voted Democratic in October by an overwhelming majority, and he did not doubt his triumphant election, and was as confident of carrying Pennsylvania as he was of the rising of the sun, but one of his junior brigadiers from civil life, who served under him in Mexico without attaining military distinction, swept the country like a hurricane, leaving Scott but four States of the Union. The Whig organization was maintained in 1853, when, for some reason that I never could fully understand, I was made the nominee of the party for auditor general. I had not been spoken of as a candidate, had no thought of it myself, but Morton McMichael headed the Philadelphia delegation and he took the liberty of presenting my name to the convention in one of his fervently eloquent speeches, and the result was that I had the honor of being in with the Whig party at its death.

The American, or Know Nothing, movement brought into the Legislature at Harrisburg the most Dolly Varden political job lot that I have ever seen in Pennsylvania. The secret Know Nothing organization surprised nearly every county in the State by electing senators and representatives whose outside friends never dreamed of their success.

My first knowledge of this unique organization was obtained in a Chambersburg municipal election. The town was largely Whig, and we went through the regular motions of nominating Whig candidates for

burgess, councilmen, etc., and sat down entirely confident that they would be elected, as the Democrats were making no opposition, but our surprise may be understood when I state the fact that when the vote was counted an entire ticket was elected not one of whom was publicly known as a candidate. Even the great Whig Gibraltar of Lancaster County was dumfounded when the election returns were footed up and it was discovered that H. M. North, a Democrat, was elected to the Legislature in a square fight.

This system of politics invited all the mean methods of mean men, and the result was that a motley crowd of shady Democrats and Republicans, including a pretty large number of local preachers, appeared in the Legislature. It was without able or responsible leadership, although there were a number of very good men who owed their election to the new political power, and the entire session was simply a series of desperate scrambles for political and personal advantage.

General Cameron had made a speech in favor of Bigler in Harrisburg the night before the election, but before the Legislature met, when he found that the Know Nothings controlled both branches of the Legislature, he turned up as a full-fledged member of the order, and became an aggressive candidate for United States Senator. Andrew G. Curtin, then secretary of the commonwealth under Pollock, was also an aggressive candidate for Senator, and was supported by many of the best old Whigs and especially by the younger element of the new political combination. Efforts were made to unite the party vote by a caucus, but it failed, and the result was the most disgraceful free-for-all fight for the senatorship that has ever been witnessed at Harrisburg.

Cameron and Curtin were the leading candidates from beginning to end, but there were a dozen or more of side-show aspirants who injected themselves into the fight at various stages, some of whom had their bank accounts very greatly depleted, and the battle grew in bitterness with each recurring day. One of the most defamatory utterances ever issued against General Cameron was prepared, signed and published over the names of a score or more very prominent members of both branches. The Legislature was not then required by the National law to meet in convention every day until the Senator was elected, but the joint convention would ballot three or four times for Senator and then adjourn to meet at a given day, probably a week later. This was continued until nearly the close of the session, when all had become disgusted with the hopeless and demoralizing conflict and the motion to adjourn without day was carried.

The Legislature thus adjourned without choosing a Senator, and the Democrats had an easy task in the fall of 1855 to elect their State ticket and both branches of the Legislature. There were many Democrats who would have been more than willing to contest senatorial honors with Governor Bigler, but they met with no encouragement. The Democratic sentiment of the State was overwhelming that the man who had been so ruthlessly crucified by Know Nothingism, as rapid in its death as it was in its birth, should have the nomination, and Governor Bigler was nominated with great enthusiasm, and he was thus given a full term in the Senate, less the few weeks intervening between the meeting of Congress on the first Monday of December and his election on the third Tuesday of January.

Bigler's career in the Senate showed that he was equal to the mastery of the gravest National problems,

and his sound judgment and conservative aims gave him great power to aid in the election of James Buchanan, his favorite candidate for the Presidency. His personal devotion to Buchanan made him resolve all doubts in favor of supporting the President in his battle with Douglas, and that led to his support of the sadly-mistaken policy of the administration in the Kansas-Nebraska disputes, although Senator Bigler always sought to temper the desperate policy of his associate leaders. He visited Kansas personally, and in perfect good faith appealed to the Free State men to come to the front, as they seemed to have the majority, but they had been overwhelmed by hordes from Missouri, and they refused to accept his advice.

Taking his career as a whole in the Senate, it was eminently creditable, and after his retirement he continued to exhibit the liveliest interest in all public affairs. He was one of the leading men in the direction of the Centennial Exposition, and labored most earnestly and unselfishly to promote its success.

Although he never made public utterance on the subject, nothing would have gratified him so much as to have been recalled to the gubernatorial chair of the State. In 1875, when the Democratic convention was in session in Erie, and had what seemed to be an almost hopeless wrestle with a number of candidates, he was hopeful and anxious that he might be accepted as a compromise between disputing factions. He was in my editorial office waiting for despatches from the Erie convention, and when I handed him the despatch announcing the nomination of Judge Pershing, he accepted it gracefully, and I doubt whether any other saw the expression of disappointment that he did not conceal from me when he felt that his last opportunity had failed.

He continued active in State affairs as well as in church, charitable and social matters in his own community, and when his life work was done no man who has ever lived in the Clearfield region was followed to his last resting place by so large and so sincere a concourse of mourners.

XIX.

THE KNOW NOTHING PARTY.

Repeal of the Missouri Compromise and Expiring Agonies of the Whig Party Created a Strong Know Nothing Organization Opposed to Foreigners and Catholics—The Secret Know Nothing Party Organized as "The Sons of '76, or Order of the Star Spangled Banner"—Judge Conrad Elected Mayor by the Know Nothings—His Brilliant Literary Work—His Desperate Struggle to get a Uniformed Police—Know Nothings Organize as the American Party and Nominate Fillmore for President against Fremont—The Repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

GOVERNOR BIGLER'S administration was universally acceptable to his party and even his most earnest political opponents found little ground for criticism in the record he had made, but when he came up for re-election, two entirely new and unexpected factors confronted him, and doomed him to a most humiliating defeat on issues which had no relation whatever to the administration of State affairs. The two causes which unhorsed him in the sweeping revolution were first, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise by a Democratic Congress and President, and second, the advent of the secret American, or Know Nothing, party.

The American, or Know Nothing, organization that became such an important political power in 1854, was the culmination of various spasmodic Native American organizations beginning in New York as early as 1835, and extending to Philadelphia and Boston. The original Native American organization of New York was directed wholly against foreigners, and was provoked by the large number of foreigners

who held positions on the police force and in other city departments. It never made itself felt as a controlling political factor in New York until the spring of 1844, when it elected James Harper, one of the original firm of Harper & Brothers, publishers, as mayor of the city over both the Democratic and Whig candidates, and carried a majority in every branch of the city government.

Opposition to Catholics was not at that time an avowed article of Native American faith, but the success of the Native Americans, controlling the entire city government of New York in the spring of 1844, greatly inspired the Native Americans of Philadelphia, and an issue in an uptown section of the city over the question of reading the Bible in the public schools led to such an inflamed condition of public sentiment that the city was disgraced by what is remembered as the Native American riots of 1844, in which a number of lives were lost, and several Catholic churches and institutions burnt. This issue arose in probably the least religious section of the city, and a large majority of the Protestants who fought out the question of reading the Bible in the public schools to riot and the burning of Catholic churches, would not have known the difference between the Protestant and Catholic Bible if it had been placed in their hands, and cared little for the strictly religious issue that was involved.

It was the experience of 1844 in Philadelphia that led to the incorporation of the anti-Catholic plank into the Native American faith, and from that time until the order entirely disappeared from local or general politics, opposition to Catholicism was even a more vital issue with most of the members of the organization than opposition to foreigners. At the fall elections of 1844 the Native Americans carried New York

and Philadelphia cities with material aid from the Whigs, and they remained an important element at times in both local and State politics in Pennsylvania for a number of years.

The Native American party was an open political organization, but when its power was visibly waning in both Philadelphia and New York, a new and secret party was organized out of the remains of the old Native American known as "The Order of United Americans," but that organization did not attempt to exploit itself in general politics, although it made itself felt in local contests, and, after lingering in politics for a few years, it was supplanted by a new secret order that started in 1852.

The name of the order was "The Sons of '76, or Order of the Star Spangled Banner," but the name was not made known to the members of the organization until they were admitted to its higher degrees, and all were instructed that if asked about the organization they should answer that they knew nothing about it. This gave rise to the title of Know Nothings, by which the organization was popularly known throughout the period of its existence. It wore no badges, displayed no banners, meetings were held in the utmost privacy and called by a signal understood only by the initiated. Each lodge had its delegates who constituted a council with power to nominate all candidates, and every member was sworn to support the candidates thus nominated under penalty of expulsion if they failed to do so.

This organization would probably never have been known beyond an occasional assertion of power in local contests in our cities, but for the general demoralization of the Democratic party caused by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and the general distintegration of the Whig party that was then in its

dying agonies. The appointment of Judge Campbell, a prominent Catholic, to the National cabinet in 1853, intensified the anti-Catholic sentiment, and added largely to the numbers of the new secret party, and this new political party, with the Whig party in the throes of dissolution and the Democratic party split wide open on the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, had a most fruitful field in which to harvest an immense increase of its forces.

The first startling exhibition of the power of the Know Nothing party was given in the first municipal election held in Philadelphia after the consolidation in 1854. Until that time Philadelphia city extended only from the Delaware to the Schuylkill and from Vine to South streets, with a goodly number of petty municipalities embraced in what was known as Philadelphia County. The contest for consolidation had disturbed political parties for some years, but in the fall of 1853 the substantial business men of the city decided that they could not longer trust the regular political organizations to accomplish consolidation, and they nominated an independent ticket for senators and representatives and elected it, defeating the Whig candidates in the city, and sending Eli K. Price to the senate over Charles O'Neill, then a senator, and for many years a Congressman, and the representatives chosen were among the leading business men of both parties. Consolidation was thus effected as all parties were afraid to oppose it, and the municipal elections were fixed for May to separate them entirely from the political influences of State contests.

The Whigs nominated Robert T. Conrad for mayor, and the Democrats nominated Richard Vaux, who was then regarded as one of the strongest of the Democratic leaders. He had been a candidate for mayor in 1846, but was beaten by Mayor Swift. He was a

man of great ability, tireless energy, and devoted much of his life to very active participation in the management of our penal and charitable institutions. Although defeated by Conrad, he was elected over Henry D. Moore as the successor of Conrad in 1856, but he was not successful as an executive officer, and altogether too high-toned for practical Democratic politics. The result was that he suffered a humiliating defeat two years later, when Alexander Henry became mayor of the city. Vaux was for many years one of the unique characters of Philadelphia, universally respected and generally beloved, and when Samuel J. Randall, then father of the House, died in the harness, Vaux was given a practically unanimous election as his successor, but was defeated for re-election by Mr. McAleer.

Judge Conrad, like Richard Vaux, possessed very few of the qualities necessary for the successful performance of administrative duties. He was one of the most brilliant of the then somewhat noted Philadelphia circle of literary men. He was a ready, ornate and caustic writer, and his editorial contributions to the "North American" attracted very wide attention, but the only two positions to which he was ever called happened to be public trusts for which his peculiar attainments, eminent as they were, were not adapted. He was one of the three judges of the criminal court, created by the Legislature for Philadelphia, but he was entirely too poetic for dry judicial duties, and the court soon came into such disfavor that it was abolished. He made a very earnest struggle to accomplish good results for the city and make his administration successful, but he was impatient, untactful and failed to command the hearty support of the people.

It may surprise some of the readers of the present

day to know that one of the measures originating with him that greatly weakened his administration by the very general criticism it provoked, was his attempt to uniform the police, so that they might be distinguished and exercise a moral influence by their presence wherever they appeared, but the police rebelled against it, declaring a uniform to be a badge of servitude, and the public, then entirely unused to any uniforms outside of military companies, regarded the innovation as one of Judge Conrad's poetic ideas, and the result was a very disheartening failure. But Judge Conrad persisted so earnestly in the effort to have his police distinguished from others that he finally required the police to wear a particular style of hat that would distinguish them from others, wherever they might appear, and, although he succeeded in carrying the measure through, it was violently assailed as a job for the benefit of some favorite hatters, and the police were looked upon with contempt by a very large portion of the community. He blazed the way, however, and in the fullness of time the people got to understand that policemen should be in uniform, and that the uniform would be a badge of honor. His administration weakened rather than strengthened his party, and gave Mr. Vaux an easy victory for the succession.

Conrad was nominated by the Whigs solely because it was known that he was in favor with the Native American element of the city, and it was the new secret organization of the Know Nothings that gave him a victory over Vaux nearly half as large as Vaux's entire vote. The result was appalling to the Democratic politicians of the city and State, and somewhat disturbing even to the Whigs, as they saw that a new political power confronted them with sufficient votes to decide any contest between the two great parties.

These apprehensions were fully justified at the succeeding fall election when one man on the Whig State ticket was elected by nearly 40,000, and another on the same ticket was defeated by nearly 200,000. Judge Conrad was one of the most eloquent and impressive of our Pennsylvania orators. He was very scholarly, earnest and imposing in manner, and unusually forceful in his exquisite rhetoric. He should have attained much greater distinction than came to him, as he was a man of rare and unusually versatile literary qualities. I never missed an opportunity to hear him, whether on the political or temperance rostrum, and he was one of the most genial and delightful of companions. He was always intensely interested in politics, and Philadelphia would have honored herself if her people had clothed him with congressional honors, and continued him there for life.

The Know Nothing organization was well described by Chief Justice Black, who had been elected to the supreme bench in 1854 when Bigler, the Democratic candidate for Governor, was defeated. I chanced to be in Pittsburg, where the court was in session, soon after the October election of 1854, and had a pleasant chat with Judge Black on the election. He was startled at the exhibition of the power of the Know Nothings and appalled at the wrecks they had wrought on both sides of the old party lines, but I well remember his prophesy:—

"They're like the bee, biggest when it's born; it will perish as quickly as it rose to power."

It is remarkable that an organization so strong never was felt as a controlling factor after its wonderful exhibition of power in 1854. It rapidly declined in strength, as its secret methods gave despotic power to the councils or managers, which positions had been generally successfully sought by unworthy and unscrup-

Robert T. Conrad

ulous men. It practically absorbed the Whig party, leaving it little more than the running-gears of an organization, and, after struggling along for a few years, it and the remnant of the Whig organization were absorbed in the Republican party, whose timely birth gave refuge to the hopeless old organization.

It exhibited some strength in 1856 when it nominated Fillmore and Donaldson for President and Vice-President. Fillmore's high character gave credit to the movement, and the conservative Whig and anti-slavery elements which were generally disgusted with the sudden advent of Fremont as a Presidential candidate, were glad to take refuge under its banner. The old Whig element of the South was strongly averse to affiliation with the Democracy, and readily accepted Fillmore, and the opposition to Buchanan voted almost solidly for Fillmore in the Southern States, while in the Northern States it was more or less divided. Fillmore carried the electoral vote of Maryland, where the Fremont ticket received only 81 votes, and Fillmore had 8,345 majority over Buchanan. That is the only electoral vote that ever was won by the Know Nothing party, and a majority of those who voted for Fillmore in Maryland were not members of or in sympathy with the organization.

After 1856 the Know Nothing party practically disappeared as a general political factor, although some efforts were made as late as 1860 to galvanize the remains into a semblance of life. Its achievements were confined to a single year, that of 1854, when it controlled Pennsylvania, and in Massachusetts elected not only a Governor on a straight Know Nothing ticket over both the Whig and the Democratic candidates, but elected every Congressman in the State. But its decline was as rapid as its growth, and the only year that marked its triumph dated its decline and fall.

Unlike most parties which have been created and perished, the Know Nothing organization died generally unlamented save by the few unscrupulous political leaders who could profit only by its peculiar and arbitrary methods, and it left no approving impresson in the public mind, and no monuments of beneficent achievement to tell that it had ever lived.

The other disturbing political element of 1854 was the repeal of the Missouri Compromise by a Democratic Senate, House and President. In the history of a free government such as ours there must be many political blunders committed in the heat of great party struggles or to promote individual ambition, but the repeal of the Missouri Compromise stands out single and alone as the most monstrous and fatal of all political errors committed by the party in power. The question of slavery extension had become a very vital one. The North was developing and extending westward with great rapidity, giving the positive assurance of new free States at an early day, while the South had nothing in prospect to maintain what it called the "equilibrium" between the two sections. In addition to this necessity of political power, the old slave States were largely interested in slave markets, as their exhausted lands made slave growing more profitable than cultivation of plantations.

It was deliberately decided that the battle should be made to control the population of the two new Territories of Kansas and Nebraska by Southern votes from Missouri and give them slave Constitutions, but the Missouri Compromise stood in the way, and Douglas, the ablest of the Democratic disputants of that day, took the lead in repealing the Compromise, and substituted what he mistakenly called popular sovereignty. After a long struggle the bill was passed in the House by 113 to 100 and in the Senate by

35 to 13. Many of the Northern Democrats voted against it, including Curtis, Drum, Gamble, Grow and Trout, from Pennsylvania. The Southern States gave nine votes against it, including four Whigs from Tennessee and the venerable Thomas H. Benton, of Missouri.

On the night of the final passage of the bill in the Senate William H. Seward made one of the most impressive speeches of his life. It was known that he would make the closing argument on behalf of the minority, and when he arose near the midnight hour there was the stillness of death throughout the Senate and the crowded gallery. In his opening he said:—

> The sun has set for the last time upon the guaranteed and certain liberties of all the unsettled and unorganized portions of the American Continent that lie within the jurisdiction of the United States. To-morrow's sun will rise in dim eclipse over them. How long that obscuration shall last is known only to the Power that directs and controls all human beings.

The repeal of the Missouri Compromise not only dated the decline and fall of the Democratic party, but it sowed the dragon's teeth that made the avoidance of civil war impossible in '61. True, Buchanan was elected President in 1856 by divided opposition, but for more than a quarter of a century thereafter no Democrat reached the Presidential chair.

XX.

GOVERNOR POLLOCK.

The Fantastic Election of 1854—Majorities on State Ticket Varying from 37,007 Whig to 190,748 Democratic—Pollock's Career in Congress—His Earnest Aid to Professor Morse—Curtin Chairman of the Whig State Committee—His Peculiar Deals with the Know Nothing Leaders—Severe Conditions Exacted—William B. Reed—His Controversy with Curtin—The Sad End of One of the Most Brilliant Members of the Philadelphia Bar.

THE political contest of 1854 presented the most unique and conspicuous results to be found in the entire history of Pennsylvania politics. It was the last battle made by the Whig party as a recognized factor in politics, and while the Whig organization was thus in its dying throes, the Democratic party was greatly disintegrated and sowed the seeds which made it practically a minority party for more than a generation. True, it elected Buchanan in 1856, who was largely a minority President, but for nearly a quarter of a century thereafter the party was defeated in every National contest. Had the contest for Governor in 1854 been fought out squarely between the two parties without the intervention of the Know Nothing organization, there is little doubt that the Whig ticket would have been elected, because of the Democratic revolt against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, but the Know Nothing organization, with all its severely secret appliances, gradually absorbed quite two-thirds of the Whigs of the State, and a very large proportion of the Democrats. In order that the unique situation of that period may be understood, I give the official vote for the three State offices then filled:

GOVERNOR.

James Pollock, Whig	204,008
William Bigler, Democrat	167,001
Pollock's majority	37,007

CANAL COMMISSIONER.

George Darsie, Whig	83,331
Henry S. Mott, Democrat	274,074
Mott's majority	190,743

SUPREME JUDGE.

Daniel M. Smyser, Whig	78,571
Jeremiah S. Black, Democrat	167,010
Thomas Baird, Know Nothing	121,576
Black's plurality	45,434
Majority of combined opposition over Black	33,137

The Whigs and Democrats held their regular State conventions early in the year, as was common in those days, and Governor Bigler was renominated, not only with entire unanimity, but with the heartiest enthusiasm exhibited by his supporters. There was then no sign of Democratic disintegration or of the advent of the new political factor that turned everything topsy turvy in the politics of the State. I was a delegate in the Whig convention, and heartily supported the nomination of Pollock. He was the logical candidate of the Whigs, and his nomination was effected without a serious contest. Curtin's name was presented to the convention, not with any hope of winning the nomination for him, but he was the favorite of a large element of the young Whigs of the interior of the State, and they simply put him in training for the great battles which he fought later in life.

Pollock had exhibited unusual personal and political strength in carrying at three consecutive elections his Democratic congressional district that had been

specially fashioned by Governor Porter to give congressional honors to his old friend, John Snyder. He was first chosen to fill a vacancy occasioned by the death of Congressman Frick, who had defeated Snyder in 1843 and died soon thereafter, and in the desperate contest of 1844 Pollock won out by a small majority, to which he added a sweeping victory in 1846, when the Democrats were snowed under by a repeal of the tariff of 1842. He was one of the younger members of the House when he entered Congress, but during his nearly six sessions of service he had exhibited not only great efficiency as a National legislator, but he was in advance of most of his older associates in heartily sustaining all progressive movements.

He was one of the few men who took kindly to Professor Morse when he came to Washington and was shunned by nearly all government officials as a luny crank because he proposed to utilize the lightning for the transmission of messages, and Pollock was also one of the earliest of our public men to accept Benton's idea of the great destiny of the West after the extension of our territory to the Pacific by Mexican annexation. He was a man of fine address, delightful manners and a popular orator of unusual attainments. He was not a man of more forceful intellect than Bigler, but quite as logical and rather more fervent and ornate in public discussion. Thus the two candidates for Governor were both men who had been tried in the public service, both of unblemished reputation, and both prepared to bring high qualities of statesmanship and ripe experience to the service of the State.

Pollock indicated Curtin as the man to take charge of his campaign, and Curtin was made chairman of the Whig State committee. He entered upon his new duties with all the ardor that was always exhibited in his public efforts, and everything seemed to be going

along very smoothly for a month or two until he was finally confronted with the startling information that there was a secret organization in the State that embraced a clear majority of the Whig voters and many of the Democratic voters, and the election of Mayor Conrad in Philadelphia in May was pointed to in confirmation of the statement. I happened to be in a position to know the inner movements of that contest, and while there have been some political struggles in Pennsylvania which were regarded as exceptionally peculiar in their developments and results, I confess that I never saw political highjinks played to the limit as it was by the Know Nothings in 1854.

Three men, all of whom are dead, and none of whom are remembered as a factor in Pennsylvania politics, had managed to get possession of the machinery of the Know Nothing organization. They were men of low cunning and had availed themselves of the peculiar facilities offered by the new secret organization to make leadership autocratic in authority. There were no public assemblies where the movements of the party could be discussed, and those who controlled the State councils of the organization had it in their power to declare any decision that best suited their purpose, and they started out to make the most of their opportunity. I was present with Curtin when the proposition was made by those three men, who showed beyond doubt that they held the control of the Know Nothing nominations absolutely in their own hands, as the local Know Nothing lodges voted in secret, neither one knowing what another did, while the returns were sent to the State Council to be computed and declared. They did not approach the subject with any degree of delicacy, but were brutally frank alike in their demand and in declaring their

purpose to defeat the Whig candidate for Governor if their wishes were not acceded to. Each of the three men required a pledge from Curtin that three of the most lucrative offices in the gift of the Governor, being the inspectorships of Philadelphia, should be given to them.

They did not conceal the fact that it made no difference how the Know Nothing lodges voted, they would declare the nomination in favor of or against Pollock, depending upon Curtin's agreement to their proposition. He could have rejected the traders and exposed their infamy, but it would probably have cost the success of his candidate. Curtin deliberated long and had several conferences with them before he gave his answer, and he finally acceded to their demands to the extent of agreeing that he would recommend the appointments they demanded, but that he would not give an unqualified pledge as to the action of the Governor, who was then not a member of the Know Nothing organization, and I do not know that he ever did formally associate himself with it.

Curtin was safe in taking the position that he did, for the reason that the same men could not have approached the Democratic organization with a like proposition, as Bigler certainly would never have appointed any of them, even if they had elected him, as they had no position in the Democratic party. With visible reluctance they finally accepted Curtin's pledge, of which Pollock had no knowledge, and it was understood he was not to be advised of it during the contest.

The entire programme was then arranged that the State Council should announce as the nominees of the Know Nothing party: Pollock, Whig, for Governor; Mott, Democrat, for canal commissioner, and that

they should nominate one of their own order as the third candidate for supreme judge. Mott was a dyed-in-the-wool Democrat from the Tenth Legion, and would have lost a leg in preference to becoming a member of the Know Nothing party, but without his knowledge he was declared the candidate, and did not even know he was the Know Nothing candidate until the returns gave him the largest majority that had ever been cast for any man in Pennsylvania. As soon as the election was over and he saw that he had been given this large majority by the Know Nothing vote, he openly denounced the organization as deliberately guilty of a fraud in making him its candidate, and from that time until his dying day he was probably the most vindictive opponent of Know Nothingism the State could furnish.

The alleged nomination of Pollock and Mott by the Know Nothing organization was a deliberate fraud upon the Know Nothing people, as was evidenced by the fact that their names were submitted to the various lodges by the State Council as candidates and as members of the order, when, in fact, neither of them was in political fellowship with the organization, but it mattered little whether the lodges voted for Pollock and Mott or voted against them, as there was no power to revise the returns, and when they were declared the candidates of the party, then new in political experience and enthusiastic with expected victory, the ticket was accepted without a question and the election of Pollock and Mott was absolutely assured.

It is marvelous indeed how little was known of the Know Nothing organization during the campaign of 1854. Even Curtin, who was in close contact with the trading leaders, had no conception of its strength and never dreamed of the political revolu-

tion that it was about to work out. For some time before the election it was generally expected that Pollock would be successful, as the Democratic ranks were very much broken by the repeal of the Missouri compromise, against which nearly or quite one-half the Democratic members from the State had voted. The leaders of both parties, who were usually well informed as to the conditions of the battle, simply measured the probable result by the revulsion against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise that aroused an intense hostility and broke away from the Democratic party the entire Wilmot wing and swept the solid Democratic counties of the North into revolution.

When the returns came in they dumfounded all political calculations. They found one man on the Whig ticket chosen by nearly forty thousand majority, and one man on the Democratic ticket chosen by nearly five times forty thousand majority, while one Democrat on the State ticket had been saved because he was fortunate enough to strike a triangular contest in which the Whigs and Know Nothings voted for their separate candidates.

Darsie was one of the ablest of the Whig leaders of the West, and one of the most respected, but he was unfortunate in having been born abroad, although his parents emigrated here when he was in his infancy, but that made him an impossible candidate for the Know Nothings. Bigler was astounded by the unexpected blow and felt that his public career was ended, as the unity of the Democratic organization seemed hopelessly broken. I saw him soon after his defeat, and found him eminently philosophical and so entirely disgusted with politics that he anticipated a pleasurable retirement to private life in the enjoyment of his home and people, to whom he was singularly devoted; but that defeat, with a cloud hanging over

him that seemed to be almost without a silver lining, made him United States Senator practically without a contest only one year later, and gave him a position of distinction and influence in the party that he never otherwise would have attained.

It was the contest of 1854 that practically severed William B. Reed's fellowship with the Whig party. He was then district attorney of Philadelphia and the most accomplished prosecutor that ever entered a court of justice. I had met him the year before, when I was the Whig candidate for auditor general, and had several political conferences with him relating to the contest in Philadelphia. He was on the local ticket himself the same year for re-election as district attorney, and the first assurance he gave me was that his battle was practically settled, and that he was ready to give his best efforts in support of the State ticket.

I can recall few men who impressed me as did William B. Reed when I first met him. He was an unusually handsome man, with a face that clearly indicated the masterly ability he possessed, and one of the most graceful of gentlemen under all conditions. He was ambitious to be attorney general under Pollock, and failing in that he committed the error of permitting his resentments to master him, and he addressed a very angry and caustic public letter to Curtin soon after the new administration got under way, resigning his position on the Whig State committee, of which Curtin was chairman. He discovered that there had been some peculiar political diplomacy between Curtin and the Know Nothing organization, and as Reed was himself a master in that sort of political management, and had always handled the Native Americans in Philadelphia most successfully to serve himself, he felt that he had been slighted and that,

with his disappointment at not entering the cabinet, made him publicly break with the organization, believing that he was omnipotent in Philadelphia and could compel the Whig party to restore relations with him on his own terms.

I know of no sadder wreck in our public men than that of William B. Reed. The organization of the Republican party and the nomination of Fremont in 1856 opened the way for him to support Buchanan for President, but misfortunes and disappointments multiplied upon him until he finally became the most violent opponent of the North in our Civil War. He had been a leader of leaders; he could not bow to the mastery of others, and his impetuous temperament led him into the most ostentatious and violent hostility to the government until no man could trust him with a case in court, with all his ability at the bar, and social recognition of old-time friends was denied him. He had lived in luxury which was amply provided for by his large professional earnings, and poverty involved him in pecuniary complications from which he never recovered. He died in New York ten years after the war, where he lived for several years earning a few dollars as an editorial contributor to the New York "World."

It was not difficult to detect his articles, as bitterness seemed to grow upon him as long as he wielded his pen. In one article he personally criticised me most unjustly when I was editor of the "Times," to which I answered in a very brief paragraph, simply giving the statements and the source from which they came. Soon thereafter I received a letter from his daughter appealing to me not to further criticise her father, as he was then on his dying bed, and in a few days his life, so resplendent in achievements, so deeply shadowed in misfortune and sorrow, was ended.

Pollock's election, of course, brought out the usual multitude of applicants for the important places, and the three Know Nothing traders decided that they would accept the positions of flour inspector, leather inspector and bark inspector. Curtin was the only man named for secretary of the commonwealth, as he was considered fairly entitled to it, and the Know Nothing applicants assumed that they would have an easy victory in gaining their lucrative positions. Curtin literally fulfilled his pledge, saying to the Governor that he had given his promise to urge these appointments, but had not pledged the Governor to accept them. He also frankly told the Governor all that had transpired, and left the Governor to solve the problem in his own way.

The Governor's first decision was to appoint none of them, but he afterwards reconsidered that and gave one of them a minor inspectorship of the city, not nearly so profitable as any of the three they had presumably contracted for. The disappointed Know Nothing leaders had to accept their defeat, as they had no way of visiting vengeance upon any one, and, as their party went practically to pieces within a year, their names were never even locally prominent in the politics of the State. One of them became an active Republican and finally reached legislative honors, but the others were never again known or felt in the local contests of their own communities.

XXI.

SALE OF THE MAIN LINE—ERIE RIOTS.

Governor Pollock Progressive in Railroad Advancement—His Early Support of the Pacific Railway — Sale of the Main Line of Canal and Railway to the Pennsylvania Railroad — Supreme Court sets aside Tax Provision Levying Tonnage Taxes to be Paid — The Suspension of 1857 — Struggle in the Legislature to Legalize Suspension of Banks — The Erie Railroad Riots — The Prominent Men Involved in the Struggle — Peace Finally Attained by a Stakeless Game of Cards.

GOVERNOR POLLOCK had been one of the most progressive members of Congress, and much was expected of him as Governor of Pennsylvania. He was inaugurated with the most imposing ceremonies I have ever witnessed on a like occasion at Harrisburg, and his inaugural address had the ring of true metal. He was the first man who obtained formal action in Congress in favor of the construction of the Pacific Railway. On the 23d of June, 1848, he offered a resolution in the House calling for the appointment of a special committee to inquire into the necessity and practicability of constructing such a highway, and as chairman of the committee he made an elaborate report. That was the first official act of any branch of the government in favor of what was then regarded as an impossible enterprise. He appreciated the fact that he was in advance of his time, as the first sentence of his report made to Congress was in these words: "The proposition at first view is startling," but he demonstrated the practicability of the enterprise in a manner that in a few years became prophetic.

Many of his immediate constituents regarded him as

strangely deluded on the subject of the Pacific Railway, and in the winter of 1848 he delivered an address on the subject at Lewisburg in which he said:

> At the risk of being considered insane, I will venture the prediction that in less than twenty-five years from this evening a railroad will be completed and in operation between New York and San Francisco, Cal.; that a line of steamships will be established between San Francisco, Japan and China, and there are now in my audience ladies who will, before the expiration of the period named, drink tea brought from China and Japan by this route to their own doors.

Highly as he was respected, his prediction was received with general incredulity, but on the 10th of May, 1869, just twenty-one years after he had made this remarkable prophesy, the last rail was laid and the last spike driven in a continuous railway line from the Father of Waters to the Western Sea.

Governor Pollock was seriously handicapped at the beginning of his administration by the utter demoralization of his first Legislature, remembered as the one Know Nothing Legislature of the State, and one that made the session of 1855 a blot on the annals of the Commonwealth. It was not only demoralized by a free-for-all race for the United States Senatorship that dragged in the strangest combination of candidates ever known in such a struggle, but the only legislation of importance that came from it was what was known as the "jug law" that was severely restrictive upon those who held liquor licenses, and a bill for the sale of the Main Line of the public works, that had such harsh conditions as to make it impossible for any one to bid at the proposed sale. The Governor very strongly urged the sale of the public works, as they had become a running sore of corruption, including political debauchery and the systematic plunder of the treasury.

Two years later, when a more reasonable Legislature was assembled, the second act was passed and approved for the sale of the Main Line, and the Pennsylvania Railroad became the purchaser. The act of '55 proposing the sale of the Main Line was so severe in its restrictions as to absolutely prohibit the sale, and the act of '57 erred in the opposite direction by making the terms entirely too liberal. The tonnage tax imposed upon the traffic of the Pennsylvania Railroad was absolutely prohibitory on through freight, as the Pennsylvania Railroad had rivals north and south extending to the Western markets, entirely free from such taxation, and it could not possibly compete with them. Philadelphia was thus deprived of a fair share of the commerce of the West. The act of '57, authorizing the sale of the Main Line, was framed with the knowledge that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company could be the only purchaser, and it made the unfortunate provision in a single section that the company should be released from the tonnage tax and from State taxation upon all its property other than stocks and securities.

This provision seemed reasonable enough at that time, as the company had very little real estate for taxation, but, viewing its great possessions at the present time, there would be a very general protest against such a vast amount of property being free from taxation, and it would inflame popular prejudice to an extent that could not fail to force the violation of the contract. The supreme court held that the act providing for the sale was constitutional in all but the single section relating to taxation, and that gave the Main Line to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company with the tonnage tax unrepealed. The faith of the State had been practically pledged for the repeal of that tax, but it was not until four years had elapsed that the

James Thompson

Legislature repealed it, although earnest efforts were made from year to year as a new Legislature met.

The Pennsylvania Railroad Company took possession of the Main Line on the 1st of August, 1857, and in his annual message Governor Pollock congratulated the people of the State upon the consummation of the sale. He said: "The many approve; the few complain, those most who have gained an unenviable reputation by reckless disregard of the public interests as exhibited in the extravagant, useless and fraudulent expenditure of the public money for selfish or partisan purposes."

The sale embraced only the Main Line, including the canals and railroads owned by the State between Philadelphia and Pittsburg, but one year later the Legislature of 1858 sold all the remaining State canals to the Philadelphia & Erie Railroad, and I felt great pride in being able, as a member of the house, to propose and pass unanimously an act of five lines abolishing the canal board that had been a fountain of debauchery and profligacy for many years. Governor Pollock exerted a powerful if not a controlling influence in accomplishing the sale of the Main Line, that became the first development of the progressive policy that has made the Pennsylvania Railroad Company the greatest railway system of the world.

In the fall of 1857 the Bank of Pennsylvania, then the leading bank of the State, closed its doors, and a general panic and suspension of all the banks of the State speedily followed. It was not over three weeks until the general October election when a new Legislature would be chosen, and it became a very serious question when the term of a Legislature expired, as the Constitution of 1838 did not definitely fix the limitations to the terms of senators and representatives. To avoid the complication Governor Pollock summoned the Legislature on very short notice, and

sent a message urging the enactment of a law legalizing the suspension of the banks for a definite period. There were roosters in the Legislature of those days, although not as numerous as they have been in later times, and between Democratic hostility to banks generally, and the corrupt element of the Legislature, the passage of the measure was delayed until all became apprehensive that the remedial measure would not be enacted before the election of a new Legislature, and all appreciated the possibility of a remedial act passed by the old Legislature after the election of a new one being declared null and void.

The banks were represented by a powerful lobby, as they were liable to forfeiture of charter at any time, and finally the condition became well understood that the relief measure desired by the banks could be passed promptly by a purchase of the gang of roosters that held the balance of power. Bankers were inexperienced in dealing with Legislature corruptionists, and they were appalled at the proposition to secure the relief by the purchase of a gang of boodlers. In the emergency they sent for one of the oldest and most influential of the bank presidents of Philadelphia. He was a man of the world and eminently practical. He went to Harrisburg, and when the question was submitted to him his answer was: "What's the use of praying when you're in hell; pay the d—d scoundrels and let's go home." His advice was taken and the banks of Pennsylvania were relieved from the penalty of suspension.

One of the most interesting and irritating episodes that became interwoven with Pollock's administration was what was then known as the Erie riots. The Erie and Northeastern Railroad Company had built a short line to connect with the New York Central at Buffalo and with the Lake Shore line at Erie, by which a con-

tinuous railway line was made to the West. They did not have uniform gauge at that time, and the gauge west of Erie was different from the gauge east, and it required all passengers and traffic to be transferred at Erie. The necessities of commerce required that it should be relieved from the delay and cost of being handled, and of passengers changing cars, simply because there was a difference of an inch or two in the gauge of the two lines, and the railways changed their gauge so that passenger and freight trains passed east and west through Erie without reshipment of their tonnage and passengers. This aroused the hostility of the people of the city of Erie, whose sympathies the railway company seemed to have generally alienated, and the battle progressed little by little until the entire community became involved in one of the most disgraceful local conflicts in the history of the State.

The people divided pretty evenly on the side of through commerce, or in favor of maintaining the break of gauge, and the two contending forces were popularly known as "Rippers" and "Shanghais." The term "Ripper" was applied to the friend of the break of gauge, as they had repeatedly ripped up the tracks of the road, and later on when the contest had reached white heat, the women of the town turned out in a body and burned a railroad bridge. This contest continued for several years, and so completely inflamed the entire community that the prominent citizens were divided on the issue, and ceased all social intercourse and would not even worship at the same church. Erie was an important county, and although reliably Whig under all ordinary conditions, disregarded all political ties and elected a divided ticket to the Legislature on the distinct issue of repealing the charter of the Erie and Northeast Road. After a long and irritating conflict, the bill transferring the custody of the road to

the State was passed and approved by the Governor. The charter powers of the company were assumed by the Commonwealth, and of course the road had to be operated by the State authorities. Governor Pollock appointed ex-Congressman Casey as state superintendent to operate the road, and after struggling for a few months in vain efforts to harmonize the people and to maintain an open line of communication between the East and West, he resigned in disgust. The Governor then appointed the late General William F. Small, of Philadelphia, an experienced soldier in the Mexican War, and who had served in the senate, hoping that he would be able to calm down the belligerents and operate the line, but after devoting some weeks to his work he declared it to be hopeless and sent a peremptory resignation to the Executive.

The Governor sent for me, stated the situation and urged me to accept the place. It was certainly a most uninviting task, but he was so importunate that I finally agreed to accept, only on the condition that he would give me full authority to summon the necessary military power of the State to protect the line when in my judgment it was necessary. He said that he did not see any other way to maintain the peace there, and he would be willing that I should summon the military whenever, after careful consideration, I regarded it as a necessity to operate the line. I went to Erie at once and fortunately I had rather intimate personal acquaintance with most of the leaders of the dispute, all of whom were men of high character and intelligence.

On the anti-railroad side were such men as Judge Thompson, afterwards chief justice of the State; Senator Skinner, then serving in the senate; Mr. Lowrey, who afterwards became senator for two or more terms, and a large number of men prominent in

the business circles of the city. On the other side were men of equal distinction and character, such as John H. Walker, who had been senator and was president of our last constitutional convention; Senator Johnson, who had served in the senate, and published one of the leading papers of the city; Mr. Courtright, one of the chief investors in the railroad company, and many others, all prominent in professional and business circles.

I was most hospitably entertained every night during my stay there, and I was careful to divide my acceptances equally between the disputing forces, but I never met one of the opposing parties at any of the entertainments given. The city was in dilapidation. Its population had been reduced to about 5,000, business was at a standstill, and the only question that was discussed in parlors, business houses, or on the street corner was the railroad issue. I earnestly tried to summon the leading disputants into conference, but it was utterly impossible. Some of the railroad people would have come, but the others would not even entertain the suggestion. After a week or more of daily conference with the leading men, I worked out a method by which I hoped I could reconcile them at least to the extent of permitting the road to be operated without interference. I made concessions to both sides in manning the line, and presented it to the leading disputants, all of whom agreed to it. I made the changes at once, and was assured by the prominent men of both sides that there would be no further trouble.

It was in midsummer, and I started east by way of West Point, where I concluded to rest for a few days, but within forty-eight hours I received a dispatch from Erie stating that the riot had broken out afresh, that Senator Johnson's printing office had been gutted

and his press and printing material burned in a bonfire on the street. I hastened back to Erie, and at once called upon the leading anti-railroad men. They said, what perhaps was not true, that it was not done with their knowledge or their approval, but that they found it impossible to restrain the people. I had done everything that it was possible to do in the way of compromise, and I then went to Mr. Courtright, who was a thoroughly experienced railroad man, and who was so anxious to save his railway property that he was entirely willing to advise the most generous adjustment. I went over the whole ground with him very fully, and finally determined upon a just policy to be adopted. I prepared it carefully and presented it to Judge Thompson, Senator Skinner and others of the opponents of the railroad who were entirely reasonable and wanted an honest adjustment of the dispute, but confessed that they could not control the mob element that had been infuriated by the long-continued irritation.

I then announced to them that all efforts to harmonize the difficulty with the co-operation of the opponents of the railroad had failed, and that I now would adopt a policy that would coerce the acceptance of law and order. I gave them a programme for operating the road, and notified them that on the following day it would go into effect, and that I would operate the line if it required a soldier upon every cross-tie to protect it, and that soldiers called to protect the road would be instructed to fire on anyone attempting to destroy it, whether the offender wore trousers or petticoats. I had the authority of the Governor to summon the military, and had an ample military force ready to be brought to Erie in a few hours.

Of course I was very much distressed at the situation, because I feared that the spirit of lawlessness was so

rife that the more intelligent portion of the anti-railroad men could not prevent them from precipitating a disturbance that must necessarily result in the sacrifice of life. After careful reflection I decided to make the desperate experiment of inviting two of the leading railroad men and two of the leading anti-railroad men to meet at my room at the same hour, without either knowing that the others were invited, and I sent a letter to ex-Senator John H. Walker and Milton C. Courtright, leading railroad men, and to Judge Thompson and Senator Skinner, the most prominent anti-railroad men, asking them to be at my room at seven o'clock that evening. There had been no social, business or personal intercourse between Thompson and Skinner on the one side, and Walker and Courtright on the other side for a year or more, and it was an even guess that when I got them together they would simply explode and separate, or probably worse than that, but I thought there was a chance for peace, and I ventured to try it. They all enjoyed a drink of whisky and a game of euchre, and I had mv room bountifully supplied to meet the emergency.

The first to appear was Judge Thompson, who was a most delightful gentleman, and whom I did not fear as likely to provoke a disturbance, but who would be probably ready for a battle on any visible provocation. While we were standing at the sideboard taking the first sample of the whisky, there was a knock at the door and John H. Walker entered. He was a fighter of fighters, and the one I most feared. He stopped inside the door, evidently startled at seeing Judge Thompson, and I immediately walked up to him, shook him by the hand, and told him that I had invited him to meet Judge Thompson, as two of the most respected citizens of the city, as my guests for the evening, and

asked him to join us in a glass. He hesitated for some moments, and I very much feared that he would respond explosively, but he finally joined me and walked up to Judge Thompson and reached out his hand, and all took a glass together. I felt then that the battle was won, for with John H. Walker, the most implacable of all the belligerents, on terms with Judge Thompson I had nothing to apprehend from Skinner, who was amiable, and from Courtright, who had great interests at stake. They came in a few minutes later, and seeing Thompson and Walker in social intercourse logically fell in, and we at once sat down to a stakeless game of euchre. I had a fine supper for the party about midnight, and the game of cards continued until the sun was purpling the east, with the promise of another day, when they all shook hands in the most friendly way and went to their homes. That settled the Erie riots.

I never had occasion to return to Erie to suppress disturbance, and the railroad was operated from that time on without interruption. Certain concessions were promptly made by the railroad company extending a branch to the Lake Shore, and as the passions of the occasion faded out, all were glad to relegate the disgraceful Erie riots to forgetfulness. After two years of riotous discord, breaking up the peace of social circles and churches and dethroning law and order in the community, and after defying diplomacy and even military authority, and carrying the riotous proceedings to the extent of women tearing up tracks and destroying bridges, the whole war was settled in one night by a game of cards, several bottles of old rye, and the best supper that Brown's Hotel could furnish. I never had occasion to return to Erie to superintend the road, and the succeeding Legislature restored the chartered rights of the company, and I returned to them the

liberal profits which stood to my credit in the treasury of the State.

In my official report to the Governor, after I was relieved from the charge of the railroad, by the re-establishment of peace in the Erie community, I did not state the precise method by which peace had been obtained, but I had personally informed the Governor of it; and while he was much delighted at the restoration of peace, he left me greatly in doubt as to whether he would not have preferred peace by military force and the sacrifice of some lives to its attainment by a game of cards and several bottles of whisky. He was a severe Roundhead in his religious views, and believed both cards and whisky to be the invention of the devil himself. He was the only Governor I ever knew who signed a death warrant without visible reluctance, as he held strictly to the old law of an eye for an eye. He was quite prominent in church affairs, and once, when on a visit to the Pacific Coast, at a large banquet, he startled the guests by an indignant and eloquent protest against the loose religious ideas which had found expression at the feast. Soon after his retirement from the gubernatorial office he was made superintendent of the mint, and although displaced by Johnson, he was restored by Grant. He devoted himself to the practice of law in Philadelphia when he was not in public office, but he was not up to date as a practitioner, and attained only moderate success. He suffered serious financial misfortunes a few years before his death, and was little known or felt outside of the narrow circle of his church efforts. He rounded out the patriarchal allotment of years, and died widely and sincerely lamented.

XXII.

POLITICAL CONFUSION IN 1855.

Know Nothing Power Broken—The First Republican State Convention Held at Pittsburg — Democratic, Whig, American and Republican Candidates Nominated for Canal Commissioner — Republican Convention Nominated Passmore Williamson then in Prison — Many Fruitless Efforts made to Unite the Three Parties Opposed to Democracy — A Union Effected after an All-night Conference a few weeks before the Election — Too late to Harmonize the Parties —Democrats Carry the State and Legislature — Bigler Elected Senator — Rev. Otis H. Tiffany, an Important American Factor, a Candidate for United States Senator, Originally Selected to Deliver an Address of Welcome to Blaine in New York in 1884 — Clerical Jealousy made Him Retire, and Burchard Delivered the Address and Defeated Blaine.

THE revolutionary results of the election of 1854 left the three contending political parties in a condition of most disturbing uncertainty. It was evident that the Whig party had lost its power, as its distinct vote in 1854 was not greatly in excess of one-half the strength of the new Know Nothing organization. A very large majority of the rank and file of the Whigs had deserted to the Know Nothing organization, with little probability that they would ever return. The Whig party had stultified itself by declaring in favor of the Compromise measures of 1850 in its last National convention of 1852, where, after a long struggle between Fillmore, Scott and Webster for the nomination, a compromise was finally effected by which certain Southern Whigs agreed to accept Scott as candidate of the anti-slavery element of the party, on the condition that the convention should approve of the Compromise measures.

That platform paralyzed the Whigs of the North, and made defection from the ranks of the party easy, when Know Nothingism came along with avowed hostility to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

In the early part of 1855 the leaders of the three parties were entirely at sea. The Democrats felt no assurance of success, and in fact they had no promise of victory excepting in the division of the opposition. Their ranks had been badly torn by defection into the Know Nothing order, and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise had quickened the anti-slavery sentiment among the Democrats to an extent that gave them little hope of controlling the State. They had permanently lost the strong Democratic counties of the North, but they had great leaders, and they came to the front early in the year with their State convention, and nominated Arnold Plumer, of Venango, for canal commissioner, the only State office to be filled. Plumer was one of the ablest of the Democratic leaders. He had been state treasurer, was twice elected to Congress, and was one of the most adroit political managers of the State, with a blameless reputation. The Democrats of those days could be relied upon in an emergency to organize in the best possible way to meet it.

The Whig convention was called at the usual period, and I attended it as a delegate, but a careful review of the situation, of which the leaders of the different sections reported, the condition of the party proved that we were an assembly of leaders without rank and file. The Whigs of every part of the state had practically given up the organization in despair, and the only adherents were, as a rule, a few old Scotch-Irish Whigs, most of whom would have been compelled to lie awake at night to decide whether they most hated Know Nothingism or Democracy. It

was evident to all intelligent observers before the Whig convention organized that it had ceased to be a party of power, and that the sooner the funeral ceremonies were performed the stronger would be the hope of getting the stubborn old Whigs into some new attitude, where they could exert their opposition to Democratic authority that had reopened the Pandora box of sectional strife by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Having met, however, and most of the districts with full representation, we went through the motions in regular form and nominated Mr. Henderson, of Washington, for canal commissioner, and passed resolutions in imitation of the two tailors of Tooley Street, London, who held a mass meeting and prefaced the resolutions with the words "We, the people of England."

All of the delegates in the Whig convention were very earnest in their hostility to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the avowed purpose of taking possession of Kansas and Nebraska as slave territories, and while no such confession as the ended usefulness of the Whig party was heard in the proceedings of the body, in the many side conferences held it was decided that earnest efforts should be made to combine the opposition to Democracy in some way that could not then be indicated. The Know Nothing order had chosen its canditate for canal commissioner and nominated Mr. Martin, of Lancaster. He was an old Whig, thoroughly anti-slavery, and it was thought it might be possible to harmonize all of the different elements on him as the opposition candidate to Democracy.

Knowing that the last Whig State convention had been held, and that the organization of the party was practically abandoned, I attended the Republican State convention in the summer of 1855 at

Pittsburg, of which John Allison, of Beaver, was president. It was a mass convention, and all were admitted to its deliberations regardless of district representation. A number of able men were there, and Giddings, the great anti-slavery representative from Ohio, and Bingham, another Ohio representative, who was one of the ablest popular orators in the State, aroused the convention to great enthusiasm by their anti-slavery appeals, and the assurance that the Republican party would speedily control the government. Many private conferences were held, and after very full and careful deliberation it was settled, as we all supposed, that the convention should nominate Peter Martin, the Know Nothing candidate for canal commissioner, as he was heartily in sympathy with every principle of the Republican organization.

If the nomination of Martin had been accomplished it was reasonably certain that the Whigs would voluntarily withdraw their candidate and unite in the movement, although a small percentage of the Whigs would not have accepted any Know Nothing candidate. Everything was moving along very serenely until Mr. Acker, an old Quaker from Bucks County, arose, and, after delivering a most impassioned anti-slavery speech, moved the nomination of Passmore Williamson for canal commissioner, who was then in prison for contempt of court in refusing to make a satisfactory answer to the court as to the whereabouts of a fugitive slave. A torch applied to a powder magazine could not have been more explosive, and in less time than the proceeding could be fairly described the convention was on its feet in a tempest of enthusiasm, and Williamson was declared the nominee of the convention.

Williamson was, of course, an impossible candidate.

His imprisonment for contempt was severely criticised, but it would have been utterly hopeless to make a contest that would make the leading issue a battle with the supreme court of the State on its right to enforce its own process. There was not a ray of hope of uniting the other elements opposed to the Democracy on Williamson, and it would have been utterly useless to attempt to persuade the convention to reconsider its action.

Thus the Whig State convention of 1855 had met only to learn that it ceased to be anything more than a light-weight political ally of some greater organized opposition to the Democracy, and the Republican convention, that was regarded as representing the hopeful party of the future, started out with such revolutionary radicalism that it appeared only as a political suicide.

The campaign dragged along with the three regularly nominated candidates representing the opposition to the Democracy, and of course assuring the success of the Democrats unless a hearty union could be effected. The only State officer to elect was canal commissioner, but the Legislature to be chosen had the choice of a United States Senator, as the previous Legislature had wrangled over the senatorship during the entire session, and adjourned without electing. The office of canal commissioner was of little moment, but the Legislature was regarded as of vital importance, as it involved the choice of a Senator. The leaders of the three opposition parties made very earnest struggles to bring about a union, but many of the old Whigs were obstinate. The Republicans, then embracing only the more radical anti-slavery people of the State, were wildly enthusiastic over Williamson, and the Know Nothings insisted that, as they had a candidate who was a Whig and an

anti-slavery man, he should be accepted by all and receive the united support of the various opposition forces.

The pressure for union increased as the election approached, and finally, after very earnest and often defeated efforts, a conference was called at Harrisburg by representative Know Nothings, Whigs and Republicans to make a last struggle for unity. A large number attended, and they finally decided that three should be chosen from each party to confer on the subject, and any decision agreed to by a majority of each delegation should be accepted as final. The pledge was given that any of the opposition candidates not nominated by the union conference should be withdrawn, as authority had been obtained from all of them to do so. I was chosen as one of the Whig conferees, with John Adams Fisher, of Harrisburg, and Thomas E. Cochran, of York. The American conferees were headed by Rev. Otis H. Tiffany, then prominently connected with Dickinson College, with two associates whose names I do not recall. Senator Meyer, of Bradford, headed the Republican conferees, and Governor Pollock, who had very modest rooms at Coverly's Hotel, where the conference was held, took a very active part in urging the necessity of a cordial agreement.

The conference began at seven o'clock in the evening, and continued until three in the morning. Several times, after heated and irritating discussion, the conference was on the point of breaking up, and twice at different times during the night the motion was made to adjourn without day, but John Adams Fisher, the chairman, arbitrarily ruled the motion out of order, and never permitted a vote to be taken. The Know Nothings felt that they had the butt end of the whip, and with very good reason urged that their candi-

date should be accepted, as they must furnish most of the votes to elect him. Finally disruption was averted by the sagacity of Rev. Dr. Tiffany, who proposed that Thomas Nicholson, long chief clerk in the State treasurer's office, and practically State treasurer himself, and whose record in the Legislature had been very creditable, should be accepted by all as the union candidate for canal commissioner, and that the names of all the others be withdrawn. The proposition, coming as it did from the Know Nothings, was promptly accepted, and the next morning the official announcement was made of the nomination of Nicholson, and the withdrawal of Martin, Henderson and Williamson, but it was too late.

If the union had been accomplished sixty days earlier there is little doubt that Nicholson would have won, but as there were less than two weeks of time to brush away all the obstinacy of the old Scotch-Irish Whigs, to placate the radicalism of the Republicans, and to reconcile the Know Nothings to the great sacrifice they had made, the fusion was not completely effected, and Plumer defeated Nicholson by 11,500 plurality, while Williamson received 7,200 votes, Cleaver, Know Nothing, received over 4,000 votes, and Henderson, Whig, received nearly 3,000 votes, showing a majority of the united opposition against Plumer of 3,000. The Legislature was carried along with the State ticket by the Democrats, giving them one majority in the senate and thirty-two majority in the house, and resulting in the election of Governor Bigler to the Senate.

The Know Nothing movement brought an unusual number of ministers into politics, largely from the Methodist and Baptist Churches, whose people were rather more aggressive than other Protestant denominations in their hostility to Catholics. Many of them

Otis H. Tiffany

were local or lay ministers, and very few of them developed into creditable legislators, while many of them left disreputable records of their brief public careers. While there were a number who did not disgrace the cloth by active participation in politics, the one who stood out most conspicuous as an active politician and consistent Christian gentleman was Dr. Tiffany, who, as I have stated, accomplished the union of the opposition forces at the conference in 1855. He was not only a man of unusual eloquence, but a sagacious leader in Church and State, and always commanded the respect of all who came in contact with him, whether supporting or opposing him.

Hotel accommodations in Harrisburg at that time were very limited, and as nearly all of the parties to the conference were guests at Coverly's Hotel, the house was crowded, and Tiffany and I occupied a small room together. He was regarded as the ablest of all the Know Nothing leaders, and after the conference adjourned our little room was speedily crowded by parties desirous of conferring with him about the situation and management of the campaign. He entertained them until nearly five o'clock, when he said: "Gentlemen, you will please excuse me, I must retire, and if you will give me a minute to say my prayers I will go to bed, and you can continue the conversation as long as you choose." He then knelt at his bedside for a very brief period, arose and prepared himself for bed, bidding us a cheerful good night as he turned in. He was an unusually capable man, and was much beloved even outside of his religious and political associations. He had made a somewhat earnest contest for the United States senatorship in the preceding Legislature, but the struggle became so demoralizing that a man of his aims and methods was hopelessly bowled out of the race, as

in that contest he stood like a clean dove in a dirty deck.

He ended his career, that was so unusually eminent, in the Methodist ministry in the city of New York, where he stood among the foremost of the ministers of the great metropolis; and had he been permitted to deliver the address of congratulation to Blaine when the ministers met him in New York just before his defeat for President in 1884, Blaine would have been President instead of Cleveland. He was prominent among the ministers who arranged to have the clergy meet Blaine on his way home from his great campaign. Blaine had fought his battle and had won it, but the irony of fate doomed him to defeat from a cause that was expected to add largely to his success. It had been arranged by those immediately in charge of this meeting of the ministers with Blaine that Tiffany should deliver the address of congratulation, and had he been permitted to do so he would have welcomed Blaine in a speech of great brilliancy and peculiar fitness for the occasion, but some of the older ministers who had not been consulted complained that the assignment had been made without a full conference, and as there were but a few minutes time for consultation before meeting Blaine, the question threatened to develop considerable irritation.

Some one, in the interest of peace, proposed that the oldest minister present should be assigned to the duty. It was a plausible solution of the dispute, and it was accepted. On inquiry it was found that Rev. Dr. Burchard was entitled to the honor of addressing Blaine, and he blurted out his "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion," to a candidate for the Presidency who had just returned from a visit to his sister in Indiana as Mother Superior of a Catholic convent. Blaine missed a great opportunity to save himself

by not noting Burchard's blunder and dismissing it, as he could have done, in a way that would have made it harmless. He told me of the circumstance some time after his defeat, and when I asked him why it was that one of his exceptional readiness had failed on that occasion, he answered that while he had heard the remark, he was so intent in collecting his ideas as to the best answer to be made, that he was not impressed as he ordinarily would have been by the importance of correcting the error. He lost New York by 1,100 votes, and the Burchard blunder cost him much more in New York city alone than would have saved the Empire State and given him the Presidency. Had Dr. Tiffany delivered the address it would have been at once elegant and politic, and would have made the ministers' welcome to Blaine a very material aid to his cause, instead of ending in open and disastrous disgrace.

XXIII.

BIRTH OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

Became a National Organization in 1856—Pittsburg Conference Issues a Call for Republican National Convention—Fremont Nominated for President in Philadelphia—Many Old Line Whigs Support Buchanan for President—Fremont and Fillmore Forces Unite on State and Electoral Tickets Defeated by 3,000 at the October State Election—Buchanan Carries the State by a Thousand Majority over both.

THE elections of 1855 were singularly ragged in results, and clouded the Presidential contest of 1856 with great uncertainty. The Whig party had done its work, and it was practically eliminated from the political forces of the nation. True, after Fillmore had been nominated by the Know Nothings against Fremont, a mass Whig National convention was held in Baltimore without any pretence of regular State or district representation, as the organization was not maintained in any of the States, and indorsed the nomination of Fillmore and Donaldson, the Know Nothing candidates. The old Whigs of the South who had not fallen in with the Democracy on the sectional issue had all become absorbed in the Know Nothing organization, and it was the only party in the Southern States that maintained any organized opposition to the Democrats. In the Southern States the Know Nothings polled in 1855 nearly or quite as large a vote as the usual Whig vote, but the organization lacked the vigor and inspiration of a hopeful National party, and but for the facts that the nomination of Fremont was very objectionable to the conservative Whigs, and that Fillmore was a highly respectable candidate for Pres-

ident, the Know Nothing organization would not have exhibited one-half the strength that was brought to it by a combination of circumstances in 1856.

The year 1856 is memorable for the creation of the Republican party as a National organization. The opposition to the Democracy was not coherent, but was floating around promiscuously as old line Whigs, anti-slavery Democrats, Know Nothings and Republicans. It was evident to any intelligent observer of the situation that if the opposition to the Democrats could be cordially united it would command a decided majority of the votes of the American people. The situation was somewhat like the political condition presented in 1839, when the first Whig National convention was held at Harrisburg and nominated Harrison and Tyler. That convention gathered in the old Anti-Masons, the Whigs who had exhibited power in 1836 and the formidable Democratic elements of the country opposed to Van Buren and his financial policy. There was no vital public issue on which the various elements of the Harrisburg convention of 1839 divided that could not be reconciled. Clay was defeated for President, although a majority of the delegates desired his nomination, solely because he was a high Mason, and the Anti-Masons of the country furnished the large portion of the opposition to Van Buren. They made Clay an impossible candidate, as Seward's proposition to divide the school fund of New York when he was Governor of that State made him an impossible candidate at Chicago in 1860.

The political condition of 1856 differed from that of 1839 in the fact that between the Know Nothings and the Republicans there was an absolutely impassable gulf. The entire Know Nothing element of the South was opposed to slavery agitation, and to every chief article of Republican faith, and a large proportion of

the Know Nothings of the North were strongly conservative on the slavery question and with no affiliation with the Republicans. It became evident soon after the election of 1855 that the Republican party must take the lead and fight a battle single-handed with the Democracy.

The Republican organization had its birth in 1854, when the name was adopted by the more anti-slavery opposition to the Democrats in sections of a number of the States, including New York and Pennsylvania. Michigan is entitled to the credit of holding the first State Republican convention in 1854 that nominated a full State ticket under the distinct Republican banner, and won without any combination with side political forces. It was done under the leadership of Zachariah Chandler, an able and aggressive anti-slavery man who afterward became conspicuous as a Republican United States Senator, and as chairman of the Republican National committee in 1876, and who won for Hayes after a desperate battle ending in the Electoral Commission.

Iowa was carried the same year by a fusion between the Whigs and Republicans, but Michigan stood alone as the only State that had achieved a clean Republican victory. The name Republican had been accepted spasmodically in many localities, and when it became necessary to adopt a name under which to rally the opponents of slavery extension, the leading Representatives of that sentiment in Congress unanimously decided that the new party should be called Republican, in imitation of the Jefferson party whose victory of 1800 laid the foundation for sixty years of Democratic control of the government.

In Pennsylvania the opposition to the Democrats was badly disintegrated and gave very little indication of possible unity. The lack of able and faithful lead-

ership in the Know Nothing organization was a very serious objection to affiliation with that order, and the radical anti-slavery views to which the early Republicans gave expression repelled alike the conservative Whigs and Know Nothings. Pollock was Governor of the State, but not in any sense a political leader. Cameron was in the Know Nothing organization and was smarting under the wounds of his long and bitter contest for Senator during the session of 1855, and his broad, comprehensive knowledge of politics made him earnestly desirous for the unity of the opposing elements, as he hoped to return to the Senate if such a victory could be achieved. Curtin was also in the Know Nothing organization, but was greatly disgusted with its corrupt political leadership and methods, and the old Whigs of the State were simply in retirement without asserting themselves in any way whatever. Repeated consultations by the National leaders in Washington, after the elections of 1855, finally decided that a conference of active Republicans from all the Northern States should be held at Pittsburg early in the winter of 1856, and it was that informal conference that shaped the organization and policy of the National Republican party.

There were a number of able leaders present, all of whom understood the magnitude of the contest they were about to invite, but they felt that the slavery issue had then been pressed upon the nation in such a manner as to require the question of slavery extension to be squarely met and ended by the victory or defeat of the adopted policy of the advocates of slavery. Henry J. Raymond, then editor of the New York "Time," and a politician and writer of great ability, became the controlling leader in the Pittsburg conference, and he prepared the address that was then issued to the people of the United States, including a call

for a Republican National convention to meet in Philadelphia on the 17th of June to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President.

There was not even the pretence of a Republican organization in Pennsylvania. It was without a State committee, and had no machinery in existence by which a single delegate could be elected to the Philadelphia convention, but a large number of volunteer delegates appeared, representing every section of the State. I was among the number. Thaddeus Stevens took quite an active interest in the convention, and personally urged me to attend, hoping that, with a conservative delegation from Pennsylvania, Judge McLean, of the supreme court, could be nominated as the Republican candidate. Knowing how utterly unprepared Pennsylvania was to accept naked Republicanism, I attended the convention, but it was evident before the convention met that the radical element would nominate Fremont by a large majority, and I did not appear as a member. Fremont was nominated over McLean by a vote of 359 to 196, and nearly one-half of McLean's vote came from Pennsylvania.

The nomination of Fremont did not commend itself to the great mass of the old Whigs of Pennsylvania, and I left the convention expecting that I would feel little interest, and take no part in what then seemed to me to be an utterly hopeless battle for the Republican ticket; and but for the violent attitude assumed on the slavery question by the Cincinnati convention that nominated Buchanan, it is more than likely that I would have voted for Buchanan as against Fremont. I had known him personally for many years, and knew him to be great in statesmanship, of unblemished character, and thoroughly and severely conscientious in the discharge of public and private duties.

A number of prominent Whigs immediately severed

Passmore Williamson

their connection with the opponents of Democracy after the nomination of Fremont and openly espoused the cause of Buchanan. Among them were such men as the Randalls, the Whartons, the Ingersolls, William B. Reed and others who had been among the leaders in the old Whig party. There were many others, such as Morton McMichael, William M. Meredith and Horace Binney, who were strongly inclined to revolt at the nomination of a Rocky Mountain adventurer, whose whole strength with the people was his romantic career as an explorer, and who was entirely unknown in statesmanship. They all respected Buchanan as one of the old school statesmen of the land, but the platform adopted by the Cincinnati convention that nominated Buchanan so distinctly endorsed the movements and policy of the slave power that many old Whigs were not only compelled to oppose Buchanan's election, but were inspired to make an aggressive battle for the Republican candidates. The general political confusion that prevailed among the opponents of the Democrats greatly strengthened Buchanan, as his admitted ability and thoroughly clean record commanded the respect of even his bitterest foes.

The Democrats were early in the field and held their State convention in March. It was one of the ablest of the many political State conventions I have seen, and Buchanan's distinctive friends had an overwhelming majority of the delegates. Dallas, who had seriously divided the convention in 1852, was practically unfelt in the convention of 1856, and the ablest of the Democratic leaders had come to the front to give the Buchanan cause the highest commendation to the Democrats of the country.

There were no speeches made against Buchanan, but a number of interesting episodes occurred during the proceedings which brought out very positive

expressions in favor of "Pennsylvania's favorite son." The few anti-Buchanan men in the body attempted occasionally to move by indirection to gain some advantage, but they were foiled at every step, and that system of tactics was abandoned after one of the most brilliant speeches I have ever listened to in a State convention, made by Colonel Samuel W. Black, of Pittsburg, who tore the mask off the few mutineers and silenced them until the convention adjourned. I attended the convention as a spectator, and sat close to Black. He was a man of magnificent presence, with an exquisitely molded face that brightened grandly as he poured out his eloquent invective against the hopeless minority. It was a speech to be remembered regardless of the merits of the controversy, and my kind recollections of him brought me the sincerest sorrow when, in scanning the reports of the Seven Days battle on the peninsula, the name of Colonel Black appeared in the list of the dead.

The Democratic State convention nominated Mr. Scott for canal commissioner, Mr. Fry for auditor general, and Mr. Ives for surveyor general, and broadly indorsed the pro-slavery policy of the National admintration. There was something of a battle over the platform, as Colonel Stokes, of Westmoreland, one of the most eloquent men of the State, bitterly assailed the policy of the party, but there were very few who dared to make a record against the overwhelming and earnest majority that dominated the body. They felt confident, with the opposition divided into several discordant and more or less belligerent organizations, that the Democrats could win an easy victory.

The defiant attitude assumed by the Democrats in support of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise with violent and revolutionary efforts, made to enslave Kansas and Nebraska, inspired the opponents of Dem-

ocracy to practical action, and I attended a conference in Philadelphia, of which Morton McMichael was the central figure, in which it was decided that a "Union" State convention should be called, and that Whigs, Republicans, Know Nothings and all opposed to the policy of the National government on the slavery question should be invited to attend, to nominate a Union ticket. I was a delegate to the convention, and it was a body composed of very earnest and able men, in which were leading Whigs, Know Nothings and Republicans, and, to harmonize these various elements, we nominated Mr. Cochran, Whig, for canal commissioner; Mr. Phelps, Know Nothing, for auditor general, and Mr. LaPorte, Republican, for surveyor general. They were all men of high character and admitted ability, and there was every indication at that time of a cordial union of the opposition forces, which embraced a majority of the people of the State. A platform was adopted, confined chiefly to the issue of the extension of the slave power, and the contest was entered upon by the Union organization with bright hopes of success.

The cordial unanimity exhibited in the Union State convention by the different elements opposed to the Democrats inspired very general and earnest enthusiasm among the people supporting the new movement, and the Democrats speedily appreciated that they had a very desperate battle on their hands to save the State in October. Had Pennsylvania been lost to Buchanan in the October election he would certainly have been defeated in the Electoral College, and Fremont's election would have been probable. If the electoral vote of Pennsylvania had been transferred from Buchanan to Fremont, Buchanan's majority of the electors would be reduced to six, and the effect of Buchanan's defeat in his home State in October

would certainly have given Illinois to Fremont. In that State Buchanan polled 105,348 votes, with 96,187 for Fremont and 37,449 for Fillmore. If they had made a fusion electoral ticket there as we had in Pennsylvania, the electoral vote would have been given to Fremont, as the combined opposition was 28,283 greater than the Democratic vote, but with or without a fusion electoral ticket the prestige of a Union victory in Pennsylvania would have safely anchored Illinois in the Fremont column. Pennsylvania was thus the pivotal State in the National contest of 1856, as it was in the Lincoln battle of 1860.

The apprehension of the Pennsylvania Democrats as to the result was exhibited soon after the Union ticket was placed in the field by the withdrawal of Senator Timothy Ives, of Potter, from the State ticket for surveyor general, and substituting ex-Representative John Rowe, of Franklin. Some alleged irregularity in Mr. Ives' public record, that would not now be considered for a moment as an impediment to the success of a candidate, was discovered, and the Democrats demanded his declination, as they could not afford to have a single weak point in their line of battle. The contest was fought out not only with earnestness on both sides, but with more or less desperation, and the Democratic ticket was successful by a very narrow majority. The following is the official vote of the State:

CANAL COMMISSIONER.

Scott, Democrat	212,886
Cochran, Whig	210,111
Scott's majority	2,775

AUDITOR GENERAL.

Fry, Democrat	212,468
Phelps, Know Nothing	209,261
Fry's majority	3,207

SURVEYOR GENERAL.

Rowe, Democrat	212,623
LaPorte, Republican	208,888
Rowe's majority	3,735

Many interesting incidents of this great struggle, in which the Republican party made its first appearance as a National political factor, are worthy of record, and will occupy another chapter.

XXIV.

COL. JOHN W. FORNEY.

Forney Conducted the Campaign for Buchanan with Masterly Ability—His Intimate Relations with Buchanan — Forney was to be Editor of the Washington National Organ and Senate Printer if Buchanan Succeeded — That Assured Him Distinction in His Profession and Ample Fortune — Aggressive Opposition to Forney as Editor of the Democratic Organ from the South — His Jamison Letter, brought out in the Forrest Divorce Case, made the Breach — Buchanan Assents to the Sacrifice of Forney — Forney Advised of it by Buchanan's Secretary — Continued His Battle Confident that Buchanan would do Him Justice — A Cabinet Position Tendered to Forney — Buchanan Forced to Recall it — Buchanan asked the Legislature to Elect Forney United States Senator — Cameron Combines the Republicans with the Democratic Votes of Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller and Defeats Forney — A Foreign Mission Tendered to Forney — Final Estrangement between Buchanan and Forney.

COLONEL John W. Forney was chairman of the Democratic State committee in 1856, and had absolute charge of the great battle that was fought for the election of Buchanan, to whom he was romantically attached. He had received his chief education at the printer's case in Lancaster, Mr. Buchanan's home city, and gained National distinction as editor of the "Pennsylvanian" in the contest of 1844 between Polk and Clay. He proved himself a foeman worthy even of the steel of one of the most accomplished and forceful Whig editors of that day, Joseph R. Chandler, of the "United States Gazette." He was called to the leadership by Buchanan himself, and Forney developed grand resources not only as a political organizer, but in his varied methods to inspire the people of the State to sup-

port the only hopeful candidate for President ever presented by Pennsylvania. I saw him many times during the contest, and he always seemed to be wholly absorbed in what he evidently regarded as the great battle of his life. His wife and children spent a large portion of the summer at Wheatland, Buchanan's beautiful home on the outskirts of Lancaster city, and from the time the political lines were formed in the early midsummer until the campaign closed with the election of Buchanan, Forney never allowed himself so much as a whole day at one time to visit his chief and his family.

Buchanan and Forney were entirely different in temperament. Buchanan was naturally cold, calculating and reserved, while Forney was nothing if not enthusiastic and impetuous. Forney was in his personal attributes as lovable as a woman, with a face and form befitting an Apollo, and his dominating qualities were gentleness and affection, but when brought into battle he was sublimely heroic.

It was Buchanan's own proposition, dictated not only by his affection for Forney, but by his sense of duty, that Forney was to receive as his reward, in the event of Buchanan's election, the editorship of the "Washington Union," the organ of the administration, and the Senate printing. His whole ambition was in the line of his profession, in which he stood among the most eminent in the land, and he would have regarded it as a crowning triumph of his editorial career to be the chief editor of the National organ of the Buchanan administration, while the Senate printing, then one of the profitable abuses of the age, that was by universal custom accorded to the organ of the administration, would have given him ample fortune.

Buchanan had many times spoken to Forney, in the presence of Forney's family and others, of the

gratification it would afford him, if elected President, to give Forney what he then regarded as the highest editorial honors, with a handsome fortune added in the Senate printing. Unfortunately it became whispered in the South that Forney would become the editor of the organ of the administration if Buchanan was elected, and very earnest remonstrances came to Buchanan from leading men of the South, many of them demanding a pledge from Buchanan that Forney should be provided for in some other way. The commonly accepted idea at that time was that Forney was not acceptable to the South because he was not regarded as entirely sound on the slavery question, but that assumption is erroneous. Forney had fought the battle of the South in Philadelphia with great courage and ability for years, but one of his romantic attachments was for Edwin Forrest, the actor, and he profoundly sympathized with Forrest in his struggle for a divorce from Mrs. Forrest. The case attracted not only national but international interest, as Mrs. Forrest was a prominent English actress.

Forrest, whether justly or unjustly, was entirely convinced of the infidelity of his wife, but his evidence, although very strong, was not conclusive, as was shown by the verdict of the New York jury. Forrest had proceeded for a divorce on statutory grounds, to which his wife answered, demanding that the divorce be awarded to her on statutory grounds, and the jury gave the divorce to Mrs. Forrest, with $3,000 annual alimony, and giving her the right to marry, while denying it to Forrest. I met Forrest frequently with Forney during the last decade of Forrest's life, and Forney always exhibited agonizing sympathy with Forrest, and I could well understand how Forney had been misled by his ardent attachment for Forrest into writing the Jamison letter, in

John W. Forney

which he suggested that the suspected lover of Mrs. Forrest should be gotten into his cups and led to a confession of his criminal relations with Forrest's wife.

This letter was brought out in the Forrest trial, and while it was defended or excused by few, if any, the Southern journals and leading public men of the South criticised Forney with great severity. His many friends, who knew him personally and knew his strong affectionate temperament, and his unqualified devotion to Forrest, well understood that Forney was seeking to obtain only what he believed to be the truth, but Southern chivalry, however shadowed by felonious gallantries, accepted Forney's error as unpardonable. It was this circumstance that made the leading men of the South protest against Forney becoming the oracle of the Democratic National administration.

Buchanan was a man of most methodical and industrious habits, and he never employed a secretary until well on in the campaign of 1856. His letters were all written in his own hand, in almost copperplate style, but the voluminous correspondence of the campaign compelled him finally to ask Forney for a secretary to assist him, and Forney sent him William V. McKean. McKean remained with Buchanan a month or more, and saw the increasing demand made upon Buchanan from day to day for a pledge that Forney should not be the editor of the National organ. Several weeks before the October election Buchanan dictated a letter to McKean, giving a pledge that Forney should not become editor of the "Washington Union," in the event of his election. McKean wrote and mailed the letter without exhibiting his feeling to Buchanan, asked permission to make a hurried visit to his home, and came to Philadelphia and informed Forney what Buchanan had done, and declared his purpose to resign his posi-

tion as Buchanan's secretary. Forney was greatly distressed, but doubtless felt what he said to McKean, that if Buchanan had given the pledge he was moved by imperative necessities, and he could be safely trusted to do justice to Forney. McKean was persuaded to return and perform his duties as Buchanan's secretary until the close of the campaign.

Colonel Forney well understood the situation presented by the October election in 1856. While he had secured for his State ticket mere nominal majorities, he knew that it was practically a drawn battle, and that the November struggle would be even more desperate than the one that had just ended. Buchanan had not given an intimation of his pledge to refuse to Forney what Forney most of all things desired, nor did Forney intimate to Buchanan that he knew of the pledge that Buchanan had made. He had faith in Buchanan's fidelity, and his interest and efforts in the desperate battle were increased rather than abated. He was confronted with the most appalling charges of fraud, circumstantially portrayed, accusing him of using many thousands of fraudulent naturalization papers, and the feeling of the Union leaders and people that they had been defrauded out of victory in October made them rally with increased desperation in the November struggle.

They not only charged the use of false naturalization papers and other election frauds, but nearly a score of men were later convicted of having perpetrated frauds upon the ballot at that election. The Union leaders called a general conference at Harrisburg, that I attended, and the response was so general from every section of the State that we met in the hall of the house of representatives, and it was filled with as earnest a body of men as I ever saw assembled. In the white heat of such a contest it was not difficult

for the Union leaders to accept the conviction that they had been defrauded out of their victory, and they there not only resolved to renew the struggle with increased energy, but to inaugurate a relentless war against the corruption of the ballot.

I met Colonel Forney repeatedly during the contest between the two elections, and toward the close of the campaign he was utterly exhausted mentally and physically, but he stood to his guns until he scored a narrow victory, giving Buchanan only a thousand majority over the combined vote of Fremont and Fillmore. The union effected on the State ticket between the several organizations opposed to Democracy was finally, after much negotiation, carried to the arrangement of a Union electoral ticket. There was considerable difficulty with some of the Know Nothing leaders, as they were very much averse to the radical views of the Republicans, but it was finally agreed that there should be but one electoral ticket voted by the three organizations that had united on a Union State ticket. One elector was to be sacrificed by printing two electoral tickets for the Union party, one of which had as its first candidate for elector the name of Millard Fillmore and the other had as the first candidate for elector the name of John C. Fremont.

General Cameron came to the front as a supporter of Fremont, and was placed on the ticket as an elector-at-large, and the electors were divided between Whigs, Know Nothings and Republicans. The agreement was very explicit, and, to avoid all misunderstanding, it was formulated in writing. The electors were each solemnly pledged to give a solid vote for either Fremont or Fillmore if the electoral vote of the State would elect either to the Presidency. If, however, the entire electoral vote of Pennsylvania would not

give success to either of the Union candidates, then the Union electors, if chosen by the people, should divide the vote of the State between Fremont and Fillmore in proportion to the vote received by each. As Fillmore's name headed one ticket and Fremont's name headed the other, it was very easy to determine the relative strength of the two candidates at the polls. There is no doubt that if the Union electoral ticket had been successful in the State the agreement would have been carried out with hearty fidelity, but, as the ticket was defeated, all dispute on the subject ended.

The very small majority received by Buchanan in his native State that had voted for every Democratic candidate for President for more than half a century, with the single exception of Harrison and Taylor, who were elected in sweeping political cyclones, was very mortifying alike to Buchanan and the Democratic leaders, but under the conditions which confronted them they were glad to escape with any majority. Had the Know Nothing element been faithful to the compact, both the State and National elections of 1856 would have been against Buchanan. John P. Sanderson, who had been senator from Lebanon, and one of the editors of the "Daily News," of Philadelphia, was in charge of the American wing of the combination, and his private conferences with Forney were discovered some weeks before the election, and finally a letter from Sanderson to Forney was intercepted, in which Sanderson invited Forney to meet him and come in by the back door. This was after the October election, and the exposure came like a bombshell, but it accomplished nothing beyond perhaps intensifying the conservative or pro-slavery Know Nothings in their hostility to the Union cause. The official vote for President was: Buchanan, 230,710;

Fremont. 147,510; Fillmore, 82,175, giving Buchanan 1,025 majority over the combined vote of the opposition.

Immediately after the election Buchanan informed Forney of the pledge he had given to exclude Forney from the editorship of the National organ, and asked Forney to indicate what other position he would prefer. Forney, without reflection, suggested a cabinet appointment, to which Buchanan promptly assented. It would have been a mistake for Forney to enter the cabinet. Great as he was as a political organizer and writer, he was not distinguished for executive qualities, and he could not have lived with his family on the salary paid a cabinet officer, but he was doubtless impelled by the desire to vindicate himself against his assailants in the South.

I met Forney soon after this arrangement had been made between Buchanan and himself, and at his suggestion I wrote a Philadelphia letter to the New York "Tribune," predicting the appointment of Forney to a cabinet position and highly commending the selection. As soon as his name was publicly discussed as a probable cabinet officer the same Southern leaders who had driven him from the editorship of the National organ became vehement in their protests against his admission to the cabinet, and Buchanan finally yielded and advised Forney that he must recall the tender. The South had voted solidly for Buchanan with the exception of Maryland, and he felt that he could not commence his administration with formidable hostility from the most powerful section that supported him.

Forney was again asked to state the appointment he could accept from Buchanan, and he named the senatorship, to which Buchanan cordially assented, and wrote a personal letter to Canal Commissioner

Mott, of Pike County, urging the nomination of Forney, who, until then, had not been thought of as a candidate for the senatorship. It had been generally accepted that Henry D. Foster, then a member of the house, who had been in Congress, and was a nominee for Governor in 1860, would be chosen. A Pennsylvania President just on the threshold of the immense power of the National administration, could successfully dictate to the Legislature, and Forney was nominated, but while there was no sign of open rebellion when the nomination was made, the demoralization of the party was visible to all, and many of the Democrats who voted for him, although they joined in the universal and violent denunciations of the three Democrats who voted against him, lost no sleep in worrying over Forney's defeat. The Legislature had three Democratic majority on joint ballot, and three Democratic representatives, Lebo and Wagenseller, of Schuylkill, and Maneer, of York, voted for Cameron and gave him the election.

Thus Forney lost the third position he had reason to expect from the Buchanan administration, and both he and Buchanan were profoundly mortified and humiliated by the action of the Legislature.

It is due to Buchanan to say that he was earnestly desirous of rewarding Forney in any satisfactory way that was within his power. Forney had been fortunate, through some friends in Washington, in acquiring a small fortune for that time, and he had placed it in Mr. Buchanan's hands as trustee for Mrs. Forney, as Forney was not conspicuous as an economist. Buchanan's next offer was to give the German mission to Forney, and the President had personally arranged so that Forney should receive, in addition to his salary as minister, $5,000 annually from some commercial interests. Buchanan urged Forney to accept it,

as he could live very comfortably on his income, educate his children and save money.

Forney was inclined to accept it as Mr. Buchanan was very earnest in urging it, but Mrs. Forney peremptorily refused her assent, and Buchanan's offer was declined. That was the beginning of the end of Forney's close relations with Buchanan. Buchanan felt disappointed at Forney's refusal of the offer of the German mission, and the chilly breath of estrangement had entered between them. Buchanan's last offer was a proposition to give Forney a large amount of postoffice printing, but Forney could not see his way clear to accept it, and, smarting keenly under his ostracism by the South, he decided that an independent editorial career was his line of duty and the best prospect of success, and the result was the establishment in Philadelphia of "The Press" in August, 1857.

XXV.

CAMERON'S DEFEAT OF FORNEY.

Forney's Desperate Battle for Buchanan Greatly Inflamed the Supporters of Fremont and Fillmore — They Openly Declared that the State Election was Carried by Fraud — When Forney was Nominated for Senator They were Ready to make any Combination to Defeat Him — Cameron Not Acceptable to the Republicans, but the Desire to Defeat Forney Dominated — Senator Charles B. Penrose Managed Cameron's Contest — A Republican Committee Visits Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller — The Republicans finally Agree to Cast One Solid Vote for Cameron to give the Democratic Opponents of Forney a Chance to Defeat Him — Interesting Incidents of the Senatorial Election in the Hall of the House — Stirring Scene after the Roll Call — Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller Compelled to Leave their Hotels.

THE Presidential campaign of 1856 was a revelation to the old-time political leaders. Fremont was nominated by a free-for-all convention that selected a man unknown in statesmanship for the Presidency with a radical Republican platform, and the Democrats naturally calculated on an easy victory, but they were speedily confronted by a tidal wave of impulsive politics, inspired by the sincerest and profoundest conviction on the slavery question, with largely new and strange leadership. College professors, with a very large proportion of their graduates, and many ministers, were for the first time in the front rank of political disputation, and the Democrats were appalled from time to time as their own leaders deserted and joined in the new political crusade against slavery.

Governor Reeder, of Easton, the most forceful intellect of all the Democrats in the State, and who

had been Pierce's Governor of Kansas, startled his party in the State and country by announcing his purpose to support Fremont. John M. Read, who had battled in the Democratic ranks for a full generation, and who was the leader of the Philadelphia bar, surprised his party associates by taking the stump for Fremont. David Wilmot and Galusha A. Grow, the two great leaders of the Democracy of the Northern tier, were promptly at the front under the Fremont banner, as was J. Kennedy Moorehead, the strongest Democratic leader of Allegheny. It was the most earnest practical campaign I have ever witnessed in Pennsylvania and it was an educational campaign on the Republican side from start to finish. They not only held large mass meetings, but they had their speakers in almost every township in the State. Local mass meetings were held in the schoolhouses and at the crossroads where the country people could be gathered, and a class of stump speakers, unknown as a rule in previous campaigns, delivered able and impressive appeals to the masses.

The Democrats were put upon their mettle, and the many able Pennsylvania campaigners, and a host of others from different States, were heard on the hustings in Buchanan's home State to an extent never before known in political conflicts. When Mr. Ives was withdrawn from the State ticket simply because of some alleged official irregularity that did not involve any criminal purpose, the Democratic convention was recalled to meet at Chambersburg, where I then resided, and I listened most intently to Colonel Forney's great speech before the convention in which he outlined the battle with unusual candor, as he then fully appreciated the desperate struggle that confronted him. He predicted disunion in the event of Fremont's election, and made a most eloquent and impassioned

appeal for the election of Buchanan as the only safety for the unity of the Republic. He was my guest at dinner during the meeting of the convention, and we spent an hour alone over cigars, during which he poured out the intensity of his earnestness for Buchanan's election to prevent fraternal strife, and personally appealed to me to join him in his great work. I told him that the Cincinnati platform made Buchanan an impossible candidate, much as I respected him and little as I hoped from Fremont.

The result in Pennsylvania has already been given in these notes. The several elements in opposition could not be completely united in local contests, and the Democrats elected fifteen of the twenty-five Congressmen, but John Hickman, one of the fifteen Democrats elected, broke with Forney against Buchanan, and ultimately became one of the Republican leaders of the House, and William Montgomery, of Washington, another of the Democrats elected, became a Douglas leader against Buchanan. The senate stood fifteen Democrats to eighteen opposition, and the house had fifty-three Democrats to forty-seven opposition, giving the Democrats six majority in the house and the opposition three majority in the senate, leaving three Democratic majority on joint ballot. The nomination of Forney for United States Senator, having been literally forced by President-elect Buchanan, was a very bitter pill for Henry D. Foster and his friends. Foster was a member of the house, having come to the popular branch of the Legislature after having served in Congress, solely for the purpose of making himself United States Senator. He was a man of strong intellectual qualities, and personally a universal favorite because of his very amiable attributes. He came into the support of Forney, but without visible cordiality, and there was a very strong

rebellious undercurrent of Democratic sentiment against the President-elect controlling the Democratic nomination for Senator against the known wishes of the Legislature.

It was this demoralization, deep-seated, but not visible on the surface, that opened the doors for Lebo, Maneer, and Wagenseller, three Democratic members of the house, to betray Forney and elect Cameron. The opposition members were smarting under the defeat that Forney had given them in October, and the disposition was very general to avenge the wrong they believed he had done them and their cause. There were very few of the opposition members who were friendly to Cameron, and certainly not one-fourth of their entire number would have preferred him as their candidate for Senator; but Cameron, with his exceptional shrewdness as a political manager, saw that he could depend upon the resentments against Forney among the opposition members to support him if he could assure them of his ability to defeat Forney. Cameron was most fortunate in having in the senate as one of his few earnest friends Charles B. Penrose, grandfather of the present Senator, Boies Penrose, who had just been chosen to the senate from Philadelphia. He had been in the senate a quarter of a century before from Cumberland County, was greatly disappointed in not being called to the Harrison cabinet in 1841, and resigned the speakership of the senate to accept a department position at Washington. He was a man of ripe experience and great sagacity in politics, and he was very earnest in his desire to punish Forney, and quite as earnest in his desire to promote his friend, General Cameron.

No one in the opposition caucus ventured to nominate Cameron as the candidate against Forney, for the reason that it would not have prevailed, but Cameron

had the positive assurance from Representatives Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller, all Democrats, that they would vote for him if their votes could elect him. Cameron communicated that information to Penrose. As the Democratic majority on joint ballot was only three, the defection of three votes with the united opposition would give Cameron the election. Penrose very shrewdly stated to the Republican caucus that he had good reason to believe that if the opposition members would unite in the support of General Cameron he could command a sufficient number of Democratic votes to elect him. The caucus refused to take any action on the subject until the members could have absolute information as to the Democratic defection, and Penrose finally proposed that three members of the caucus, in whom the caucus could have implicit confidence, and whose discretion could be fully trusted, should be conducted to the presence of three Democratic members who proposed to vote for Cameron, and receive the assurance from them and report at a later meeting of the caucus.

Cameron at once arranged with Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller to meet the committee of the opposition caucus at Omit's Hotel, and give the assurance required, and the committee reported to the caucus that they had seen the three Democratic members of the Legislature, whose names they were not then at liberty to divulge, who pledged their sacred honor that if the opposition members united in the support of Cameron they would give him their votes and elect him. The only persons on the Cameron side who knew of the arrangement with Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller to vote for Cameron, were Cameron himself, his son Donald, George Bergner and John J. Patterson, and the younger Cameron, with Bergner and Patterson, were Cameron's skirmishing force, and they watched the

rear of Omit's Hotel as Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller were admitted by the back yard to Cameron's room, where the opposition caucus committee was assembled, and when they saw the three Democratic members safely inside, they dispersed.

The opposition caucus was somewhat distrustful, and instead of nominating Cameron for Senator, they adopted a resolution that they would give him a united vote on one ballot, but that the obligation to vote for Cameron was not to go beyond that period. There were many reluctant votes given in support of the resolution as a large proportion of the opposition members were positively hostile to Cameron, but they were intensely inflamed against Forney, and they believed that Cameron had severed his connection with Democracy, and if elected to the Senate would be opposed to the Buchanan administration.

At that time the Legislature did not vote for Senator in the separate bodies as they do now, and no vote was taken for Senator until the joint convention met, when the compact was carried out to the letter, and Cameron was elected over Forney for a full-term senatorship. The whole arrangement was conducted with such secrecy that not one of the opposition legislators had any idea as to what Democrats had bolted, and the Democrats themselves did not doubt the fidelity of Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller until they cast their votes in the joint convention The three bolting Democrats had not only refused to vote for the regular Democratic candidate for Senator, but they voted for, and elected as Senator, the man who had been at the head of the Fremont electoral ticket in the last campaign, and their action was an absolute betrayal of the plighted faith of the party that elected them.

A hurricane of resentment struck Lebo, Maneer and

Wagenseller. Many of the Democratic members of the house refused to recognize them. The Pennsylvania Hotel, where they boarded, required them at once to find another boarding house, and all the prominent hotels of the city refused them admission, compelling them to accept the hospitality of obscure private rooms. The Democrats of the senate and house drew up a formal protest against the admission of Cameron to the Senate, signed by all the members, alleging that his election was tainted with corruption, and urging that the validity of his election be carefully inquired into, but as no specific evidence of corruption could be presented, beyond the fact that three Democrats had voted for a Republican for Senator, the Senate could not take cognizance of the protest, and Cameron was logically admitted to the Senate without question.

The spectacle in the hall of the house of representatives when the joint convention met to elect a United States Senator was one long to be remembered. There was quiet anxiety on the part of the opposition, and sullen apprehension among the Democrats. There were no boisterous demonstrations of any kind. The opposition were hopeful, but not entirely confident, as only three of their number knew where the Democratic votes were to come from, and the Democrats felt that there was some subtle miasma in the political atmosphere, but they were bewildered in attempting to locate it.

Senator Taggart, opposition, of Northumberland, was president of the senate, and presided over the joint convention. He had been one of the most violent opponents of Cameron two years before in the Know Nothing jangle, and had written the most defamatory paragraphs against Cameron issued to the public by a number of senators and representatives. He was more open and defiant against Cameron than any mem-

ber of the Legislature only two years before, but Cameron took summary vengeance upon him, and before a year had elapsed he saw that Cameron was a dangerous man for him to quarrel with. Taggart's father was the responsible head of the Northumberland Bank, then a very sound and successful country banking institution. Senator Taggart was its solicitor, and the family largely depended upon the income from the bank for its livelihood. Cameron arranged with his brother, William Cameron, of Lewisburg, who was then a large stockholder in the Northumberland Bank, to quietly purchase a majority of the stock, and he succeeded in doing so. The result was that at the next election the entire Taggart family were turned out and the friends of Cameron put in their places. After two years of experience in wrangling Senator Taggart made satisfactory terms with Cameron, and he earnestly supported Cameron's election in 1857.

Cameron was not forgetful of the service rendered him, as he earnestly supported Taggart for Governor against Curtin in 1860, but without success, and after Cameron became Secretary of War, and the army list was enlarged, he appointed Senator Taggart the first paymaster in the regular army from civil life. This gave Taggart a life office, and he felt that Cameron had fulfilled his bond.

When the joint convention was called to order the profoundest silence prevailed throughout the vast assemblage, as the hall was crowded to its utmost capacity. When the roll-call began there was no break until nearly half the list had been called. The Democrats generally voted for Forney, but there were a few who gave Foster a complimentary vote, intending to change their votes before the result would be announced, while the opposition members voted solidly for Cameron. When the name of Lebo was reached

he startled all the members present, with the exception of the members of the committee who had conferred with the bolting Democrats, by announcing the name of Simon Cameron in distinct tones.

The vote of Lebo came like a thunderclap from an unclouded sky to the Democrats, and one of their leaders arose and attempted to make an impassioned appeal to the Democratic members to cast a united vote for their candidate, but he was speedily called to order and reasonable quiet was finally restored. The opposition members felt confident that the needed number of Democratic votes would come from somewhere, and the Democrats realized that Lebo would not have voted alone for Cameron, and that there must be other Democratic votes yet to come. Maneer's name was called soon after, and he, in a feeble voice, announced his vote for Cameron. His vote with that of Lebo assured Cameron's election with the united opposition vote, and of course the united opposition vote was assured when the defeat of Forney was clearly within their power. There were a few soft hisses, but silence was promptly restored, and the list was called on until nearly the close, when the name of Wagenseller was announced, and he declared for Cameron in a distinct and defiant tone.

When the calling of the roll closed, J. Lawrence Getz, speaker of the house, who sat beside Speaker Taggart, rose up and attempted to make a most inflammatory speech, but Taggart, who was a man of powerful physical force, took him by the arm and forced him back into his chair, telling him, in terms loud enough for all to hear, not to make a fool of himself. This comic feature of an occasion that was verging close to tragedy, called out the humor of the opposition members, and while the Democrats stormed, the opposition responded in hearty laughter, and in a few minutes

Speaker Taggart announced the election of Cameron, and the adjournment of the convention without delay. Donald Cameron, with Patterson, was standing on the left of the speaker, close to the rear window, and as soon as the result was announced, they hoisted the window, sprang out on to the pavement six feet below, and rushed down to Omit's Hotel, where General Cameron was waiting, and informed him of his election. He immediately started with his son to his country home, and did not return to the city until the next day.

It was with much difficulty that Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller got away from the Capitol, and they would not have escaped violence but for the fact that they were promptly surrounded by a number of able-bodied men, who protected them to their hotels, where they were greeted with dismissal by the landlords. They were allowed to occupy their seats during the remainder of the session, but they were severely ostracised by all the Democrats and not much respected by most of the opposition. They were all very ordinary men who never could have gained any distinction in public life, but they made their humble names immortal in the political memories of the State by the one act of reversing a Democratic majority in the Legislature and electing a Republican Senator.

XXVI.

BUCHANAN AND BLACK.

The Opposing Political Characteristics of Buchanan and Cameron—Buchanan Unjustly Censured as Sympathizing with the Rebellion—The Circumstances of His Election—The Solid South had Chosen Him President—Judge Black's Story of the Inner Movements of the Buchanan Cabinet—Interesting Incident of Black's Correction of Buchanan's Answer to the Southern Commissioners—Black as Buchanan's Ablest and Most Devoted Friend.

GENERAL CAMERON entered upon his second term in the Senate simultaneously with the inauguration of President Buchanan. He had first entered the Senate as Buchanan's successor, simultaneously with Buchanan's appearance as premier of the Polk administration, and in both instances he was an irritating thorn in the side of Buchanan. No two men could be more unlike than were Buchanan and Cameron in temperament, in taste, in method and in the trend of their intellectual forces.

Buchanan was a painstaking student, conservative, commanding respect rather than affection from his associates, while Cameron was aggressive, always looking to the end to be attained rather than to the means employed, and always cherishing the warmest attachment for his friends. Buchanan was trained in statesmanship and in its severest school. His first service in Congress, covering a number of years, was as a Federalist, and while he later accepted the Democratic faith with absolute sincerity and adhered to it unfalteringly, he was not a leader whose keen perception and prompt action could be relied upon to guide a party in an emergency. He was a statesman

of the old school that sedulously discredited innovations, while Cameron without claims to statesmanship was a consummate politician, a man of broad intellectual force and capable of employing his faculties to the uttermost when the occasion demanded it.

Cameron could be patient and conservative, or keen and aggressive, as occasion demanded, and when the new problems arose which culminated in civil war his adaptability to new conditions was vastly greater than that of Buchanan. Buchanan adhered to the theories of old-school statesmanship. He believed in the resolutions of 1798, which were known to have come from the pens of Jefferson and Madison, and that made Buchanan invest them with sanctity, while Cameron, in his eminently practical way, never took pause over the traditions or records of the past when new conditions and new necessities confronted him.

If North and South had taken counsel with Cameron during the period of Buchanan's administration, civil war would have been averted and slavery preserved. Every new problem that came up Cameron was ready to meet in an equitable and practicable way, and when war came he was one of the foremost to declare that slavery must be overthrown. There never was any intercourse between Buchanan as President and Cameron as Senator beyond the necessary official courtesies. They had parted in their political paths as early as 1845, when Cameron became Buchanan's successor in the Senate, and during the four years of the Buchanan administration Cameron ranked as a conservative Republican.

President Buchanan has been very unjustly censured as largely responsible for the precipitation of civil war, and for alleged disloyalty to the government during the war. Those yet living who knew

him need not be told that he would have given his life if necessary for the preservation of the peace and unity of the Republic. He was responsible for permitting the South to pursue its policy looking to secession until it was too late to halt it, but when secession came he took a bold stand in favor of the maintenance of the Union, and while profoundly deploring the war against the South that had made him President, he never uttered a sentence during the war that was not in favor of the union of the States, and the employment of war to any extent necessary to accomplish it. He exhibited a great interest in public affairs, although in a very unostentatious way, and wrote hundreds of letters to his Democratic friends always displaying absolute loyalty to the government.

In 1863, when it was feared that the supreme court of Pennsylvania would declare the National conscription law unconstitutional, Buchanan laid aside the delicacy that he always exhibited in his relations with judges, by writing a most earnest letter to Chief Justice Woodward, appealing to him not to commit such a wrong against the country and the Democratic party; but his patriotic counsel was unheeded, and Woodward fell in the race for Governor because the loyalty of the court and of its chief justice was distrusted.

It should be remembered that Mr. Buchanan entered the Presidency under very peculiar circumstances and conditions. He did not receive a majority vote in a Northern State with the single exception of Pennsylvania, where he had a majority of little more than one thousand. California, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey and Pennsylvania gave him their electoral votes, but there were large majorities against him in Illinois and Indiana, and smaller majorities against him in California and New Jersey. On the other hand,

Fremont did not receive in all the slave States over one thousand votes. To be precise, he had 308 in Delaware, 314 in Kentucky, 281 in Maryland and 291 in Virginia, and yet, receiving only the vote of a single section of the Union, Buchanan had less than half of a million plurality over him.

The contest was conducted entirely on sectional issues. They were forced upon the Democrats by the radical and aggressive Republicanism that had sprung into being in great proportions almost in a day, and the solid South gave Buchanan a majority of the popular vote in every State excepting only Maryland, where Fillmore received some 8,000 majority over Buchanan. While North and South were intensely inflamed by the vehemence with which the sectional issue was pressed by the Republican leaders, Buchanan was chosen President solely because the South had stood by him in almost unbroken column, while a large majority of the Northern States had voted against him, and in all except Pennsylvania the majority refused to accept him as the ruler of the Republic. With all of Buchanan's severely conscientious devotion to justice he could not but be profoundly impressed with his obligation to the South that had come forward and rescued him from the overwhelming majority of his own section.

Buchanan's fundamental error as President was in assuming that old conditions must continue to govern. He did not appreciate the fact that a new era had dawned upon the nation that could not be turned backward or even halted. He regarded the immense Republican majority in the North as a sudden ebullition of sectional passion that would speedily run its course and perish. He believed that his election to the Presidency was a final judgment that must settle the sectional dispute on the basis of the Compromise

measures of 1850. So confident was he of the correctness of this assumption that in his inaugural address he foreshadowed the then not yet proclaimed judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred Scott case, which was regarded by him and by the South generally as the final action needed to restore sectional unity.

This error was possible to Buchanan for the simple reason that he conscientiously adhered to the old school of statesmanship that had been reverenced for more than two generations, and that he believed would always command the reverence of the nation. He started on his administration entirely confident that the sectional disturbance would be quieted, and that he would be enabled to retire from his high official trust with the country restored to tranquillity.

Had Buchanan's wishes prevailed with his party, there is little reason to doubt that the sectional agitation that grew in intensity during his entire term would have been measurably or wholly restrained. The South felt that the final triumph of slavery had been won; that its right to occupy the teritorries was no longer to be questioned, and that even the right of the Southerners taking and holding slaves in transit in free States would be accepted as the law of the land. The hope of new slave States in the territory acquired from Mexico had perished, and the South immediately staked everything on the issue of forcing slavery into Kansas and Nebraska, where climatic and all other natural conditions were against it. The policy of the violent introduction of slavery into those territories had been inaugurated under Pierce, and unfortunately had been tolerated if not approved by him.

Buchanan was thus early confronted with the

problem of taking issue with the South in its then settled policy of forcing slavery into Northern territory, or permitting the violent and in every way inexcusable crusade to go on. To break with the South at the threshold of his power would have been fatal to his administration, and he would have been openly impaled as an ingrate. He naturally decided not to throw himself into the breach against the policy of the South, but hoped to restrain it and prevent it from further inflaming sectional prejudices. This was the fatal step that Buchanan made at the beginning, but in judging him strong extenuating circumstances should be given due weight. He fully agreed with the South on the policy of coercion, and knowing his views on the subject, the South persisted in its midsummer madness until secession had actually begun after the election of Lincoln. It is doubtful whether under any circumstances he could have restrained the secession of the Cotton States after Lincoln's election, and the greatest struggle of his life came after he had fully awakened to the fact that the tolerant policy of his administration had led to the actual severance of the States.

I never fully understood the inside movements of the Buchanan cabinet immediately before and at the time of the transition of the cabinet and the administration to open hostility to the South and secession, until two years after the war began, when I enjoyed a most interesting and instructive all-night talk with ex-Chief Justice Black, who had been first Attorney General and then premier of the Buchanan administration. I had known Black well for many years, and, like all who knew him, not only respected, but loved him. He was one of the most fascinating conversationalists I have ever met, and there was hardly a line of Shakespeare or the Bible or a poetic

sublimity anywhere that was not stored away in his wonderful memory.

Black had located at York after he had retired from the cabinet to practise his profession. I had charge of the draft made under the State laws in the fall of 1862, and after having made the adjustment of the quotas, ordered the draft in Codorus Township, York County, for a certain number of men. That township was almost solidly Democratic, there being but five Republican votes in it to several hundred Democratic. It was not surprising that no Republicans were drafted, as two of the five had volunteered and were credited to the township.

Quite a clamor was raised in the township about the alleged unfairness of the draft, as only Democrats had been drafted, and a committee of inflamed citizens called upon Judge Black and demanded that he should appear as counsel for them before me to have the alleged injustice corrected. Black came to Harrisburg one evening and at supper told me what his mission was, and that he desired to be heard on the subject. I told him that any time that suited him would be satisfactory to me—that night if he specially desired it, if time was pressing, or the next day at any hour that was convenient for himself. I said: "Of course, Judge, I will give you all the time you want, for there is no person whose speeches I so much enjoy, but you certainly know that I will decide against you, as you have no possible ground on which to claim relief." He stated that he expected that, but that it was business to discharge his duty.

After supper we went up to my room and drifted into conversation about old times when he was judge of the Chambersburg district, and about the war, until he finally noticed that the midnight hour had passed. He got up, put his hat on the back of his



Jeremiah S. Black

head, threw his overcoat over his arm, bade me good night, and got as far as the door, when he turned around to make some remark about what we had been discussing, and he unconsciously warmed up on the subject, slowly paced back to his chair, seated himself, and it was not until broad daylight that the conversation ended. He gave me the entire inner story of the action of the cabinet and the President during the troublous times after the secession movement began. He told me, what had not then been made public, that he had written Buchanan's answer to the South Carolina commissioners; that Buchanan had first written an answer and submitted it to the cabinet, and it was approved by all the members of the cabinet except Cass and Black. Cass resigned soon thereafter and Black took his place as Secretary of State.

Black said little or nothing during the cabinet session, but after it adjourned he went to the President privately and told him that, much as he loved the President, he must sever his relations with his administration if that answer was sent to the Southern commissioners. He told me that it was the only time he had ever seen Buchanan exhibit great emotion. He was silent for a long time, and finally rose up with his eyes dimmed with tears, handed the paper to Black and told him to rewrite it as he believed it should be. Black took the paper, rewrote it, and it was accepted by Buchanan without change. That act of Black saved Buchanan from adhering to his old-school ideas at a time when, had he done so, it would have been utterly fatal to his record. I may add here that after getting a little sleep and a light breakfast I looked around for Black to fix a time for his argument, and found that he had gone home, and I never heard anything more of the unlawfulness or irregularity of the Codorus draft.

Judge Black was Buchanan's most trusted and certainly most devoted friend after Buchanan's retirement. Black had been for ten years president judge in the district embracing Buchanan's native county of Franklin. He had been called to the bench by Governor Porter when quite a young man because of a very earnest contest between Judge Thomson, then president judge (father of the late President Frank Thomson, of the Pennsylvania Railroad), and Frederick Smith, a prominent member of the bar who had been speaker of the house. The contest became so animated that Porter solved the problem by appointing Black from Somerset, who was not personally known to the members of the Chambersburg bar, but his exceptional record made as president judge in that district had made him the youngest man nominated for supreme judge in 1851, and when he was elected he drew the short term and became at once chief justice. He was very popular with the people throughout his mountain counties, and was once prevented from going to Congress, when the Democrats had decided to nominate him without a contest, by the Whigs first entering the field and nominating his father as the Whig candidate. He was the trusted and confidential adviser of Buchanan until his death, and it is unfortunate that he did not give posterity the benefit of his great intellectual powers and ripe experience in dealing with public affairs.

He continued active in the practice of his profession until his death long after he had passed the patriarchal age. He was counsel for John C. Fremont in his serious Paris complications, and finally had him released from a criminal conviction that had taken place in the absence of the defendant, and he was counsel for the dissenting heirs of Commodore Vanderbilt, who had willed his vast estate almost

entirely to his son William, and obtained a very liberal adjustment.

Buchanan fully appreciated Black, and intended to give him the position that Black most earnestly desired, that of Supreme Judge of the United States, but he unfortunately delayed the nomination of Black until by the resignation of Southern Senators the administration had lost control of the Senate, and Black's nomination was not acted upon. If he had been called to the court of last resort he would have gone into history as one of the great jurists of the nation, and he would have been consistent in his loyalty to the government.

Buchanan lived until 1868, three years after the war had closed, and Cameron had just one year earlier entered upon his third term in the United States Senate, having defeated Curtin, Stevens, Grow, Moorehead and Forney in the race for senatorial honors. At the time of Buchanan's death he was very generally misunderstood throughout the North. Secession had begun under his administration; he had been the close friend of the men who causelessly precipitated secession, and in the inflamed passions of the time he was generally regarded as having been faithless to his trust, and not in hearty sympathy with the North. He knew how sadly he was misunderstood and spoke of it freely in private letters to his many friends, but he avoided all public demonstrations or discussions on the subject, because he believed the time had not come when he could present his own vindication to a disappointed public.

He wrote a small volume in which he justified his actions as President, and gave very important contributions to history, but he did not attempt to show his attitude in favor of maintaining the unity of the States even though it should be done at the point of

the bayonet. It was not until Curtis' "Life and Letters of Buchanan" were published some years after his death that Buchanan's consistent and earnest loyalty to the government during the Civil War was conclusively presented to the public, and he went to his grave profoundly respected by all who knew him, but harshly judged by many of his countrymen as a factor in creating fraternal conflict. It caused him profound grief to know that he was misjudged as faithless in the highest trust of the nation, when, as he well knew, he had been scrupulously conscientious in his devotion to the union of the States, and ready to accept his full share of all the sacrifices necessary to overthrow rebellion and preserve the great Republic of the world.

XXVII.

MANN AND CASSIDY.

Fremont's Defeat Brought Strange Political Conditions—He Revolutionized the Democratic States of New England and the West—Mann and Cassidy Lock Horns for the District Attorneyship in Philadelphia—The Battle Between Master Politicians—Cassidy Returned Elected—Mann Contests the Return in the Courts—After a Protracted Trial They Agree to Pool Their Issues and Have Two District Attorneys—They Go to Harrisburg and the Special Bill is Passed and Approved by Governor Pollock—Judge Thompson, Who Was Trying the Contested Election Case, Refused to Discontinue It, and After Trial Decided in Favor of Mann and Refused to Appoint Cassidy as the Additional District Attorney—Cassidy and Mann as Great Party Leaders.

JOHN C. FREMONT burst upon the political horizon in 1856 like a dazzlingly brilliant meteor. The campaign made for him was one of the most earnest in effort and surprising in results in the history of American politics. It permanently revolutionized the Democratic States of New England and most of the Democratic States of the West, and such an achievement under all ordinary circumstances would have made its leader the one man to continue in command of the battle until the new Republican party won its control of the nation.

Strange as it may seem, while the Republican party emerged from the defeat of 1856 with very general and steadily-growing confidence as to its ability to win in 1860, the name of Fremont was rarely spoken of as the Republican candidate for the next campaign. He was probably the strongest man that could have been nominated as the Republican candidate in 1856, as the new organization was composed of a mass of

independent free thinkers in politics, anything but homogeneous in all their political aims and convictions, and as Fremont was practically without a political record, and with a romantic career as an adventurer, he could be accepted by all the varied and conflicting elements which united in his support.

I supported him against Buchanan, for whom I cherished the highest personal regard, and whose statesmanship commanded the respect of friend and foe, solely because of the aggressive pro-slavery platform on which Buchanan stood in the contest, but I now regard it as fortunate for the country that Fremont was not successful. I met him but once during the campaign when, with some half dozen of his supporters in New York, I called upon him by appointment at his home. He impressed me more favorably than I expected, but I did not then know that he was under the most positive orders from such leaders as the elder Francis P. Blair and Thurlow Weed, who had nominated him, not to make any public utterance on politics either orally or by letter during the campaign. He was courteous, dignified and severely discreet, and all his visitors left him with very favorable impressions as to his personal qualities.

I knew him much better later in life, not only during the war, but I met him often after the war when he was engaged in his various speculative bubbles which finally led to his criminal conviction in Paris when he was not present at court nor even in France. Through the wise legal services of ex-Attorney General Black he was rescued from the extraordinary French conviction, but he died without ever having achieved substantial success either as a military commander or a promoter.

A runaway marriage made Jessie Benton, daughter

of Senator Benton, of Missouri, his wife, and she was a woman of great intellectual force and unusual accomplishments. She survived him many years, and I last saw her when in Los Angeles several years ago, and only a year before her death. She was in feeble health, unable to rise from her chair, but her face seemed to brighten when I informed her that I had called to pay my respects as one who had earnestly supported her husband for President. Her means were very limited, but kind friends saw that her home had every needed comfort.

Had Fremont been elected President in 1856 the secession tidal wave would have been quite as sudden and powerful as it was after the election of Lincoln, and very likely there would have been less restraint upon the South. Lincoln's few utterences after his election all tended to tranquilize the South, and no word ever escaped from him that could quicken sectional passion. He was always conservative and finally saved the Republic by patiently waiting in fretful silence until the Confederacy committed the suicidal act of firing upon the starving garrison of Sumter. There is little doubt that Fremont, if he had been elected President, would have met secession with aggressive and defiant utterances, and it is doubtful whether he would have been restrained after his election as he was during the campaign.

The reason for this belief is found in his record after the war began. He was abroad when Sumter was fired upon, but he was suddenly recalled and commissioned as a major general of the regular army. The younger Francis P. Blair had been elected to Congress from St. Louis, the first Republican ever elected from a Southern State, and as Missouri was one of the most disturbed of the border States, Congressman Blair insisted that General Fremont should

be assigned to the command of Missouri, believing that he and the General could very heartily co-operate, and that Fremont would welcome his counsels; but as soon as he was safely installed in his new command, Fremont assumed autocratic authority, discarded the counsels of his best friends, proclaimed the emancipation of slaves in Missouri without even consulting the President, and generally became so impracticable and unmanageable that Congressman Blair was compelled to demand his removal.

Lincoln felt great delicacy in striking down at the beginning of the war the man who had led the Republican party in its first great battle, and he sent General Cameron, then Secretary of War, to Missouri to make a personal investigation of the situation, and on Cameron's report General Fremont was relieved of his command. He was very importunate for active military service, and in 1862 Lincoln assigned him to the command covering the valley and mountains of Virginia, but he was compelled to make a separate department for him, as Fremont would not serve under McDowell or Pope, who were his juniors. The only result of that campaign was Fremont's defeat by Jackson, when three armies were converging upon him. With wonderful celerity of movement and equal celerity of battle, Jackson struck the three commands in detail including Fremont, defeated all of them and came out with a great victory, when he should have been not only defeated but captured.

That was the end of Fremont's military career, and his military and business record sadly eclipsed his brilliant achievement as a Presidential candidate in 1856. Lincoln well understood that a large majority of the North, embracing all of the Democrats and many Republicans, would not sustain him in precipitating fraternal war. Fremont would not have taken

William B. Mann

pause as Lincoln did, but would doubtless have precipitated war when the North was entirely unprepared to support it. The suicidal act of war committed by the Confederacy in firing upon Sumter would in all probability have been performed in some way by Fremont, and it is impossible to calculate the terrible and far-reaching evils which would have resulted in a conflict thus forced upon the South.

The Presidential campaign of 1856 left all of the three leading parties in the contest clouded with uncertainty. Although the Democrats were successful in the election of the President and Congress, they were largely in the minority of the popular vote, and saw no prospect of maintaining Democratic supremacy save by recovering a number of the Democratic States which had taken their position in the Republican column.

The Know Nothings, then known as Americans, were given an important veneering of respectability by Fillmore, their candidate for President, who commanded the solid opposition vote of the South, and carried the electoral vote of the State of Maryland. Their leaders, especially in the North, were largely composed of political adventurers. They were widely estranged from the Republicans; they felt that they held the balance of power, and they were autocratic in their demands, while the Republicans, confident that they could win under their own banner in the near future, felt no inclination to conciliate the arrogant leadership of the Americans.

Fillmore and his immediate surroundings knew how utterly hopeless his canvass was, and they were much more embittered against the Republicans than against Buchanan, although for the sake of local advantages they had fused with the Republicans in Pennsylvania, but fusion failed of success, and with

the Pennsylvania Americans exhibiting entire lack of sympathy with the Republicans, it soon became evident in this State that the only way to attain Republican success was to cut loose from the Know Nothings, unfurl a distinctive Republican flag, and accept defeat simply to show the poverty of Know Nothing power.

In Philadelphia the Know Nothings as a body co-operated with the Republicans in local affairs, although many of the Know Nothing leaders were very reluctant in the movement, and some openly opposed the combination. It was this combination in Philadelphia that brought out a most interesting political espiode as an aftermath of the Presidential battle of 1856, in which two men were brought prominently before the State for twenty-five years thereafter, and were very important factors in their respective parties. These men were William B. Mann and Lewis C. Cassidy.

Mann had been assistant district attorney under William B. Reed for some years, and when Reed left the party and joined the Buchanan forces in 1856, Mann was the logical candidate to succeed him. He was nominated by the combined opposition, embracing the Whigs, Republicans and Know Nothings, and Cassidy was nominated as his competitor.

They were then comparatively young men, and each confessedly stood as the best equipped leader of his party. They were both eminent in their profession, thoroughly trained in local politics, and tireless in their political efforts. It is needless to say that two such men, both on the sunny side of middle life, both adroit and accomplished campaign orators, and both familiar with the minutest details of all political methods known in city politics, would make a rattling campaign, and even eclipse the Presi-

dential contest in Philadelphia, and it is fair to assume that no known method of political advancement was left unemployed by either to win victory. The Democrats had control of the city, and although the Know Nothing organization had taken from the Democracy a large percentage of its men trained in the pollution of the ballot, the opportunity for fraud was largely on the side of the Democrats. Cassidy was returned as elected and Mann contested on the ground of fraud.

The case was tried before Judge Oswald Thompson, a man unusually equipped in all the best qualities of a judge, and inflexibly honest in all his judicial actions. A contested election covering a great city was a huge undertaking and the contest dragged along for weeks and weeks with Mann and Cassidy daily struggling for the advantage. Both finally became discouraged, as neither could see the end of the conflict. They were men trained in the same political methods, and it was not unnatural therefore that when they grew disgusted and weary of the daily contests they should come together and decide to pool their issues. They formed a compact that they should both go before the Legislature at Harrisburg and ask for the enactment of a special law authorizing two district attorneys to serve in Philadelphia during the present term.

I was at Harrisburg when they arrived there, and was present in Governor Pollock's room when they presented their proposition. They both admitted that the contest was doubtful and that it would require months and the expenditure of many thousands of dollars to make an exhaustive trial of the case. As Cassidy, the incumbent of the office, was entirely willing, and as Mann, who was conducting the contest, was entirely willing, the Governor and the Legislature accepted their views and the bill was

promptly passed and approved. They did not doubt that when they appeared in court and presented a certified copy of the act of the Legislature, and asked for a dismissal of the contest and the appointment of the additional district attorney by the court as the law authorized, Judge Thompson would willingly end the case and appoint Mann as the second district attorney.

To their utter surprise and terrible discomfiture Judge Thompson reminded the parties that it was not their suit at all, and that they had no control over it; that certain citizens of Philadelphia had petitioned the court, alleging that great frauds had been committed in the pollution of the ballot, and it was the cause of the public, not of the individual candidates, and therefore the case must proceed to final judgment.

With a sternly honest judge, and the developments already made in the case, Cassidy regarded his chances for retaining the office as rather remote, and he did not thereafter maintain his side of the case with the interest and effort previously exhibited. The case was thus hastened to final judgment by Cassidy permitting Mann to strengthen his side without serious rebuttal, believing that Mann would be declared elected, and that Cassidy would then be appointed as the additional district attorney.

Judge Thompson gave the case very thorough investigation, and, in an opinion that was unanswerable, declared Mann to be the lawfully elected candidate and he was at once qualified. His first act was to move for the appointment of an additional district attorney, and suggested that the court should give the position to Cassidy, but Judge Thompson again astounded both of them by declaring that he could not, consistently with his duty to public justice,

appoint a man to a position who had held it fraudulently and been judicially deposed, whereupon he appointed Mr. Loughead, a reputable member of the bar who was untrained in the politics of Mann and Cassidy. It was a great disappointment to both of them, but they were without remedy and had to accept the command without complaint.

This contest brought Mann and Cassidy into closest personal relations, and for a quarter of a century thereafter Cassidy was the acknowledged leader of the Democrats in the city, and Mann the acknowledged leader of the Republicans, but there never was a time when either could aid the other personally that it was not done with great fidelity. They would lock horns as opposing leaders in general political battles, and lead as only two such able, aggressive and experienced men could lead, but when either needed the help of the other the draft was always honored at sight.

Cassidy left the office of district attorney only to be by the side of Mann, the public prosecutor, in the defense of nearly every important criminal case, and it is an open secret that many criminal cases were finally disposed of as Mann and Cassidy mutually believed to be best, regardless of their efforts at the bar of the court. Both were generous to a fault, and accepted heavy exactions in the interest of their respective parties, which forbade fortune to either and the bond of personal sympathy between them lasted throughout their lives. In 1874, when Mann was beaten for district attorney by Furman Shepherd, it was a defeat that clearly proclaimed the dominating power of Mann to be ended, and he was made prothonotary of the common pleas courts by a single Democratic vote that could have been obtained only by the friendly efforts of Cassidy.

Mann became practically the district attorney at the end of the contest of 1853, as his associate was not known as a political leader, and for many years thereafter no man ever exercised more absolute power in the Republican party in the city than that exercised by Mann. He was re-elected in 1859, again in 1862, again in 1865, and was renominated in 1868, but a bolting convention nominated Isaac Hazlehurst, and finally both withdrew to give the field to Charles Gibbons, who was defeated by Furman Shepherd. In 1871 Mann was again nominated and elected, and in 1874 he was again made the candidate of the party, but suffered defeat, practically retiring him as a political leader.

I well remember in 1860 when Curtin's friends had decided to make him the candidate for Governor, I was one of the number who had several conferences with District Attorney Mann. He wanted to be entirely satisfied that it was the best nomination that could be made, and that he would be regarded as heartily in accord with the administration. After considering the matter carefully he announced to us that Curtin could depend upon a practically solid delegation from the city in favor of his nomination. It was not necessary to consult any other person. What he promised was performed.

His omnipotence was never questioned until 1868, when an organized opposition in the convention bolted from his nomination and nominated Isaac Hazlehurst, who had been the Know Nothing candidate for Governor in 1857. Mann could not understand that his defeat was inevitable. The fact that the party was split, and that a candidate of the highest character within his own household was pitted against him, convinced his friends that he could not escape defeat, but he was deaf to all appeals for his retirement.

He then lived on a large farm in the suburbs, and for a month or more he remained at home waiting, as he believed, for the tempest to subside. Finally it became necessary for the party to take action, and after consultation, William H. Kemble and myself were assigned the task of making him a visit at his home and obtaining his declination. We went out in the afternoon, dined with him, and met with a very hospitable reception generally, but he at first refused to entertain the question of his retirement. We were both warmly attached to him, and he had entire confidence in the sincerity of our friendship, and after persisting in our appeals to him until near the midnight hour, he finally yielded.

I well remember him throwing up his hands and saying, "This is to be the end of my political career." We told him that by yielding at that time he could reasonably expect to be re-elected three years thereafter, as he was, but he had then little hope that he had any future political career. I wrote a brief letter of declination, putting it entirely upon the ground of harmonizing the party, which he copied and signed, and we returned with it to the city the following day.

Although forced from the field, his power over the party was well maintained until after his final defeat in 1874, and I know of no man who served so many and received so little return from them. All who knew him could well overlook his faults because of common frailty, while they could not but cherish grateful memories of the many generous and philanthropic acts of his life. He continued as prothonotary of the courts until he had rounded out fourscore years, when he passed away with his memory green in the hearts of a multitude of friends.

Cassidy was also the ruler of his party for many years, but his rule was much more tempestuous than

that of Mann. His party was almost always rent by factional divisions which now and then would unhorse him for a time, but his leadership was so great, his championship of the party so grand, that none could supplant him in his mastery. I have seen him in Democratic State conventions when the war of factions was so bitter that the pistol and the dagger were held convenient for use, but even in the bitterest quarrels he was always victor.

He served one term as attorney general under Governor Pattison, and he made a record not only for legal ability, but for fidelity to his public trust that has been equaled by few who have held that high position in the State. Unlike Mann, he fell in the race before the infirmities of age and the ever-changing conditions of politics relegated him from political command, and when Lewis C. Cassidy crossed the dark river the Democrats of Philadelphia lost the ablest champion who ever held their colors in the front of battle.

XXVIII.

PACKER AND WILMOT.

William F. Packer a Strong Candidate of His Party for Governor—David Wilmot, an Advanced Republican, Nominated by the Union State Convention to Force Lingering Know Nothingism out of Political Power—They Nominate Hazlehurst for Governor—The Way Cleared for Future Battles against the Democrats—Wilmot's Great Ability as a Campaigner.

A REACTION that sometimes reaches a general revulsion usually follows a severely contested National political battle. The defeated party, after having strained its resources to the uttermost to achieve success, as did the Republicans in 1856, retires from defeat with the inclination to rest for a season. This condition is common, if not universal, in this country. The year following the Presidential contest is what is called an "off year" and cannot in any material way affect National issues.

The Republican and American parties, which summed up the opposition to the Democrats in 1856, were not in accord on National questions as a rule. The National leaders of the American organization, including Mr. Fillmore himself, were more aggressively hostile to the Republicans than they were to the Democrats, and while the Republicans polled half a million more votes than the Americans, although the vote was confined to a single section, the Americans claimed that theirs was the only party with a National existence and that it must be the ruling party of the opposition in order to maintain its organization alike in the North and South.

These two parties had pooled in Pennsylvania in a

union convention that nominated a State ticket, but in no other State was such a union accomplished, and the bitterness of the leading Americans in their opposition to Republicanism was speedily diffused throughout the American leadership in Pennsylvania. The Republican leaders were confident that the American organization must have, at the most, a very short existence and that the future success of the party depended upon unfurling the Republican flag and standing squarely under it even in the face of temporary defeat.

A Governor, two judges of the supreme court and a canal commissioner were to be elected in 1857, and there was little reason to hope for the success of the Union State ticket, however carefully selected to harmonize the party. The Union ticket had been defeated the year before when there was much closer sympathy between the two opposition organizations than then existed, and the sentiment of the Republican leaders was very general that while they should call a union convention which they could not fail to largely dominate, and make a fair division of the nominations between the two elements, the head of the ticket and the platform of the convention should emphasize in unmistakable terms the purpose of the Republican party to maintain its distinctive organization, with the hope of winning control of the nation in 1860.

The Democrats made their nominations early in the year, and chose William E. Packer for Governor, Judges Thompson and Strong for the supreme bench, and Mr. Strickland for canal commissioner. Packer was a strong candidate, and one of the most sagacious politicians of the State. He was brought into prominence when quite a young man by the favor of Governor Porter, who appointed him auditor general, where

he proved to be not only a very efficient officer, but developed into an important political leader. He was trained in the best political school of those days by his experience as the editor of the Democratic organ of Lycoming County, and a few years after his retirement from the auditor general's office he was nominated for the Legislature in the district embracing Lycoming, Clinton and Potter counties, and defeated by twelve majority.

His successful competitor served without contest during the entire session, but during the next summer Packer was making a tour of the district, and he was led to examine the official returns in Clinton County, when he discovered that his competitor had been returned elected by a mistake in addition, and that he had really been the successful candidate by a larger majority than that conceded to his opponent. There was no dispute as to the fact, for the error was visible on the official record. He published an address to the people showing the error, and was re-elected that year by a decided majority.

He was a man of unusually fine address, delightfully genial in social intercourse, and was thoroughly up in politics and parliamentary practice. He was made speaker of the house, and I well remember that it was conceded, alike by political friends and foes, that no better equipped presiding officer ever filled the speaker's chair.

While Packer was not classed as lacking in devotion to President Buchanan, who had just entered upon his high official trust, he was not the man that Buchanan would have chosen. He was the favorite candidate of Colonel Forney, who was then gradually severing his intimate relations with the President, and as the campaign progressed, and the Kansas-Nebraska issue became vital by President Buchanan indorsing the

LeCompton constitution, Packer was significantly silent on that particular question, and confined himself to the general advocacy of Democratic principles.

I was a delegate to the Union convention that was called to nominate the opposition ticket, and was in harmony with an overwhelming majority of the delegates in the opinion that it was necessary to emphasize the dominating purpose of the Republicans. The only question considered in the various conferences on the subject was how to make the ticket as distinctively Republican as possible without slapping the Americans squarely in the face.

We were entirely satisfied that the Americans would not give such support to the Union ticket, under any circumstances, as would give promise of its election, but as a large proportion of the followers of the American organization would certainly prefer Republicanism to Democracy, it was decided that the American party should have a full share of the nominations, and Mr. Millward, of Philadelphia, a pronounced American, was made the candidate for canal commissioner, and Mr. Veach, of Fayette, another pronounced American, was nominated for the supreme bench, along with Joseph J. Lewis, of West Chester.

David Wilmot was then president judge of the Bradford and Susquehanna district, and, of course, was the most pronounced, as well as confessedly the ablest, Republican in the State. He was not only positive and aggressive in every phase of hostility to slavery, but he had acquired National reputation as an anti-slavery leader by the Wilmot proviso when he was in Congress. He was not an anxious candidate for the nomination for Governor, as he knew that his election was quite improbable, if not impossible; but he was very desirous to have the Republican standard boldly unfurled in the State, and he was willing to

accept the position of standard-bearer. The nomination of Wilmot was a heroic conception, for he was not in full sympathy with a large proportion of both the organizations opposed to Democracy on the question of protection, as he was the only Pennsylvania Congressman who voted for the tariff of 1846 when that measure was enacted by Congress.

Wilmot was thus the weakest candidate who could have been chosen against the Democracy on the question of protection that had been accepted by the Whigs as the paramount issue, but his nomination would give no uncertain note in the contest as to the attitude the opposition to Democracy occupied on the slavery question, and it was notice to the American element that those who were not willing to accept the Republican faith on the question of slavery should sever their fellowship from the opposition combination.

Looking to the immediate result of that campaign, the nomination of Wilmot would have been regarded as a suicidal blunder, but the men who made it understood fully that they accepted defeat to establish the absolute mastery of Republican sentiment in opposition to the Democracy. Judge Wilmot was in no sense deceived. He understood thoroughly that he was to accept a battle to fallow the ground for future harvests, and he resigned his judgeship, that was filled by Governor Pollock appointing a close friend of Wilmot, who proposed to resign and restore the judgeship to Wilmot immediately after his defeat for Govenor, all of which was done.

While there was no formal bolt from the convention of the American leaders, they saw that they were in what was a distinctively Republican convention that had given them a sop in the shape of two nominations, and they well understood what the movement meant. It was a deliberately and carefully planned method by

the Republicans to take from the Americans two-thirds or three-fourths of their followers, and leave the Americans with little more than the running gear of a State organization. They nominated a full State ticket, with Isaac Hazlehurst, of Philadelphia, a gentleman of high character and ability, who had been elected city solicitor in the Know Nothing uprising of 1854, as their candidate for Governor, and Mr. Linderman for canal commissioner, and Mr. Brown and Mr. Brady for the supreme court, thereby rejecting Millward and Veach, the Americans, who had been nominated by the Union convention.

Mr. Hazlehurst accepted, but did not make an aggressive campaign as he knew how utterly hopeless his cause had been made by the pronounced Republican action of the Union State convention. Packer made occasional speeches, but devoted himself chiefly to the methodical management of the campaign, as he well understood the necessity of organization to assure success. He was a very capable speaker, and could make a very agreeable impression upon an audience, but it was an off year with no tidal wave of political excitement, and he felt that the best way to win was by systematic organization to bring out the Democratic vote. He was a gentleman of blameless reputation, whose public record challenged criticism, and the campaign was entirely free from scandal or bitterness, except in the northern section of the State, where Judge Wilmot resided. The old school Democrats were intensely inflamed against him as he had revolutionized the strong Democratic counties of his district—Bradford, Tioga and Susquehanna—and made them overwhelmingly Republican, and they assailed him unscrupulously, both on his political and his judicial records, but that feature of the campaign was not visible in any other section of the State.

Both the leading candidates for Governor were men of admitted ability and character, and, outside of the local prejudice against Wilmot, the campaign was one of the most dignified in the history of the State. Wilmot having resigned his judicial office, started out for a campaign covering every section of the State, and his meetings were attended by unusually large numbers. There was none of the hurrah and display exhibited in tidal waves of political excitement, but his high character and pre-eminent ability called out the more intelligent and sober classes in every section of the State, and his speeches were among the ablest ever delivered on the stump in Pennsylvania contests. He was a sober, profound and impressive speaker before an appreciative audience, but he possessed none of the arts by which campaigners on the hustings often invest their arguments with popular interest, and in the then transition condition of a large portion of old line Whigs and Americans, he accomplished vast good in bringing them to the support of the Republican faith. It was in fact a missionary campaign, a campaign of education, and outside of Philadelphia he certainly accomplished much for his cause wherever he was heard.

Philadelphia was naturally averse to Wilmot. It was the center of the pro-slavery American leaders and the old Whig line, long trained to criticise Wilmot for his opposition to the policy of protection, and with the commercial interests of the city that had a preponderance of Southern trade, he found little inspiration for missionary work in the City of Brotherly Love, but he fought his battle bravely from start to finish, and was not disappointed in the result. The defeat he received was just what he expected, and it was his battle, although confessedly hopeless, that prepared Pennsylvania for the political revolution that came

the following year, resulting in making Pennsylvania one of the reliable Republican States of the Union. The full vote of the State was 188,887 for Packer, 146,136 for Wilmot and 28,132 for Hazlehurst, giving Packer 42,751 over Wilmot and 14,619 majority over both.

The American vote fell from 82,202 for Fillmore in 1856 to 28,132 for Hazlehurst in 1857, while Wilmot in the light vote of an off year polled within a little more than 1,000 of the vote received by Fremont. Many of the more pronounced pro-slavery Americans voted the Democratic ticket, and in all the old Whig and later Republican counties where the Americans possessed material strength, they gave local success to the Democratic party. Such now strong Republican counties as Armstrong, Blair, Chester, Dauphin, Franklin, Huntingdon, Philadelphia, Snyder, Venango and Washington, all gave Packer a majority over Wilmot.

The weakness of the Republican cause in Philadelphia at that time may be understood when it is known that Packer received in the city 27,749 votes, Hazlehurst 14,335 and Wilmot 10,001; the Republican candidate not receiving one-fourth the entire vote cast in the city. Both branches of the Legislature were also carried by the Democrats. In the popular branch the Republicans had but thirty members, or less than one-third the entire body.

This battle accomplished all that the Republican leaders had hoped for. It practically eliminated the American organization as a political factor in the State, beyond the hope of occasionally holding the balance of power. More than one-half its entire vote had been cast in the city of Philadelphia, and it was left without a future as a distinctive political organization in either State or nation. It suffered a like defeat in New York, where the American vote in 1857

David Wilmot.

was reduced nearly one-half, but the general political reaction was more distinctively felt in New York than in any other of the States, as the Democrats elected their State ticket in 1857 by over 18,000 in the same triangular fight that had been made for President, in which they had given Fremont over 80,000 pluraltiy.

The Democratic States which had been revolutionized by the Republican party in 1856, such as Maine and New Hampshire in New England, and Michigan, Minnesota and other States of the West, maintained their Republican supremacy by reduced majorities. Chase was re-elected Governor of Ohio by nearly 1,400, but throughout the entire North the Republicans were shaping their aims for the congressional battle of 1858 and for the National contest of 1860, and that they adopted a wise policy was clearly demonstrated by the sweeping revolution of 1858, when the administration Democrats elected but three Congressmen in Pennsylvania and the entire new Congress stood Republicans 113, Administration Democrats 93, Anti-Le-Compton Democrats 8 and Americans (all from the South) 23.

Before the campaign of 1857 had closed, the Buchanan administration had clearly shown its hand in support of the pro-slavery policy that aimed to make Kansas and Nebraska slave States by violent effort, and the Republicans were thus strengthened in the faith that they had victories assured for them in the future, and in no State was this policy so distinctly proclaimed, and so greatly aided, as by the Republicans of Pennsylvania, who nominated Wilmot for Governor in the face of inexorable defeat, solely for the purpose of planting the honest opposition to the Democracy in line for future contests. Wilmot's efforts and his sacrifice in the contest were highly appreciated, as was shown by his election to the Senate

to fill the vacancy occasioned by Cameron going into the cabinet, and also by his subsequent appointment as judge in the Court of Claims, a position he filled until his death.

He was a man of rugged integrity, of great ability, without that keen intuitive perception that is necessary to a ready disputant, but he was a careful student, and was a most formidable antagonist when he was fully prepared for the battle. The devotion of his people in the northern tier of counties was unexampled. They had unbounded faith in his judgment and in his fidelity, and when he severed himself from the Democratic party he made a political revolution in his district, composed of Tioga, Bradford and Susquehanna, of fully 10,000 against the Democratic party. He was one of the kindest and most amiable of men in the ordinary intercourse of life, but when aroused in support of his convictions he was a most able and heroic antagonist.

His health failed when he was serving as a judge of the Court of Claims, and after struggling with disease for many months, he finally went home to enter the dark valley that leads to the unknown beyond. In the village graveyard hard by the town of his old home in Towanda a modest marble headstone marks his final resting place, on the inner face of which are his name and date of birth and death, and on the outer face, that can be seen from the road passing by, is the simple text of the Wilmot proviso.

XXIX.

KNOW NOTHING POLITICAL TACTICS.

How the Author, after Retiring from Politics Disgusted with Dominating Know Nothingism, was made a Legislative Candidate — His Positive Purpose to Decline the Nomination — Prevented by the Boisterous Opposition of Know Nothingism to His Election — Nominated to Elect a Local Ticket — He was the only Man Successful with a Strongly Adverse County added to the District — Interesting Experience in a House Two-thirds Democratic and a Democratic Senate and Governor—The Sale of the State Canals.

IN the contest of 1857 I was most unexpectedly, and equally unwillingly, made a candidate for the house of representatives, and while, of course, personally gratified, I shared the very general surprise over my election, and had the unusual experience of being elected three times to the house and twice to the senate without ever having been a voluntary or even a willing candidate.

I became so utterly disgusted with the methods and general demoralization of Know Nothing tactics that I openly opposed their ticket in 1855, even to the extent of taking the stump in support of the Democratic ticket, which was elected by a large majority; and I decided, as I then supposed for all time, to abandon journalism and politics and devote myself to the law. I sold my newspaper property because most of my patrons were Know Nothings, and having previously studied for the bar I was at once admitted and gained a promising position in the profession by my association with Mr. McLellan, one of the well-established practitioners of the time.

While I meant to discard politics, as a rule I could

not resist active opposition to the pro-slavery platform adopted by the Democrats of Cincinnati in 1856, and I joined in a perfunctory way in a call for a Union convention to nominate local candidates, but took little or no interest in local affairs. A county ticket was nominated composed almost entirely of Know Nothings, but it was defeated with the exception of one candidate for associate judge, who had an equal vote with his Democratic competitor.

In 1857 I felt no interest in the political situation until it was decided by leading Republicans in different sections of the State to call a Union convention and shape it distinctly to Republican ends and aims. I attended the convention as a delegate solely to eliminate the American element as much as possible from the opposition and aid in strengthening the Republican party for future contests. A Union county convention was called, and it happened that nearly or quite all the lucrative county offices were to be filled that year, and there were a number of candidates for the different positions, all of whom were more or less prominent Know Nothings. The old line Whigs, like myself, were disgusted with the Know Nothings, and although they numbered nearly 1,000 in the county, or one-fourth the opposition vote, they did not present a single candidate, and the Know Nothings dominated the local convention in about the same manner that the Republicans dominated the Union State convention.

A new legislative apportionment had added Fulton County to Franklin, giving the two counties two members, the same number that Franklin alone had been given for many years. Fulton had nearly 400 Democratic majority on a full vote, and could be depended on for that majority from year to year, unless election day happened to be an exceptionally

good day for harvesting the buckwheat crop. Franklin County had given Buchanan 1,000 plurality over Fremont, but the combined Fremont and Fillmore vote presented a very small majority against Buchanan. It was regarded as possible for the Union party, if well organized, to elect the county ticket by a very narrow margin, but the legislative district was accepted as utterly hopeless, as Fulton's Democratic majority had to be overcome.

When the Union County convention met it was simply a gathering of Know Nothings, with here and there an old line Whig with Know Nothing affinities. The leaders saw that they had no hope of electing their candidates unless they could command the old line Whig vote, but they did not offer any of the half dozen important offices to the Whigs, nor could they find any candidates for any one of the different positions willing to concede a place to an old line Whig for the purpose of securing the Whig vote for the combination. They had, therefore, nothing to offer the Whigs but the nomination for the Legislature, with inevitable defeat. The committee waited upon me before the convention met, and urged me to accept it to aid in electing the local ticket. It was simply an offer for me to burn my fingers in defeat while pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the election of the Know Nothing candidates. If there had been every promise of election, I would have peremptorily refused, as my purpose was settled, as I then supposed, not to enter politics with any idea of political promotion, but the particular feast to which I was asked was so uninviting that it required some effort to give a respectful declination.

The committee then called upon William L. Chambers, one of the leading citizens of Chambersburg, and well known as an old line Whig, but he would not

entertain the proposition, and they were unable to find a candidate for the Legislature before the meeting of the convention. The convention met, spent the most of the day in wrangling over the half dozen or more lucrative offices to be filled, and finally completed a county ticket made up entirely of Know Nothings. My name was then presented to the convention for the Legislature, in the face of my positive declination, and I was nominated. My office was close to the courthouse, where the convention met, and I was immediately advised of the nomination, and at once started to the convention to repeat my peremptory declination, but when I reached the door the convention had just adjourned, and I notified the leaders that I would wait for the legislative conference of the two counties, when I would send a positive refusal to accept.

I was the only Whig out of some seven or eight on the ticket, and was ostentatiously assigned the duty of making the battle for the success of the Know Nothing ticket by bringing the old line Whigs into its support, and receive as my reward inevitable defeat for the house.

My pronounced and aggressive opposition to the Know Nothing ticket two years before was keenly remembered by the supporters of that organization, and immediately after the nominations were made, the Know Nothing lodges of the leading towns, including such important centers of population as Greencastle, Waynesboro, Mercersburg, etc., were suddenly summoned and passed resolutions repudiating my nomination and declaring their purpose not to support me. This gave me no concern, as my purpose to decline was fixed, and the only importance to be attached to this action was its effect upon the old line Whigs of the county, who would be certain to repudiate

the Know Nothing ticket and defeat it by a large majority.

As this agitation was doing me no harm from my own standpoint, and promised only to assure the defeat of the whole Know Nothing ticket, I had little or no regrets and looked on with perfect composure and silence. This agitation was kept up for some weeks during which I said nothing, except that I was not a candidate, but I soon received evidence from the Democratic leaders of nearly every section of the county that they were ready to resent this action of the Know Nothings because of my having supported the Democratic ticket against them two years before, and many of them urged me to stand as a candidate, assuring me that they would support me, along with Judge Nill, who was the Democratic candidate from the same county, and elect both the members from Franklin.

With the revolutionary attitude of the Know Nothings, there was little prospect of my election even with a very large Democratic support, and as I was particularly anxious not to go to the Legislature at all, I gave the matter no thought. Finally the Know Nothings called a conference of leading men from different sections of the county, and decided to appoint a committee to wait upon me and ask me to decline, as I could not escape defeat by an overwhelming majority. The committee appointed were all personal friends who would gladly have supported me, the chairman being Congressman Robinson, and they called on me in entire good faith, believing that they were advising me to escape fearful political crucifixion.

As I knew they were personally friendly, and as they made their proposition with perfect respect, I heard them patiently until they had made their

proposition and given their reasons for my acceptance of it. I then thought that I had stood about enough of the crinkly, crazy politics of the Know Nothings, and I said to the committee that I had watched the proceedings of the Know Nothings with considerable interest, not because I desired an election to the Legislature, but simply to get the true political bearing of the county; that they had nominated an entire Know Nothing ticket to fill all the lucrative offices, and that I had been tagged on to the tail end of the ticket to face a Democratic majority of 400, with the hope that I would bring the 800 or 1,000 old line Whigs to the support of the local ticket to elect it while I suffered defeat; that I had considered the subject very fully; that I was satisfied the Know Nothings would not support me, which made me equally satisfied that the old line Whigs would not support the Know Nothing ticket, and as they had evidently decided on a campaign of suicide, I would accept the nomination, make my own battle, and as I was certain to be defeated, it mattered very little whether I was defeated by 500 or 1,500 majority.

They attempted to expostulate, but I said that my decision was final; that I would not decline, and it was nothing to me whether any of the Know Nothings voted for me or not. I made this decision, fully believing that I would be defeated by at least 1,000 majority, but as it would wipe out the last vestige of Know Nothing power in the county, I was willing to accept it.

To my surprise, my defiant announcement of my refusal to decline in obedience to the violent protests of the Know Nothings did not inflame them to increased hostility, as I expected, but they were speedily quieted down by their own candidates and leaders, who simply said to them: "If you oppose McClure the

old line Whigs will defeat us," and the leaders and candidates went into a methodical campaign to bring the entire Know Nothing forces into my support. I made no advances to them, and told them that they need make none to me. I would support the ticket, but I would fight my own battle in my own way.

The nominations had not been made until after midsummer, and on the 1st of September I announced a series of meetings, taking in every district in the county, and continuing until the October election. They were nominally called by the chairman of the Union committee, but they were my own meetings, entirely controlled by myself, and at each of them I urged the election of Wilmot for Governor, and of course supported the entire Union ticket.

The meetings were largely attended, as it was a new departure in the politics of the county for a candidate to make such a campaign. I not only addressed the meetings, but spent a day in each district in ascertaining the exact political situation. Neither the Unionists nor the Democrats liked the association with Fulton for the Legislature, and I found Democrats adhering to the promises made at the outset to support me along with Nill, the local Democrat. Nill was an able and aggressive leader and took the stump in active opposition to me and gave no encouragement to the Democrats voting for me along with him.

My canvass was so thorough that I knew either in person or by reliable information the attitude of every voter in each district, and by the time the campaign closed with the Know Nothings apparently giving me a general support, I finally concluded with mingled gratification and regret that I had a chance to be elected. The result was that I was the only man on the entire Union ticket who was successful. The local candidates were all defeated in the county,

while I carried it by a sufficient majority to overcome the Democratic preponderance in Fulton and give me over 200 majority in the district. I appreciate the fact that these details of a legislative contest would not be of general interest to the public, but they are presented simply to show political morals and methods of Know Nothing organization.

The most important Democratic support given me was by Daniel and Hugh Logan, of Quincy Township, a mountain region bordering on Maryland, that gave 140 majority for the Democratic candidate for Governor and gave me 66 majority for the house. I had defended them in a charge of kidnapping and accomplished their release. The South Mountain was the first resort for fugitive slaves after they crossed the Maryland line, and Dan Logan was the best natural detective I have ever known. He captured and returned many fugitive slaves, and as he was always on the lookout for them and knew their hiding places in the mountain, it is not at all certain that he did not at times return free negroes instead of fugitives. He was a man of rugged fidelity, and without exacting any conditions assured me that he would carry his township and also control votes in two adjoining townships. He was the man who captured Captain Cook, of John Brown's army, and perhaps the only man in Franklin County who would have ventured to capture him.

His brother Hugh, who joined the Confederacy immediately after the firing on Sumter, guided Stuart's raid into our county in 1862, and he touched me on the shoulder after Stuart's force had arrived in town and informed me that I was on the list to be taken as a prisoner to Libby along with a number of others, seven of whom were taken South and one died in prison. His advice was that if they attempted to take

me along, to go quietly, and he would put me out of the lines the next night, which he would have done at the risk of his life.

Later in the war he was condemned by General Kelly as a bushwhacker. He made his appeal to Kelly, referring to me as knowing that he was an officer in the Confederacy. Kelly referred the case to me, and the result was the discharge of Logan.

The result of the local election astounded the Know Nothing leaders even more than it did me. None of them had any knowledge of the Democratic vote I expected to receive, and my defeat was regarded by all of them as inevitable, while they expected my campaign to call out the entire old line Whig vote and save the local candidates. The old line Whig vote did come out and voted for me, but a considerable percentage of them did not vote for the local candidates, and in like manner the entire Know Nothing vote was polled, and probably quite as large a percentage of it voted against me.

Contrary to all my, as I supposed, settled purposes for an exclusively professional pursuit, I found myself elected to the Legislature and the only Republican in the entire house south of the Susquehanna and east of the Alleghenies. Of the 100 members of the house only thirty of us were Republicans, less than one-third. Philadelphia County sent seventeen Democrats, elected on a joint ticket headed by the late General Joshua Owen. Dauphin had one Democratic member, as had Union, Snyder, Huntingdon and Blair. Chester sent three Democratic members to the house, with one from Delaware, and ex-Justice Bell, of the supreme court, a pronounced Democrat, was elected to the senate in the district, while Allegheny and Erie had divided their delegation.

With a Democratic Governor elected by 42,000,

with a Democratic senate and an overwhelming Democratic house, I saw little promise of achieving anything of importance in the Legislature, and I publicly announced that under no circumstances would I be a candidate for a second term. I could get away from legislative service to attend to the law part of every week, but I was resolute in the purpose that one session should end my legislative career, as I had every incentive to devote myself to my profession.

The Legislature was an unusually able one. In the senate were such Democratic leaders as Judge Wilkins and Dr. McClintock, of Allegheny; Buckalew, of Columbia, and Randall, of Philadelphia, who had been chosen to fill an unexpired term; and among the Republican leaders were men of such eminent ability as Finney, of Crawford; Schofield, of Warren, and Coffee, of Indiana. In the house the Democrats had an unusual galaxy of able leaders, such as Judge Nill, of Franklin; Calhoun, of Armstrong; Goepp, of Northampton; Richmond L. Jones, of Reading; Christy, of Blair, and others.

It was the first time that the Democrats had obtained complete control of the Governor and Legislature since 1854, and both branches were intensely Democratic, cherishing the strongest prejudice against banks and everything looking to corporation progress. I expected the session to be practically a waste of so much time, as I saw little prospect of accomplishing anything that I desired in the way of legislative advancement; but I was agreeably disappointed in several important achievements, including the sale of the State canals, which were very fortunately and advantageously practically loaned to the Philadelphia & Erie Railroad, to enable it to complete its through line from Williamsport to Erie.

I had been fighting the canal board from my earliest advent in politics as a boy editor in the Juniata Valley, as I saw the reckless profligacy that was exhibited in the management of the board, and the one result of the session of which I felt extremely proud was a bill of three lines that I read in place and passed by a unanimous vote, abolishing the canal board after the sale of the last of the canals had been completed; but the important results of that session and some of the interesting episodes connected with it will make another and unusually interesting chapter.

XXX.

HOW THE ERIE RAILROAD WAS BUILT.

Governor Packer's Imposing Inauguration—Forney's Address to the Legislature—How Judge John C. Knox Became Attorney General—William A. Porter Appointed to the Supreme Bench—His Defeat and Resignation—Battle for the Sale of the State Canals to the Erie Railroad—G. Nelson Smith's Parliamentary Tactics—Scheme to Abolish Judge Wilmot's District Defeated in the Democratic House by Fifteen Republican Members Agreeing to Vote for or against Anything to Save Wilmot—How the Present Usury Law was Enacted.

GOVERNOR PACKER was inaugurated in January, 1858, with imposing ceremonies. The Democrats had been out of power in the State for three years, although they had part of the time controlled the popular branch of the Legislature. Pennsylvania was then regarded as next to iron-clad as a Democratic State, and the defeat of the party was accepted as accidental. It was natural, therefore, that in January, 1858, when the Democrats resumed control of the Executive department and both branches of the Legislature by decisive majorities, they should make the occasion memorable.

Packer's inaugural address was an able and carefully-prepared paper. The Kansas-Nebraska troubles had grown more and more serious during the year just past, and great anxiety was felt as to the attitude the new Democratic Governor would assume on National questions, as it was generally believed he was not in entire accord with President Buchanan and his policy relating to slavery. The inaugural referred to National issues in a cautious and rather diplomatic manner, but when

read between the lines it was universally accepted as not in accord with the National administration. There was nothing in the address indicating his approval of the Kansas-Nebraska policy of Buchanan, while his general expressions on National questions rather indicated his disapproval. It was not long after he became Governor until it became well known that he did not approve of the National government attempting to force the LeCompton constitution on the people of Kansas, and he removed all doubt on the subject before the close of the session of the Legislature.

Colonel Forney was invited by the Legislature to deliver an address in the hall of the house and Governor Packer presided. Forney was just then entering upon his battle against the President, and Governor Packer, in introducing Forney, emphasized his approval of Forney's battle for the exclusion of slavery in the new Northern Territories. Thus the new Democratic Governor was in open antagonism to Pennsylvania's Democratic President. Packer maintained a very dignified attitude, made no aggressive warfare against the National administration, but he never allowed himself to be misunderstood, and the whole moral power of his administration was in support of the revolution for which Forney was then earnestly battling.

Governor Porter was living in Harrisburg when Packer was inaugurated, and although retired from active business operations was nevertheless active in public affairs, and as he had given Packer his first start on his political career by appointing him auditor general when quite a young man, he felt that he had strong claims upon the new Governor, and proposed that Packer should call to his cabinet, as attorney general, ex-Governor Porter's son, William A. Porter, then a prominent member of the bar of Philadelphia. Packer fully appreciated his obligations to Porter, and

was very desirous to comply with any request that Porter might make; but Porter was not then in good favor with the Democratic party, and Packer felt that the appointment of young Porter to his cabinet would result in factious opposition to his administration and thus endanger its success.

Packer finally proposed to Porter to call Justice John C. Knox from the supreme court to the attorney generalship, and appoint William A. Porter to succeed Knox as supreme judge. As the position of supreme judge was higher than that of attorney general, with a reasonable prospect at that time of an election for the full term of fifteen years, ex-Governor Porter accepted the arrangement, and the result was that Judge Knox was made attorney general with ex-Senator William M. Heister, of Berks, as secretary of the commonwealth, and William A. Porter was appointed to the vacant judgeship. It proved to be an unfortunate arrangement for Judge Porter. While he was nominated very cordially for election, the mutterings of the revolutionary political tempest culminated in that year, and Porter suffered an overwhelming defeat by the election of John M. Read, the nominee of the united opposition. Judge Porter was so keenly disappointed and chagrined at the defeat that he resigned immediately after the election, when he had less than three months of his appointed term to serve.

The Main Line of public works had been sold to the Pennsylvania Railroad, leaving the various local canals, such as the North and West Branches and others, to be managed by the board of canal commissioners. The management of the public works had long been a running sore, resulting in large losses to the State, and there was a very general desire that they should be disposed of and the State entirely divested of its interest in transportation lines.

The Sunbury & Erie Railroad Company, now known as the Philadelphia & Erie, had long been struggling to complete a line through from Sunbury to Erie. The construction of such a line was first proposed by Nicholas Biddle, the president of the United States Bank. New York had completed her canal from Buffalo to the Eastern sea, and he saw that the only way to hold a share of the Lake and Western trade for Philadelphia was to reach the lakes by railway at Erie. Various attempts were made to construct the road, but it was completed only from Sunbury to Williamsport, and each new organization repeated the story of failure.

A number of very able and experienced railway men finally conceived the idea of practically borrowing the credit of the State, without imposing any liability upon the Commonwealth, to aid in the construction of this road. The proposition was that the various canals remaining in the ownership of the State should be sold to the Sunbury & Erie Railway Company for $3,000,000, giving the railway company the right to sell or mortgage the different canals as might be deemed best, the proceeds to be applied to the construction of the Erie line, and the State to accept a mortgage upon the line for the $3,000,000 to be paid for the canals. It was believed that the money resulting from the mortgage or sale of the canals would give sufficient means as stated to complete the Erie line, and that when completed the $3,000,000 mortgage held by the State as payment for the canals would be abundant security against loss to the Commonwealth.

A bill entitled "An act for the sale of the State canals" was read in place early in the session, and a very earnest battle followed in both senate and house, as the canal board had great power and the sale of the canals would simply retire them from politics and

plunder. The few Republicans in the House generally supported it. The canal board was entirely Democratic, and had long been a fountain of corrupt political power in the State. The interest in the construction of the railway brought Philadelphia practically solid in both senate and house in favor of the bill, as it did the Democratic legislators along its entire line. The bill was fought with desperation at every step, but it finally passed the house by a decided majority, and after a long and somewhat embittered battle in the senate, passed that body by one majority.

Governor Packer resided in Williamsport on the line of the road, and, of course, was intensely interested in the measure. The bill did not reach him until within a few days of the final adjournment, and, upon careful examination of it, the Governor discovered that a single sentence in the bill, the possible importance of which had been entirely overlooked by those who framed it, would result in very serious embarrassment in executing its provisions. He could not return it with objections, as it could not be passed over the veto; there was no time for the passage of a new bill, and the bill could be amended in the hands of the Governor only by the adoption of a joint resolution instructing such change. A joint resolution was required to lay over a day under the rule, and it required two-thirds to suspend the rule, while the delay of a day would be fatal.

The matter was submitted to Speaker Longenecker, who presided with great dignity over the body, and he informed those who were conferring with him in the interest of the bill that a joint resolution could not be read and passed finally on the same day.

Among the prominent Democratic members of the body was George Nelson Smith, of Cambria, well versed in parliamentary rules, and much more flexible

under exacting circumstances than the speaker. Smith was one of the most popular of all the members of the house. He told a good story, sang a good song, and had been with Sam Houston at the battle of San Jacinto. It was suggested to Speaker Longenecker that if he would permit Smith to take the chair the difficulty could be evaded and the amendment to the bill passed.

The speaker consented. Smith took the chair and the resolution to amend the bill was changed from the usual form of a joint resolution by saying: "Resolved, If the senate concur," giving it the appearance of a house resolution requiring simply the concurrence of the senate. As soon as it was read the point was raised that it was a joint resolution and must lie over for a day, but Smith faced the emergency with magnificent boldness, deciding that it was not a joint resolution and directing the final vote to be called.

It was evident that a majority of the house meant to save the bill; tactics for delay would be defeated by the previous question, and by the aggressive action of acting Speaker Smith the house was suddenly brought to a call of the yeas and nays and the bill was saved. The senate had ample time for concurrence and it was given.

Even after giving the Erie Railroad Company the benefit of the loan of $3,000,000, the work was pushed forward under many embarrassments, but it was finally completed. It was on the verge of breaking down in the general prostration of 1860, but the Legislature of that time came to its relief and tided it over by an extension of credit. When the war came with its quickening of business and large increase of circulating medium, the great enterprise of building a railroad through an almost continued wilderness from Williamsport to Lake Erie was completed, and the State

gained not only by the sale of its canals and the abolishment of the canal board, but the $3,000,000 were abundantly secured to it. The new railroad brought multiplied wealth to the State and the people that could never have been realized excepting by the construction of a great railway through the boundless riches of that region.

The legislative session of 1858 was made memorable by a unique and desperate struggle made to depose Judge Wilmot from the bench. When nominated for Governor he resigned to take the stump in what he knew to be an utterly hopeless contest, and a close friend of his was appointed by Governor Pollock to succeed him. Soon after the election the new judge resigned, and Wilmot was restored to his judicial duties by appointment.

I have never known more embittered and even malignant personal and political hostility developed against a public man in his own community than that exhibited by the opponents of Wilmot, who embraced nearly all the Democratic members of the bar of the judicial district composed of Bradford and Susquehanna. He was a scrupulously honest man in public trust and in all private relations, and, however strong his political prejudices, he was so big and broad in all the qualities of manhood that his personal feelings never entered into his judicial actions. His opponents felt that they had gained a great triumph by defeating him for Governor and they resolved to fight the battle to a finish for his annihilation. They had both branches of the Legislature and the Governor, and it was decided to abolish the judicial district by attaching Susquehanna to one of the old districts and Bradford to another.

Victor E. Piolett, who had been in the Legislature some years before, and was long prominent in Demo-

cratic politics, led the fight against Wilmot, and it was very carefully and shrewdly planned to win. An entirely harmless bill, attracting little attention and no opposition, but to which an amendment abolishing Wilmot's district would be germane in that day, was passed in the house and soon after the bill reached the senate it became an open secret that the bill would there be amended, abolishing Wilmot's district.

It was first earnestly opposed by several of the leading Democratic senators as a dangerous precedent of legislative interference with the judiciary. Samuel J. Randall, then in his first session of service, took a bold stand against the bill and the venerable Judge Wilkins at first declared his purpose to stand abreast with Randall. It required considerable time to get the Democrats of the senate in shape to pass the vindictive measure, but Judge Wilkins finally yielded and Randall stood alone in opposition to it. He made a manly and heroic struggle, although he was entirely without sympathy with Judge Wilmot's political record, but he was defeated. The amendment was adopted in the bill and its final passage effected.

Piolett's brother-in-law, William H. Miller, was clerk of the senate and he could message the bill back to the house for concurrence at any time he chose. Fortunately, by the time the senate had passed the bill, by some extraordinary legislative trades, the house was prepared to vote down the amendment, although it was unknown and entirely unsuspected by the anti-Wilmot leaders.

Wilmot had been in Harrisburg two weeks and prepared a very able and dispassionate appeal to the Legislature against the policy of the measure. He was a born fighter and he had been assailed and defamed by the Democratic leaders of his district until he felt that if they succeeded in abolishing his district they would

win a final triumph over him from which he saw no prospect of recovery. He summoned a number of his friends the day before the bill passed the senate, when it was well known what the action of that body would be, and made a most earnest and even pathetic appeal to us to make an effort, even at the cost of some consistency, to form combinations in the house whereby sufficient Democrats could be had to defeat the measure.

The leading Democratic lawyers in the house, including Judge Nill, Goepp, Richmond L. Jones, Calhoun and others, were at heart opposed to the measure, but felt that it was not in their power to defeat it. They had all given us the assurance that if they were certain of a majority they would join us. Wilmot had fifteen clean Republicans in the house who had agreed in his presence to make any sacrifice to save their chief. They were all brought together and solemnly promised that if the defeat of the anti-Wilmot bill could be assured they would vote for or against any pending measure in the house to accomplish the result, and Lawrence, of Dauphin, and myself were assigned the task of trading in the Democrats.

Jacob Ziegler was clerk of the house, and had been either chief or assistant clerk for some years. He was a universal favorite, and it was well known that no legislative serpent wriggled around the house that escaped his notice, and his relations with them were generally friendly. With fifteen votes, all of which had been cast against every measure of questionable honesty, in stock for the deal, we first called upon Chief Clerk Ziegler and told him that we had fifteen votes who were outside of the general legislative market, and wanted to know the most important measure in the house on which a trade could be effected. His face immediately brightened, and he said: "Why, you're just the men I'm looking for. You voted against and

helped to defeat the new usury bill that was before the house, and," said he, "it was the biggest serpent that has been wriggling around here for some time." The penalty of the usury law at that time was the forfeiture of principal and interest, and even if both the parties to the contract were entirely satisfied with the usurious arrangement, any outside person could proceed against the usurer and receive half the forfeiture as informer.

Ziegler told us that the new bill we had defeated only two days before, involved $120,000 to a prominent banker of Harrisburg, who was sued for a usurious contract for that amount. Said he: "You are in time to reconsider it, and with your fifteen votes we can pass the bill." We then told him that we would give him the fifteen votes for fifteen Democratic votes against the bill abolishing Wilmot's district. He told us that we could have them on sight.

There had been considerable lobbying for the bill, and it was not difficult for Ziegler to transfer fifteen Democratic votes to our measure, as it enabled the commercial members to fulfill their contracts. He wrote down at once the names of fifteen men, and gave his solemn assurance that they would all be seen within an hour, and that not one would refuse to join us.

I then asked him what was left on the trading list, to which he answered that the usual portage railroad bill for extra expenditures, most of which was theft, was hanging in the house for want of a majority, and said he: "I can get you eight more votes for your fifteen if you will agree to vote for the portage appropriation." Thus in less than ten minutes we had concluded negotiations with Ziegler, which we knew he was abundantly able to carry out, for twenty-three Democratic votes, enough with our thirty Republicans to defeat the bill.

The names of all the Democrats who were to go with

us were given by Ziegler, to avoid doubling in our trades. Philadelphia then had a solid delegation elected on a joint ticket, but an amendment to the Constitution requiring single districts in Philadelphia County was going into effect, and the whole seventeen Democratic members were hustling around, each one trying to save a district for himself. There were two Donnellys in the house from Philadelphia, one a saloon keeper and the other a drayman, and the saloon keeper Donnelly had several times urged me to help him get a satisfactory district. He was very proud of his legislative career, and had written to his friends in Ireland that he was a member of Parliament.

I went to him and said that I could give him fifteen votes for his legislative apportionment in Philadelphia, and wanted to know how many Democratic votes he could give me to defeat the Wilmot bill. He said he could not give me over six, and I told him that would be satisfactory.

I asked him for the names, and I give his answer literally: "There's the two Donnellys is one," and he named on till he got four others, but as he counted only five instead of six, he scratched his head and said: "By jimminee, McClure, I've got six. There's the two Donnellys is one," and he continued his count until he got up to five.

I said: "All right, Donnelly, if your men will stick," and he gave me the most emphatic promise that they would stand by him, as they did.

I then went to Nill, Goepp, Jones, Calhoun and the other leading Democratic lawyers who wanted the bill defeated, and gave them the positive assurance, that was guaranteed by Clerk Ziegler, that the Wilmot bill would be defeated, and they then agreed to take the lead and oppose it. This work was done while the senate was considering the bill on final passage, and

by the time it was disposed of in the senate we were entirely ready to welcome it to a hospitable grave in the house.

The movement was not suspected by Piolett or any of the other leaders opposed to Wilmot, and it became important for us to have the amended bill brought to the house as speedily as possible to prevent Piolett from discovering the set-up against it. I was well acquainted with Piolett and managed to come up to him, apparently accidentally, and made an appeal to him not to send the Wilmot bill to the house that afternoon, as the Republicans were very anxious to have a full discussion of it, and we wanted a special night session so that we might be heard freely and fully.

The appeal to Piolett accomplished just what we wanted. He then suspected that there was something on hand for which we wanted delay, and within ten minutes his brother-in-law, the clerk of the senate, brought the amended bill into the house.

Speaker Longenecker understood the situation and was in sympathy with the Democrats who opposed the bill, and knew that the house was ready for the fray. The bill was laid on the speaker's table, and immediately called up by one of the prominent Democratic lawyers, who, to the utter consternation of the anti-Wilmot Democrats, fired a defiant broadside against it and was followed by Goepp, Calhoun, Jones and others, the Republicans being silent. The result was the defeat of the bill by a two-thirds vote in a house that was more than two-thirds Democratic, and the portage railroad jobbers got their appropriation, and the present usury law was promptly reconsidered on my own motion, and carried, by which the Harrisburg banker saved his many thousands, the loss of which was so seriously threatened.

Most of the fifteen votes who stood solid for Wilmot

were Republicans from the northern counties with unsullied legislative records, and they stood squarely to their guns and fulfilled their contract to the letter. The defeat of the Piolett organization in the house was so unexpected and overwhelming that they suddenly disappeared from the Capitol and Wilmot returned to his judicial duties in triumph, with even his bitterest enemies compelled to respect the power he had been able to wield in unhorsing them.

This emphatic record made by the Democrats against violent legislative interference with the judiciary saved at least two Democratic judges from being judicially disrobed during the fierce political passions of the Civil War.

XXXI.

THE PEOPLE'S PARTY ORGANIZED.

Anti-LeCompton Democrats Ready to Join in a Movement against the Democracy — John Hickman's Heroic Career — Sweeping Revolutions in the Congressional Districts — Thaddeus Stevens Returns to Congress — How He made Edward MacPherson a Congressman — MacPherson's Important Work as a Politician, Clerk of the House and Historian.

THE election of 1857 achieved what the leaders of the State expected to accomplish by the nomination of Wilmot and fighting the campaign on a high Republican plane, leaving the Know Nothing element to make a public exhibition of its weakness. A successful fusion could not have been effected between the several elements opposed to Democracy because of the corrupt and demoralized leadership of the Know Nothing element. By the nomination of Wilmot it was forced to stand alone, and it came out of the struggle with only 28,000 votes, one-half of which were cast in the city of Philadelphia, while Wilmot received over 146,000.

The Republican element that had just asserted its mastery in the battle of 1857 was greatly strengthened by the continued disturbance in Kansas and the violent efforts sanctioned by the National administration of the Democratic party to force slavery into the Territory. The honest residents of Kansas exhibited heroic qualities in resisting the power of the National government, whether it came by direct violent oppression or by studied efforts to tempt the people from fidelity to their own convictions by measures offering unusual advantages to the new States. The attempt

to force the LeCompton constitution upon the people of Kansas exhausted the ingenuity and resources of Democratic statesmanship and power. The people of the Territory braved civil war, the destruction of private property by the border ruffian, and the sacrifice of homes and crops, rather than accept a slavery constitution that was offensive to their convictions.

A new political factor was developed early in 1858 known as the "Anti-LeCompton Democrats," embracing such men as Montgomery and Hickman, of Pennsylvania; Haskins, of New York, and others. Montgomery and Hickman were among the ablest of the Democrats in the Pennsylvania delegation, as was Haskins, in New York's. They were in the forefront of the fight on the floor of the House and voted steadily with the Republicans on the Kansas issue.

John Hickman had been twice elected to Congress in one of the strongest Republican districts of the State, composed of Chester and Delaware. In 1854 he was the regular Democratic candidate against the late Judge Broomall, of Delaware. It was the year of the Know Nothing hurricane, and that organization secretly adopted Hickman as its candidate and elected him over Broomall by 2,656 majority, when Pollock, the Whig candidate for Governor, had 2,800 majority in the same counties. Although elected as a regular Democrat, he was strongly anti-slavery in his convictions, and aggressively opposed the whole slavery policy of the Democratic administration. In 1856 he was renominated by the Democrats against Bowen, who was chosen as the Republican candidate. It was apparently a square fight on party lines, but a large Republican element that appreciated Hickman's courage and ability in opposing the slavery policy of the administration supported Hickman and elected him by 173 majority. In 1858, when a strong

tide had set in against the slavery policy of the Democratic President, Broomall was again made the candidate of the Republicans and the Democrats were so little in sympathy with Hickman's anti-slavery policy that they nominated Mr. Manley as the regular Democratic candidate, who had exhibited unusual strength in Delaware County by electing himself to the Legislature. Hickman was placed in the field by an organization of Anti-LeCompton Democrats, and he split the Republican party into nearly equal divisions, resulting in his election by 1,601 over Manley and 2,100 over Broomall. During his third term in Congress Hickman logically drifted into the Republican organization, and was elected to a fourth term in 1860 as the Republican candidate by a majority of 2,500. He was a man of indomitable courage, of stern fidelity to his own convictions and an unusually able disputant. He closed his public career as a Republican member of the Legislature after his physical vigor had been greatly impaired, but his name stands in history to-day as one of the heroic and patriotic Democrats who stood up against the party organization when it made the issue of slavery extension paramount.

Galusha A. Grow was an old Democrat who was also returned to Congress, but he had identified himself with the Republican organization in 1856, and could not therefore be classed among the Anti-Le Compton Democrats.

Montgomery, of Washington, was elected in the Fayette, Greene and Washington district in 1856 by a majority of 845. He was a man of quite unusual intellectual force and as rugged physically as he was mentally. He was a man of exceptional power as a disputant, and he strengthened his position by one of the boldest speeches against the Kansas policy of

the administration that was delivered in the House. He was very strong with the people of his district, notwithstanding his issue with the administration on the Kansas question, and he was nominated for re-election by the regular party conference. Some of the old mossback Democrats opposed him, but a large Republican element went to his support, giving him a majority of 3,500, more than four times the majority given him two years before.

There were some strange revolutions in the congressional elections of that year. Henry M. Phillips, one of the leading Philadelphia lawyers, was elected in the Fourth district in 1856 by over 2,700 majority, and in 1858 Millward, the Union candidate, defeated him by 300. Owen Jones, a prominent Democrat of Montgomery, who had been elected to Congress in a district consisting of that county and three wards of Philadelphia by over 1,700 majority in 1856, was defeated by Mr. Wood, the Union candidate, in 1858, by 2,500.

The strangest revolution of that revolutionary season was the defeat of J. Glancey Jones in the Berks district. Jones was one of the ablest of the Demcratic leaders of the State, a man not only of great ability, but cultured and accomplished in all his mental and physical qualities. He was regarded as the oracle of President Buchanan in the House. He was an experienced parliamentarian, as he was then serving his fourth term in Congress and had been unanimously renominated for another term, but the Anti-LeCompton Democrats organized and nominated John Schwartz, a venerable German citizen not above mediocrity in mental attainments, but an intelligent and highly respected representative of the industrial class. The contest became very animated and Jones led his battle with masterly ability, never doubting for a moment that he would win by a somewhat

reduced majority, but he was not only surprised but dumfounded, when the final returns were known, to find himself defeated by 19 majority where he had received 6,004 majority two years before.

President Buchanan exhibited his intense interest in the issue as well as his devotion to Mr. Jones by announcing on the day after the election the appointment of Jones as Minister to Austria. Jones resigned his position in the House to accept the Austrian mission and at a special election to fill the vacancy the Democrats were so demoralized that the Republicans elected General Keim to fill the vacancy, being the only instance in which the Republicans carried Berks County in a party contest.

A strong Democratic district composed of Columbia, Luzerne, Montour and Wyoming was also carried by over 3,800 by Colonel Scranton, the Union candidate, and Judge Hale, of the Centre district, defeated Allison White, then a resident of Clinton, but later a resident of Philadelphia, by 1,900 majority, where White had been elected two years before by over 500. Judge Junkin, who is yet living in his native county of Perry, was elected in the Cumberland, Perry and York district by 46 majority, notwithstanding the natural 3,000 Democratic majority that confronted him. Edward MacPherson, then prominent as an editor and general political writer, made his first apperarance in public life as a successor of Wilson Reilly, who had been elected in the Adams, Bedford, Franklin, Fulton and Juniata district by over 500 majority in 1856 and was distanced by MacPherson by 267.

The sweeping character of the revolution of 1858 will be understood when it is remembered that in the delegation elected in 1856 the Democrats had fifteen of the twenty-five members, and in the delegation chosen in 1858 there were only three members elected

on the Democratic ticket, viz., Florence, of Philadelphia; Dimmick, of the Tenth Legion, and Montgomery, who was an Anti-LeCompton Democrat. On the vital issue made paramount by the Buchanan administration the Pennsylvania delegation elected in 1858 stood 23 to 2.

A very carefully and completely planned organization was effected in Congress early in 1858 to give special attention to the election of members of the next House, and every debatable congressional district was thoroughly organized and a clear majority carried against the administration. The House chosen in 1858 footed up 113 Republicans, 23 Americans or Southern opponents of Democracy, 8 Anti-LeCompton Democrats and 93 Administration Democrats, and the House was organized by electing ex-Governor Pennington, of New Jersey, speaker, and Colonel Forney, of Pennsylvania, as clerk. The election of Forney was intended to emphasize the popular revulsion against President Buchanan.

Thaddeus Stevens had been in Congress for four years, but he willingly retired, as he regarded the battle against slavery then to be hopeless. His second term ended in the middle of the Pierce administration. He saw that the Whig party was shorn of its strength, and he saw nothing in the future that promised successful battle against the slave power. In mingled disgust and despair he decided to retire from public life and devote himself to his profession, but soon after his retirement Buchanan, his fellow-townsman and implacable political foe, was elected President. The Missouri compromise had been repealed, the South was battling to force slavery into Kansas and Nebraska, the Dred Scott decision had practically declared that the black man had no rights that the white man was bound to respect, and there

was such deep-seated unrest that Stevens decided to return to Congress, believing that at last a hopeful battle could be made against the advance of slavery. He consented to return to Congress only after a very careful examination of the political conditions of the country, which satisfied him that there was a very reasonable prospect of the opponents of the Buchanan administration carrying a majority of the next House, and he devoted much of his time to organizing the congressional contests in his own State, and to some extent in other States.

Soon after his nomination he visited me at Chambersburg, where I was his attorney in representing his furnace and other business interests in that county, and appealed to me to accept the nomination for Congress. The district was regarded as a safe Whig district as created by the Legislature, but the advent of the Know Nothings had driven from 500 to 800 native-born Catholic Whigs into the Democratic party in Franklin and Adams, making the district reliably Democratic under ordinary conditions, as the Democratic candidate for Congress had carried it by over 500 at the previous election. I had been elected to the Legislature the year before in a strongly adverse district by a singular combination of favorable circumstances, and Stevens insisted that I could carry the district, and that I must accept the nomination. He was very earnest in his appeals, but the contest was a desperate one at best, and even if successful would have been costly, not only in handling the campaign, but also in separating me very largely, if not wholly, from my professional duties. I was not in a condition to afford either sacrifice, and Stevens finally reluctantly accepted my positive declination.

He then decided to go to Gettysburg, his old home, and urge Edward MacPherson to take the nomination.

MacPherson at first refused, but he had great respect for Stevens' wishes in the matter and he finally agreed that he would accept the nomination if I would agree to go on the local ticket for a second term in the Legislature, as that would relieve him of organization for the battle in Franklin County, where his chief majority had to be attained to give him success.

Stevens returned to Chambersburg, told me of MacPherson's willingness to accept on the condition that I should return to the house, and he added: "I gave him the positive promise that you would do so and organize and bring out the full vote of Franklin County."

I had on every occasion, when it was appropriate to give expression on the subject, announced that I would not be a candidate for re-election to the house. There did not seem to be a doubt of election, as every indication pointed to a political revulsion that would bring an easy victory in the legislative district, and cherishing, as I did, a devoted friendship for MacPherson, I consented to the arrangement, was unanimously renominated, made a thorough personal canvass of the county extending to every election district, resulting in my election by a quadrupled majority, and MacPherson won out by 267, Franklin giving him one-third more majority than he received in the entire district.

MacPherson was unusually well equipped for service in the field of National politics. He was one of the readiest and most forceful of the political writers of his day and a walking political cyclopedia. He commanded a high measure of respect immediately upon his appearance in the House, and was one of the most industrious and generally intelligent of the members on every subject of legislation. He was re-elected to the House by a large majority in 1860,

when Curtin and Lincoln swept the State, but he was defeated by Coffroth in the revulsion of 1862, which was largely effected by the Emancipation Proclamation, although the general depression among the peop e naturally caused by the many defeats suffered by the Northern army was an important factor in the Republican disaster of that year.

Fortunately for the House and for MacPherson, he was chosen chief clerk of the Congress to which he had failed in his re-election, and continued in that important position for many years. His last official trust was that of Chief of the Treasury Bureau of Engraving and Printing, to which he was appointed by Hayes, as the popular branch of Congress was then Democratic, and MacPherson was retired from the clerkship.

He was known in Washington as the best informed in political history of any of the members of the House, and the most valuable records of his highly creditable career remain in his "History of the Great Rebellion," his "History of Reconstruction" and his political manuals, issued every two years until the great task of reconstruction was completed. These works of MacPherson's can be accepted by any intelligent student of to-day who wants to acquire an accurate and complete history of the Civil War and Reconstruction. All of the many important Reconstruction measures are carefully presented, with the action of each House given in detail; every battle of the war is faithfully recorded in brief, and his work on Reconstruction is the only entirely reliable connected history we have to-day of the tempestuous and long-protracted struggle for the rehabilitation of the seceding States. He was a severe student without at any time enjoying vigorous health, and his arduous labors ended his career when he was well equipped to render very great service to his State and Nation.

XXXII.

SWEEPING VICTORY OF PEOPLE'S PARTY.

The Know Nothings or Americans Eliminated from Politics—Morton McMichael Baptized the People's Party—John M. Read of Philadelphia Nominated for the Supreme Bench Against the Instructions of Philadelphia Delegates—Elected by Over 25,000—The House Changed from Two-thirds Democratic to Two-thirds People's Party—The Author's Contest for Speaker of the House—His First Experience with Cameron Tactics.

THE year 1858 dated the beginning of the final overthrow of the great Democratic party that had ruled the nation from the time of Jefferson in 1800 until the election of Lincoln in 1860. There had been two Whig Presidents elected during that time—Harrison in 1840 and Taylor in 1848—but they made no special change in the general policy of the government beyond halting for a period and somewhat conserving Democratic power. Since 1858, when the popular revolt against the Buchanan administration swept the Northern States and blazed the way for the triumphant election of Lincoln two years later, the Democrats have never elected a President by Democratic votes. They gave popular majorities to Tilden in 1876 and to Cleveland in each of his three Presidential struggles, but the majorities given the Democrats came from disaffected Republican elements.

The Whig party was entirely eliminated as a political factor in the contest of 1856, and in the Northern States there remained only the Republicans, the Democrats and fragments of the American or Know Nothing organization.

In only two States did the Americans attempt to

assert themselves. In Massachusetts, where they had triumphed over both the old parties, they made a battle for Governor in 1858, but were overwhelmingly defeated by the election of Banks, and in New York, under the lead of Fillmore, they were greatly embittered against the Republicans. They had polled 125,000 votes for Fillmore in 1856, when Fremont carried the State by 80,000, but in 1857 they had lost the greater proportion of the Democratic element, and polled a small fraction over one-half their vote of the previous year. Negotiations were attempted when the Republican convention met at Albany, but the pro-slavery Americans were so intolerant that finally after a conference with them Thurlow Weed arose in the Republican State convention and moved to proceed to the nomination of a candidate for Governor. That motion made by the leader of leaders of the Republicans was notice to the convention that there could be no affiliation with the Americans, and the Republicans nominated Morgan for Governor, who was elected by nearly 18,000 plurality.

In all the other Northern States the Americans made no distinct nominations, and either formally or informally fused with the Republicans. In Indiana fusion was effected on the State ticket, but the Democrats won out by majorities ranging from 1,500 to 2,000 for their entire State ticket, embracing six candidates, but the fusion carried eight of the eleven Congressmen. A like fusion was effected in Illinois and carried the State ticket by 3,800 majority. The contest of that year between Douglas and Lincoln for United States Senator made Lincoln the next President of the United States. Until then he was little known outside of his own State, but when even his opponents had to confess that he was a foeman worthy of the steel of Douglas in popular debate, the attention of the whole

country was attracted to the masterly ability exhibited by Lincoln in a contest with the ablest and most adroit popular champion of the Democratic party.

In all the Southern States the opposition to the Democracy was rallied under the flag of the American party, and it elected twenty-three members of Congress, more than enough to hold the balance of power between the distinctive Republican and Democratic forces.

The humiliating defeat suffered by the Pennsylvania Americans in 1857, when they were compelled to exhibit their weakness in utter nakedness, made it impossible for the leaders of the remnant of that organization to assert themselves as a political factor in a State contest, and when a call for the third Union convention was issued, the Americans very generally and cordially co-operated with the movement. It was deemed expedient to change the name of the opposition organization, as many of the old Americans had some reluctance about coming into the support of the Union party, against which they had been earnestly battling only a year before. Morton McMichael, who headed the Philadelphia delegation, offered a resolution declaring that, as the convention represented the people of every political faith opposed to the offensive policy of the National administration, the title of the opposition should be the People's party. The proposition was accepted with cheers, and all but a very few of the old Americans accepted the new fellowship, and the battle was thus opened with a thoroughly united opposition against the Democrats.

The convention was an unusually able one. I well remember meeting at various conferences such men as Governor Ritner, Thaddeus Stevens, the late Chief Justice Mercur, Colonel Mann, Congressmen

Grow and Moorehead, and many others of more than State reputation. It was believed by all that with a united opposition the State could be won by a large majority, and a universal spirit of confidence pervaded the deliberations of the body.

The delegates chosen to the convention by the opposition elements of Philadelphia were instructed to support Judge Oswald Thompson for supreme judge. Judge Thompson was a man of admitted ability and unusually well equipped as a judge, but he was little known outside of the city. The prominent members of the convention were generally united in the conviction that as they had an almost assured certainty of success, they should nominate the ablest representative of the Pennsylvania bar for supreme judge, and there was little dispute at the time that John M. Read, of Philadelphia, was the man who should be made the candidate. Until 1856 he had been one of the great Democratic leaders of the State, although opposed to the slavery policy adopted by his party. His anti-slavery convictions had been part of the faith of his life, as was clearly exhibited in his defense of Castner Hanway, when tried for treason in the United States Court, before Judge Grier, for alleged participation in the Christiana riots.

It was the first important trial in the State under the fugitive slave law, part of the compromise measures of 1850, that made it the duty of every citizen to aid in the capture of fugitive slaves under penalty of severe punishment. Hanway, a Chester County Quaker, happened to come upon the ground when Mr. Gorsuch, of Maryland, was attempting to capture two or three of his fugitive slaves near Christiana, but it was proven that he had come there only to advise the preservation of peace. When there he was summoned by Gorsuch to aid in the arrest of the slaves,

and because he refused to expose his life, as Gorsuch did, who was killed on the spot, to arrest fugitive slaves, he was indicted for treason, and John M. Read, then admittedly the ablest Democratic member of the bar of the State, appeared for the defense along with Thaddeus Stevens and others. The laboring oar of the trial was put upon Read, in which he exhibited masterly ability as a trial lawyer, resulting in the acquittal of his client.

He continued to act with the Democratic party, although not approving of its repeal of the Missouri Compromise, until 1856, when his fellow Democrats were astounded one morning to notice in the newspapers that a great mass meeting had been called at Harrisburg, at which John M. Read was to be the chief speaker in favor of Fremont.

Highly as Judge Thompson was respected by the bar of Philadelphia, it was deemed of paramount importance to the opposition to win its first victory in the State with the ablest representative of the bar that could be furnished as a candidate for the supreme court. The Philadelphia delegation readily divided on the question under the force of the general argument that the present victory should be made distinguished for the merit of its successful candidate.

A portion of the Philadelphia delegation battled very earnestly for Thompson, but the task soon became hopeless, and Judge Read was nominated by a large majority over a candidate for whom the delegation from his own city had been unanimously instructed. Read was not only strong because of his admitted legal ability and unblemished public and private character, but he was especially strong as a representative of the anti-slavery Democrats of the State. With all these attributes of strength he was

Thaddeus Stevens

undoubtedly altogether the most formidable candidate the opposition could have presented.

The Democrats had their candidate already made for them by the appointment of William A. Porter by Governor Packer to succeed Justice John C. Knox of the supreme court, who had been called to the office of attorney general. Porter stood high in his profession, was personally unblemished, and he was unanimously nominated by the Democrats. Under ordinary conditions he would have been a strong and successful Democratic candidate, but he struck a tidal wave created by the perfect union of all the elements then opposing Democracy, and was defeated by 26,897. Porter was so thoroughly disgusted with his defeat that he promptly resigned his seat on the supreme bench, although he had less than three months to serve, and thereafter until his death he was unfelt and unknown in the political struggles of the State.

At the same election a canal commissioner was chosen, and Senator Frazer, of Fayette, who had been elected to the senate by the Know Nothing organization was made the opposition candidate, and he was elected over Frost, Democrat, by 26,290. His triumph turned to ashes in his hands, as the sale of the last of the State canals had just been consummated, and in a few weeks after he had been qualified the canal board was abolished.

A sweeping revolution was wrought in the popular branch of the Pennsylvania Legislature. I had served in the previous session, in which there were but thirty Republicans to seventy Democrats, being more than two-thirds Democratic, but the House chosen in 1858 had only thirty-two Democrats to sixty-eight of the People's party. Thus the Democrats had more than two-thirds of the house of 1858, and less than one-

third of the same body in the session of 1859. Fully two-thirds of the majority members in the house were entirely new men and nearly all of them inexperienced in legislative service

Soon after the election of 1858 I was asked by leading members of the house to become a candidate for speaker, and until within two weeks of the meeting of the Legislature there was no other name presented for that important position I had not solicited the support of a single member, and of course was greatly gratified at the apparent unanimity with which the honor seemed to be coming to me. Representative Lawrence, of Dauphin, who had served with me in the previous session, and who was one of the admitted leaders of the body, was among the first to ask me to be a candidate for speaker, and as he was the only member whose position and experience might reasonably make him a candidate for the chair, my election as speaker was discussed in the public press as assured without contest.

Two weeks before the meeting of the Legislature, when on a visit to Harrisburg, Lawrence invited me to take a walk, and we strolled across the bridge chatting pleasantly, when he suddenly surprised me by saying that he must have the chairmanship of ways and means. I told him, what was entirely true, that not a single member had asked me to pledge myself on the subject of appointments to committees, and that I could not do so in his case. He answered half jocularly that if I did not give him the assurance of that chairmanship he would be a candidate for speaker. I laughed at what I supposed to be a quixotic idea of my friend, and dismissed the subject, as I supposed that he was not serious in what I regarded as an utterly hopeless candidacy.

We were both young men, he about twenty-eight and I

just thirty, and I made the mistake of assuming that the battle was surely won in advance of the fight. He carried his case to Cameron, who well understood the State and never had been friendly to me, and a quiet but thorough canvass of the members was made by personal visitation and liberal promises made for important positions on committees, and to my surprise when the Legislature was about to meet I found a very formidable opposition to my election as speaker.

Until then I had made no effort whatever, but I immediately entered the fight, marshalled my forces and at three o'clock in the afternoon of the day on which the caucus was to be held at eight in the evening, I had a caucus of my supporters, in which there were eight majority over the entire opposition vote of the house, but, to my surprise, when the vote was taken in the caucus Lawrence was nominated by two majority.

I had my first political experience with Cameron in the contest. He had very actively organized the opposition to me, but when he found that I had a majority of eight in the caucus he decided on a counter movement, in which he was always a noted master. Soon after the adjournment of the caucus a personal friend of mine, who was aiso very close to Cameron, asked me to call at his room at the Omit House at four o'clock. I of course assented, and when I went to the hotel at the appointed time he met me at the door, took me to a room upstairs, opened the door and handed me in where I was face to face with General Cameron.

It was our first political conference. He informed me that I had been invited there to meet him, and that he desired to say to me that he was quite willing for me to be chosen speaker, but wished my assurance that his friends would not be ostracised in the organization of the committees. I told him that I certainly

would not ostracise any man in the formation of the committees because of his friendship or enmity to himself or any other. He told me that I would be nominated by a decisive majority. I either did not know the measures of Cameron's cunning, or failed to give it due appreciation, and I defeated myself by inquiring whether Lawrence, to whom I was strongly personally attached, was aware of his meeting with me, and whether he was advised of the purpose Cameron had declared to me. Cameron answered that Lawrence did not know, and would not be advised of it; that he, Cameron, was going to Washington that evening, and would not be in the city, but that his special friends knew of his plans.

I exhibited the qualities of a political tenderfoot to an extent that has often amazed me since when thinking of it, by insisting that Lawrence should be brought into our presence and advised of the situation, which Cameron declined. I then said to him that I would advise Lawrence myself of it. Cameron answered that he was sorry I was so foolish, and left me evidently displeased. Instead of going to Washington he threw himself into the contest with redoubled vigor, and the first knowledge I had of it was a personal notice from a close friend, a member of the house, who represented himself and three associates, informing me that unless I paid $200 these four votes would be lost. I summarily rejected the proposition, and the four votes, with an additional desertion, turned against me and defeated me by two majority.

Cameron thus had the speakership while I had the experience, and in the many conferences and arrangements which I made with Cameron during a score of years of political hostility I never repeated the rôle of the political tenderfoot.

The election of Lawrence did not in any way change our personal relations, as he was an able and chivalrous fellow. He was, of course, fearfully embarrassed after his election by the many promises made in his name for prominent positions on committees. I had been supported by nearly all the experienced members of the body, who as a rule were entitled to lead on committees, and common courtesy under the circumstances required Lawrence to tender me the first position on the floor as chairman of ways and means, but he called upon me and frankly told me of his embarrassment, and appealed to me to assist him in organizing the house as creditably as possible without violating the faith that had been pledged to his friends.

I voluntarily resigned to him the chairmanship of ways and means, for which he was very grateful, and told him to dispose of me in any way he thought best; that I certainly would not permit any factional strife in the first opposition house we had had for some years, and he placed me at the head of the judiciary committee.

It was a political necessity that the house should have at least the appearance of harmony, and I very cordially supported the speaker in every emergency, so that no factional division line was visible at any time during the session. His health was then breaking, and the next year, when he was again elected speaker of the body, he came to the speaker's stand with the marks of death indelibly stamped on his bright face Before the session had half passed he was unable to discharge his duties of speaker and rarely appeared in the house, and only a few months later he slept the dreamless sleep of the dead.

XXXIII.

SECOND DEMOCRATIC DEFEAT.

The Opposition Strengthened by the Kansas Agitation and the Killing of Broderick in a Duel—An Early People's State Convention Called—Thomas E. Cochran Nominated for Auditor General and General Keim for Surveyor General—Both Elected by Large Majorities—The Author Forced into a Contest for State Senator—Political Conditions of the District—A Most Violent and Defamatory Campaign—The Dunkards Decide at Church Meeting to Vote for Neighbor McClure—The Military Committee of the Senate.

THE year 1859 was an off year, but most of the contests in the States, North and South, were very earnest, as the two great parties, as they then stood before the country, viz., Democrats and Opposition, fought desperately on the skirmish line of the great battle of 1860 that made Lincoln President and brought the Republicans permanently into power. All of the Northern States which held elections in that year voted decisively against the Democratic party with the exception of California and Oregon. California was carried by the pro-slavery Democrats, then known as "Velvet Heads," one year before in a triangular fight, in which the regular Democratic candidate for Governor received 62,255 votes to 31,298 for the Anti-LeCompton Democratic candidate, and 10,110 for the Republicans. There was a practical fusion on Congressmen, the Anti-LeCompton Democrats and the Republicans supporting Congressman McKibben, Anti-LeCompton Democrat, and Colonel Baker, Republican, afterwards Senator from Oregon, and killed at Balls Bluff. It was in this contest that Broderick was overwhelm-

ingly defeated after having elected himself to the Senate, and the partisan bitterness, almost wholly sectional, was so intense that it was deliberately decided by several of the pro-slavery Democrats to challenge Broderick to duels until he should fall.

Very soon after the election he was challenged by Judge Terry, and fell mortally wounded on the first fire, with McKibben by his side as second. It was the murder of Broderick more than any other cause that revolutionized the State and gave the electoral vote to Lincoln in 1860. The only other Northern State that did not vote with the opposition in 1859 was Oregon, and there the Democratic majority was only 39. New Jersey gave her first Democratic defeat in that year by electing Olden Governor by 1,601 majority, and Minnesota came into the Republican line by electing Ramsey Governor by 3,752. A few Northern States that then held biennial sessions of the Legislature, such as Indiana and Illinois, held no general elections in 1859, but the activities of the great skirmish battles for the great contest of 1860 left the Democratic party with but two Northern States, away on the Pacific slope, as the only places where their standard had been unfurled to tell of victories.

While the Democrats suffered a sweeping defeat in the North the opposition in the South made great inroads against the Democracy. Maryland's State officers were all of the opposition; North Carolina gave but 6,000 Democratic majority, and the opposition had half the delegation to Congress; Georgia elected a Democratic Governor by only 405 majority; Virginia elected Letcher, Democrat, for Governor by 5,500 and had five opposition Congressmen; Tennessee elected Harris, Democrat, for Governor by 800, and had seven opposition Congressmen to three Democrats; Kentucky elected a Democratic Governor by

9,000, but the opposition had just half the Congressmen; Texas defeated the Democratic candidate for Governor and elected Senator Houston, Independent American, by 3,700.

It was well understood when the political campaign of 1859 opened that the varied shades of opposition to the Democratic party and its policy embraced an overwhelming majority of the American people. The Republicans of the North, who had the distinctive Republican banner boldly unfurled in all the Northern States excepting Pennsylvania and Indiana, were entirely confident that they could win the Presidency if they maintained their victories of 1858 in the off year of 1859 The great triumph achieved by the People's party in Pennsylvania by the election of supreme judge and canal commissioner in 1858 by nearly 30,000 majority, not only inspired the varied shades of opposition in this State to very earnest political activity, but also taught the supreme necessity for the greatest discretion and sagacity in directing the opposition forces, which were not wholly homegeneous, and holding them thoroughly united in 1859 to assure the State for the Republicans in 1860.

The People's State convention was called early in the year, and it brought out an assembly of representative political leaders, who inquired only how they could best assure success. I was in the several conferences held before the convention met, and had any one attempted to advance individual or factional interests at the expense of party harmony, he would have been practically voiceless in the convention. There were plenty of delegates who looked to the advancement of individuals in the future, but they well understood that the great principle of the convention was to hold closely united the opposition, and crystallize it for the National battle of the following year.

Thomas E. Cochran

There were two State offices to be filled, and the candidates were chosen after the most careful deliberation. It was a convention that would have driven from its fellowship any candidates importunately seeking individual success; and, although the important offices of auditor general and surveyor general were to be filled, no man was discussed for either position outside of the very sincere and exhaustive deliberation in the conferences held to search for the most available men for the places to be filled. Thomas E, Cochran, of York, an old line Whig, and a man of great ability and the highest personal character, was selected as the candidate for auditor general, and General Keim, of Berks, who had carried that county for Congress at the special election of the year before to fill the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of J. Glancey Jones, who had been appointed to the Austrian mission after his defeat by John Schwartz, was generally agreed upon as the best man for surveyor general. The ticket was nominated with hearty unanimity, and the convention adjourned with the conviction universally accepted that no interests of individual ambition looking to future achievement should be entertained within the party.

Thus the bitter strife between Cameron and Curtin that had its origin in the contest for Senator in 1855, and the many conflicting ideas and aims between the old line Whigs, the old Know Nothings, the Anti-Le-Compton Democrats and the aggressive Republicans were harmonized by postponing all differences for future arbitrament, and the battle was thus made hopeless for the Democrats from the start. The Kansas irritation was continued by the earnest opposition to the National administration and the slave power. While there was an overwhelming Free State majority of the people in that territory, the issue of

slavery extension was forced upon the people by the Democratic administration and the leaders of that party, and that caused continued agitation and steadily weakened the Democracy. There were no State issues on which the Democrats could make a hopeful stand. Packer, the Democratic Governor of the State, did not conceal his lack of sympathy with the slave policy of the party, and Surveyor General Rowe, who had been elected surveyor general three years before, and was unanimously nominated in 1859 for re-election, with difficulty kept from the public his conviction that his party was fatally wrong on the great issue that then convulsed the nation. He accepted the nomination of his party, however, and went down with it in defeat; but when the South precipitated civil war to maintain slavery, Rowe was one of the first of the Democrats of the southern border to take an aggressive stand in support of the war, and in the fall of 1861 he was unanimously nominated by the Republicans as a War Democrat for the Legislature, was elected by a large majority and made speaker of the house by the Republicans and War Democrats. His son, D. Watson Rowe, then a promising young lawyer just admitted to the bar, also abandoned his Democratic faith, and has since served with conspicuous ability twenty years as the Republican president judge of the district.

The Democrats made a very earnest struggle to redeem the State from the disaster of 1858. They had very able leaders, and they made exhaustive efforts to bring the Anti-LeCompton Democrats back into the support of the State ticket, but the opposition was thoroughly united and Cochran and Keim, the People's candidates, were elected by 18,000 majority with an opposition majority of nearly 2 to 1 in both branches of the Legislature. Of the eleven

senators chosen the Democrats carried only one in the Cumberland, Perry and Juniata district. The senate stood 21 opposition to 12 Democrats, and the house 67 opposition to 33 Democrats. This result was notice to the leaders of both sides that anything approaching a united opposition would defeat the Democrats for Governor and President in 1860.

The senatorial district in which I resided was normally Democratic by several hundred. A Democratic senator had been elected in the old district, consisting of Franklin and Adams, but under the new apportionment Fulton was added to the district with 300 to 400 Democratic majority to assure Democratic ascendency under all conditions. When I was forced most reluctantly to be a candidate for re-election to the house in 1858 I announced in the most positive terms that I would retire from legislative or other public duties at the end of that term to give my whole time to professional labors. When the opposition began to look around for candidates in 1859 I was very earnestly appealed to from all the three counties of the district to accept the nomination for senator, but every such appeal brought out only a peremptory refusal to accept. As I had twice been nominated for the house in the face of equally peremptory refusals, they seemed to assume that I could not refuse a nomination for senator if unanimously tendered, and the conference met in my own town, within sight of my own office, unanimously nominated me for senator, and adjourned and dispersed without having any communication whatever with me. They assumed that if they had notified me of the nomination it would have been refused, and they took the responsibility of nominating me and adjourning without day.

There was a reasonable prospect that, by exhaustive

effort and a very costly campaign in entirely legitimate expenditures, I could win, but I was just on the threshold of a professional career to which I expected to devote my life, and I could neither afford the labor and cost of the campaign, nor to take from my profession the time and interest necessary to serve as a legislator and take an active part in politics. The method of campaigning in those days was at times costly to individual candidates. No such thing as campaign funds for county and district committees had been heard of. The candidate who fought the battle relied entirely upon his own resources. The corruption of voters was with very rare exceptions unknown in those days, but to win the senatorship required the holding of public meetings in every district at the expense of the candidate, the employment of men to reach every individual voter in each district, and personal visits of the candidate to all who could be reached.

Some idea of the political methods of that day may be acquired when I state that after having canvassed Franklin County twice for the house and once for the senate I knew the name, residence and occupation of every voter in the county; I knew the exact shade of his politics, but I did not know a single instance in any of those counties in which a man was directly paid for his vote. Doubtless some of indifferent political faith were influenced by the purchase of tax receipts and other of the ordinary methods which are deemed legitimate in political contests, but the corruption of voters and fraudulent returns were then practically unknown in nearly if not quite all of the rural districts of the State. Sorely against all my wishes and fixed purposes, as I had supposed, I could not decline the contest put upon me without being exposed to the imputation of ingratitude to the

people who had twice given me such exceptional expressions of confidence. The Democrats nominated J. W. Douglas, a respected member of the Chambersburg bar and an aggressive champion of the old line Democracy.

The contest for senator in that district was one of unusual desperation, and I well understood that it could not be won except by reaching every individual voter whose vote was doubtful. The Democratic organ of Chambersburg aided me very greatly by publishing a series of most defamatory articles, charging me with legislative corruption. When the articles became sufficiently bold to take definite shape in the grave accusations, I arrested the editor and publisher, and as the regular session of the court was to be held soon thereafter, I had them indicted, appeared in court and demanded trial before the election, stating that if the accusations were proven I would deserve to be defeated; but the defendants demanded postponement and pleaded for it on the ground that the witnesses were scattered over the State and they could not be prepared to try. Although it was evident that they could not try the case, and did not mean to try it, they brought themselves within the rule of the court and a continuance was authorized, although they certainly could have been prepared to try if they had the evidence obtainable anywhere in the State to sustain their case. There was no other court until some time after the election, and as I was successful by over 400 majority, the case was finally *nol prossed* with satisfactory retraction of the charges made in the editorial columns of the paper.

Not only did this defamation aid me very greatly when my accusers refused to try the case when I challenged them in open court, but it brought out a considerable number of Dunkard non-voters to aid

me. I lived just outside of the town on a farm and was surrounded by a Dunkard farming community. Their standard of manhood is good, neighborly acts, but their religion, while not mandatory, taught them to refuse participation in politics, and until 1864 they generally abstained from voting. A National meeting of the sect was held in Waynesboro, my own county, in 1864, at which it was known that the question of releasing the membership from the obligation of refraining from participation in politics was to be considered. Lincoln was then a candidate for re-election, and the Dunkards very generally approved of Lincoln's policy, although earnestly averse to war. Governor Curtin visited the National meeting, and was very heartily welcomed. He was in general confidence with the leading men of the Church and aided very much in bringing them to the deliverance they made, allowing each one to be guided by his own conscience in the matter of political efforts.

The Dunkards had a church on an farm adjoining mine, and at a Sunday meeting, some three weeks before the senatorial election, they discussed the defamatory publications made against their neighbor McClure, and expressed their earnest disapproval. Some one suggested that it might be a neighborly duty for them to go to the election and vote for the single office of senator, and after some discussion the matter was postponed until the following Sunday, when, after very grave deliberation, they decided that they should attend the election and vote only for the office of senator. Thus a number of the Dunkards in my own immediate neighborhood and some others throughout the county who were influenced by their action, attended the election and voted only for me for senator. How bitterly the senatorial battle was fought may be known when it is stated

that without any pretense of wrong the vote cast for senator was larger than that ever cast for President in the district, and I was elected by over 400 majority.

That election practically changed my career from the legal profession to politics and journalism, as war came soon after I entered the senate, with the people of my own district exposed on the southern frontier, and public duties practically isolated me from my profession. When the committees were being arranged, after I entered the senate in January, 1860, I was given an entirely satisfactory share of important positions, but there were a number of committees which never met, among them being the military committee. The Pennsylvania militia had degenerated into worse than farce, with the exception of a few uniformed volunteer companies, and there was not even a record of the committee's proceedings in the senate; but the committees had to be filled, and when they came to the military committee the inquiry was made: "Who in the senate has a military title?" and as I happened to be the only one with the title of colonel, given me as a member of Governor Johnston's staff, who commissioned me the day I was twenty-one years old, I was made chairman of that committee that was never called during the session; but one year later it became the most important committee of the body, and I held it until I retired from the senate.

XXXIV.

THE JOHN BROWN TRAGEDY.

Brown's Invasion of Virginia was Planned in Chambersburg—He was known as Dr. Smith, Engaged in Organizing Mining Operations in Virginia—His Identity not Suspected by Any—The Author Writes the Will of One of Brown's Soldiers—Startling Announcement of Brown's Attack at Harper's Ferry October 16, 1859—The Full List of Brown's Associates—The Capture of Captain Cook—How His Escape was Prevented—Interesting Incidents in the Efforts to Enable Him to Get Out of the Chambersburg Jail.

THE John Brown raid on Harper's Ferry was one of the most startling and tragic events in the history of the Pennsylvania border, and it was as unexpected as a thunderbolt from an unclouded sky. In the midsummer of 1859 a tall, spare, plainly-clad and heavily-bearded man appeared in Chambersburg, and engaged boarding with a widow who lived quietly away from the center of the town. He gave his name as Dr. Smith, and announced that his purpose was the organization of a considerable force for mining operations in the State of Virginia. He remained there for six weeks or more, and became known by sight at least to most of the people of the village, but was exceedingly modest in seeking intercourse with those around him. The post office was next door to my law office, and the afternoon mail arrived about four o'clock, bringing the daily papers from the East, and it was common for a crowd of a dozen or more to gather waiting for their papers and mails.

Among those who appeared frequently to watch for the arrival of the train was Dr. Smith. He made



John Brown

few acquaintances, and rarely conversed with any except when conversation was opened by another. I saw him many times, and on several occasions conversed with him, never doubting that he was a quiet business man who decided to develop the mineral wealth of Western Virginia. I am quite sure that not a single citizen of Chambersburg ever had reason to doubt Dr. Smith's identity. Occasionally, he had visitors at his quiet boarding house, but not in such numbers as to attract attention. His last visitor before his fatal movement upon Harper's Ferry was Frederick Douglas, the great colored leader, and his presence in Chambersburg was not known until after the battle at Harper's Ferry. He visited Brown just before the movement was made upon Harper's Ferry, and made exhaustive efforts to have Brown abandon the enterprise. Douglas afterwards gave me the full account of that interview with Brown. He was not in sympathy with the movement, but was in very close relations with John Brown, and when he learned what Brown contemplated, he earnestly advised him against it, and when he found that Brown was about to start upon the expedition, he hurried to Chambersburg and spent a night with him in vain effort to have him abandon it.

A day or two before the attack on Harper's Ferry, a young man came into my office and asked me to write his will. He was accompanied by a man whom he introduced as Mr. Henry, and gave his own name as Mr. Merriam. We retired to a private office, where I drew his will. He told me he was from Massachusetts, that he was going on a trip South, that accidents might happen in traveling, and he thought it prudent to make a disposition of his estate before starting. There was nothing in his movements or any of his expressions to indicate anything at all out of the ordinary. The

fact that he made the Abolition Society of Massachusetts his residuary legatee was not regarded as calling for inquiry into the plans or purposes of the testator. When I drew the will he signed his name, Francis J. Merriam, in a bold legible hand, and I inquired whether he would have his friend as one of the witnesses, but he said that he desired two witnesses from the office, as they could be found without difficulty if wanted. The man whom he introduced as Mr. Henry was J. Henri Kagi, who was among the killed at Harper's Ferry. The will was properly witnessed and mailed to the executor in Boston.

Within a few days thereafter I discovered the name of Mr. Merriam in the list of Brown's little army that attacked Harper's Ferry, and he was one of the few who escaped. He worked his way through the South Mountain, reached Philadelphia, registered his correct name at the Merchants' Hotel, and went to his home in Boston. Whether an effort was made to have him returned for trial I am not advised, but he never was arrested.

John Brown's entire force consisted of Brown and his three sons, Owen, Oliver and Watson; William and Adolphus Thompson, brothers of Henry Thompson, who was the husband of Brown's eldest daughter; John Henri Kagi, Aaron Dwight Stevens, John Edwin Cook, William H. Leeman, George Plummer Tidd, Jeremiah G. Anderson, Albert Hazelett, Stewart Taylor, Edwin and Barclay Coppock, and Francis J. Merriam, all of whom were white men, and Osborne P. Anderson, William Copeland, Lewis Sherrard Leary and Shields Green, colored.

Brown had rented the Kennedy farm in Washington County, Maryland, four miles from Harper's Ferry. It was isolated and of little value, as the rental was $35.00 a year. At that place his consultations were

held, and his pikes and other implements of warfare, which had been forwarded ostensibly as mining tools, were stored. On Sunday morning, October 16, 1859, Brown had his entire force at the Kennedy farm, and they were all summoned to unusually early Sunday morning prayers. He read a chapter from the Bible, followed by a very fervent prayer for the deliverance of the slaves. Every man responded to his name at roll call. At ten o'clock the force was again assembled with Anderson, colored, in the chair, who read the constitution of the organization, and gave out detailed orders for the attack to be made that night. The story of the two days' battle, the loss of a number of lives, including several citizens, and the final capture of Brown and the remainder of his band by Colonel Robert E. Lee, who had been sent by the government to recover possession of the Harper's Ferry works, need not be repeated here. Of Brown's men, Oliver and Watson Brown, William and Adolphus Thompson, Kagi, Leeman, Taylor, Leary and Jeremiah Anderson were killed in the battle; Owen Brown, Cook, Tidd, Coppock, Merriam, Hazelett and Osborne P. Anderson escaped. Of these, Cook and Hazelett were captured and executed with Stevens Coppock and the others. Brown was severely wounded.

Oliver Brown, Coppock, Tidd and Anderson escaped into the South Mountain together, but had to move very slowly on account of the severe wounds of Brown and one or two of the others. They reached Chambersburg a week or more after they had gotten into the mountain, and were hidden for several days in a forest near the town, where they were fed and had medical assistance. Mr. Deal, who afterwards filled the position of postmaster under Lincoln, was in communication with the underground railway organization of the State, and learned from Dr. Rutherford, of Harris-

burg, the best method of getting fugitives to the home of the Browns in Crawford County. As soon as they were able to travel they moved northward, traveling only at night, crossed the Juniata at Bell's Mills, and were piloted and cared for by the underground agents until they reached Crawford County, where Brown remained undisturbed, although his presence there was well known. Morrow B. Lowery, a very active agent of the underground road, met them soon after they crossed the Juniata, and personally accompanied them to Crawford, where he resided. Why no effort was made to arrest Brown's son I have never understood. One thousand dollars reward was offered by the State of Virginia for each of the fugitives, but no attempt was made to capture any others than Hazelett and Cook, and Hazelett was first captured believing him to be Cook, and that blunder cost Cook his life, as will be seen later in the narrative.

Captain Cook was altogether the most brilliant of John Brown's lieutenants. He had fought through the Kansas war when the Missouri border ruffians, as they were then called, had a price set upon his life, and he was completely infatuated with the idea of taking revenge upon the South by provoking negro insurrection as the beginning of the extermination of slavery. There was great anxiety on the part of Virginia to accomplish the arrest of Cook, and he was arrested finally by walking right into the hands of the only man in Franklin County who would have attempted to capture him. That man was Dan Logan, a most accomplished natural detective, who had many times arrested fugitive slaves, and who was constantly advised of all rewards offered for slaves or fugitives from the South, as they very often took refuge in South Mountain, where Logan lived. A man of great self pcssession and courage, he well knew that Cook would

prefer death to surrender, so he captured him by strategy.

Cook had been several days in the South Mountain, and was greatly in need of food. In his search for some hamlet in the mountains where he could obtain bread and meat, he suddenly emerged on a number of workmen employed at the Hughes Furnace, where Cleggett FitzHugh, a Southern man, was manager, and Dan Logan was in conversation with FitzHugh at the time that Cook appeared not many yards distant. The moment Logan saw Cook he recognized him, as he had a full description of him, and Cook's unique personality made it impossible to err. He was under medium size, skin as soft as a woman's, and his deep blue eyes and wealth of blond hair made it easy to identify him. Cook stopped short when he saw he was in the immediate presence of a large number of men, but he was feeble from starvation, and knowing that he would be pursued, he walked boldly up to FitzHugh and Logan and said that he was hunting in the mountains, and desired to get some bread and bacon. Logan, without showing any emotion whatever, told him that he would take him to his store, although Logan had no store, and supply him with all the food he desired.

Cook was thrown entirely off his guard, and walked along between the two men. At a signal from Logan, each grasped Cook by the wrist and he was helpless. His identity was clearly established by his commission, which was in his pocket, and his powder flask, on which his name was blown. Cook was disarmed, and in his feeble condition Logan knew that he could not escape. He put him in a buggy without tying his hands or feet, and started immediately for Chambersburg, some eight or ten miles distant. On the way Cook attempted to negotiate for his escape. He asked Logan what

reward had been offered, to which Logan answered, a thousand dollars. In answer to Cook's question, whether Logan wanted him to be hung, Logan answered that he did not; if the reward was paid he would deliver him to any person he would name. Cook told him that the reward could be readily arranged, as he was the brother-in-law of Governor Willard, of Indiana, and had another brother-in-law, a rich merchant, in Brooklyn. Cook had told Logan the truth about his relations to Governor Willard, as Mrs. Willard was his sister, but Logan suspected that it was the beginning of an effort to deceive him and let Cook get away without him receiving the reward.

Finally Cook appealed to him to take him to some one in Chambersburg who might feel an interest in him with whom an arrangement might be made for the payment of the reward. I had just been elected to the senate a few weeks before, and Logan had very actively supported me in my several campaigns. He finally told Cook that he would take him to my office, and that if I told him to go home he would go and ask no questions. They arrived in town near sunset, and Logan at once sent to my office, house and other places where I might be found, but I had gone that evening to look at some suburban lots with a view of purchasing a cow pasture, and on my way home at the extreme end of the town, where they never thought of looking for me, I stopped at a little store where a number of friends had gathered who had been very active with me in the senatorial fight just recently closed, and I chatted with them for an hour.

Soon after dark I walked down the street on my way home, and in passing the office of Squire Reisher I found quite a crowd assembled, and stopped to inquire what it meant. Some one told me that Captain Cook had been captured, and was there before the justice.

I went inside, but as soon as Logan saw me he took me to one side, and begged of me to get Cook away, as he did not want the responsibility of having a man hung. He told me that he had hunted for me, and now regretted that he had arrested Cook. I went in and Logan introduced me to Cook, and I told the justice that Captain Cook would waive a hearing and he should remand him to prison, which was done. I went with him to the prison, and Cook was faint and nervous, but game to the limit. I found myself in the rather delicate position of being counsel for a prisoner whose escape I wanted to effect, and at the same time was counsel for the sheriff whose duty it was to prevent him from escaping.

I did not apprehend any serious difficulty in Cook escaping from prison if he could remain until the next night, and so told him. We found that a requisition could not possibly be delivered to Chambersburg from Richmond to arrive any time the following day, and it was decided that he must remain in prison over night, when everything would be in readiness for his escape the following night. After the programme was arranged I talked with him for an hour on his wonderful exploits in Kansas, and found him a man of fine culture, rare intelligence, but keenly emotional. I did not doubt that he would escape the following night, and said to him that if he escaped this time he must cease his reckless revolutionary methods against slavery. His face at once flushed and he jumped up, declaring that as long as God gave him life he would battle to the death against the men who held the slaves in bonds.

Soon after nine o'clock I left him, telling him to be quiet, as he would hear in due time as to how he might escape on the following night. I went to J. Allison Eyster, then one of the commissioners of the county,

and asked him whether the man was living who had built the jail. He said he was, and then one of the oldest citizens. We went together to call upon the builder, told him we wanted to know where a prisoner should be placed to best get out of jail. He gave us minute instructions as to the best method of making the escape, and I started for home, confident that on the following night Cook would be free.

When I reached my residence and entered the library, I found Mrs. McClure and Miss Riley, daughter of the Democratic Congressman of our town, a very intimate associate of Mrs. McClure's, and later known in Philadelphia as Mrs. Rev. Thos. X. Orr, waiting for me; and both were clad ready for the street with a considerable bundle on the floor beside them. When I asked what it meant, Mrs. McClure informed me that they had decided to visit Captain Cook in the jail, as the sheriff would not refuse Mrs. McClure admittance, and after remaining for some time, they intended to use the contents of their bundle in dressing Cook in female apparel, when one of them would walk out of the jail with him, and the other remain in the cell. Both were women of unusual earnestness of purpose and heartily sympathized with the Free State people in the bloody Kansas struggle, and there was no doubt that they could have carried out their plan, as they would not have been closely scrutinized by the sheriff.

I at once explained that a requisition could not be obtained for Captain Cook from Virginia until the second day, and that the arrangements were all completed for his escape from prison on the following night. They both earnestly protested against the delay, and insisted upon making the venture, as they were apprehensive that Cook would not escape as had been planned. I had finally to be peremptory in forbidding their visit to the jail, and with tears in their eyes they

said they would abandon it. Their apprehensions were fearfully verified, as at eleven o'clock the next morning an officer appeared at the jail with a requisition from the Governor of Virginia, and Cook was remanded to the gibbet at Charlestown.

Hazelett had been arrested near Shippensburg the week before, and when arrested he was supposed to be Captain Cook, as he partially answered Cook's description. He was taken to Carlisle, and the authorities at Richmond were notified that Cook was a prisoner there. A requisition was promptly forwarded for his rendition, and by the time it arrived his identity was discovered, and the requisition was lying there not more than an hour distant from Chambersburg by rail. Cook was taken to prison in Virginia, and the night before his execution he managed to escape from his cell and attained the outer wall of the prison, but, strange as it may seem for one of his courage, and knowing the doom that awaited him, he surrendered to the guard without requiring it to end his life there by the bullet.

He seemed to have been strangely fated. Had I been in my office, at my home, or in any of my usual visiting places, when he arrived in town, Logan would have disappeared in ten minutes with absolute certainty of his reward; and had I permitted Mrs. McClure and Miss Riley to execute their heroic plan for his escape, he would certainly have been out of the jail before midnight, but the decree of a different destiny was inexorable, and Cook, with his captive associates who had survived the conflict, paid the penalty of his lawlessness on the gallows. There was very general regret throughout the county that Cook had been captured and executed, and the man who most keenly regretted it was Dan Logan, who had captured him in the South Mountain.

The John Brown raid was the maddest of all mad attempts ever made in a revolutionary enterprise. Brown and Cook, while different in almost every chief attribute of character, except in their sincere and intense hatred of slavery, were hopeless fanatics in their revengeful policy against the slaveholders. They had faced the rifles for several years of the "Missouri ruffians," who attempted to force slavery into Kansas, and they had often hidden for weeks or months when a large price was offered for their capture dead or alive, and all their instincts and feelings seem to have been centered in the desire to avenge their wrongs by revolutionary and bloody emancipation of slavery. John Brown was as sincerely and severely a religionist as any of the many millions of the land, and he organized, attempted to execute, and went through the whole Harper's Ferry tragedy, firmly believing that he was obeying the commands of his Creator; and Cook, while less zealous as a religionist, was fully persuaded that it was his duty to bring about the release of the bondsmen in the country. They were not wild, hap-hazard buccaneers, but their deep convictions, intensified by long and bloody sacrifice, made them organize the raid on Harper's Ferry, believing that a slave rebellion would speedily follow.

The entire country was profoundly impressed by the Brown tragedy at Harper's Ferry. A decided majority of the Northern people, including a very large element of the Democratic party, had no sympathy with the warfare waged in Kansas to force slavery into that State, and all confessed that the movement was as lawless as it was visionary and hopeless. Had Henry A. Wise, then Governor of Virginia, taken the advice of the cool-headed leaders of the North, such as Fernando Wood and others, he would have commuted their punishment to imprisonment for life on the

ground that they were simply madmen. Wood and others earnestly urged them to do so, as it would have been a declaration from the South that the Harper's Ferry tragedy was only the creation of a score of madmen; but Wise summoned the militia in grand martial array, and made the execution of Brown and his fellows one of the great events of Virginia history. Even the sober sense of the South revolted at Wise's ostentatious exhibition of the authority of a great Commonwealth in dealing with a few desperate fanatics, and he thus alienated the sympathy of the North and largely the respect of the South. Thaddeus Stevens was then in Congress, and when Congress assembled a few weeks after the Harper's Ferry tragedy, some of the Southern fire-eaters haughtily criticised Stevens by pointing to the logical fruits of his revolutionary teaching. He answered only as the grim old Commoner could answer. He said, "John Brown deserved to be hung for being a hopeless fool. He attempted to capture Virginia with seventeen men when he ought to have known that it would require at least twenty-five."

None then had any conception of the immortality that was to attach to the name of John Brown. Within less than two years, overwhelming armies were in battle array in the Southern States, and from the first disaster of Bull Run until the final surrender at Appomattox, every Confederate force that met their brethren of the North on the battlefield heard the song of "John Brown's body lies moulding in the grave, but his soul goes marching on;" and to-day his modest grave in Northwestern Pennsylvania is visited by the lovers of liberty with a reverence for his memory that few even of the grandest of our chieftains have commanded.

XXXV.

LIBERALIZING THE LAW OF EVIDENCE.

Titian J. Coffee, State Senator from Indiana County, the Leader in Liberalizing Our Laws of Evidence—Several Times Defeated, but Finally Won—Career of Glenni W. Schofield—Coffee's Unfortunate Removal to Washington—Interesting Law Relating to Inheritance—The Married Woman's Act—Gibson's Blunt Reversal of Lewis' Poetic Decision—The Battle for Free Schools—Defeat of Ner Middleswerth for Signing the Bill as Speaker when He Earnestly Opposed and Voted Against It—The Free School System Vitalized and made Progressive under Curtin as Secretary of the Commonwealth.

AN important change in the common law relating to evidence was accomplished just before 1860, by which parties to suits could become witnesses in their own behalf, but under very severe restrictions. Prior to that time the old common law rule prevailed forbidding any person from testifying in his or her own case. The author of this important reform was Titian J. Coffee, then a senator from Indiana County, and one of the ablest lawyers of the State. He was a man of marked ability and a very accomplished trial lawyer. When he first entered the senate he introduced a measure proposing to liberalize the law of evidence, but he was not supported by a single lawyer in the body. He persisted in it, however, and pressed it with increased vigor during his second session, when he was supported by the venerable Senator Wilkins, of Allegheny, who had ripe experience as a lawyer, and had been United States Senator, Secretary of War and Minister to Russia. Coffee was finally enabled to carry through both branches of the Legislature a measure that

simply opened the door to the present broad and just extension of the principle that permits all suitors, or defendants in criminal cases, to testify in their own behalf, excepting only where the party of opposing interest is dead.

While serving in the house I had become intimately acquainted with Coffee and earnestly enlisted in support of his reform, and it would startle the profession of the present day to learn what formidable opposition had to be overcome to separate our system of evidence from the old common law restriction which often defeated justice. It was one of the bravest battles ever made in our Legislature, as Coffee stood almost alone when he began the struggle. Able lawyers like James P. Penny, of Allegheny, and Glenni W. Schofield, of Warren, had entered the senate after Coffee had blazed the way through the wilderness of legal prejudice, and came to his support along with Wilkins. They were all men of much more than ordinary ability in the legal profession.

Schofield had a remarkable political career. He was a delegate in the Democratic State convention in March, 1856, and voted for the nomination of Buchanan for President, but after the Cincinnati convention had nominated Buchanan and adopted a radical pro-slavery platform, Schofield bolted over to the support of Fremont, was nominated by the Republicans for senator and elected the same fall that Buchanan was chosen President. When he retired from the senate he was sent to Congress, where he served with distinction twelve years, and later served as a judge on the court of claims, a position that he held at his death. Penny was the law partner of the late Chief Justice Sterrett, and after Coffee had retired he was accepted during his entire term of service in the senate as the oracle of the body in solving legal

propositions. He was chairman of the commission that framed the new criminal code adopted early in the 60's, and I well remember when it was before the senate for consideration and final passage by its title, without being read in the body. Of course, it had been printed and examined by the lawyers of the senate, but if ever a question of doubt arose, the confidence in Penny was so general that his judgment was accepted.

Coffee would have had a greater career in Pennsylvania if he had not been unexpectedly diverted to Washington. When he retired from the senate he formed a partnership with ex-Representative Purviance to engage in the practice of law in Pittsburg, where he would certainly have been eminently successful as a lawyer. Coffee had studied law with Edward Bates, of Missouri, and when Bates was called to the Lincoln cabinet as Attorney General he tendered to Coffee the position of Assistant Attorney General, which he accepted. He thus gradually became severed from his political associations in Pennsylvania and lived for many years in retirement until his death at an advanced age. When Curtin accepted the Russian mission Coffee accompanied him as secretary, but beyond that he neither sought nor held any public position. I have always regarded his elimination from Pennsylvania politics as an equal misfortune to himself and to the State.

He was a man of stern integrity in public and private life and would certainly have stood in the forefront of the bar of Pennsylvania. He was one of the original and among the most effective supporters of Curtin's nomination for Governor in 1860, and would have been in the floodtide of political favor had he remained in the State. The fascination of Washington life has cut off many distinguished and useful

careers, and among them was that of Titian J. Coffee. He was a nephew of the original Judge White, of Indiana, father of the present Judge White, of that district, and was altogether the most potent political leader of that section of the State.

While Senator Coffee won out in breaking through the old common law relating to evidence, he did little more at first than to lay the foundation for our present beneficent system of evidence that gives the greatest possible latitude for the courts to ascertain the justice of the cause. Contrary to the general prejudice of the bar, the innovation met with very positive and popular approval, and it was not difficult to speedily perfect the system by gradual advancement in legislation until our present Pennsylvania system of evidence is as perfect in the interest of justice as it could be made.

Another measure that was at first very generally resisted by the profession, passed the Legislature about the same period after having been proposed and earnestly championed by the venerable Judge Wilkins and defeated in the first effort. A case in one of the western counties of the State attracted not only the attention of the profession, but was very generally discussed and gravely considered by intelligent laymen of the State. A man in reasonably well-to-do circumstances among the frugal rural citizens of that day was furnished a child by his wife only some four or five months after their marriage. The husband disowned the paternity and the wife confessed her perfidy and gave the name of the actual father. The husband was devotedly attached to his wife and finally decided to forgive the crime and accept the child as his own. He lived for many years and died, leaving a considerable estate, and a number of children survived him, including the first born.

The question was raised on the distribution of the

estate that the oldest child was not entitled to inherit. It was not disputed by any who were informed on the subject that the child was not begotten by the putative father. The only one able to establish the fact was the mother, and she was held by the court as an incompetent witness in the case. Justice Knox, of the supreme court, delivered a very powerful dissenting opinion, and the case was very generally discussed throughout the State, not only by the profession, but by the more intelligent public generally. Judge Wilkins became very warmly enlisted in the case of children born and reared under such circumstances, and after suffering several defeats he finally succeeded in passing a law that yet remains upon our statute books, providing that any child born in wedlock, regardless of the circumstances of birth, should inherit the estate of the husband, unless the illegitimacy was established by the husband himself by divorce or other definite legal proceedings, and it also legitimatizes the children born of any unmarried woman as the legal heirs of the person who may marry such a woman. Strong as was the opposition to the passage of this eminently just law, no effort has ever been made to repeal it, and it has long been universally accepted as entirely just.

The decade closing with 1860 brought many troubles into our jurisprudence arising from the first enactment of what was known as the married woman's act of 1848. That was the first effort of Pennsylvania authority to release women under coverture from the harsh and disgraceful limitations put upon the natural rights of the weaker sex. The subject of releasing married women from these limitations agitated the Legislature of the State for a number of years, but finally in 1848 a law was passed releasing wives from the oppressive obligations imposed by the common law, under which

William Wilkins

she had no control of her person, her property, her earnings or her children, save in extreme exceptional cases.

In 1851, three years after the passage of the married woman's act, a new supreme court was elected, and only two of the five members of the old court were chosen. Judge Lewis was one of the new justices, and he had made a very positive record in the common pleas court of Lancaster in supporting the rights of married women, having set aside the will of a resident who willed his entire estate, during life or widowhood, to his wife, when the estate should be distributed to the other heirs. The widow accepted under the law, but a few years thereafter changed her mind and again married, and the heirs proceeded to recover the estate, but Judge Lewis held the will to be in restraint of marriage and against public policy and therefore void. The supreme court reversed him by an opinion from Chief Justice Gibson, in language quite as pungent as Lewis' opinion was poetic. Judge Lewis' opinion, as it appears in the law reports, declared that all animated nature, from the mountain kalmia to the fructifying lily of the plain, obeyed the primeval command to increase and multiply, and the will was therefore void, and Chief Justice Gibson reversed Lewis with the rugged and incisive argument that a man should be permitted to give his whole estate to the support and comfort of his widow so long as she depended upon his estate, without making his bed a nest to hatch a brood of strangers to his blood.

Judge Lewis entered the supreme judicial tribunal of the State not only intensely interested in the rights of married women, but smarting under the rebuke administered to him by the court of last resort, and he very soon had a majority of the court in sympathy with his general views. The result was that for several

years thereafter married women were generally successful before the supreme court in battling for their rights under the act of 1848, and step by step the court had advanced in favor of married women, until finally Mrs. Ritter sued Mr. Ritter, her husband, in the Perry County court, for money had and received, and Judge Graham, a judge eminently learned in the law, while not sympathizing with the general tenor of the supreme court decisions, declared that he must sustain the action because the teaching of the supreme court imposed it upon him as a judicial duty. The case was appealed to the supreme court after Lewis had retired, and Chief Justice Woodward delivered the opinion of the court, not only reversing Judge Graham, but generally reversing the policy of the court as to married women's rights, and he declared the act of 1848 to be the result of the "mistaken philanthropy" of the Legislature.

Thus the married women of Pennsylvania had a long season of abject servility under the laws of Pennsylvania, followed by nearly a decade of extremely liberal rulings in their favor, and finally ending with the establishment of a rational and just policy, now well defined, that gives practical and substantial effect to all the reasonable rights of women under coverture.

Strange as it may seem in this enlightened age, with Pennsylvania enjoying the most liberal educational policy of any State of the Union, the free school system was originally simply a crude, crippled and in some localities very generally decried system of free education of the children of the State. It had been passed by Thaddeus Stevens a quarter of a century before, but the public sentiment of the State was so overwhelmingly against it in many counties that it was impossible to make it a homogeneous and beneficent system. The same year that the law was passed, the people of the State elected a Legislature that was openly

and positively averse to free schools, and a bill repealing the entire system had reached a position of final passage in the house, when Stevens, the author of the original bill, delivered the most effective speech of his life, and doubtless one of the ablest and most eloquent, as it literally made the house take pause and defeat its own openly proclaimed purpose. For many years thereafter, notably in the German counties of Berks, Lehigh and others, delegations were chosen to the Legislature on the distinct issue of "no free schools," and it was nearly or quite a generation after the passage of the original bill that the acceptance of the free schools of every district was made mandatory.

The law as first enacted authorized any township to accept the free school system by the vote of the majority at the spring elections and put it into operation, but in some sections of the State there were entire counties in which there was not a single accepting district. I well remember, when a small boy, the special interest taken by my father and other Scotch-Irish residents of the township to have the free school system accepted. They called election after election from year to year, but suffered defeats for a decade or more, as the Germans, as a rule, were bitterly opposed to enforced education. Although Governor Wolf, a distinct representative of the old German element of the State, with his home among the Germans of Northampton, had approved the school bill, a very small percentage of the Germans of the State supported it, and it cost him his re-election, as when he was nominated for a third term a large element of the Democrats bolted, nominated Muhlenberg, of Berks, as a second Democratic candidate, and thus divided the Democratic vote and elected Ritner Governor.

A more pointed illustration of the overwhelming prejudice of the Germans against the free school law

was given in the case of Ner Middleswerth. He was much the ablest of all the German leaders of the State and a political speaker of great ability, without any pretensions as to rhetorical attainments. He served more than twenty years in the senate and the house as a representative of Union County, then embracing the present county of Snyder; was speaker of the house several times, was the Whig candidate for canal commissioner when Johnston ran for Governor in 1851, was later elected to Congress and ended his public career at an advanced age as associate judge. Originally a Democrat, he revolutionized his county as an Anti-Masonic leader, and after the disruption of the party acted with the Whigs. He was speaker of the house when the free school bill was passed. His people were next to unanimous in their opposition to it and he took special pains to make his record as clear as possible. He took the floor and spoke against the bill and voted against it at every stage, but when the bill was passed it was his official duty as speaker of the house to sign the certificate of its passage by that body.

There were few newspapers among the people of that day, and especially among the Germans, and the constituents of Middleswerth generally understood that he had made very earnest opposition to the bill, with which they were entirely content, and he was unanimously nominated for election to another term without a visible ripple on the political surface. All went along smoothly until some time in midsummer, when the pamphlet laws were distributed. At that time the pamphlet laws were printed by the State in English and German and a copy was furnished to each justice of the peace in the language he preferred. In Union County the German copies of the laws reached the German justices of the peace and they were

astounded to find that Middleswerth's name was signed to the school law. The information created an immediate and sweeping revulsion in the county, and a cunning and unscrupulous man named Yeager announced himself as a candidate against Middleswerth on the ground that no man should be elected who had signed the free school law.

Middleswerth at first assumed that it was a mere tempest in a teapot and he went around among his people with the House Journal, showing that he had voted against the bill, but he could not show that he had spoken against it, as there was then no "Legislative Record." His competitor had immense mass meetings of the inflamed Germans to hear him, and he simply held up the Dutch pamphlet laws opened at where "Ner Middleswerth" was signed to the law. He declared that no man who was opposed to the free school law could have signed the measure as he did. It was impossible for Middleswerth to bring the tide to an ebb, and he was largely defeated, although he had made exhaustive efforts to defeat the school bill, but had simply performed a duty that was absolutely mandatory upon the speaker to certify the passage of the bill by the house. If he had called some person to the chair and announced him as acting speaker, to serve long enough to sign the bill in certification of its passage, he would have had no contest for re-election, but he had simply performed his duty, and he was compelled to suffer a year of humiliation and defeat that was accomplished by the persistent diffusion of falsehood among the people. Gradually they got to understand it and they gave Middleswerth his vindication by sending him back a year later and keeping him in legislative service until a score or more years had crowned him with legislative honors.

It was not until 1855, when Curtin became secretary

of the commonwealth under Governor Pollock, that any organized effort was made by the State government to extend and perfect the free school system of the State. There was then no department of education, and the school system was left in the hands of a clerk in Curtin's office. He summoned Henry C. Hickok, whose memory will ever be green among the friends of education in Pennsylvania, made him deputy secretary of the commonwealth and the head of the school system. Hickok devoted himself exclusively and tirelessly to the advancement of our schools, in which he was heartily supported alike by Governor Pollock and Secretary Curtin, and then for the first time the school system of the State was brought into something like organization. The popular prejudices against the free schools had been slowly dying out and increased appropriations were made from year to year until it was regarded as safe to win the crowning victory for free schools by making the acceptance of the system mandatory upon every d strict of the State. The approach to this grand consummation had been so gradual that it was finally effected without convulsion.

How the State has advanced in her exceptional educational system may be well understood by turning to the Constitution of 1874, only thirty years ago, in which will be found the provision that the appropriation for common schools shall thereafter not be less than $1,000,000 per annum. That was then regarded as a very liberal minimum for public education, but that command of the fundamental law was entirely needless, as is shown by the fact that at no time since the adoption of the Constitution did the Legislature accept the minimum, but always gave an increase from year to year, and it is now nearly or quite a decade since $5,000,000 a year has been the lowest appropriation made for the education of the children of the State. Penn-

sylvania was not among the earliest advocates of free schools, but while her people are slow to innovation or advancement, they can be safely entrusted with fidelity to the educational and philanthropic claims made upon the Commonwealth, and to-day she stands out grandly among all her sister States in these richest jewels of governmental authority.

XXXVI.

THE PRELIMINARY BATTLE OF 1860.

How the North and South Misunderstood Each Other—The Curtin-Cameron Feud—Interesting Episodes in Their Quarrel—Cameron Opposes Curtin for Governor—Curtin Opposes Cameron for President—Both Nominated by the Same Convention—Cameron Compelled to Restore Curtin Delegates He had Taken from Him—Intense Bitterness Between Curtin and Cameron Wings of the Party.

THE year 1860 came upon us pregnant with the most momentous events of the century. It dated the second great political revolution, and the third distinct epoch, in the history of the Republic. The Federal party came into power with Washington, and ruled during the twelve years of the two terms of Washington and one of the elder Adams, when Jefferson won the first substantial revolution in the politics of the nation. Jefferson's battle was against the illiberal Federal views, which demanded a government of centralized power, while Jefferson battled for government of the people. The policy established by the Jefferson revolution ruled the country for sixty years. All of the Presidents during that time were not distinctly Democratic, as Adams, who was elected by the House in 1825, although nominated as a member of the then existing Republican party that later became the Democratic party, was drifting away from his old political affiliations and made an entirely independent administration. The two Whig Presidents—Harrison, elected in 1840, and Taylor, in 1848—brought no material reversal of the general Democratic policy established by Jefferson in

Alexander Henry

١

1800, that gave us the acquisition of Louisiana and all our Pacific and Southern extension of territory; but 1860 brought a revolution that ended the Democratic party as a ruling power of the nation. Two Democratic Presidents have been elected since 1860, but, even with the strong personality of Cleveland in the Executive chair during two terms, no permanent change was made in the policy of the government.

A decided political revolution was generally expected in 1860, but none then dreamed that it would mean anything more than merely halting the extension of the slave power, and liberalizing the policy of the government in the support of free industries against the slave labor of the South. Had it been generally believed in 1860 that the election of Lincoln would bring the bloodiest civil war of modern times, and the sudden and complete overthrow of slavery at the point of the bayonet, it is doubtful whether the popular vote of the country would have invited such an appalling entertainment. The sectional feeling was greatly intensified by the earnest and constantly growing agitation that began with the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854 and had continued to convulse the country by the desperate struggles over Kansas, with the battle for a free State then unsettled. The North believed that the South was more bombastic than earnest in the threat of provoking civil war for the protection of slavery, and the South believed that the Northern people were mere money-getters, ready to yield anything rather than accept fratricidal conflict.

Had the North and the South justly understood each other, as they should have done when remembering the common heroism exhibited by Northern and Southern soldiers on every battlefield, there would have been no civil war. It was common in those

days to hear demagogues on the stump in the North declare that, in the event of secession, the women of the North would sweep away the bombastic South with their brooms, and like demagogues of the South told how, in the event of civil war, they would march to Boston and command their obedient slaves on Bunker Hill. How it was possible for the bravest and noblest people of the world thus to misunderstand each other merely because of irritating sectional divisions, must be incomprehensible to any intelligent student of the present day. The people of the North and the South were of the same blood; they had the same proud traditions; their herosim and their grandeur in field and forum had been established side by side in every triumph, and only the madness of the fiercest passion could have made either section assume that cowardice could be an attribute of the American people, North or South. The most fearful atonement was made for this strange misunderstanding of each other, and there is nothing in Grecian or Roman story that equals the heroism of the soldiers of the blue and the gray in four years of bloodiest conflict.

The second victory of the opposition to democracy in Pennsylvania was achieved in the fall of 1859, and it was notice to all that Pennsylvania was debatable ground for the great battle of 1860, with chances largely in favor of another defeat for the Democracy. So earnest were the people in forcing the unity of political action by the various elements which were not in hearty sympathy with each other, that the leaders who were ambitious for promotion by the success of the new organization were compelled to avoid disturbing the unity of the opposition forces by individual ambition, but as soon as the election of 1859 had reached a decided opposition victory, a host of candidates were suddenly sprung upon the

new People's party for the office of Governor and United States Senator.

Curtin and Cameron had become implacably estranged in their desperate contest for the Senatorship in 1855, and from that time until the close of their political careers they never met or exchanged the ordinary courtesies of life except on ceremonial occasions. They became intensely embittered against each other in the three months' struggle for the Senatorship five years before, and reconciliation, or even the restoration of the ordinary civilities of life, was made impossible by a personal reproach put upon Curtin by Cameron when he had several of his political friends about him in a convivial mood, during the heat of the Senatorial struggle. The only time that I ever knew Curtin and Cameron to meet in conference was the morning after Sumter had surrendered, when Curtin with myself, as chairman of the military committee of the senate, was summoned hastily to Washington to confer with the President, the Secretary of War and General Scott as to the action necessary for Pennsylvania to take to meet the civil war that had been forced upon us.

In the raising and furnishing of troops in Pennsylvania many serious differences arose between Governor Curtin and Secretary Cameron, as both were probably inclined to judge the actions of each other harshly. When such disputes became serious, Lincoln invariably summoned me to Washington to confer with Cameron and himself on the subject, and in every instance the difficulties were adjusted and accepted by both Cameron and Curtin. My relations with Cameron were always personally pleasant, and while he was very earnestly opposed to me politically as a close and ardent friend of Curtin, he had confidence that I would always fulfill any obligations which I

assumed. Cameron embarrassed Curtin very seriously on several occasions by giving special authority to favorites to raise regiments in Pennsylvania. Armed with the authority of the War Department, with all necessary expenses paid, the prospective colonel would locate in Philadelphia, or some section of the State, to raise a regiment, and as a rule they did not make much progress. Indeed, some of them were not in haste to fill their regiment and get into the field, as they were enjoying a good time and were well paid while on recruiting duty. A number of such embryo regiments were located in different parts of Pennsylvania when a requisition was made upon the State for additional troops, and Curtin, always prompt in response to the call of the government, at once declared his purpose to consolidate the various embryo regiments, appoint the officers and make them part of the quota.

In this Curtin was entirely warranted by the Constitution and the laws, as his right was absolute to appoint the officers of regiments. He communicated with the Secretary of War, officially announcing his right and his duty and asking the Secretary to issue his order to the recruiting colonels he had authorized, to consolidate their regiments under the direction of the Governor, but Cameron promptly and positively refused. Curtin and Attorney General Meredith went over the case very carefully, resulting in Meredith drawing an order to be signed by the Secretary of War, directing the consolidation of the regiments under the authority of the Governor, and I was requested to take the order to Cameron, then visiting his home at Lochiel, and explain why his signature was a necessity. Assuming that he would promptly refuse to sign the order, Mr. Meredith prepared for Curtin a letter to the President, stating the

Governor's right under the Constitution and the laws of the State, and demanding that they should be respected by the National government, as it was the only way in which he could be relieved of painful embarrassment and grave obstacles in filling the quota of the State. My instructions were to present the order to Cameron at his home, and if he refused to sign it to take a train that night to Washington and present the letter and order to the President.

I reached Cameron's home in the evening some time after dark, and, as usual, was received with courtesy. I presented the order to him, and before he had time to read it, I explained the Governor's rights, which Cameron doubtless knew, and urged him to harmonize the effort to fill our quota by signing the order. He read it carefully and deliberated for some time, when he finally answered that he would refuse to sign the order. He insisted that he was trying to aid the Governor in furnishing troops from Pennsylvania, and that to sign the order would be to confess that he had exceeded his authority in a manner injurious to the service, by granting permission to various persons to organize regiments. He gave his answer very courteously and expressed his regret that there should be any difficulty between the State Executive and the War Department in such a crisis.

I took the order, placed it in my pocket, and, while putting on my overcoat, I remarked that I regretted his refusal to sign the paper, not only because it opened an unpleasant issue between him and the Governor, but because I was compelled to proceed to Washington that night to deliver the order and a letter in my possession to the President, explaining the situation and demanding the revocation of the Secretary's order as a matter of right to the Governor.

Cameron evidently knew that a letter from Curtin

to Lincoln defining the Governor's rights and duties which were absolutely undisputed could have but one result. He asked me to sit down and talk the matter over. We had a very earnest, frank, but always kind and courteous discussion of the question for some time. I told Cameron that the President could do no less than direct him to issue the order, and it would make public a political scandal that would weaken the power of the State in furnishing troops, and I appealed to him not only for his own sake, but for the interests of the State, to end the dispute there by signing the order. He asked me to give it to him again, and when I did so he signed it promptly without any exhibition of unkindness toward Curtin or any others, and handed it back to me. This act of Cameron removed a multitude of troubles which had grown up in the State in organizing and furnishing troops. The dispute between the Governor and the Secretary of War had been wisely withheld from the public, and the order of the Secretary directing the consolidation of the various embryo regiments was made public by the Governor as though it were the voluntary act of the War Department, and thereafter no attempt was made to encroach upon the prerogatives of the State Executive.

Curtin was the logical candidate for Governor of the opposition that was united under the People's party flag. He was known as altogether the most effective popular campaigner in the State, and he had exhibited great administrative ability as secretary of the commonwealth under Pollock, especially in the advancement of our free school system. He was a man of the most genial and fascinating manners, and was the special favorite of the younger element of the party. Cameron was intensely hostile to him, and saw that unless he played a bold hand with reasonable

success, Curtin would be nominated and elected as Governor and be strongly entrenched in the citadel of power of the new political organization. While, as a rule, the followers of Cameron and Curtin shared the prejudices of the chiefs, there were a number of men, and some of them quite prominent in political power, who supported Curtin for Governor as the most available of the candidates presented, but who were personally and politically friendly to Cameron as well. They were ready to serve Cameron in any movement for his own advancement, but unwilling to desert Curtin in doing so.

Cameron was one of the most sagacious political leaders of his day, and was heroic in effort when he had decided upon his plan of operation. He knew that he could not be nominated for President, as in the political conditions then existing he was simply an impossible candidate, but as he would be without a competitor for the Presidency in Pennsylvania, he decided to make an aggressive battle ostensibly for the Presidential nomination. He was formally announced as a candidate for the Presidency by his friends, and a very active campaign made to secure his endorsement by the State convention that was to nominate a candidate for Governor. It was a masterly movement on the part of Cameron, regardless of its utter hopelessness. It gave him a strong position in which to wield his power against the nomination of Curtin, and it would also give him special prominence for cabinet or other National honors if the Republicans elected the President. The Cameron campaign was pressed as Cameron always pressed his battles, persistently and methodically, and some time before the convention met it was generally conceded that Cameron would receive a decided majority in the convention for President, and that Curtin would be

nominated for Governor. In point of fact, in a convention of 133 members, Cameron had about eighty who were ready to support him for President, and Curtin had about a like number who were ready to support him for Governor, and yet Cameron and Curtin both played to the limit in hostility to each other.

There were two prominent competitors of Curtin in the contest for Governor. They were John Covode, of Westmoreland, and David Taggart, of Northumberland. Cameron shrewdly planned to divide the party as much as possible by multiplying candidates for Governor, and Covode and Taggart were regarded as the two men, one of whom would ultimately be chosen, on whom to unite the opposition to Curtin. Thomas M. Howe, a highly respected Congressman from Allegheny, was brought into the field to divert the strength of Curtin, as was Levi Kline, of Lebanon, but the man upon whom Cameron intended ultimately to unite the opposition forces was Covode, and he was altogether the strongest of the opposing candidates.

Covode attained great distinction as a political leader. He was a man of rare sagacity, strong natural intellectual force, with little culture and rather inclined to take pride in his crude ways and expressions. He was elected to Congress in the Westmoreland Democratic district by the Know Nothing whirl of 1854, and early became a very aggressive leader in opposition to the slave power that was seeking to force slavery into Kansas and Nebraska; was elected to his fourth consecutive term in the popular branch of Congress, and he was chairman of the committee that went to Kansas and investigated the efforts that had been made to overthrow the rule of the bona fide residents. He was an expert in knowing how to develop all the bad political phases of the movement against free Kansas, and with a man of Repre-

sentative Howard's ability and accomplishments to write a report, Covode's presentation of the wrongs of Kansas became the political text-book of the Republican party. He was a man of tireless energy, clean personal record, a master student of human nature and was one of the most skillful of all our prominent men in managing a campaign for himself. He retired from Congress in 1863, but did not abate his interest in politics. He was sent south by President Johnson in 1865 to aid in Johnson's reconstruction, but Covode soon rebelled against it and retired. He was renominated for Congress in 1868 and was elected, and in 1870 made his final political battle for Congress against Henry D. Foster, the ablest Democrat of the district, and was successful.

Covode was a man of liberal means, a most tireless worker, personally popular, and Cameron confidently counted upon his ability to give Covode sufficient support in the State convention to nominate him for Governor. Taggart had been elected to the State senate in 1854 in the Northumberland and Dauphin district, but bitterly opposed Cameron's election to the Senate in 1855. Cameron resented this opposition of his own immediate senator by severely retaliating upon Taggart and his family, taking from them the control of the Northumberland Bank that gave a livelihood to Taggart's father and increased his own revenues as attorney for the bank.

A few years later Taggart decided that Cameron was a dangerous enemy, and they reconciled their differences upon terms which Taggart confidently believed would bring Cameron to his support for Governor. He did not assume that Cameron was pledged to support him, but he did not doubt that he would be the Cameron candidate in the end. He lacked the strength and some important personal

qualities possessed by Covode, and Cameron in the end logically concentrated his strength in the strongest candidate, and had Cameron not been caught by Curtin's friends in the convention in a position much like that of Hooker's bull, who was fast on the fence and could neither hock in front nor kick behind, it is quite possible that Covode would have been nominated.

There were fully eighty men in the convention who were positively pledged or instructed for Curtin and sixty-seven were a majority, but by the time the convention met the friends of Curtin discovered that half a dozen or more of the men positively pledged to support him had been switched off to Covode, and among them Colonel Gehr, my fellow-delegate from Franklin, who was one of the very few known Cameron men in that section, and whose election I had aided to accomplish simply to demonstrate that Cameron's friends would not be ostracised. He was sincerely for Curtin and positively pledged to him, but I learned the night before the convention met that he was pledged to support Covode, as were McConkey, of York, and Haines, of Perry, two additional Cameron delegates, who were pledged to Curtin and elected for the same reason that had given me a Cameron associate from Franklin. Nearly the whole of the night before the meeting of the convention was devoted by Curtin's friends to getting his stragglers into line, but when the convention met the next day we were in grave doubt as to our ability to hold a majority for Curtin.

Fortunately Cameron pressed his nomination for the Presidency as the first duty of the body. It was an unusually able assembly with Governor Pollock in the chair, and such able anti-Cameron representatives as Tom Marshall, of Allegheny, and District

Attorney Mann, of Philadelphia, while Schofield, of Warren, a man of unusual ability, championed the Cameron cause and stood with heroic fidelity in support of Curtin. A resolution was offered nominating General Cameron for the Presidency, and instructing the delegates-at-large to support him in the national convention. No other name was presented, and the delegates were compelled to vote directly for or against conferring the honor upon Cameron. Protracted and somewhat acrimonious debate was had upon the resolution, in which Tom Marshall, one of the ablest and most fearless of the Western Republicans, denounced Cameron unsparingly as a Presidential candidate, and declared that he could go out any dark night and grab fifty men who were better fitted for the position than Cameron.

Schofield ably supported Cameron, and sought to pour oil on the troubled waters, while Senator Mumma, who represented Cameron's home county, took the laboring oar of managing the Cameron side and defended his cause with great earnestness. When the vote was finally taken, forty-four of us voted squarely against the adoption of the resolution, and about eighty voted for Cameron, with a few who did not respond.

Cameron shrewdly sought to temper the opposition somewhat by proposing David Wilmot and Thaddeus Stevens, neither of whom was for Cameron, as two of the four delegates-at-large. He relied upon them obeying their instructions, which they did, but neither attempted to advance Cameron's nomination at Chicago. The question then arose as to how the district delegates should be chosen. As Cameron was weak with the Republican people in the State, I made a blind stroke to call him to a halt on the Curtin issue by offering a resolution providing that the district

delegates should be chosen by the people of their respective districts and not by the convention, and to my surprise, after I had spoken briefly in support of the motion, Mumma followed with a motion to adjourn until the next morning. Although coming from a Cameron leader, I was very glad to accept it, and the convention adjourned, neither side knowing precisely where it stood, and the Curtin men did not know how weak the Cameron men were on the question of selecting a Cameron delegation by the convention.

Very early in the evening Alexander Cummings, then editor of the Philadelphia "Evening Bulletin," and ex-Senator Haldeman, of York, both very earnest Cameron men, sent for me to meet them in a private room in the same hotel where I was staying. I joined them at once, and they informed me that they had come to effect a compromise on the question of electing the district delegates to the National convention. I asked them why they did not defeat my resolution that was still pending before the convention, and they frankly informed me that they had not done so because they had not votes enough. They said:—

"You want Curtin for Governor, we want Cameron for President, and we are here, with the knowledge and by the advice of Cameron himself, to adjust the difficulty on the basis of giving Curtin the nomination for Governor."

I told them that as they had come from Cameron I certainly must confer with Curtin before I could propose to accept any definite proposition, and we adjourned for an hour. I immediately hastened to Curtin's room, locked the door, told him of the situation and asked him to go over the list of delegates and ascertain how many men we had who could be relied upon under all circumstances to support him. We found the names of sixty-five on the list who

could be relied upon to stand by Curtin, and I proposed that the negotiations with Cameron's representatives should require them to return to us ten delegates who had been elected for Curtin, but who had been taken from us by Cameron. I suggested to Curtin, as a compromise proposition, that I should agree to modify my resolution to authorize the delegates in the convention from any congressional district to decide for themselves whether they would name delegates to be chosen by the convention, or whether they would refer the choice of district delegates back to the people, to which Curtin agreed.

I met Cummings and Hallman soon thereafter and gave them my ultimatum, viz., first, that they should return to Curtin ten delegates originally chosen for him, each of whom I named, who must come to Curtin personally and pledge their support to him, and that if that were done at once I would move to modify my resolution as Curtin had agreed to it. I named among the delegates to be returned to Curtin my own associate and others, who, like him, had been honestly committed to Curtin, but were taken from him by the power of Cameron. They were quite willing to give us the ten delegates or even more, as they meant the adjustment to involve the nomination of Curtin, but begged to be excused from compelling the men they had taken from us to return to their allegiance to Curtin. I peremptorily refused, and they finally assented, and every one of the delegates named came in person and pledged himself to Curtin before midnight.

They accepted the other proposition very willingly as to the district delegates, but insisted that I should give the example of electing the delegates from my own district. It would have been difficult then to find two men in my district fitted for the position of

National delegate who were friendly to Cameron, but I finally agreed to elect delegates and to send two men of high position, neither of whom was friendly to Cameron, but whom I pledged to vote with the delegation.

It is quite possible that Curtin might have been defeated, but for this halt in the Cameron programme that enabled Curtin's friends to make reprisals. When the convention met the next morning Judge Hale, of Bellefonte, Curtin's immediate representative, offered a compromise resolution as an amendment to mine, as had been arranged, and it was promptly accepted by Mr. Mumma and myself and unanimously adopted. Curtin's nomination followed on the second ballot when he received seventy-four votes to twenty-seven for Covode, sixteen for Taggart, ten for Howe and a dozen scattering. Such is the story of the inner history of Curtin's nomination for Governor.

XXXVII.

CAMERON'S STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP.

The Author made Chairman of the People's State Committee—Rhode Island and Philadelphia Falter at the Opening of the Battle—How Lincoln was Nominated at Chicago—Curtin and Lane the Important Factors in Defeating Seward—Pennsylvania Delegation a motley Combination—The Vote for President in the Convention—Sanderson's Contract with Davis for a Cabinet Position for Cameron—Cameron's Efforts to Control the State Committee over its Chairman Defeated at Cresson.

THE People's State convention of 1860 adjourned after embittered struggles on the nominations for both President and Governor and presented candidates for those important offices who were not only not in sympathy with each other, but actually not on speaking terms; and while the majority of the supporters of Curtin were resolutely determined not to aid the nomination of Cameron for President, Cameron and his closer friends earnestly hoped for and confidently expected the defeat of Curtin. The National conventions of the great parties were two months distant; the disruption of the Democratic party, with two Presidential candidates, was not then anticipated, and the apparently assured nomination of Seward by the Republicans would have made Curtin's election next to impossible by alienating the entire Know Nothing or American element from the People's organization.

While upon the surface there was apparently a strong tide against the Democracy, all who intelligently understood the situation well knew that very great, and possibly insuperable, obstacles stood in the way of the

success of the opposition to Democracy, but half a dozen prominent men in the People's party became candidates for the position of chairman of the State committee. The fact that a man desired the position was very strong evidence against his fitness for it, as it involved a task that no one who well understood the situation and the labor and responsibilities to be assumed would have sought. I was then still cherishing the hope that after the Curtin contest I could escape exacting political duties and devote myself to my long neglected profession, and went home from the convention without any knowledge whatever that I was to be charged with the responsible management of the campaign. Curtin had spoken to me on the subject after the convention adjourned. He named the men who were pressing for the place, and in an apparently casual way asked me whether I would accept it, to which I gave a peremptory refusal.

I heard nothing further on the subject until some two weeks later, when I received notice from Curtin that, after very careful consideration of the subject with Governor Pollock, who was president of the convention, and had the power of appointing, I had been selected as chairman of the People's State committee and must accept. I answered by an appeal to Curtin to change the selection of chairman before any public announcement was made, but he informed me that the complications and necessities were such that a change could not be considered and that I must accept the responsible direction of the contest.

Cameron had made an earnest effort to have a Cameron-Curtin man placed at the head of the organization and, although Pollock was in that class himself, he assumed that as Curtin was to fight the great battle of Pennsylvania his wishes should prevail in choosing the chairman.

Until then I had given little attention to the personnel of the State committee that had been selected by the senatorial delegations in the State convention, and when I came to a careful analysis of it I discovered that a majority of the members were followers of Cameron, who could be relied upon to co-operate with me in advancing Curtin's interests only to whatever extent Cameron approved. Viewing the general situation on both sides, I saw nothing but perplexity and threatening perils, but my relations with Curtin compelled me to accept the task with its consequences.

Two important preliminary elections were to be held before the meeting of the National convention. One was the State election in Rhode Island to be held in April, and the other was the municipal election in Philadelphia to be held in May, and both were regarded as important finger-boards in the National contest. I immediately got into communication with Governor Morgan, of New York, who was chairman of the Republican National committee appointed in the Fremont campaign; the importance of the Rhode Island election was carefully considered and he gave me the assurance that the Republican organization there would be cordially aided to any extent necessary to assure success, but Sprague, the richest man in the State, who had accepted the Democratic nomination for Governor, flooded the State with money, and the first gun of the Lincoln campaign of 1860 gave us the shock of a Democratic victory in a Republican State, thus adding to the many clouds which hung over the Republican horizon.

I then devoted myself to the Philadelphia contest for mayor. Henry was a candidate for re-election, opposed by ex-Congressman Robbins, with the Democrats thoroughly united and very earnest in the effort to win control of the city. I had little knowledge of

the inner workings of Philadelphia politics, but soon learned some features of political warfare which I would be glad never to have known, and they came about equally from the worst elements of the Democracy under the lead of McMullen, and the worst elements of the People's party under the lead of Commissioner Neal. The only thing that I could assume to know about the Philadelphia contest, after getting a fair insight into it, was that no matter who was returned elected by any moderate majority I could never be sure as to who had really won in the fight.

Mayor Henry, who is now very justly regarded as the model chief magistrate of Philadelphia, maintained the most consistent dignity throughout the contest and refused to permit his police to perform any political duty beyond voting. His chief of police was very liberal in his construction of the mayor's orders, and the police in a very quiet way rendered very important aid.

On election night I was one of the very few who were admitted into the police electrical bureau, where the returns were received long before the public obtained them, and a complete return gave a majority of some 1,500 for Robbins. I quietly retired to my room in the Girard House, supposing that another disaster had come upon us, but I was awakened about three o'clock in the morning by Colonel Mann and several others, who informed me that the official returns elected the entire Curtin city ticket, and the papers of the morning after the election all gave a majority of over 1,200 for Mayor Henry, with the rest of the ticket in doubt.

On Friday when the return judges met to compute the vote the People's candidates all received certificates of election. The Democrats charged fraud, but no attempt was made to contest and I have never doubted that Mayor Henry was honestly re-elected, but I have

never been entirely certain that the honest computation of the vote as it was found in the ballot-boxes would have given him a majority. He never knew of the original computation of the vote at the police headquarters, and had he ever been in doubt as to the integrity of his election he would not have held the position for an hour.

Such was the unpromising opening of the campaign of 1860, with a party that was not at all homogeneous, the two candidates of the party in the State implacable foes, the Republican State of Rhode Island lost, and the important city of Philadelphia practically a drawn battle. The party whose battle I was to direct was without cohesive organization, and was made up of a loose aggregation of old line Whigs, radical Republicans, Americans or Know Nothings and anti-slavery Democrats, and I abandoned all attempt at organization until after the June National convention should name the candidates for President and Vice-President and give us a starting point.

The first rift in the lute of Seward's omnipotence was given by Horace Greeley, who startled most of his readers and the Republicans generally throughout the country by a series of articles presenting Seward's want of availability, and urging the nomination of Edward Bates, of Missouri, as the Republican candidate for President. The New York "Tribune" was then the most potential newspaper of the country, and exercised a greater influence than any other paper that has ever been established in the history of our Republic.

It was not then known that Greeley had a personal grievance with Seward, and there was not the semblance of grievance in any of his editorials. They gave Seward full credit for his pre-eminent ability and leadership, but declared that he was unavailable,

as he could not command the support of the conservative Whigs nor the Americans who were potent in the pivotal States. That was the first ray of hope that broke in upon the gloom that enveloped us in this State, as the nomination of Seward would have precipitated the immediate and aggressive rebellion of all the Americans, without whose support it was not possible for us to succeed.

Lincoln was not then regarded as a hopeful candidate for President. Indeed, when his own State gave him a unanimous nomination for the Presidency they had little hope of his success. Nearly one-half of the delegates chosen were positive friends of Seward, who were expected to give one or more complimentary votes for Lincoln and then transfer their votes to Seward. The Republican leaders of the State did not appreciate the earnestness of the Republican people in support of Lincoln for President until the State convention met, and the climax of the expressions in favor of Lincoln was given when Hanks, who had made rails with Lincoln, came into the convention bearing upon his shoulders two rails which he had taken from a fence made of rails split by Lincoln and himself. There was a spontaneous uprising of the Republican people after the convention adjourned that encouraged the leaders to take a positive stand in favor of his nomination. Until that time the most that they expected was that Lincoln would be taken for Vice-President along with Seward.

In the meantime Curtin and I were in active correspondence with Henry S. Lane, who had been nominated as the Republican candidate for Governor in Indiana, and Representative John D. Defrees, who was chairman of the Indiana State committee. Curtin and Lane had to run the political gauntlet at the October election, and upon their election depended the success

of a Republican President. Lane and Defrees with Curtin and myself knew that if Seward were nominated, Pennsylvania and Indiana must inevitably be lost in October, and it was the positive convictions of Lane and Curtin expressed at the Chicago convention that made Seward's nomination impossible in a convention in which fully two-thirds of its members sincerely desired to make him the candidate for President.

They were the two men of all whose judgment could be accepted as most considerate and intelligent in shaping the way to victory. Neither of them cared to serve friends or punish foes in the Presidential nomination; all that they desired was that a candidate should be nominated who would strengthen, or at least not weaken, them in their battle for the control of their respective States, where victory for them meant victory for a Republican President.

The Pennsylvania delegation was a motley combination chiefly of Cameron-Curtin men and Curtin-Cameron men, embracing many who were earnestly opposed to Cameron, and a less number who felt quite willing to see Curtin defeated. About one-fourth of the delegates were earnestly in the fight for Cameron's nomination, another fourth were willing to accept Cameron's nomination with more or less doubts as to the wisdom of making it, and the other half, with two or three exceptions, were willing to give a complimentary vote to Cameron provided his nomination was not possible. All, however, desired to avoid factional contests in the delegation because of its possible effect on the State contest for Governor. The delegation had repeated conferences after its arrival at Chicago, in all of which Curtin and I were invited to participate without voting. After a day and night of struggle between the belligerents of the delegation, both maneuvering for advantage of posi-

tion, it was evident to all that Cameron's nomination was not within the range of possibility, and with the consent of the leaders of both sides the delegation was summoned to decide who among the available candidates should be preferred.

The Indiana delegation had held a conference at which Lane and Defrees were present, and unanimously resolved to support Lincoln. This had been done before the final conference of the Pennsylvania delegation.

Before the meeting of the Pennsylvania delegates the anti-Cameron men had a conference and decided to propose to the delegation that its first, second and third choice for President should be declared. The first choice should be Cameron by a unanimous vote, second choice should be Judge McLean, of Ohio, who was very earnestly championed by Stevens, but who was no more possible than Cameron, and the third choice, being the only choice of moment, to be Lincoln.

When the delegation met this proposition was made and by consent Cameron was declared the first choice and McLean the second, but on the third choice the Cameron leaders decided to urge the selection of Bates, and Lincoln was declared the third choice of the delegation over Bates by about six majority. Every one understood that the third choice of Pennsylvania was the only one that would command any interest outside of the delegation, and when it was announced that Pennsylvania had declared in favor of Lincoln, many thousands of Lincoln's followers who crowded Chicago made the streets echo with the cheers that followed the announcement that Pennsylvania was for Lincoln, and that action of the delegation decided the nomination of Abraham Lincoln for President.

On the first ballot Cameron received a total vote of

50½, of which 47½ were given by Pennsylvania, with 1 from Virginia, 1 from Iowa, and 1 from Nebraska. The Lincoln feeling had been steadily growing, and 4 of the Pennsylvania delegation broke to Lincoln on the first ballot with 1½ to Seward and 1 for McLean.

On the second ballot Pennsylvania gave 48 votes for Lincoln, with 2½ for Seward, 1 for Cameron and 2½ for McLean, Cameron receiving only 2 votes, viz., 1 from Pennsylvania and 1 from Virginia.

On the third ballot Pennsylvania gave 52 votes to Lincoln and 2 for McLean, Cameron's name having been withdrawn. The vote on this ballot showed that Lincoln lacked only 2½ votes of a majority, and before the ballot ended Chairman Carter, of the Ohio delegation, arose and announced the change of 4 Ohio votes from Chase to Lincoln, which gave him the required majority.

One of the many phases of political dickering developed in and around the Pennsylvania delegation was a shrewd movement made by John P. Sanderson, formerly senator from Lebanon, and later prominent as editor of the "Daily News," of Philadelphia. He was one of Cameron's confidential leaders, and as soon as the Pennsylvania delegation decided to accept Lincoln as third choice, that really meant its first choice, Sanderson obtained a conference with Leonard Swett and David Davis, who were the chief Lincoln managers of the convention, and proposed that Cameron should have the assurance of an appointment to the cabinet if the Pennsylvania delegation voted for Lincoln and Lincoln should be elected President.

This proposition was made by Sanderson at a time when there seemed to be a reasonable hope of Lincoln's nomination, and yet his battle was regarded as desperate, and they gave Sanderson the assurance that his demand was accepted and would be carried out. Lin-

coln had no knowledge of this agreement until he came to make up his cabinet before starting for Washington to be inaugurated, and he was not advised of it even at the time that he sent for Cameron to go to Springfield and there gave him a written tender of a position in the cabinet, either as Secretary of the Treasury or Secretary of War.

When it became known that Cameron had been tendered a position in the cabinet I was one of a number to telegraph Lincoln protesting against it, and Lincoln telegraphed me to come to Springfield at once. I did so, and had my first meeting with him, but left without any knowledge as to the effect of my protest. Upon referring to Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Lincoln," however, the correspondence between Lincoln and Cameron is given, showing that that night, after I had gone, Lincoln wrote Cameron revoking the appointment and asking Cameron's declination, which Cameron refused to give. The matter was held under advisement until Lincoln came to Washington, when Davis and Swett came to the support of Cameron on the ground that the promise had been given and should be fulfilled. Cameron was originally called to the cabinet by the President because he had decided to call to his cabinet every prominent competitor for the Presidential nomination, embracing Seward, Cameron, Chase and Bates. Seward also joined in pressing Cameron's appointment chiefly to punish Curtin for having defeated Seward's nomination at Chicago.

Cameron's friends returned from the Chicago convention not greatly disappointed because they had no expectation of his nomination, and they felt assured that if Lincoln should be elected, Cameron, who was then in the Senate and potent as a Senator, was likely to be more potent as a Cabinet officer. There was really no dissatisfaction among the Cameron men in

the support of Lincoln, but their hostility to Curtin, while somewhat tempered by new conditions, was very far from being obliterated.

What Cameron most needed to serve his purposes was the control of the State organization, and my position as chairman was anything but satisfactory to him and his friends. They knew that they had the control of the State committee, and they quietly arranged that at the first meeting of the committee they should assert their omnipotence by appointing an executive committee from the State committee to be practically charged with the control of the campaign, and a treasurer. This purpose was carefully mapped out, and would have been carried into effect and given them the absolute control of the State organization, leaving me merely an ornamental chairman, had not their plans miscarried by a roystering frolic at Cresson where the committee met, that was as carefully planned as were the designs of the Cameron people.

Every friend of Curtin was there, and every one of the opposition was present also the evening before the committee was to meet, the hour being ten o'clock on the following morning. Every Curtin man had been sworn to keep sober, but to join in the general frolic that night at Dr. Jackson's old hospital building, a little distance from the hotel. The programme was carried out with great precision, many of the Curtin men joined in the frolic, and the place overflowed with wine, with a dozen card tables adding to the interest of the entertainment. The result was that just about daylight they broke up to go to bed, but the Curtin men slept in their boots, and at ten o'clock every one of them responded to the roll-call, while more than a score of the others were missing.

Curtin was present and had carefully mapped out his campaign in the State. We had several innocent

resolutions ready declaring in favor of a thorough canvass of the State by Curtin, indorsing Lincoln and promising him the electoral vote, and denouncing the LeCompton policy of the Buchanan administration. Curtin's program was submitted and promptly approved; the resolutions were submitted and promptly passed, and after a session not exceeding fifteen minutes in duration, on motion the committee adjourned to meet at the call of the chairman, and it never occurred to the chairman that another meeting of the committee was necessary.

Many very earnest appeals were made to the chairman by members of the committee to call another meeting at different stages of the contest, but they never impressed the chairman with the necessity of obedience, and as by the vote of the committee it could meet only at the call of the chairman, the chairman conducted its operations without further disturbance.

Failing to get a meeting of the committee, a number of the members, including Cameron himself, advised Lincoln that the action of the chairman was very arbitrary, and that the organization of the State was not being perfected as it should be. This very naturally alarmed Lincoln. He was in frequent communication with me from the time the committee opened its headquarters until the election, but he gave no indication to me at any time that anything should be done other than what was being done. Some time after midsummer Leonard Swett and David Davis came to my headquarters as though they were simply calling to know how things were going generally, and everything that we were doing was at once opened to them, showing what had been done, what was planned to be done, and how it was to be done.

We had no money, but, fortunately, had earnest

people in every election district who were willing to perform the political service without pay, and the committee was in direct communication with thoroughly competent and prompt and reliable men in every election district in the State, the first time that such an organization had been effected, and after having made a very exhaustive examination of the plan of the campaign and what had been done, they invited me to dine with them. I accepted, and while at dinner Swett said:

"We can now tell you what we are here for."

He then informed me that Lincoln had been written to by a number of people in the State complaining that the organization was imperfect and the management incompetent; that he could not be indifferent to such statements, and that he had sent them to make a personal examination of the condition. To which Swett added:

"We can give you the information now, as we shall report to Lincoln that it is the best organization that we have seen in any State."

Lincoln's letters were much brighter in tone thereafter than before, and when I sent him the last count that was made of the State, carefully canvassed by faithful men in each election district, showing that Curtin's majority would be 17,000, regardless of doubtful votes, he wrote me that he was entirely satisfied that the victory was won in the pivotal State of the battle. The estimate was generously fulfilled, as Curtin's majority was over 32,000.

XXXVIII.

CAMPAIGN METHODS IN 1860.

Difficulty of Obtaining Lincoln Headquarters in Philadelphia — Business Men Could not Allow a Lincoln Flag to be Attached to their Buildings —Financial and Business Interests Against Lincoln—Dr. Jayne's Generosity—Commissioner Neal's Novel Method of Getting Out a Flag — Organizing Discordant Elements an Appalling Task — Entire Expenditures of State Committee $12,000—Seward Men and National Committee Refuse Aid to Pennsylvania—The Know Nothing Break Against Curtin—How $2,000 had to be Obtained for the Campaign.

LINCOLN was nominated on the 18th of May, and I hurried home from the Chicago convention to devote a little time to business and professional affairs, as I knew that from the first of June until the election my time would be entirely engrossed with the campaign. The defeat of Seward at Chicago apparently assured us the continued co-operation of the Know Nothing or American element in the State, and, with the anti-Curtin Republicans anxious for the election of Lincoln, the contest assumed a very much more hopeful aspect.

I came to Philadelphia on the first of June and engaged a single second-story back room in the Girard House as my home for the summer, and as my presence there made the Girard practically the headquarters of the party, I obtained my room and board at the very moderate price of ten dollars per week, which I paid out of my own pocket, as the committee never had any funds to draw upon for personal expenses. From that time until the November election I abandoned all professional and other business duties, being

unable to spare the time from campaign duties to attend the courts.

I appointed George W. Hammersly chief secretary of the headquarters, who lived in the city and who imitated my example by working for nothing and finding himself. Colonel Mann, Charles S. Ogden and Charles M. Neal, then president of the board of county commissioners, all members of the State committee, agreed to act with me as an informal executive committee, and meet at headquarters for consultation or action at any time required.

The first important thing to be done was to establish suitable campaign headquarters, and we decided that they should be as imposing as possible, and that the largest flag ever suspended in the city should float over Chestnut Street bearing the names of Lincoln, Hamlin and Curtin. It will probably startle many of the Republicans of the present day in Philadelphia, who assume that there is little or nothing respectable in politics outside of Republicanism, to know that there was not a single business man on Chestnut Street between Third and Ninth who would permit a rope to be attached to his building across the street to bear the Lincoln flag.

Colonel Mann and I spent three days visiting houses on Chestnut street to find a suitable location for the headquarters where a large Lincoln flag could be suspended over the street by attaching the rope to a building opposite. Some of our business people were Lincoln men, but they all, with one accord, began to make excuses when asked to permit a rope for a Lincoln flag to be attached to their building. Of all the leading business houses in the city at that time I can recall but two that were willing to come to the front and openly contribute to aid Lincoln's election. They were the Quaker houses of Morris Hallowell &

Company, in the silk trade, and Ogden & Company, in the wholesale drug trade. Philadelphia merchants had a vast preponderance of Southern trade, and they were unwilling to commit themselves in any public way to the support of Lincoln.

The late A. J. Drexel, then a young partner in his father's banking house, was the only prominent financial man who publicly supported Lincoln. He promptly contributed $100 when first called upon at the opening of the campaign, and that was then regarded as a very liberal contribution. Later he doubled it, and he stood on the records of the committee as one of the most liberal of its supporters.

We were compelled to abandon the idea of getting headquarters where we could suspend the immense flag contemplated by attaching a rope to a building on the opposite side of the street, and finally accepted the offer of Dr. Jayne, who was heartily in accord with the movement, to give us the entire Commonwealth Building on Chestnut Street above Sixth, excepting the first floor, where he then had an insurance company, at a rental of $2,000 for the three floors, embracing a hall on the upper story. I told him that I saw little prospect of being able to pay so large a rental, but he insisted that I should accept his offer, saying that he was not a hard landlord, and he more than vindicated the claim he thus made by giving me a receipt in full for the rent after the campaign closed without the payment of a dollar.

We immediately took possession of the second floor of the building, gathered up a few second-hand desks and chairs, and settled down to the hard work of creating a party organization out of somewhat discordant elements and organizing it for battle. Colonel Mann was still determined upon having the Lincoln flag over Chestnut Street the largest that had

ever floated in the city, and repeated efforts were made with the occupants of the three houses immediately opposite our headquarters to get permission to attach a rope to one of their buildings, but every appeal so made was promptly refused.

Commissioner Neal, Colonel Mann and Mr. Ogden were at the headquarters every morning, and several days after we had taken possession of the new headquarters, Mr. Neal, then president of the board of county commissioners that then fixed the assessed valuation of property for taxable purposes, was standing at the window for some time smoking a cigar and looking across the street. Finally he arose, took up his hat and started hastily from the room, saying that he would have the flag across that street or he would know why. He went to the commissioners' office, took up the assessment books, and doubled the valuation of the three buildings, any one of which was suitable for our purpose, and then found some trusted friend who was charged with the duty of informing the owners or occupants of the property of the increase in the valuation for taxes.

At that time property was taxed very moderately, usually not at half its value, and it was entirely safe to impose a double tax valuation. There was very general depression in business, as the revulsion of 1857 had produced paralysis in every channel of commerce, industry and trade, and the notice of doubled taxation convulsed the property owners. They immediately appealed in person to President Neal of the commissioners' board, and he heard them with all the dignity of the Lord Chief Justice of England. When they had finished their appeal he quietly informed them that he would take their properties and pay them cash at the increased valuation he had put upon them. He said that the taxation of the city

was very unequal, and that the valuable properties were not paying anything like a fair share of taxation. None of them was willing to sell at the price named, and of course they could offer no further argument for an abatement. They left the commissioners' office fully satisfied that they must be prepared to meet double taxation.

Neal then selected some suitable person whom he could trust and who knew the parties well, and had him go and suggest that he thought he could arrange to have an abatement of the increased valuation. He also said in an apparently casual way that Neal was very anxious to have an immense Lincoln flag out on the street, and that he thought he could be greatly mollified if he were allowed to attach a rope to one of these buildings. The three parties had a conference, and they mutually agreed that the one of them who was likely to suffer the least from the imputation of abolitionism should agree to have the rope of the Lincoln flag attached to his building. That was communicated to Neal, who answered that if that were done he would give the matter early and very careful consideration. The result was that the rope spanned the street from the fourth story of the Commonwealth Building and the building nearly or quite opposite, and a Lincoln flag nearly as wide as the street and reaching down to within fifteen feet of the pavement was flung to the winds.

A few days thereafter Commissioner Neal decided, upon more careful reflection, that he had made a mistake in increasing the valuation of the properties, and he immediately restored them to their original valuations. The immense flag startled the people of Philadelphia, but it was a great feature, and hundreds who shuddered when they first saw it, learned to love it before the contest closed, and

sent up the heartiest cheers when Lincoln's election was finally announced.

It was an appalling task to create an organization from our disjointed and often jarring opposition elements, out of which a party had to be created to cope with the able Democratic leaders and their thorough political organization. If money had been needed, as it is now, to accomplish organization and secure co-operation of district voters, it would have been an utter impossibility, as money was not to be had. The entire cash receipts of the committee in the campaign in the pivotal State, that by its October election accomplished the great political revolution of 1860, did not exceed $10,000, and, including Dr. Jayne's contribution of $2,000 rent, our receipts were $12,000. Of this $3,000 was paid for stationery and printing, leaving what would now be regarded as the pitiable sum of $7,000 as the entire resources of the committee to organize and campaign the State.

Fortunately the people were then, as a rule, strangers to the debauchery of politics, and in no contest in the history of the country were they more earnest in their convictions. It was not at all difficult to get a sub-committee in every election district of the State composed of intelligent and earnest workers in the cause, and before the first of July the State committee was in direct communication with a perfect organization extending into the remotest townships of the Commonwealth Not a dollar was paid for this service and in no instance was there any failure to respond to any demand that was made upon them. They not only organized their clubs and wideawakes, held their meetings in schoolhouses and paid their own expenses, but they twice made a careful canvass of every vote in the State outside of Philadelphia and Pittsburg, and their last canvass, made only a few

weeks before the election, fixed Curtin's certain majority at 17,000, and the accuracy of their work was proved by Curtin receiving over 32,000.

Every man in sympathy with us in the State who was equipped for the rostrum cheerfully gave his time to speak wherever ordered by the State committee, and paid his own expenses, and a large number of speakers from other States aided us, and all without compensation with the single exception of Carl Schurz. Schurz was then living in Wisconsin and was certainly the ablest disputant who could be brought to aid in the support of our cause. He was poor, his services were in great demand, and he could not afford to come to Pennsylvania without pay. I finally took the responsibility of engaging him for a week, during which time he spoke always once a day and sometimes twice or three times, often delivering part of his speech in German. He rendered inestimable service to us in the battle, but a week or so after he went home a draft for $500 produced fearful consternation at our headquarters, as that was an unusually large sum for the committee to have on hand. The draft was promptly met, however, and I could not dispute that he had well earned the money.

We could have used a considerable sum of money advantageously and legitimately in making great demonstrations and perfecting our organization, but it was impossible to obtain it and fortunately the people were willing to do the necessary work without it. Some collections were made every day, but a ten dollar bill was considered a generous contribution and the majority of the contributors gave five dollars or less. Curtin was not in condition to contribute to the campaign beyond the heavy expenses he would incur in traversing the State.

After we had gotten fairly under way, I visited

Governor Morgan, who had been continued as chairman of the National committee, and who was one of the Seward leaders at the Chicago convention. Pennsylvania was the arbiter of the National battle; if it was carried in October Lincoln's election was assured; if it was lost in October Lincoln's defeat was inevitable. It was reasonable, therefore, to expect that the National committee would not only be intensely interested in the Pennsylvania contest, but would liberally aid the cause. Morgan received me most frigidly and peremptorily refused to contribute a dollar.

During the entire battle in this State that was to decide the National contest, I never received any aid, directly or indirectly, from the National committee, and never had any inquiry from it as to the progress of the campaign. I twice wrote to Thurlow Weed, giving the situation in our State and asking his co-operation, but he did not exhibit even the courtesy of a reply. They were greatly offended at Curtin for defeating Seward, and they would have been well satisfied had Curtin been defeated, with the logical result of Lincoln's defeat to follow. After Pennsylvania and Indiana were won in October, both Morgan and Weed, Seward's leaders in New York, came to the front, when there was nothing to do but shout over the victory.

Early in September, when I was fully satisfied that Curtin would be elected, I made a careful investigation into the congressional districts of the State, as it was deemed very important to carry a Republican Congress with the President. I found half a dozen of our congressional districts that were trembling in the balance and likely to go for or against us, depending upon the best methods employed. The candidates for Congress, as a rule, had to pay their own expenses, and most of them were poor. I had no

means to aid them and saw no way of commanding it. I knew Moses Taylor, of New York, very well, and made an appointment to meet him in that city. I presented the condition of these congressional districts and appealed to him to raise some money to aid them. He called in several business men in no way connected with the National committee, and in one day they raised $4,700, and I had them send it directly to the candidates for Congress without going through my hands at all, and every one of the candidates was elected.

Curtin's campaign was the most exhaustive ever made in the State. He was in superb physical condition, spoke with great ease and was one of the most fascinating of popular orators, with a very imposing personality. His campaign was planned for every secular day from the time he started out, some time in July, until election day, and he many times spoke twice and sometimes thrice a day. He never had a moment of leisure, and all the many letters he received, excepting those from his own family, he sent to me without opening. His programme was changed by the State committee from time to time without even advising him. He knew that when he delivered an address at any place there would be persons there to take him to his next appointment, and at times he did not know of it until thus informed. Facilities for travel were then few and tedious, as compared with the present, and he had many long carriage rides, and he was at times compelled to travel most of the night, but he filled every appointment and enthused the various opposition elements to the highest degree by his admirable campaign speeches. He possessed the rare combination among public speakers of being ably argumentative, with an exhaustive reserve of wit and invective that never failed to captivate the

audience. At one time I did not hear directly from him for an entire month, but he was of course advised from headquarters every few days of the progress of the campaign, and especially of any new phase that had developed and how it was to be met.

Everything progressed favorably until early in September we discovered a serious disaffection in the American element of Philadelphia. The organ of that party, the "Evening Journal," brought the crisis to a culmination by announcing that it must withdraw its support from Curtin, and charging that he was of the Catholic faith. Fortunately the venerable Rev. James Linn, who was then living as pastor emeritus of the Bellefonte Presbyterian church, came to the front stating that he had baptized Curtin in his own church, and that Curtin had always been a member of his congregation.

The Know Nothing defection was a purely commercial transaction, and I was offered the restoration of harmonious relations between that order and Curtin for the sum of $2,500. There were many good reasons why I should not pay such a price for such a purpose, but it was needless to consider more than one of the many, as it was utterly impossible for me to raise the amount of money demanded, and in a public speech in the Wigwam, where our great meetings were then held in Philadelphia, I announced the price demanded by the Know Nothing leaders and gave their names to the public. A healthy reaction was produced, but they held over 2,000 of their voters, who were still actively connected with the secret organization, away from Curtin.

They claimed that they had 13,000 voters in the Know Nothing lodges of the city, and it became very important to ascertain the force they had. I called upon Mayor Henry, and asked his permission to have

the police estimate them, as it could well be done in the different parts of the city, but he peremptorily refused to allow the police to perform any such political duty. Fortunately his chief of police was more liberally inclined, and inside of a week he brought me a careful enumeration of the entire number of Know Nothings yet remaining in connection with the secret lodges as 2,300, and they exhibited within 100 of that number in the election returns, where they had acted in concert and their vote could be accurately estimated.

The Know Nothing revulsion soon ceased to be a factor in the contest, and we worked along without any new alarming indications until within two weeks of the election, when the Democrats, who were entirely united on Henry D. Foster, the Democratic candidate for Governor, decided to spend a large amount of money in city and State, hoping thereby to control the election.

Able leaders came to Philadelphia, and the influence of the movement was speedily felt along our lines. They had money in abundance and we had none, and after carefully looking into the situation it was decided that we must raise an additional sum of money, and the minimum was fixed at $2,000. All of the men who consulted with me, like myself, were exhausted financially, and it was not possible to raise that sum of money without finding some new source of supply. The subject was considered for several hours without finding any way out of the difficulty.

I finally inquired of Colonel Mann whether there was any person in Philadelphia whose appointment to one of the most lucrative of the offices in the gift of the Governor would be entirely creditable and acceptable, who would be able to furnish that amount of money. He answered very promptly that there was

one man in the city who would be a candidate for one of the most lucrative of the inspectorships, and whose appointment he hoped to accomplish if Curtin was successful, who was entirely able to contribute that sum of money, and would probably do it. He was instructed to visit the man, and he returned with a check for $2,000.

That was the last severe strain the State committee had in the October battle of 1860 that decided the Republican revolution in the election of Lincoln. Of course the contributor received his appointment as leather inspector, and it was universally commended, although it is quite probable that he would have filled the same position had he not been called upon to make the contribution. It will require another chapter to complete the story of the great battle of 1860.

XXXIX.

THE LINCOLN VICTORY.

Democrats Open the State Campaign with Great Vigor—Senator Welsh Made Chairman of the Democratic State Committee—Two National Democratic Tickets Nominated—How Joint Discussion Between Curtin and Foster was Unwittingly Provoked, and the Difficulty in Abandoning it When Nobody Wanted it—The October Elections Paralyze the Democrats—The Democrats Frenzied by the Election of Lincoln.

THE Democrats opened the campaign of 1860 with great earnestness and confident of success. Although they had lost the State at two previous elections by a combination of all the opposition elements, they believed that the same elements could not be crystallized into an organization to battle for National issues, on which the different elements of the opposition were not in hearty accord. They relied upon the more conservative Whigs and Americans to become alienated from the combination when called upon to elect a Republican President, and they were hopeful that they could recover back many of the disaffected Democrats.

There never was a party with abler leadership than had the Democrats of Pennsylvania when the campaign of 1860 was about to be opened. The Democratic leaders of that day were men of eminent ability and ripe experience in political management, and they acted with great fidelity to their party organization. There was no such thing as a party boss on either side, and if any man or factional combination had attempted to issue orders to the State conventions of either of the parties about to meet in battle, it would not only

Henry D. Foster

have been resented, but such leadership would have been sent to the rear without ceremony.

Such men as J. Glancey Jones, of Berks; Judge Campbell and Chambers McKibben, of Philadelphia; Arnold Plummer, of Venango; John L. Dawson, of Fayette; George W. Cass and James P. Barr, of Pittsburg; State Chairman Ward, of Bradford; Senator Buckalew, of Columbia; Senator Bigler, of Clearfield; James Burns, of Mifflin; A. Porter Wilson, of Huntingdon, and many others who had attained distinction in the Democratic counsels, came to the front, not to battle for individual mastery but to consider calmly how Democratic supremacy could be regained in Pennsylvania.

Their convention met at Reading before the Democratic National convention had split, and presented two candidates for the Presidency, and all were hopeful that, notwithstanding the clouds which hung over party harmony, the party North and South would be thoroughly united and would win in both State and nation. There were a number of candidates for the Democratic nomination for Governor, and several of them men who would have made creditable leaders in the contest, but it was decided after most careful consideration of existing political conditions that Henry D. Foster, of Westmoreland, was altogether the strongest man who could be presented against Curtin, and he was nominated amidst the wildest enthusiasm.

While the Democrats had many able men, there was no one of them so well equipped for the great battle of 1860 as was Henry D. Foster. He was confessedly the ablest and best trial lawyer in western Pennsylvania, and a gentleman as genial in his personal qualities as he was blameless in reputation. He was one of the most amiable men I have ever met in public life, and

if Henry D. Foster had a personal enemy it was not because any intentional affront had ever been given.

He had been active in politics for many years. As early as 1842 he had been elected to Congress without opposition when not yet thirty years of age, and was re-elected in 1844. Before his term had expired in Congress he was elected to the popular branch of the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1846, was re-elected the following year, and was again elected to the House in 1856. After his defeat for Governor in 1860, he retired from active participation in politics until 1870, when he was again elected to Congress, and in 1872 he was defeated in a contest for re-election.

The friends of Curtin well appreciated the fact that in Foster they had altogether the strongest candidate that could be presented against him, and if the Democratic National convention had not broken up and presented two National tickets, the contest for Governor in Pennsylvania would certainly have been doubtful, with chances rather in favor of Foster. His nomination inspired the Democratic party with a degree of confidence its people had not felt for several years, and on every side the indications were that the Democrats were in a position to make a desperately close if not a successful battle.

Senator William Henry Welsh, of York, who was then the Democratic leader of the Senate, presided over the convention, and after the nomination of Foster the convention departed from the customary method of choosing a State chairman by unanimously electing Senator Welsh as field marshal of their great battle. The Legislature was then in session, and on his return to the senate I congratulated my fellow senator on the distinction he had achieved with probably quite as much sincerity as he had previously congratulated me when my appointment as chairman of the Curtin com-

mittee was announced. I think it quite likely that either of us would have been glad to congratulate some other person as his immediate foeman in the struggle.

Welsh was an accomplished and skillful politician with all the sagacity and tact necessary to make him a master leader. He was then serving his second term in the senate, and as I had served two previous sessions in the house, and had intimate fellowship with him, the closest ties of personal friendship had grown up between us. We were both among the youngest members of the body, engaged in the same profession, and I at times protected him from drastic partisan legislation aimed at him personally as the Democratic leader. During my first year in the senate the Democrats had but twelve members to twenty-one Republicans, and in the session of 1861 the Democrats were reduced to six, with twenty-seven Republicans.

The Democratic National convention first met at Charleston on the 23d of April, and after wrangling for ten days adjourned to meet at Baltimore on the 18th of June. The bolters from the Charleston convention adjourned to meet in Richmond on the 11th of June, but on meeting they adjourned until the 21st, being three days after the meeting of the regular convention in Baltimore, with the view of harmonizing on a ticket if possible. The Baltimore convention declared Douglas the Democratic nominee, and the Richmond convention then rejected both Douglas and the platform and nominated Breckinridge and Lane.

While a large majority of the Democrats of Pennsylvania were in sympathy with Douglas as against Breckinridge, the entire patronage of the Buchanan administration was thrown into the breach against Douglas, and the factional conflict became extremely bitter and greatly chilled the hopes of Democratic victory.

After much tribulation and many vexatious conferences, the opposing wings of the party agreed upon an electoral ticket that was pledged to vote unitedly for either of the Democratic candidates for President if thereby he could be elected, but was at liberty tc vote individual preferences, if elected, in case the united vote of the electors of the State would not give success to either. No such fusion would have been attempted but for the hope that thereby Foster might be elected, and the unanimity in favor of Foster was shown in a very emphatic way by the fact that, while he was on the stump almost continuously for several months, no one ever asked him to define his position on the Presidency. He was a man of fine presence, of charming manners, a most adroit and able political disputant, and both wings of the party supported him.

An interesting incident occurred some time after the campaign was fairly under way, and Curtin and Foster were speaking daily in different sections of the State, showing how things have sometimes to be done under cover in great political struggles. While Foster was one of the coolest and most unimpassioned of popular speakers, Curtin was nothing if not impulsive and enthusiastic. In one of his speeches in the western part of the State he was criticising Foster's straddling attitude on the Presidency, and thoughtlessly stated that he would be glad to meet him and have him discuss the issue of the contest face to face. It was a passing thought with Curtin, and he never intended it to be accepted as a challenge to Foster, but it was so proclaimed by the papers supporting Curtin, and Foster was called upon by the Democratic organs to respond by meeting Curtin in joint debate.

Foster addressed a letter to Chairman Welsh, who had his headquarters at the Merchants' Hotel, stating that as Curtin had challenged him to a joint discussion,

he could do no less than accept it, and instructed him to meet me and complete the necessary arrangements.

There was only one way for Welsh to meet the emergency, and that was to address a defiant letter to me stating that, as Curtin had challenged Foster to a joint discussion, Foster was quite willing to accept it, and asking me to meet him and arrange the details. I could do no less than answer as defiantly as Welsh had written, without intimating that Curtin had not intended his remarks to be accepted as a challenge, and declared my willingness to meet Chairman Welsh at any time and place he might name, to fix an acceptable programme for the two candidates for Governor.

Welsh replied expressing his gratification in the strongest terms that his candidate would have the opportunity of meeting Curtin, and named the next day at one o'clock for me to meet him at his headquarters at the Merchants' Hotel.

I was there promptly on time, and, of course, received a very cordial greeting from my warm personal friend, the Democratic chairman. He had cigars and a rather dark-hued bottle on the table, with glasses and ice water, and immediately proposed that we take a drink.

After refreshment we took our cigars, sat down and chatted for half an hour or more without referring to the campaign, and finally Welsh inquired whether it would be agreeable to me to adjourn the meeting to a time several days distant, as he had an important appointment out of the city, and he wished to have ample time to arrange for the discussion. He did not intend that I should misunderstand his willingness to avoid a joint discussion if it could be accomplished, and without assuming that I understood him, we adjourned.

We met again promptly on time several days there-

after, and Welsh opened the conference with the bottle, ice water, glasses and cigars as before. After refreshments, while enjoying the cigars, we chatted for nearly an hour about legislation and many other things of personal interest, without once alluding to the business which we had met ostensibly to consider. The fact that I did not introduce the subject satisfied Welsh that I was not hungry for a joint debate, and without a word having been said on the subject both well understood that neither desired to consummate the arrangement for a joint discussion.

Finally Welsh took an extra whiff from his cigar, and coming up in front of me, said: "Aleck, you don't want this joint debate, do you?"

To which I answered: "Harry, I don't want it any more than you do."

At this there was a mutual laugh, but we were both soon sobered by the reflection that the public had been assured of this joint discussion, and it would be very difficult for either of us to explain why we had not brought it about when it was known, and had been published all over the State, that the matter was in the hands of Chairman Welsh and myself to arrange the details. We were both in the position that an explanation to the public was an absolute necessity, and to publish the letters which really passed between us would have made it impossible for us to offer any plausible explanation of failure to complete the arrangement.

We finally agreed to destroy all the letters which had passed between us, and to rewrite several letters on each side embracing certain embarrassing conditions, and the letters to be so carefully worded that each side could plausibly claim that the other had refused to have the joint debate. It was quite a serious task and required the most careful political diplomacy, but

we finally got it accomplished to the satisfaction of both, and the next morning the Curtin papers published the correspondence with immense scare-head lines declaring that Foster had declined to meet Curtin, and the Democratic papers published the correspondence with equally flaming headlines declaring that Curtin had refused to meet Foster.

Curtin had no knowledge of these conferences on the subject of a joint discussion until he saw the letters in public print. Welsh had very good reasons for wanting to avoid a joint discussion for the reason that Curtin would have crucified Foster on the altar of his two Presidential candidates, but even with that advantage on Curtin's side Foster would have maintained himself creditably.

My reason for very willingly assenting to the rejection of the proposed joint discussion was that I regarded it as most important to Curtin to cover the entire State in his campaign, and the joint discussions would have brought him away from the rural districts where his presence and speeches accomplished so much, as the joint discussions would necessarily have been in the important centers of population throughout the State, in many of which Curtin had already spoken. His personality was altogether the most important factor in the contest, and it was specially important that he should meet the masses in every section of the Commonwealth.

Welsh and I often met during the progress of the fight, and within a week after our correspondence had been published we each had the pleasure of informing the other that our principals were highly delighted with our disposition of the joint debate proposition.

After the two Democratic National tickets had been formally placed in the field without the hope of adjustment, the popular tide was steadily against the

Democrats in Pennsylvania, but their leaders made the most heroic struggle to save Foster. Our opposition elements were naturally more cordially united and greatly inspired by the prospect of success, and the result was the election of Curtin by a majority of 32,164.

Henry S. Lane, the Republican candidate for Governor in Indiana, carried his State on the same day by 9,757 majority. The only other States holding elections in October were Ohio and Iowa, and both of them gave large Republican majorities, but Pennsylvania and Indiana were the pivotal States of the battle, and the election of Curtin and Lane in those States irrevocably decided the election of Lincoln in November.

With the sweeping majority for Curtin the Republicans carried 18 of the 25 Congressmen, and the Legisture elected made the Senate stand 27 Republicans to 6 Democrats, and the House 71 Republicans to 29 Democrats.

The great contest in Pennsylvania that had practically decided the judgment of the nation in favor of the great political revolution of 1860, was honestly fought and fairly won, and the only reproach upon our cause that was attempted was in the city of Philadelphia, where, on election night, a sum of money was raised and some Democratic election officers were corrupted to make a false return in favor of the election of Mr. Butler, Republican, over Lehman, Democrat, for Congress. It was a palpable and flagrant fraud, and I learned of it before I went to bed in the early morning hours of election night. I at once went to Colonel Mann, then district attorney, and demanded the immediate prosecution of the corrupt election officers. Mann was a very earnest friend of Butler, but I informed him that no such stain would

be permitted to cloud the great victory we had won. He prosecuted William Bierly and others, convicted them and had them sentenced before the Governor had issued his proclamation declaring who were elected members of Congress. On the strength of those convictions Governor Packer gave the certificate to Lehman, and proclaimed him elected. Butler contested, and I appeared before the Republican committee of Congress, stated the facts and the contest was then ended.

The October elections having practically settled the National contest, the labors of the State organization were greatly diminished. All we had to do was to keep our forces in line by a succession of mass meetings demanded by the enthused conditions of our people. The hopeless condition of the Democracy greatly lessened the interest of the rank and file, but the Democrats of that day were natural voters. Notwithstanding nearly 10,000 Democrats in the city of Philadelphia alone voted for the distinctive Douglas ticket and against the fusion Democratic electoral ticket, they polled 178,871 votes for their regular electoral ticket, while the straight Douglas ticket received 16,765 votes. Bell, the Constitutional Union candidate, received a total of 12,776 in the State, most of which was cast in the city of Philadelphia. Lincoln had 89,159 plurality over the fusion Democratic ticket, and 59,618 majority of the entire vote.

The election of Lincoln almost frenzied the Democrats of Philadelphia, as up to that time they had always treated Republicanism with the utmost contempt, and the kindest term they ever applied was that of "Black Republicans," always associating them with abolitionism and negro equality. The streets of the city were crowded with parading Republican banners which were greeted with hissing scorn, and at

times with volleys of stones from the Democratic gangs of the wharf wards. They could not understand how it was possible that a Black Republican could be elected President of the United States, and they openly predicted that the end of the Republic had come, as the country had taken a desperate plunge into anarchy. Many riots occurred during the night in different parts of the city, but the next morning the sun arose with its accustomed splendor, and Philadelphia was as quiet as if no political convulsion had occurred.

Such is the story of the battle in Pennsylvania for Lincoln in 1860.

XL.

THE CURTIN CABINET.

Cameron was Senator and Curtin Governor and Implacable in Their Political and Personal Resentments—Purviance a Compromise as Attorney General—Slifer Made Secretary of the Commonwealth—How Slifer Came to the Surface by Defeating Middleswerth for Senator—Slifer's Service to Curtin and to the Country Never Justly Appreciated—Cameron's Triumph in Electing Cowan United States Senator—Assured His Appointment to the Lincoln Cabinet.

THE election of Lincoln opened wide the door for factional conflict in Pennsylvania. The severe restraints which had been imposed upon factional belligerents by the necessity of remaining apparently tranquil until a National Republican victory could be achieved, entirely perished when the Republicans had won in State and nation.

Cameron and Curtin, implacabe personal and political foes, were both in favorable positions to wield vast political power. Cameron was a Republican United States Senator, with his term extending through half of the Lincoln administration, and he well knew that whatever conditions existed in the State, and however he might be estimated by the new President, he could not be ignored. On the other hand, Curtin, in all the vigor of the noontide of life, had been called to the chief magistracy of the State by an overwhelming majority, and his personal following very largely dominated the party to which the two great factional leaders were indebted for their honors.

Cameron's ambition was to enter the cabinet, and Curtin was aggressive in his hostility to Cameron's

success. Of the two, Cameron was the greater political leader. While Curtin well understood the State generally, Cameron studied and understood individuals who could be of service, and could always summon them when conflict confronted him. He had many friends who were largely inspired by the hope of political rewards, and it was that inspiration that made his followers support him with great earnestness for a position in the cabinet.

Pennsylvania never produced a more adroit political manager than Cameron. He was far-seeing, knew the precise value of men, would command influences by the most circuitous methods, and was tireless in managing his organization. It was most important to him that the Curtin cabinet should indicate some recognition of the Cameron element of the party, and to that end he directed exhaustive efforts. He had many friends who had sincerely supported Curtin for nomination and election, and they made earnest appeals to Curtin for party harmony by recognizing Cameron's friends in the State administration.

Beside the Cameron-Curtin men who were pressing for a division of factional honors in the cabinet, there were nearly or quite a score of prominent Curtin men in the State who were vigorously pressed upon Curtin for cabinet positions. If he could have chosen the chief cabinet officers in accordance with his own personal wishes he would have made ex-Senator Francis Jordan, of Bedford, secretary of the commonwealth, and Senator Darwin A. Finney, of Crawford, attorney general, but many complications arose and Curtin, who very earnestly desired to serve the many friends who had so enthusiastically supported him, was greatly embarrassed in the selection of his cabinet officers. Finney was then a member of the Senate with one year to serve, and Curtin and Finney were entirely in

accord in regarding Finney as ineligible to a position in the cabinet until the expiration of his senatorial term.

This opened the way for an arrangement suggested by ex-Senator Titian J. Coffey, of Indiana County, one of the ablest and most influential of Curtin's supporters, who had decided to locate in Pittsburg to practise his profession, associated with Congressman Samuel A. Purviance, of Butler, who had just finished some years of service in the National Congress. Purviance was known as friendly to Cameron, although not offensive in factional warfare, and Coffey earnestly urged the Governor to open the way for Finney as attorney general by appointing Purviance to that position, with the distinct understanding that he should resign at the end of one year, when Finney would become eligible.

The appointment of Purviance not only relieved the Curtin administration from the imputation of following aggressive factional lines, but it gave the new law firm of Pittsburg very substantial advantage in entering upon a professional career. The attorney generalship was thus settled by a compromise that gave a tub to the Cameron whale and apparently assured Finney the attorney generalship as soon as he was competent to assume its honors and duties.

There were a full dozen of able and very worthy friends of Curtin who were desirous to fill the position of secretary of the commonwealth, and Curtin was exceedingly embarrassed in his efforts to solve the problem. He delayed his decision until a short time before his inauguration, and difficulties multiplied upon him with each succeeding week. He finally summoned several of his trusted friends who were not applicants for any position under him to a conference on the subject, and I was one of the number. The various ex-

pectants were very frankly discussed, but the selection of any one of them seemed to threaten serious complications.

Eli Slifer was then State treasurer and serving his third term. He did not seek a cabinet appointment, but was expecting to reach congressional honors in his district. After a protracted discussion of the qualities of the various men named for the secretaryship the men who had been called into conference with Curtin unitedly decided that Slifer would be altogether the best man for the position, and with one accord they urged Curtin to tender him the appointment. Slifer was a very earnest friend of Curtin, and Curtin would have been more than willing to accept him but for the many disappointments which must result from the choice. After reviewing the whole situation he finally decided in favor of Slifer, and the next morning his appointment was announced in the public press. Slifer accepted with some reluctance, as it changed the political plans of his life, and called him to six years of the most exacting and wearing public duties, which left him hopelessly enfeebled physically.

There are very few people living to-day who have anything like a just appreciation of the services rendered to the Curtin administration, to the State and to the nation by Eli Slifer. He was a man of the most quiet and unassuming manners, and one of the most tirelessly patient of thinkers and workers. In all the vexatious complications which arose from the countless new problems presented by civil war, the one man whose judgment was always deferred to was Slifer. He was an entirely self-made man of limited education, but a great student and an energetic, intelligent business man, who acquired the highest position in his community and abundant wealth, garnered by the most conscientious business methods. He had served two

sessions in the Legislature a decade before he entered the Curtin cabinet, and in 1851, just when he was closing his service as a representative, we met as conferees in a senatorial conference for the district composed of Union, Mifflin and Juniata.

Ner Middleswerth, who had represented Union County in the senate and house for nearly twenty years, was the Whig candidate, and although he had never enjoyed a day's schooling in his life, he was regarded as one of the ablest political disputants of the State. He was rich, illiterate, unsympathetic, autocratic, and the young Whigs of the district had grown very weary of his domination. Juniata had a candidate for senator, and I was one of the three conferees charged with the duty of making an effort for his nomination. Mifflin also had a candidate, and James Milliken, then a resident of Mifflin County, but better known in Philadelphia as one of the founders of the Union League, was one of the three conferees chosen to press the nomination of their local candidate. The conference met in a small village in the interior of Union County, and Milliken and I represented the young element that wanted to retire Middleswerth. We first ascertained that it would be impossible for Mifflin and Juniata counties to unite on either of their candidates, and we then decided that whoever might be eventually nominated Middleswerth should be defeated, as we controlled six of the nine votes.

Union County furnished the entire Whig majority of the district, and had a very strong claim for the nomination, while neither of the other counties presented candidates of such eminent distinction as to justify his nomination over Middleswerth. Middleswerth attended the conference in person, and was entirely confident of success, as he knew Juniata and Mifflin would not unite on either of their candidates. There was an

old-time feud between Juniata and Mifflin that had existed for many years as the result of political quarrels. Before the county of Juniata was created out of the part of Mifflin County commonly known as "below the narrows," about the only thing the people of the county above and below "the narrows" could agree upon was to bury people when they died. What was then known as "the narrows" is well known locally by the same name to-day, being the very narrow gap in the mountain that divides the county, not wide enough at places for a turnpike, the river and the railroad.

Middleswerth well understood that these two counties could not be united, and did not doubt that he would ultimately be nominated. His confidence in his success was ostentatiously expressed, and it certainly did not tend to reconcile Milliken and myself, and we finally took a walk into a nearby forest to solve the problem that confronted us, and we decided that we would nominate Slifer for senator without consulting him or permitting him to know in advance that his name was to be used.

In order to pave the way for a compromise candidate we agreed that when the conference got fairly under way we would each present the claims of our county and candidate and finally drift into a wrangle that apparently threatened the dissolution of the conference, when we would carry a motion to adjourn for dinner, and at the meeting after dinner we would cast the six votes of Juniata and Mifflin for Eli Slifer.

The programme was carried out to the letter, and when the conference adjourned for dinner the expectation was general that the quarrel between Juniata and Mifflin had become so intense that Whig success in the district was greatly endangered. No one outside of our six conferees had any knowledge of our purpose

Eli Slifer

to nominate Slifer, and it came like a lightning flash from an unclouded sky to Middleswerth, and utterly dumfounded Slifer, who was in the conference, and most sincerely supporting the nomination of Middleswerth. He arose, very much confused, and simply said that it would be impossible for him to accept the nomination, as he was a delegate instructed for another candidate whose nomination he very earnestly desired. We promptly voted six to three not to accept his declination, and adjourned the conference.

Middleswerth, then a man of more than patriarchal years, cried like a child at his unexpected defeat, and he at first said that Slifer was right in not accepting the nomination, but Milliken and I informed him that if Slifer declined we would nominate another Union County man other than himself, and left it for him to say whether, under the circumstances, he should force the declination of Slifer. He knew that Slifer was incapable of perfidy in his trust, and he frankly said that if his nomination was impossible he must advise Slifer to accept.

Slifer was elected without a contest and during his three years in the senate he demonstrated remarkable practical ability and devotion to every public duty. After retiring from the senate he was thrice elected State treasurer, and he was thus thoroughly equipped from experience in public affairs to take the position of secretary of the commonwealth as one of the ablest and soundest advisers the Governor could have, and he more than vindicated the expectations of his friends.

He was one of the few men during the severe trial of the Civil War who did more to guide the affairs of state than any other one man in the Commonwealth, not even excepting Curtin, for the Governor soon learned to rely more upon the intelligent judgment of Silfer than even upon his own. Always calm and unruffled,

even in the most perilous extremities, he was keen in perception, comprehensive in the mastery of every problem, and there was not a peril in the war or politics that he was not ready to meet and present the very best solution.

Beyond a Sunday visit to his beautiful country home in the suburbs of Lewisburg to attend his beloved family and Methodist church, when the exigencies of war permitted him to leave the Capital, he was always at his post. He not only took no vacations, but he was never diverted from his endless official duties to enjoy recreations of any kind. He was just the man to temper the impulsive qualities of Governor Curtin, and it is due to the truth of history to say that to no man was Curtin so much indebted for the eminent success of his two administrations as to Eli Slifer.

From the time that Slifer retired, in 1867, until his death, more than a decade later, he devoted his time entirely to the hopeless effort of regaining his broken health, but neither the waters nor climates of the Old World nor the rest of home could restore to him the vigor he had sacrificed to public duty in the darkest days of the government, and finally impaired mental power told to his many devoted friends the sad story that death alone could give him promise of relief.

Curtin's cabinet was accepted as a generous concession on his part to the unity of the party organization, and Cameron was enabled to claim that he had been recognized in the appointment of Attorney General Purviance, but he well knew the battle he would be compelled to make to win his cabinet position and to hold it if he were successful in attaining it. A United States Senator was to be elected, and he understood that his power with the new National administration would depend very largely, if not wholly, upon having a friendly associate in the Senate. He knew the field

well, for he always kept close watch upon the election of members of the Legislature, and he knew also that the distinctive Curtin element was not thoroughly united in favor of any one for Senator. He had no candidate of his own: he simply watched the development of the contest, ready to come to the relief of any man who developed sufficient strength to be within range of success with Cameron's support, and then by giving such candidate the victory to be able to command his kindest offices.

There were a number of candidates for Senator. Curtin was unpledged to any, and felt it to be his duty as the Governor-elect to avoid involving his administration in such a contest. Most of his prominent friends supported David Wilmot, and he would have been elected but for the fact that he could not make such terms with Cameron as Cameron desired. He was not friendly to Cameron and believed that Cameron's power was not one to be strengthened in the interest of good politics, but he had never come in aggressive conflict with Cameron, although he very earnestly supported Curtin for nomination and election.

Edgar Cowan, of Westmoreland, was a very fluent and impressive popular speaker, who held a high position in the Westmoreland bar. He was somewhat erratic and superficial, but when he got himself well balanced in forensic conflict he was a strong man. He was a radical Republican, but he gravitated during his senatorial career from extreme Republicanism to Johnsonism and Democracy. A committee of his friends waited upon me as chairman of the State committee, stated that he was a candidate for Senator, and asked that he be given good assignments as a campaigner by the committee. I made out a list satisfactory to his friends, starting him to speak at Johnstown, next Altoona and down the Juniata Valley.

The evening that he opened his campaign at Johnstown I received several despatches appealing to me to withdraw him, as his radical views offended the American and conservative element. I could not adopt such summary treatment, but when he spoke at Altoona the following night I received such a number of protesting despatches that I at once ordered him to fill a number of appointments in the Wilmot district, and transferred to Cowan's engagements an able campaigner who had previously been assigned there.

He was quite magnetic in his intercourse with others, and when the Legislature met he started in the race for United States Senator with a very formidable following, but considerably short of a majority.

Cameron saw his opportunity to join forces with Cowan and elect him Senator. Cowan was, of course, more than willing to accept the Cameron support that secured him the election, and very warmly appreciated his obligation to Cameron. The contest was quite animated, but was not conducted at all strictly on factional lines, and Cowan, with Cameron's support, won out without serious difficulty.

This was a positive triumph for Cameron, and one that was quite substantial in its results. With a fellow-Republican Senator from the State to support him he entrenched himself very strongly in the innner citadel of Republican power, both State and National. While Cowan's election was not in any sense a distinct defeat for Curtin, it was a very distinct triumph for Cameron, and it bore him rich fruits in his many desperate struggles to maintain his power.

XLI.

CURTIN'S WAR DELIVERANCE.

He was Compelled to Give the First Utterance of a Great Northern State on the Question of Maintaining the Union — Protracted Conference Over the Paragraph of his Inaugural Defining the Attitude of Pennsylvania — Curtin Fully Advised of the Strength and Determination of the Secession Element — The Senate of 1861 — Sober and Masterly Discussion of the Sectional Issue — Thaddeus Stevens and the Cabinet — Cameron made Secretary of War — The Philadelphia Appointments.

GOVERNOR CURTIN did not appear at Harrisburg until two days before his inauguration, which took place on the third Tuesday of January. He had taken no part in the exciting contest for United States Senator, and, indeed, had paid little attention to the political conditions at Harrisburg. He was profoundly impressed with the fearful responsibility that had been cast upon him, as he was compelled to give the first official utterance in the North on the secession issue. Lincoln's inauguration was then nearly six weeks distant, and Pennsylvania occupied the most important position of any of the Northern States, not only because of her material and moral power, but also because of the exposure of her border in the event of civil war.

From the time that secession began with South Carolina on the 17th of December, little more than a month after the election of Lincoln, Curtin had made exhaustive efforts to ascertain the true condition of affairs in the South. He procured the aid of several prominent and liberal business men and employed a score or more of bright young men to visit the South,

ostensibly as commercial agents, telegraph operators, etc., and had intelligent and very carefully prepared reports from all the Southern States as to the extent and earnestness of the secession movement. When he came to Harrisburg to be inaugurated as Governor he well understood that the South was terribly in earnest, and that only some unexpected miracle could prevent fratricidal warfare. His only hope was that Pennsylvania, while maintaining thorough loyalty to the Union, would exercise a wholesome influence on the border States of Virginia and Kentucky, and restrain them from joining the Confederate movement.

His views as to the earnestness and desperation of the South were not generally shared by his party friends outside of those who were in very close relations with him. The general impression throughout the North was that the South was forced into the disunion movement by a lot of bombastic demagogues, and that the Southern people were not willing to accept war. The South in like manner misunderstood the North by assuming that the Northern people were devoted chiefly to money-getting and would not sustain a war with the South. I believe that civil war could have been averted if the North and the South had thoroughly understood each other, but the tempest of passion ruled, and it was impossible to halt the drift to fratricidal conflict.

Curtin had prepared his inaugural address before he left his home in Bellefonte, but on the evening of his arrival at Harrisburg, he summoned Secretary Slifer and Attorney General Purviance, who were to compose his cabinet, with Morton McMichael, William B. Mann and myself, to hear his inaugural address read, and to confer on any modifications which might be suggested.

When Curtin presented his inaugural he said that he was entirely satisfied with every part of it excepting the paragraph which defined the relation of the State to the general government, with the attitude Pennsylvania must assume in the event of continued secession. He had a paragraph in the address on the subject, but was in doubt himself as to whether it should be accepted as the official expression of Pennsylvania when every word uttered by him as Chief Magistrate would be carefully weighed both North and South.

There was no precedent in the history of the country to guide the Governor in defining the relation of the State to the National government and to other States in rebellion. There was not only no precedent in this country, but there was no precedent in the history of any of the Republics of the world which could be regarded as a guide, and a mistaken utterance as the official edict of Pennsylvania at that time might be measureless in its disastrous effects.

There was no suggestion to change a single line of the inaugural when it was first read, excepting the suggestion made by the Governor himself, that the one paragraph defining the attitude of Pennsylvania toward rebellion should be changed, and that one question was discussed for hours without reaching a conclusion. It was nearly three o'clock in the morning when Curtin finally proposed that each of the five men in consultation should go to his room, and each write the paragraph for the inaugural as he believed it should be presented, with instructions to meet again at ten o'clock on the following morning.

The conference at once adjourned, and at ten o'clock the next morning each of the five men had his paragraph ready for submission. McMichael was the senior of the party and his paper was first read, and

without comment. Colonel Mann, being the next senior, presented his paragraph. Curtin then called for my paragraph and I read it. When I had finished McMichael asked that it be read again, and after the second reading he said that he would like permission to withdraw his paper and ask the adoption of mine, in which Colonel Mann immediately joined. Slifer and Purviance, the members of the cabinet, both said that they would not present their papers, as they agreed with McMichael and Mann, and their paragraphs were never presented. Curtin also very cordially accepted the paragraph, and was greatly relieved that all had finally agreed upon the declaration that Pennsylvania should make.

I may be pardoned for presenting the full text of the paragraph, as follows:

"Ours is a National government, and has within the sphere of its actions all the attributes of sovereignty, and among these are the right and the duty of self-preservation. It is based upon a compact to which all the people of the United States are parties. It is the result of mutual concessions which were made for the purpose of securing reciprocal benefits. It acts directly on the people, and they owe it a personal allegiance. No part of the people, no State, nor combination of States can voluntarily secede from the Union, nor absolve themselves from their obligations to it. To permit a State to withdraw at pleasure from the Union without the consent of the rest is to confess that our government is a failure. Pennsylvania can never acquiesce in such a conspiracy, nor assent to a doctrine which involves the destruction of the government. If the government is to exist, all the requirements of the Constitution must be obeyed, and it must have power adequate to the enforcement of the supreme law of the land in every

State. It is the first duty of the National authorities to stay the progress of anarchy and enforce the laws, and Pennsylvania, with a united peple, will give them an honest, faithful and active support. The people mean to preserve the integrity of the National Union at every hazard."

The inaugural address was well received and the positive attitude assumed by the Governor in discussing rebellion was generally accepted throughout the Northern States as speaking for all of them. The inauguration ceremonies were of the most imposing character, and the clamor for place under the new State and National administrations, both of which succeeded opposing political authority, greatly distressed the more considerate when the very existence of the nation was trembling in the balance. I well remember a pathetic expression of President Lincoln soon after his inauguration, when countless swarms of political importunates crowded the White House day and night, and when the dark cloud of civil war was hanging over the country, and likely to break in violent tempest at any moment. He said that he felt like a man who was sitting in a temple allotting places in it when it was wrapped in destructive flames.

Curtin was fully prepared to act, as he was entirely convinced from the information he had received from his own agents in the South that the Southern people had passed the point of compromise, and while he heartily joined in the Peace Conference, and appointed Pennsylvania's ablest men to attend it, he had no hope whatever that war could be averted.

In the early part of the session, without conference with Curtin, I offered a resolution in the senate instructing the committee on judiciary to inquire whether any of our statutes in any degree impaired the comity due from one commonwealth to another.

and to report by bill or otherwise. The resolution was unanimously adopted, and in due time the report was made that there was not a single law of our State that was not in entire accord with the utmost comity between the States.

I had made the motion because of letters I had received from several old Whigs of Virginia, including A. H. H. Stuart, who was in the Fillmore cabinet; Colonel Boteler, who had been a Whig Congressman, and, strange as it may now seem, Jubal A. Early, then a prominent Whig and positive Unionist, but one of the few of the Confederate generals who boasted that he died an unreconstructed rebel. They were very earnest Union men and were under the impression that Pennsylvania had some statutes which hindered the arrest and return of fugitive slaves, but the report of the committee confirmed the assurance I had given that Pennsylvania had even gone beyond her obligations to facilitate the execution of the fugitive slave laws.

The State senate of 1861 was the ablest senatorial body that ever met in Pennsylvania. I doubt not that any senate before or since had quite as able men in it as the ablest of the senate of 1861, but no other senate possessed so many men of eminent ability, and the discussion in the early part of the session on the question of Federal relations was not only the ablest ever had in that body, but it was the most sober and dignified of which there is any record. The occasion was so grave that demagogic utterances of the hustings would have harshly jarred the sense of senators.

The senate consisted of twenty-seven Republicans and only six Democrats, with William H. Welsh, of York, the recognized Democratic leader, and Clymer, a new senator from Berks, a close second. The Republicans steadily maintained the most gen-

erous courtesy toward the little Democratic minority. The impassioned speeches of Welsh and Clymer, declaring that the Republican party was solely responsible for the disturbed condition of the country, were pointedly rebuked with mingled dignity and severity.

Welsh was chairman of the Demoratic State committee as I was chairman of the Lincoln committee, and the utterances of both were accepted, in some degree at least, as speaking for the party they represented. Welsh delivered a carefully prepared speech demanding that the Republicans should at once halt and give peace to the country by compromise with the South, and I immediately followed him, disputing his premises and defining the attitude of the party that had triumphed. The debates were reported in full, and the following was the concluding paragraph of my reply to the Democratic chairman:

"We labored not for injustice to others, but for justice to ourselves, in redressing these wrongs by the election of a Republican President, and the true measure of that National triumph is to be realized. This duty we owe to the whole nation, and when the peaceful and faithful aims of our policy shall have passed into history, those who come after us will be amazed that a dispassionate verdict of our people in behalf of the dignity and prosperity of labor, and in vindication of the Constitution, shall have given us rebellion. But so it is, and we must meet it. We shall do so by a faithful adherence to right, by a liberal forbearance to wrong, by generous concession to honest brethren, and if for this we must avert a dismembered Union at the cost of fratricidal conflict, let the South be responsible to posterity and to God."

The question of a Pennsylvanian entering the Lincoln cabinet became the absorbing issue after the election of Senator and the inauguration of Curtin.

As stated in a former chapter, Cameron had been tendered a position in the cabinet by Lincoln in the latter part of December, and it was at once ostentatiously proclaimed by his friends, who felt confident that they could dominate the patronage of the National government. Wilmot, while not an aggressive factionist against Cameron, was not friendly to Cameron's promotion, and when Cameron entered the Senatorial fight and defeated Wilmot, the great leader of the anti-slavery men of the North, he was reluctant to assent to Cameron wearing cabinet honors.

I was much surprised to receive a letter from Thaddeus Stevens early in January expressing a most earnest desire to enter the Lincoln cabinet as Secretary of the Treasury. It was the longest letter I ever knew Stevens to write, and he had evidently made a studied effort to depart from his usually unintelligible writing to make the letter readable. He had then been elected to his fourth term in the House, having been chosen in 1848 and 1850 and again in 1858 and 1860, and his position as leader of the House, for which he was so well equipped, with absolute certainty that he could retain his position as representative of Lancaster as long as he was willing to accept it, seemed to me to make his new aim a singularly mistaken ambition. I wrote him frankly on the subject, and told him that after my conference with Lincoln at Springfield, Cameron would probably be refused a cabinet position, but if so, I was quite certain that no other Pennsylvanian would be called to the place. He made an appointment to meet me at Harrisburg, and I was amazed to find Stevens entirely absorbed in the idea of taking the Secretaryship of the Treasury.

Pre-eminent as he was among the great men of the nation as parliamentary leader and disputant, he was almost wholly destitute of the executive qualities

necessary for a cabinet officer, and his record as commoner of the war, when grave financial extremities confronted the nation, proved how utterly unfitted he was for administering the finances of the nation. He was opposed to the many severe safeguards by which Chase protected the credit of the government, and only yielded to Chase's views when absolute necessity required it. His theory was to issue treasury notes ad infinitum, regardless of the depreciation that must inevitably follow.

Of course, I did not discuss with him his relative qualities for the position of popular representative and the position of administering the finances of the government, but I did earnestly but fruitlessly endeavor to convince him that he held a much greater position in the House than any man could hold in the cabinet. When Cameron's appointment appeared to become probable again after Lincoln had tendered him the appointment and recalled it, Stevens very earnestly protested against it, and he never had more than perfunctory relations with Cameron in the War Department.

Cameron had gained a very strong position as a candidate for the cabinet by Curtin's appointment of a friend of Cameron, as attorney general of the State, and his success in electing Edgar Cowan as his fellow Senator, upon whose support he could confidently rely, enabled him to claim a seat in the cabinet with very strong influence from his own State. Lincoln had held the matter under advisement until he reached Washington, when, after very full deliberation, he decided that he would renew his tender of the position of Secretary of War to Cameron, and Lincoln at once advised me of his purpose.

After a conference with Governor Curtin and Secretary Slifer, I was enabled to assure Lincoln that no

factional opposition would be exerted toward his administration, or any portion of it, because of opposition to Cameron as a member of the cabinet. All felt that Lincoln was entitled to the earnest and united support of all his friends in Pennsylvania, and he was greatly gratified not only because of the promise thus given, but because that promise was fulfilled faithfully.

When Cameron was compelled to retire from the cabinet nearly a year later, it was not because of aggressive factional hostility in Pennsylvania, but because a representative committee of the financial men of New York and Philadelphia demanded the retirement of Cameron as an absolute necessity to facilitate the handling of the additional loans required.

On my first visit to Washington after Cameron had been installed in the War Office, I called upon him and we went out and dined together alone in a private room at one of the large restaurants of the city. Neither of us ever misunderstood the other. We had no political interests of a personal character which were in common, and our personal relations were always pleasant, while we were seldom or never in accord in political movements. In the many disputes which arose in the State during the earnest factional struggle between Curtin and Cameron, and in the disputes which often arose between the Governor and Cameron as Secretary of War, we often met and agreed upon conditions and compromises, all of which were faithfully fulfilled on both sides.

Strange as it may seem, neither Cameron nor Curtin controlled most of the important and lucrative Presidential appointments in Philadelphia. Colonel Thomas was made collector as a representative of the original Abolitionists, and chiefly because Secretary Chase very earnestly urged it. Mr. Wallace was

made naval officer by Mrs. Lincoln because he was closely related to her by marriage, and the only important appointment made by Cameron in his own interest was that of Representative Walborn as postmaster. Governor Pollock was assigned to the mint, with the cordial assent of both Cameron and Curtin, but Cameron practically controlled all of the foreign and most of the army appointments. The post offices throughout the State were controlled by the Representatives, when Republicans, and prominent men in each county were indicated by the Senators who dispensed them in Democratic districts. The factional feeling would have been increased to white heat, and probably violent and revolutionary action, but for the appalling events bringing us visibly each day nearer to civil war, which made even the most earnest factionist forget all but his interest in averting fratricidal conflict.

XLII.

QUAY'S ADVENT INTO STATE POLITICS.

How He was Appointed Prothonotary just when of Age—Made Private Secretary to Governor Curtin—Although Unassuming, He soon Became the Most Important Political Counsellor—Appointed Colonel of a Regiment in 1862—Forced March to Antietam—Forced by Curtin to Resign as Colonel to Become Military State Agent at Washington—Resignation Accepted and Mustered Out Just Before the Battle of Fredericksburg—Volunteered to Serve on Tyler's Staff—One of the Officers who Led the Bloody Charge at St. Marie Heights—Enters the Legislature in 1866—Curtin Candidate for Speaker in 1867—Defeated by Senatorial Combination Made by Cameron—How Quay Became Associated with Cameron—From Lieutenant Became Leader of the Cameron Dynasty.

THE inauguration of Governor Curtin first brought into prominence as a political factor Matthew Stanley Quay, who was until then little known in political circles beyond his own immediate neighborhood of Beaver.

Some time in 1855, when Curtin was secretary of the commonwealth and I was State superintendent of public printing, Curtin sent for me one morning and informed me that there was a vacancy in the prothonotaryship of Beaver County, caused by the death of the incumbent, and that Rev. Mr. Quay, whose home was once in the Cumberland valley, where Senator Quay was born and was well known to both of us personally, had a son Matthew, then a resident of Beaver, who had just reached his majority and was an unusually bright and promising young man. I had never met the younger Quay, and Curtin's acquaintance with him was limited, but we both cherished great affection for Quay's father,

and with the very favorable reports as to the qualities of the son, Curtin asked me to join him in an appeal to Governor Pollock to appoint young Quay to the prothonotaryship.

Pollock had a very weak side for the Presbyterian clergy; was very easily persuaded to issue the commission, and young Quay entered the prothonotary's office when he was little over twenty-one years of age. That the appointment was a very acceptable one became evident, as Quay was elected to the office the following fall, and at the end of his first term was re-elected without serious contest.

When Curtin became Governor he was naturally desirous to have a thoroughly competent private secretary, and he voluntarily tendered the appointment to young Quay, who promptly accepted and made his entry into the field of State politics with the beginning of Curtin's administration.

When I met him he did not at first impress me as a man of more than ordinary parts. He was extremely modest and unassuming in manner, with a defective sight in one eye that made his face expressionless, excepting when very warmly aroused in conversation. Under ordinary conditions he might have filled the place of secretary to the Governor without commanding the special attention of the political leaders of the State, but the most momentous events were crowded upon us at Harrisburg immediately after Curtin assumed his official duties, and Quay soon became recognized as one of the most valuable of all the men connected with the administration in meeting sudden and severe emergencies. He possessed wonderfully keen perception, broad intelligence, and was nothing if not heroic when opportunity offered. He made no visible effort to advance himself or magnify his own importance. On the contrary, he was

very unobtrusive and counseled only when he was invited, and he speedily developed into a most important aid to the Governor.

When war came, and Pennsylvania had scores of thousands of soldiers in the field, the rule was at once adopted by the Governor that every soldier's letter addressed to him should be answered, no matter how trivial or unreasonable might be its request, and Quay was the man who executed to the letter that part of the new duties the Governor had accepted. Thousands of letters written to the Governor by soldiers, which the Governor never saw, were carefully read by Quay and as carefully answered with Curtin's signature, written by Quay so perfectly that Curtin himself could not have disputed it. When important letters were received the Governor was consulted, and every such letter, whether from the humblest soldier or the highest commander, received prompt attention, and the wishes of the soldier were always complied with if within the range of possibility.

In like manner Quay issued the hundreds of military commissions which Curtin ordered, and signed the Governor's name to them, certified by the great seal of the Commonwealth. He was tireless in his devotion to his duties night and day, and there was no feature of administration policy that Quay did not as thoroughly understand as did Curtin himself, and the Governor and the entire cabinet soon learned to appreciate him as one of the most important members of the administration.

He was especially valuable in devising ways and carrying into execution plans which often had to be adopted by the Governor in dealing with an unfriendly Legislature. He was personally popular with all the members of both branches regardless of their political faith, and when the elections of 1861 lost the Repub-

licans the control of the house he was an important factor in consummating the difficult combination that restored the Republicans to power by a combination with the War Democrats.

He was then the same silent man that he ever remained even to the later days when he attained omnipotence in his party. No man could dictate more adroitly and satisfactorily the answers to the hundreds of letters the Governor at times received every day, and when it was necessary to give a political pointer to the press of the State he was not only always ready, but thoroughly equipped for the task.

After he had served as private secretary to the Governor for nearly a year and a half a requisition was made on Pennsylvania for some seventeen or eighteen thousand troops. Quay was very desirous to go to the field in command of a regiment, and one from his section of the State was earnest in urging his appointment as colonel. The Governor, who was very reluctant to spare him, felt that it was due to Quay to give him the opportunity, and Quay went to the field. He had no chance while in command of his regiment to participate in any important battle. While McClellan was fighting the battle of Antietam General Humphrey's division, to which Quay's regiment belonged, made a forced march to reinforce the Army of the Potomac, and they reached the rear of McClellan's army, after a whole day and nearly all-night march, not long before daylight the morning after the battle. I had been on the field during the conflict, and hearing that part of the Humphrey division had arrived I went to the rear immediately after breakfast and found Quay, who had taken a few hours' sleep in his fatigue uniform and boots, expecting to be summoned into action immediately after daylight. In the early part of the day they were marched

on the field and placed in position, but to their surprise the order of battle was never given, and the armies of Lee and McClellan faced each other throughout the entire day without firing a hostile gun. On the following morning Lee's army had disappeared by marching quietly away during the night and recrossing the Potomac into Virginia without pursuit.

Quay remained with McClellan during his protracted stay in Maryland and his sluggish march into Virginia and to Warren, where McClellan was relieved of command and Burnside succeeded him.

About that time very serious complaints were made against the management of the military State agency at Washington. All of the Northern States had what was known as a military State agent located in Washington, to whom all applications of soldiers for furloughs and various other matters of interest were referred by the Governors, and these agents had ready access to all of the Government departments; and the complaints and requests of the soldiers were thus promptly considered and every favor extended to them that was consistent with the military service. It was a very important trust for Pennsylvania and required a man of thorough familiarity with routine government affairs, and who would zealously perform his exacting duties. A change was an absolute necessity, and Governor Curtin, after carefully considering the situation, decided that Colonel Quay was altogether the best equipped man for the place, and notified him that he would be appointed.

Quay earnestly objected to leaving his command when it was probable that it would be engaged in battle before many weeks, but the necessities of the soldiers were so pressing that the Governor was peremptory in requiring Quay's acceptance. He for-

warded his resignation, giving the reason for it, and before the army reached Fredericksburg his resignation was accepted and he was mustered out of service.

About the same time his regiment was paid off, and he remained at the earnest request of a number of his men to receive the money they wanted to send to their homes. Some $8,000 were thus deposited with him, which he obtained in notes of large denominations and secured in a belt that he fastened upon his person. Just then the battle of Fredericksburg loomed up, and Quay was unwilling to leave. He volunteered to serve on General Tyler's staff, which brought him into the command that made the bloody and fruitless charge on St. Marie Heights. He went into that charge forgetful of the money belted upon his person, and was in the forefront of that sanguinary and utterly hopeless struggle, but he escaped without a scratch when nearly half the men who started out with him were among the dead or wounded when the retreat was ordered. He has been awarded the medal of honor for his heroic action at Fredericksburg, and no man in the army ever more justly merited it.

After Fredericksburg Quay assumed the duties of his office in Washington as military State agent, and held the position until the close of the war.

In the fall of 1865 he was elected to the house and was at once accepted as the Republican leader of the party, as was emphasized by his appointment as chairman of ways and means. He gave notice at the opening of the session that all important State appropriations would be disposed of in time for an early adjournment, and he reported the general appropriation bill earlier than it had been reported for many years and pressed it rapidly to final passage.

He seldom participated in debate beyond rising at times to make a brief explanation of some appropriation, but no leader of a legislative body ever held its business more completely in hand or directed it more successfully and with little or no friction.

In 1866 he was re-elected and was the leader of the Curtin forces in the Legislature. A United States Senator was to be elected and Curtin and Cameron were early in the field and locked horns for another desperate struggle for Senatorial honors. There were other candidates, including Galsuha A. Grow, J. Kennedy Moorehead, Thaddeus Stevens, Colonel Forney and some others of less note. A decided majority of the Republicans elected to the Legislature were either distinctly pledged or instructed to support Curtin for Senator. As Curtin was regarded as the most formidable of the candidates, Cameron, with his rare sagacity in manipulating political movements, was enabled to unite the field against Curtin in the organization of the house. Quay was the accepted Curtin candidate for speaker, and had he been successful Curtin's election would inevitably have followed. Quay and Curtin realized that they had a desperate battle for the speakership, and Cameron adroitly brought Stevens with his Lancaster delegation, Grow with his northern following, Moorehead with his western men, many of whom were pledged to Curtin for Senator, into the support of Representative Glass, of Allegheny, and Quay was defeated for the speakership by the combination, and Cameron was in a position to reap all the profits of the victory.

The contest for Senator was one of the most desperate and demoralizing ever witnessed at Harrisburg since 1855. A number of legislators who were instructed for Curtin or publicly and solemnly pledged to support him deserted to the Cameron fold, and several

days before the caucus met it was known to Curtin and Quay and their friends that Cameron would receive a majority in the Senatorial caucus.

J. Donald Cameron first made himself felt as a very important political factor in that contest, as he directed the battle for his father's election, and thereafter was the actual leader of the Cameron forces of the State. When he had a clear majority of the Republicans assured for the support of his father in the caucus he very shrewdly directed his efforts to prevent a bolt, as he apprehended that Curtin's friends might make a combination with the Democrats and defeat the elder Cameron. He invited a conference with Quay, presented the situation to him, declared that they had no purpose of ostracising the friends of Curtin, and appealed to Quay to harmonize the party by moving to make the nomination of Cameron unanimous after the majority had voted for him.

I was present when Quay consulted with Curtin as to the course he should pursue, after stating frankly his interview with the younger Cameron, and said he would be guided by the advice that Curtin had to give. Curtin informed him that he did not intend to lead a bolt against the Republican party and declared that Quay was entirely free to exercise his own judgment in the matter.

After further conferences with Cameron Quay decided that he would move the unanimous nomination of the elder Cameron after the majority should declare in his favor in the caucus. Several other prominent supporters of Curtin were then sent for by Cameron and finally induced to follow Quay in the movement, among whom were Representatives Elisha W. Davis and Jacob E. Ridgway, of Philadelphia, neither of whom would have deserted Curtin and fallen into the support of Cameron if Curtin had decided to bolt

the caucus, and Cameron's election to the Senate followed by nearly a full party vote.

Cameron's election to the Senate in 1867 made him absolute master of the political situation in Pennsylvania, and from that day on until our own time the Cameron dynasty maintained its power, with Don Cameron succeeding his father and Quay succeeding the younger Cameron. Cameron had triumphed in the Republican State convention of 1866 by nominating Geary, who, when elected Governor, became the willing and earnest partisan of Cameron. Thus, with Cameron in the Senate and with the absolute control of the State authority, Cameron's triumph was complete. That it was not acceptable to the Republican people of the State was evidenced by the defeat of the party in the fall of 1867 as an echo of Cameron's election to the Senate by a Legislature that was pledged to Curtin. In that contest the late Chief Justice Sharswood was elected to the supreme bench as the Democratic candidate against Justice Williams, of Pittsburg.

Curtin and his friends were practically powerless in the State, and those who maintained their hostility to Cameron were systematically and severely punished in the legislative and congressional districts. It soon became known that there were very few congressional or senatorial districts in the State in which a Republican could be nominated who was opposed to Cameron, and the men of ambition were simply compelled to choose between going along with the Cameron organization or giving up all hope of political preferment. Quay was young, ambitious and sincerely devoted to the faith of the Republican party, and he gravitated along with the Cameron tide.

The Republican State convention of 1868, the year after Cameron was elected to the Senate, had a

decided anti-Cameron majority, as may be judged by the fact that the delegation sent to Chicago to nominate Grant for President made Colonel Forney its chairman, and when he became ill in Chicago and unable to act, it chose me as chairman to take his place, and its anti-Cameron sentiment was further emphasized by instructing the delegation to support Curtin for Vice-President.

One of Grant's first appointments after entering the Presidency was that of Curtin as Minister to Russia, and Curtin was absent from the State for nearly four years, and as the National administration heartily supported Cameron in the matter of appointments the Curtin followers in the State gradually drifted into a powerless element.

When Curtin returned it was to lead a rebellion against the Republican organization in 1872, and that entirely obliterated Curtin as a factor in Republican politics. Quay thus logically drifted into the Cameron political control of the State, and his later record as a Cameron lieutenant, and finally as leader of leaders, must illumine future chapters of these Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, as no important political events in the State during the last quarter of a century can be truthfully written with Quay's name omitted.

XLIII.

BUSINESS INTERESTS DEMANDED PEACE.

Philadelphia Then the Great Emporium of the Southern Trade—Dinner Given to the Author as Chairman of the Lincoln-Curtin State Committee—Importunities From Business Interests Against Any Expressions Offensive to the South—Curtin's Deliverance was Regarded as Most Important, and it was Studiedly Conservative—MacVeagh's Plain Speech—Pennsylvania Militia Practically Without Organization—Conference with Lincoln After the Surrender of Sumter—Curtin's Strong Organization—Washington and Baltimore Cut Off from the North — General Patterson Makes Requisition for 25,000 Additional Troops—Order Recalled by Secretary of War when Telegraph Line was Opened—Pennsylvania Reserve Corps Organized—Offered to the Government Before the Battle of Bull Run, but Refused—Importunate Calls for the Reserves After the Defeat at Bull Run.

ONLY the very few yet living who were in touch with public affairs in 1860–61, can have any just conception of the general sentiment of the North on the subject of fratricidal war. All classes and conditions shuddered at the idea of such a conflict, and the whole North was appalled at the prospect of a bloody sectional struggle. After the election of Lincoln there was a general cessation of public political discussion, as all seemed to await developments, not knowing what grave problems would be presented for solution.

Curtin gave no public utterance on the political situation after the election of Lincoln until he was called upon to appear, in the early part of December, 1860, at a public dinner given to me at the Continental Hotel as a compliment for the successful direction of

the Lincoln-Curtin campaign. There were over 400 guests, embracing the leading men of the party from every section of the State, and Morton McMichael presided. None of the Southern States had seceded at that time, but it was well known that South Carolina would formally declare her relations with the Union severed within a few days, and that all of the Cotton States were certain to follow. The hope of those then responsibly charged with the direction of affairs in the Northern States was that Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky and Tennessee might be held in loyalty to the Union, and it was deemed an imperative duty to strengthen the Union sentiment in those States by the most generous and forbearing policy toward the South.

Philadelphia was so conservative on the sectional issue that a majority of some 2,000 was given against Curtin, although Lincoln was given a decided majority in November when his election was inevitable. Philadelphia was then the great emporium of Southern commerce, and her merchants were compelled to face the fearful problem of sacrificing millions of dollars due from their Southern customers. I well remember the interview between committee after committee of Philadelphia business men with Curtin and myself during the day on the evening of which the dinner was to be given. Any public expression from Curtin under the circumstances would be of the widest National interest, and I never heard more earnest appeals made to any man than were made to Curtin by the commercial interests of Philadelphia to avoid offensive expressions in his speech at the dinner.

Of course, as the guest of honor I was expected to speak somewhat elaborately, but it was well known that whatever I might say would be in entire accord with the utterances of my chief. It was not a question

of sentiment with the business men of Philadelphia. With many of them it was a question of bankruptcy, and none seemed to see beyond the dark cloud of civil war the slightest silver lining to give promise of future prosperity.

The speeches delivered by Curtin and myself were not in any degree changed by the appeals of the Philadelphia business men. Governor Curtin well understood that any address from him that could be even distorted into a wanton provocation of the South would be overwhelmingly condemned. All still hoped that in some way civil war could be averted, and as long as that hope was cherished it was the plain and imperious duty of all in authority in Pennsylvania to interpose no needless obstacles for the restoration of peaceful relations between the sections.

The portions of both our speeches relating to the threatened civil war were carefully prepared so that they could not be misunderstood or misinterpreted, and they were but a very small portion of each address. There was an ample field for the speakers of the occasion to cover without assuming the role of prophesy as to civil war, or without utterances which could be accepted by the South as a direct menace to the tranquillity of the nation. The speeches declared unqualifiedly that every constitutional right of the South must be sacredly maintained, and the most generous comity between sister commonwealths should be accepted for the fulfillment of every lawful obligation, and the question of civil war was not discussed beyond the simple declaration that the unity of the States must be preserved regardless of the necessary sacrifice.

It was not at all a hilarious dinner, as all were sobered by the terrible apprehension of civil war and the general disruption of all commercial and business inter-

ests of the country. Mr. McMichael opened the speech-making by one of the ablest of his many able deliverances, and as he had been one of the most active of the business men of the city in conferring with Curtin and others who were to speak, as to the necessity of carefully guarded expressions on the sectional issue, he set the pace for all by declaring for full and generous justice to every section of the country, followed by the declaration that the maintenance of the unity of the Republic was the paramount duty of every citizen.

There were many unusually able speeches, as the vast company remained until long after the midnight hour, and not one of the speakers uttered an offensive criticism of the South, while all were very positive in the expression that the Union was indivisible and must be so maintained.

Some time about one o'clock, when President McMichael arose and was about to declare the adjournment, a young man arose in a distant part of the room from the chairman, and asked to be briefly heard. I had never met him, and his slender frame and generally youthful appearance indicated that a sophomoric infliction was in store for us. This young man was Wayne McVeagh, of West Chester, since then Foreign Minister and Attorney General of the United States, but then little known outside of Chester County. His voice rang out clear and made his positive expressions on the sectional issue command the attention of every one present. He bravely told the truth about the utterances of the evening, that they were constrained, and, as he feared, might be misleading, and in fifteen or twenty minutes of eloquence that not only surprised but commanded the admiration of all his hearers, he declared that the South was in causeless rebellion, and that the North must meet it and declare its purpose to

accept civil war if necessary. His remarks grated harshly upon the conservative commercial interests so largely represented, but all felt that he had uttered the truth, and while many regretted it because it was deemed inexpedient, all profoundly respected not only the ability, but the courage and manliness of the speaker.

Pennsylvania had only a nominal militia system at that time. The military committee of the senate, of which I was then chairman, had not met for years, and the people of the State had ceased to feel any interest in maintaining the militia. Our laws required that all citizens subject to military duty should meet once a year for military drill, and what were known as the militia reviews were maintained only in the most farcical way. The most important centers had one or more uniformed volunteer companies which graced Fourth of July celebrations and other ceremonial occasions, but we were practically without any trained military force in the State.

I prepared a bill for the reorganization of our militia with an appropriation of $500,000, but it was deemed inexpedient to press it to passage, as it would be proclaimed as a public threat of war on the South, and it was allowed to slumber until Sumter was fired upon, and despatches telling the appalling story of the progress of the bombardment of Sumter's starving garrison were read from time to time by the clerk of the senate.

Lincoln summoned Curtin and myself to Washington in the evening, and we took the first train and were at the White House at ten o'clock the following morning. War was then upon us, and Pennsylvania was the State of all the Northern Commonwealths whose attitude would be looked to with the greatest interest both North and South, alike because of her material power

and her immediate interests in a war that would probably reach her own border.

A brief conference with the President, General Scott and Secretary of War Cameron settled the attitude that Pennsylvania should assume. Curtin had given the matter the most careful reflection, and his views were accepted without modification. We returned from Washington the same day and that night passed the bill through both branches, and it had Curtin's official approval before the dawn of another day.

The President's call for troops had been responded to by all the Northern States offering vastly more than could be accepted, and Pennsylvania offered the largest excess over her quota.

Notwithstanding the fact that both sections were raising great armies to support their respective flags, it was very generally believed that war could be averted, and even those who could see no possible solution of the issue hoped against hope. The Peace Commission was in session at Washington, and Crittenden, in the House, and John Bell and Andrew Johnson, in the Senate, speaking for the South, were making exhaustive efforts for pacification.

The Legislature had performed all its important State duties when Sumter was fired upon, and, after appropriating half a million for the reorganization of the militia, and seeing that Pennsylvania offered enough, and more than enough, troops herself to fill the whole requisition made by the general government upon the States, the Legislature adjourned *sine die* on the 18th of April, less than a week after the surrender of Sumter; but almost immediately after the legislative adjournment new conditions suddenly arose by an eruption of the Southern supporters in Baltimore, that not only made the city the prey of the mob, but destroyed the railway and telegraph lines between

Washington and the North, and stopped all railway and telegraph communications with Washington for nearly three days.

Governor Curtin at once summoned the Legislature to meet in extraordinary session on the 30th of April, just twelve days after adjournment, and it then became necessary for him to speak with emphasis for Pennsylvania, defining her attitude in the terrible struggle that confronted her. Curtin at once gathered around him a staff of very capable men. Reuben C. Hale, a prominent Democrat, of Lewistown, was made quartermaster general, and General Irwin, of Beaver, was made commissary general. These men had important duties to perform, and were in the regular military service of the State, but Curtin's personal aids were with him day and night, and embraced some of the ablest men of the State. Among them were Colonel Thomas A. Scott, of the Pennsylvania Railroad; Colonel John A. Wright, the head of the large steel works near Lewistown; J. Brown Parker, of Carlisle, a leading member of the bar, and Francis Jordan, of Bedford, formerly senator and later secretary of the commonwealth. Fitz John Porter, then a major on General Scott's staff, who had been sent on by Scott to Harrisburg before the communications were interrupted, to report to General Patterson, just made commander of the Department of Pennsylvania, was one of the circle of men who were called upon to act in the darkest days of our Civil War, when Pennsylvania was cut off from the Capital, and when a day's delay in important action might be fatal.

I can never forget the earnestness and solemnity of the conference held in the Executive chamber at which all the gentlemen of Curtin's personal staff, whom I have named, were present, with General Patterson and Major Fitz John Porter. Troops were moving rapidly toward Washington from the West, but we could get

Wayne MacVeagh

no information from either Baltimore or Washington, and it was accepted as necessary for the present to halt the volunteers at a safe distance from Baltimore. A large number were pushed on as far as York and there halted. Colonel Scott gave his whole attention to handling the troops on his railway, then but a single track, and I saw him sit for thirty-six hours by his battery in the Executive department, during which time he ran every train on his road west of Harrisburg out on schedule time and never even made a memorandum. When not engaged in telegraphing orders for various trains he participated freely in the conference. General Patterson, a veteran of two wars and commander of the department, was naturally looked to for controlling advice as to how to meet the perilous situation. He thought it probable that Beauregard would march from Charlestown upon Washington, as Beauregard could have done without difficulty, and entrench himself in the Capital of the nation. When asked what his plans were, he said, without waiting for authority from a government which he could not reach, that he regarded it as his duty to make a requisition upon Governor Curtin for 25,000 additional troops to serve for three years or during the war, and in a very few minutes it was decided that the requisition should be made. The clerks speedily put Patterson's requisition in form, and he signed it and delivered it to the Governor, and thirty minutes later the proclamation, prepared by Curtin himself, was signed and given to the Associated Press, calling for volunteers to fill the requisition for 25,000 men made by the commander of the department.

Some time during the early morning hours George H. Moore, then clerk of the quarter sessions of Philadelphia, and an associate, whose name I do not recall, reached the Executive chamber and brought us news

from Washington twenty-four hours old. They had taken a circuitous route to Harper's Ferry, then by Hagerstown and Chambersburg to Harrisburg. The only news they brought us was that there was no information of Beauregard marching upon Washington, but that there was universal demoralization in the Capital, and general apprehension that it would be captured within a week or ten days.

The next question to be determined at this memorable conference was what to do with the many thousands of troops which were accumulated between Harrisburg and York, with thousands more on their way from the West.

General Patterson was somewhat conservative, and he advised that the troops should be moved so as not to come in conflict with Baltimore, and I shall ever remember the flash that came from the keen, dark eyes of Fitz John Porter when he answered Patterson, that if he had command of those troops he "would march them to the National Capital through Baltimore or over its ashes."

Patterson decided to take no action until he could hear from Washington, and the following day telegraph communication was restored.

The first message sent from Harrisburg was from Curtin stating that General Patterson had made a requisition upon him for 25,000 additional troops; that he had issued a call for them, and that the quota would be filled within twenty-four hours, needing only to be concentrated and organized. To the utter surprise of both Curtin and Patterson, the first response from Washington was notice that the troops could not be accepted, as they were not needed.

Curtin and Patterson joined in the most earnest appeal to the government to accept the troops to be organized under Patterson's requisition, and Senator

Sherman, who came to Harrisburg to volunteer as an aid on General Patterson's staff, hastened back to Washington, as the representative of General Patterson and the Governor, to urge the acceptance of the troops, but Secretary Cameron was resolute in his refusal. It was one of the very few mistakes that Cameron made in the practical direction of public affairs, but he shared the general conviction of army officers and of our public men generally that there could be no protracted war; that at the most not more than one general engagement would take place without bringing about some adjustment between North and South, and the question of expense was then a fearful one to contemplate, as it was with the greatest difficulty that the first $50,000,000 loan of the government could be negotiated at all on favorable terms. When the first loan of $50,000,000 was finally consummated after extraordinary efforts, through the financiers of the country, the representative men who handled the loan gave distinct notice that the credit of the government could not be maintained if additional loans were required. Financial conditions had doubtless much to do in deciding the government authorities to restrain expenditures to the uttermost.

The refusal of the government to accept the troops called by General Patterson's requisition placed the Governor in a most embarrassing position. His call for the volunteers was published in all the papers of the State the morning after he had issued it, and long before the night of the same day twice or thrice the number called for were offered by telegrams covering every section of the State. The call for troops gave notice that immediate transportation would be furnished for volunteers to Harrisburg, where they would be organized, and some thousands of them were on their way to the Capital within twenty-four

hours after they heard of the call. Camp Curtin was organized and temporary provision made for them, but what was the Governor to do with them? To send them home would have been to chill the tidal wave of patriotism that had brought them so hastily to the defense of the country, and Curtin and Patterson were entirely convinced that the safety of Pennsylvania itself demanded that they should be organized as a State corps, thoroughly officered, given some military training, and then be subject to the call of the State or National government as emergency might require.

When the Legislature met in extraordinary session on the 30th of April, Curtin presented all the facts relating to his call for troops, and appealed to the Legislature to organize a Pennsylvania Reserve Corps. The Legislature promptly responded, provided a loan to defray the necessary expenses, and the Pennsylvania Reserves, whose heroism has made lustrous nearly every battlefield of the Army of the Potomac after the first defeat at Bull Run, were carefully officered, organized and placed in camps in different sections of the State, entirely at the expense of the State. The law under which they were organized provided that they should first be sworn into the service of the State, but that they should be subject to the call of the government at any time, when they would be mustered into the National service. The most competent officers were employed by the Governor to train the Reserves in their various camps, and the strictest discipline was enforced from the start.

Early in June, when it was known that a forward movement of McDowell's army was to be made against Manassas, Governor Curtin had some 16,000 thoroughly organized volunteers in Pennsylvania, and most of them as well, if not better, disciplined than the three months' volunteers in McDowell's army. He wrote

to the War Department advising it that he had this force in Pennsylvania that could be utilized in part or in whole in the coming battle at Manassas, but the proffer was not accepted. One of the regiments, commanded by Colonel Biddle, of Philadelphia, was finally accepted and ordered to the Potomac near Hancock, and another of the regiments was called into service somewhere on the upper Potomac.

When the battle of Bull Run was fought and McDowell's army retreated in confusion into the defenses of Washington, Curtin received more than a hundred telegrams from the President, the War Department, and from public men in Washington, most of them, however, from Colonel Thomas A. Scott, then Assistant Secretary of War, pleading most earnestly for him to hasten his Reserves to Washington for the protection of the Capital. He was urged to move them night and day from the distant points of the State, and enforce preference on all the railroads to speed their march for the protection of the government that had refused them, and that could not have failed to win a decisive victory at Manassas had the Pennsylvania Reserves been added to McDowell's command.

The Reserves were then immediately mustered into the National service, and all the expenses of the State incurred in the organization, drilling and support of the corps were repaid by the government. Never were more welcome sounds heard in the National Capital than the tread of the Pennsylvania Reserves as they marched down Pennsylvania avenue after McDowell had retreated into the Washington fortifications, as their presence assured the safety of the Capital.

XLIV.

REPEAL OF THE TONNAGE TAX.

One of the Most Desperate Struggles of Our Legislative History—Bitterly Opposed by the General Hostility to Corporations, Although Faith of the State Pledged to the Repeal—Col. Scott's Heroic Efforts to Organize the State and Make His Railway a Through Line—Deadlock in the Senate for Several Weeks—Interesting Debate in the Senate on the Final Passage of the Bill—Penny and Clymer Lead to Fight Against It—The Measure Clearly Right, but Opposed by Violent Popular Prejudice—Many Legislators Fell Who Supported the Bill—Its Final Passage Opened the Way for Pennsylvania Advancing.

THE most important question before the Legislature of 1861, outside of items of absorbing interest relating to the war, was the proposition to repeal the tax imposed upon the tonnage of the Pennsylvania Railroad.

When the company was chartered in 1846, after a bitter contest with the Baltimore & Ohio Railway Company, seeking the right of way through Pennsylvania to the West, the friends of each of the contending corporations sought to impose the severest restrictions upon the franchise of its competitor, and it was not difficult for the friends of the Baltimore & Ohio, with the very general and deep-seated prejudice that prevailed among the people of the State against all corporations, to insert a provision in the Pennsylvania charter requiring them to pay a tax of five mills per ton per mile on all freight carried upon its line. As the Pennsylvania Railroad paralleled the State canals, the tax upon tonnage was inserted ostensibly for the protection of the State works, and as

great through lines from the East to the far West were then hardly contemplated, little objection was made to this extraordinary tax.

The Pennsylvania Railroad was expected to be practically a local line, and as it charged the full tax to those who transported freight over it, it was a tax upon the people rather than upon the corporation; but viewed from the present advancement of railways, when the great Pennsylvania corporation receives only about five mills per ton per mile for its entire freight traffic, the utter absurdity of maintaining such a tax will be understood, as even a quarter of such a tax imposed to-day would prohibit the Pennsylvania Company from competing with its great trunk rivals north and south for Western trade.

When the railroad had got into operation, and the transporters discovered that they were simply paying the tax to the State if they used the Pennsylvania line, while all transporters on the other railroad lines of the State paid no such tax, the revulsion of public sentiment began on the subject, and the Legislature reduced the tax from five mills to three mills per ton per mile. As our industries were developed it was found impossible for our coal or lumber industries to transport their products to market in competition with other sections unless the tax was repealed, and the Legislature, after an earnest struggle, repealed the tax on coal and lumber.

As I explained in a former chapter, the Pennsylvania Company expected to be relieved of this tax by the bill under whose provisions it purchased the main line of the State, but the supreme court declared that feature of the act unconstitutional, and the Pennsylvania Company was compelled to accept the State works with the tonnage tax remaining. In the mean-

time Philadelphia began to reach out for Western trade in competition with New York and Baltimore, both with untaxed trunk lines north and south, but it was impossible for Philadelphia to obtain a fair share of it.

The question was brought up before the Legislature year after year and the ablest of arguments were delivered time and again by William B. Foster, vice-president; Theodore Cuyler, solicitor for the company, and by others, but, while none could reasonably dispute that the tax was an arbitrary prohibition of Pennsylvania commerce, the general feeling against corporations throughout the State was so intense that no Legislature could venture to repeal the tax on tonnage.

As I have explained in a former chapter, the company contested the constitutionality of the tax, carrying it through all the courts, during which time over $800,000 of taxes had accumulated, but the supreme court could do no less than sustain the act of the Legislature that had been accepted by the corporation, and in the session of 1860, when the Pennsylvania Company was sorely pressed by the general business revulsion that began in 1857, and when it could not have paid the amount without very serious financial embarrassment, an understanding was reached by which the whole question was delayed for a year, and the leading friends of Curtin were pledged to support the repeal after his election as Governor.

Although Colonel Scott had conducted one of the most vigorous and comprehensive educational campaigns during the entire year of 1860 by elaborate publications in nearly all of the newspapers of the State at considerable cost, and with all the attention he had given in support of the election of many Legislative candidates, when the Legislature convened

crats were elected to the House by the support of the Republicans.

Governor Curtin visited Washington certainly half a dozen times during the fall of 1861 to urge the vigorous prosecution of the war. President Lincoln and War Secretary Cameron both shared Curtin's anxiety, and, although the weather was unusually favorable throughout the fall for army movements, with excellent roads, the Army of the Potomac remained in its Washington camp until midwinter, when McClellan suffered a severe attack of illness, and the President assumed the responsibility of ordering a general advance of the army on the 22d of February, 1862. That order was withdrawn when the President reluctantly yielded to General McClellan's assurances that the advance would be made at an early day. Finally the movement was made upon Manassas, which was found deserted by the Confederate forces, with the defences mounted with wooden imitation guns.

Governor Curtin inaugurated his wonderful system for the care of the Pennsylvania soldiers in the field and in the hospitals early in the fall of 1861. He appointed commissioners representing the State to visit soldiers in the field, and especially sick and wounded in the hospitals, and see that they had every necessary provision for their comfort. I have stated in a former chapter that every Pennsylvania soldier who addressed a letter on any subject, however trivial, received a direct answer from the Executive chamber over the name of the Governor, and he was entirely in advance of all the Northern executives in making provision for the care of our State troops. He carried that theory to the extent of early legislation providing for the body of every Pennsylvania soldier who died on the field, in a hospital, or anywhere in the military service, to be brought home at the expense of the State for burial with his kindred.

Curtin's affection for his soldiers was that of the most loving father for his own children. A man clad in his country's blue, although without insignia of command, always was the first of the visitors admitted into the Executive chamber. It soon became well understood throughout the Pennsylvania portion of the army that Governor Curtin was the "Soldiers' Friend," and by that title he was known not only to every Pennsylvanian in the service, but in the home of every soldier in the Commonwealth.

No matter how grave or exacting were his official duties, the presence of a soldier, however humble, always received welcome and attention, and it was the grateful appreciation of this devotion of Curtin to the Pennsylvania soldiers that re-elected him in 1863, when some 70,000 Pennsylvania soldiers were not permitted to vote for Governor, as the amendment to our Constitution permitting soldiers to vote in the field was not accomplished until 1864. The soldiers could not vote for Curtin's re-election themselves, but earnest appeals came to the home of nearly every soldier of the State urging fathers, brothers and friends to support the Soldiers' Friend for re-election, and thus, while Pennsylvania troops were disfranchised, it is quite probable that they exerted even a greater influence upon the election, by bringing Democratic relatives and friends to the support of Curtin, than if they had been permitted to vote themselves.

If a despatch or a letter came to the Governor, even from the most distant section of the Union, telling the story of a sick or wounded soldier who needed attention, it was the first matter to be disposed of, and always in favor of the soldier to the uttermost.

I was one of the party that accompanied him when he delivered the State flags to the Pennsylvania Reserves at Tennallytown, in the presence of President

Lincoln, General McClellan, Secretary Cameron and a host of other dignitaries, and the affection exhibited by the soldiers, officers and privates, as he gave them their State standards, and expressed his entire confidence that they would bring them back with honor, was one of the most beautiful spectacles I ever witnessed. When he had completed his work, passing from regiment to regiment and handing each the standard of the State, he was quite overcome as the last flag passed into the hands of the commander of a regiment. With quivering lips and tear-dimmed eyes he raised his hand and said: "God bless you and preserve the flag."

After the flags had been delivered, a ceremony that was witnessed by a considerable portion of the army, a party consisting of eight or ten, headed by McClellan and Lincoln, rode around the entire army of the Potomac on horseback, a journey that occupied more than half the day. The only important feature of that ride, as I recall it, was the incident of McClellan stopping the entire party at one point and calling Mr. Lincoln's attention to the fact that they were for the first time outside of the Union lines, that is, beyond the Union pickets, although the Union picket line was not far in our rear. President Lincoln answered in his quaint way, that he thought it would be a very good place to leave, in which the entire party, including General McClellan, heartily concurred.

Curtin did not leave a single Pennsylvania regiment unvisited on that occasion, and I well remember the satisfaction that all felt the evening after the work of the day and the journey had been accomplished, because of the superb organization of the Army of the Potomac by McClellan, which, as we believed, would capture Richmond before the frosts of autumn came again. How sadly all were disappointed is a story too well known to all to need repetition.

XLVI.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN 1861.

Inaction of the Army Strengthened Opposition to the War — No State Ticket to Elect in Pennsylvania—The Author, as Chairman of the State Committee, with the Approval of Curtin, Made Combination with War Democrats — John Rowe of Franklin, John Scott of Huntingdon, Cyrus L. Pershing of Cambria, and Other War Democrats Nominated for the Legislature by the Republicans — War Democrats Held the Balance of Power in the House — Republicans Unite with Them and Make Rowe Speaker—Hopkins and Williams Lead in an Investigation of the Passage of the Repeal of the Tonnage Tax — An Able and Clean Committee Appointed — Col. Scott then Assistant Secretary of War — Efforts to get Him as a Witness — Sergeant-at-Arms Sent Several Times to Subpœna Scott, but after a Conference with Scott Reported that Scott could not be Found—Williams Appeals to Secretary Stanton — Senator Wilmot Carried the Case Frankly to President Lincoln — Scott Ordered to the Army in the Southwest.

THE adjournment of the Legislature of 1861 left the State in a most confused and unpromising political condition. Pennsylvania at that time was not a Republican State. If Curtin had been nominated as a distinct Republican candidate for Governor in 1860 his defeat would have been inevitable, and it was only by holding the old Whigs, the Know Nothings, the radical Republicans and the anti-slavery Democrats in some sort of united battle line under the flag of the People's party that the defeat of the Democrats was assured in 1860 and in the two previous years.

In the positive Republican States the war was popular, but in Pennsylvania, with the Democrats next to solid against coercing the South by war, most of the Know Nothings cherishing the same convictions,

and a very large proportion of the Republicans unwilling to accept fratricidal war unless it should be absolutely unavoidable, our State did not present the earnestness in support of the war policy of the government that was exhibited in Ohio, New York and the New England States. The disastrous defeat at Bull Run in June and the failure of the army to gain any important achievements until after the election in the fall of 1861, gave us next to a hopeless political condition in Pennsylvania.

Fortunately there were no State officers to be elected and no State convention to be held to embarrass us by the declarations of our platform. The same political conditions existed in Indiana and Illinois, but fortunately neither of them had State officers to be elected, although Illinois elected members to a constitutional convention in which the Democrats had a large majority. In New York the opposition to the Democracy united, as they had done in Pennsylvania, on three of the four State officers to be chosen, and elected them by over 100,000 majority, but on the office of canal commissioner the Republicans refused to accept the Union candidate, who was practically the Know Nothing representative, and the Democrats filled that office by a majority of nearly 20,000. Ohio elected Tod, Union Republican, Governor, by 55,000, and Maryland elected Bradford, Union, Governor, with a decided Union majority in both branches of the Legislature.

In Pennsylvania the contest was only for members of the Legislature and county offices, and with the discordant elements which made up the People's party and the rebellious feeling against the record of the last Legislature, especially in the repeal of the tonnage tax, the political conditions in the State seemed utterly hopeless for the Republicans.

Having been chairman of the People's State committee in the State and National contests of 1860, my position continued until a new State convention met with power to fill the place. With a discordant party that could not be made cohesive, and the grievous disappointments because of the army's defeat, with Pennsylvania's exposed condition as a border State, there was very general unrest and distrust throughout the Commonwealth. I was left practically in charge of the party organization, with no State convention to relieve me of my responsible duties, or to declare the policy of the party.

The only important officers to be chosen at the election of that year were members of the Legislature. It was most important that the Legislature should be held in harmony with the administration, but very early in the year it became evident that only by extraordinary efforts and combinations could the control of the house be maintained. The landslides of 1859 and '60 had made the senate largely Republican, but it was of vital moment to hold control of the house, and after giving the State a most careful investigation by direct inquiry with reliable men in every county, I was fully satisfied that unless we could make a combination with the new element of War Democrats, the Democrats would elect a majority of the popular branch of the Legislature.

There were a half-dozen or more legislative districts which could be carried only with the aid of the Democrats who preferred loyalty to the government to loyalty to the party, and after the State had been fully covered by inquiries to and answers from the most reliable men, I proposed to Governor Curtin that we should assure control of the house by nominating a number of promient War Democrats in Republican or doubtful districts. The matter was fully discussed

and the plan approved. I hastened to inaugurate it by calling an unusually early convention in my own county of Franklin, and placed at the head of the Republican ticket ex-Surveyor General John Rowe, who had just retired from the office of surveyor general to which he had been elected by the Democrats, but he had never, in any way, severed his relations with his party. There were then a number of very positive supporters of the war among the Democrats, and Major Rowe was one of them.

When the People's Union convention of Franklin County led off with a Democrat of State reputation as the Republican nominee for the Legislature, without asking any pledges from him other than to give loyal support to the government, like movements were made in a number of the legislative districts. John Scott, afterwards Republican United States Senator, but then a Democratic leader in Huntingdon, and a positive supporter of the war, was nominated by the Republicans in Huntingdon, and Cyrus L. Pershing, another leading Democrat in Cambria, who had been a Democratic member of the house, and who, later, served with eminent distinction for many years as president judge of Schuylkill County, was made the Republican candidate in Cambria, and Mr. Pfoutz, another Democrat, was made a Republican candidate in Adams.

This liberal action on the part of the Republicans brought to the support of legislative candidates a large Democratic war element, and every one of the Democrats thus nominated by the Republicans was elected. As between the old parties the majority of the members elected to the house were Democrats, but enough War Democrats were chosen to enable them to hold the balance of power, and the house was fortunately organized by a combination with the

Republicans and War Democrats, with Major Rowe, from my own county, elected speaker.

William H. Armstrong, of Lycoming, then the leading attorney in the West Branch region, was a member of the house and was the logical candidate of the Republican or People's party for the speakership, and his high character and ability made him the party leader without dispute; but, appreciating, as he did, the necessity of bringing the War Democrats into hearty accord with the administration, State and National, he voluntarily declined to be a candidate for speaker and supported the combination that gave the War Democrats the speakership.

Major Rowe was not new in legislative duties, as he had been twice elected by the Democrats to the house from Franklin County in 1852-53. He was a man thoroughly fitted for the position, and his unblemished integrity and always courteous discharge of the duties of the chair made him one of the most popular of the many presiding officers of the body.

But for this combination made between the Republicans and the War Democrats, by which prominent War Democrats were placed on the Republican ticket, the popular branch of the Legislature would certainly have been Democratic and serious embarrassment would have been suffered in the effort to give cordial legislative support to the National government and the war.

The revolt against the bill repealing the tonnage tax of the Pennsylvania Railroad contributed very largely to aid the Democrats in the contest of 1861, and the new Legislature was overwhelmingly in favor of repealing the act of the previous Legislature releasing the Pennsylvania corporation from tonnage taxes. Certainly three-fourths of the members of the house were in favor of such repeal; in the senate on the

Thomas A. Scott

direct question of the repeal the vote stood twenty-two for repeal to eleven against it, and this ebullition of popular hostility, inspired chiefly by deep-seated prejudice against all corporate interests, was directed against a policy that was absolutely indispensable to our State unless we desired to drive the entire commerce from the teeming wealth of the West away from Philadelphia, our great commercial emporium. There never was a measure before the Legislature of the State that was more clearly right in every feature of its merits, and it was an imperious necessity, unless we decided to exclude the great commerce of the West entirely from the use of our railways and of our leading city as an important center of Western trade; but with all these facts facing intelligent legislators the house was wildly enthusiastic on the question of the repeal, and it would have been utterly idle to attempt to prevent it.

I have already stated in a former chapter how the repeal passed the house by a four-fifths vote and was defeated in the Senate by legislative strategy; but intense as was the interest felt in both branches on the question of repealing the tonnage taxes, still greater interest was exhibied on every hand by the movement to investigate the alleged corrupt methods employed to pass the bill in the Legislature at the previous session.

It was known before the Legislature met that the demand for investigation would come from William Hopkins, of Washington, an old, experienced legislator, and a man of much more than ordinary ability and unfaltering integrity. He was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor, and, while he was not of the class of demagogues who would have inaugurated an investigation without believing that it was imperatively demanded, it was certainly ex-

pected by himself and his friends that the exhaustive investigation and fearless report he must make would not fail to aid him greatly in his contest.

Abreast with him in the movement was Thomas Williams, one of the most brilliant members of the Allegheny bar, who had previously served in the senate, and who was one of the foremost leaders in the Allegheny repudiation movement against the Pennsylvania Railroad; and when Hopkins made his motion for the appointment of a committee it was promptly seconded by Williams, which assured their appointment on the committee, in obedience to parliamentary rules.

It was well known that Hopkins and Williams were strongly prejudiced against the Pennsylvania corporation, and the selection of the five other members of the committee became a matter of more than usual importance. I had very close personal and political relations with Speaker Rowe, who was from my own county, and he well understood that the earnest efforts I had made for the passage of the bill repealing the tonnage tax in the previous Legislature made me extremely anxious to sustain the measure, and prevent its sincere supporters from suffering by an investigation that might aim at a desperate political play to inflame popular prejudice rather than to meet the issue in a spirit of manliness and justice. He informed me that he would appoint any five members of the house I named to make up the full committee, provided, however, that no one suggested for the position had supported the measure in the last Legislature, or was in any degree lacking in ability or reputation. What he desired was a thoroughly able committee, the names of whose members would inspire general confidence in the integrity of the inquiry.

Colonel Scott, who was more directly interested in the proposed investigation than any other person in the State, had given very careful attention to the question, and he named a dozen members of the house, not one of whom had made a record in support of the repeal of the tonnage tax, and all of whom were men of unblemished reputation and above the average of the intelligence of the house, while most of them were lawyers of high legal attainments and standing in their profession. Five of the twelve men thus named were appointed by the speaker, and it was conceded on all sides that no abler or more reputable committee of investigation was ever appointed by the Legislature.

It goes without saying that while Chairman Hopkins and Williams, of Allegheny, were determined to make the investigation a battle to the death against the Pennsylvania Railroad, the five additional members of the committee not only shared none of the prejudices and destructive purposes of Hopkins and Williams, but were in hearty and honest sympathy with the progressive movement inaugurated by the law whose passage was to be inquired into.

It was not difficult for the committee to prove that more than questionable methods had been employed in the passage of the bill, simply because the bill could be passed in no other way. It was not a battle against intelligent conviction that had to be corrupted to accomplish legislative results; it was a battle in which intelligent conviction was overwhelmed by a tidal wave of popular prejudice cherished in utter ignorance of, or indifference to, the highest commercial and industrial advancement of the State. A powerful lobby was employed, and each member of it in turn was called before the committee. Most of them were probably severely economical in the measure of truth they gave to the committee, but it was impossible

for them to do less than to establish the fact that disreputable means had to be employed to give success to the measure.

Colonel Scott was then in the employ of the government as Assistant Secretary of War, and was generally on the wing looking after the transportation of troops and supplies, and opening or repairing railway lines. Williams, who was violently aggressive in his hostility to the Pennsylvania Railroad, and believed that he had reached the point when he could practically accomplish its destruction, insisted that Colonel Scott should be subpœnaed to testify before the committee. It was unanimously agreed to by the committee, and the subpœna was delivered to the sergeant-at-arms of the house. He at once proceeded to Washington, where he found that Colonel Scott was absent attending to his official duties in some part of the army in Virginia.

The officer, learning of Scott's location, hastened to meet him, and after a very full chat about the condition of things at Harrisburg, and receiving suggestions which were to be delivered to some of Scott's friends at home, the sergeant-at-arms returned and reported that he had made diligent search for the person named in the subpœna, but had not been able to find him. Ten days or two weeks later the same officer was dispatched by the committee to find Colonel Scott and serve the subpœna upon him. The officer was a very close friend of Colonel Scott's, and his second attempt to obtain service of the process of the committee resulted precisely as did the first, and a few weeks later a third attempt was made by the sergeant-at-arms, under orders from the committee, to serve the subpœna upon Colonel Scott, resulting just as did the previous efforts.

Williams became suspicious of the fidelity of the

officer of the house, and decided that he would make a bold movement to capture Colonel Scott himself. He was well acquainted with Secretary Stanton, who had then succeeded Cameron as Secretary of War, as they were old acquaintances at the Pittsburg bar in their earlier days, and he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton inquiring when he could meet Colonel Scott personally at the War Office in Washington. This dispatch was sent on Thursday, and Stanton promptly replied that Williams could meet Colonel Scott at his office in the War Department at ten o'clock on the following Saturday.

Williams was wildly enthusiastic in his prosecution of the case that amounted really to a persecution of all who were connected with the Pennsylvania corporation, and on receipt of Stanton's despatch, he announced in the house that the committee would no longer have to make fruitless search for Colonel Scott, as he was to meet him in person at the War Office on the following Saturday, and would have the sergeant-at-arms with him to serve the process.

There were very potential reasons why Colonel Scott should not appear before that committee, even beyond every consideration relating to mere personal interests. The battle against the Pennsylvania Railroad and against the repeal of the tonnage tax had become the chief political stock in trade of the Democracy, and a triumph of the Democracy at that time in Pennsylvania meant a deliverance from the most important State of the Union against the war policy of the Lincoln administration. In considering what should be done in an emergency so grave, I can say with the utmost frankness that no one was consulted who was in personal fear of an honest and thorough investigation, but at a conference of a dozen or more men responsibly charged with the direction of political affairs on the

Republican side, held in the evening after Williams had made his announcement in the house, it was decided that Scott should not be permitted to be brought to the bar of the house as Williams had openly threatened.

Wilmot was then a member of the United States Senate, having been chosen to fill the vacancy made by Senator Cameron entering the cabinet, and his election to the Senate, after an earnest contest, in which State Senator Ketchum was his chief competitor, was accomplished by an arrangement with a number of Wilmot's friends in the Legislature, who gave their support to the repeal of the tonnage tax in return for Scott's successful efforts for Wilmot's promotion. Congress was then in session and Wilmot in Washington, and I wrote a confidential letter to him fully stating the political necessities which confronted us, all of which he would well understand and requested him on receipt of the letter to go immediately to President Lincoln and present the naked truth.

Williams and the sergeant-at-arms took the noon train at Harrisburg for Washington on Friday, and I selected a trusted messenger to go on the same train with them and deliver my letter to Wilmot, who, in obedience to a telegram, would be waiting for him at Willard's Hotel on his arrival. The letter was delivered to Wilmot, and he immediately proceeded to the President, gave him my letter and presented the situation with absolute candor. Lincoln at once sent for Secretary Stanton, who promptly appeared, and the matter was presented to him.

It was one of Stanton's peculiarities that when an extreme but somewhat irregular necessity was presented to him, he would promptly accept the responsibility and find his own way of meeting it, but as a rule his methods were most effectual. He expressed no

opinion as to what he would do in the matter if it were an open question for him to decide, but he at once answered that a sudden and unexpected order he had just issued in the early part of the evening to Colonel Scott, then at Fortress Monroe, in itself solved the whole problem. He said that the Southwestern army was suffering beyond measure for want of a master of transportation, and he found it necessary, from complaints made to him about the halting movements of Halleck's several commands, to order Colonel Scott to leave Fortress Monroe at once and proceed directly to the Southwest and report to General Halleck.

I much doubt whether Secretary Stanton had issued the order or thought of issuing the order transferring Colonel Scott, until after his conference with Lincoln and Wilmot, as no such thing had been spoken of in any government circles up to that time, but doubtless a master transportationist was needed in the Southwest, and he saw that such an order would not only serve the Southwestern army, but would serve other important purposes as well, and Scott certainly received the order in time to leave Fortress Monroe on Friday, passed through Washington Friday night without stopping, and, having been advised of his movement, I met him at three o'clock on Saturday morning in the railroad depot at Harrisburg, and had twenty minutes' conference with him while the train tarried. He then hurried on to the Southwest and remained with Halleck and Pope until some three or four months after the adjournment of the Legislature.

On Saturday morning Williams and the sergeant-at-arms leisurely breakfasted together and then proceeded to the War Office to meet Colonel Scott just about the time that Colonel Scott was breakfasting at Altoona. Stanton, of course, received his old

friend with great cordiality, and after the usual salutations Williams inquired how soon he could meet Colonel Scott. Stanton in the blandest way said: "Is it personally important to you that you should meet Colonel Scott?" To which Williams replied that it was of the utmost importance.

Stanton expressed profound regret that he was compelled, after having made the appointment for Williams to meet Scott at the War Office, to order Colonel Scott to start immediately for the Southwest, where great victories were lost by our army for want of adequate transportation facilities. Next to Williams' hostility to the Pennsylvania Railroad, his most intense resentment was against the South, and, sadly as he was disappointed, he could not dispute the imperious character of the duty Stanton had performed.

The investigation committe had gradually become greatly conserved in its movements by the influence of the five men who were the fellow-members of the committee with Hopkins and Williams. Instead of continuing as a malignant crusade against the great corporation and greater commercial and industrial interests of the State, it pursued its inquiry without passion, vindicated its appointment by proving the employment of corrupt methods to pass the measure, and made a dignified and temperate report, summing up the testimony and condemning corrupt practices in legislation.

Williams made an effort to have the house permit the committee to sit during the recess. That would have authorized them to follow Scott anywhere, but the house responded by refusing the request, requiring the committee to make final report and be discharged before the adjournment. Thus ended one of the bitterest struggles I have ever witnessed in the Pennsylvania Legislature.

William M. Meredith

he was considerably short of a majority of members in both branches, who were willing to come to the front and pass the bill.

It was the most bitterly contested measure I have ever witnessed before the Pennsylvania Legislature, and only a man of Scott's general acquaintance throughout the State, his intimate knowledge of men, and his sagacious, tireless and often desperate efforts to strengthen his lines, could have effected the passage of the bill. But for the fact that the appalling advent of civil war became the paramount question with the people generally throughout the State, and measurably diverted attention from the tonnage tax issue, it is reasonably certain that Scott would have failed in passing a measure that was not only absolutely right on any and every basis of sound public policy, but a measure to the adoption of which the faith of the State was solemnly pledged by the bill providing for the sale of the public works.

Nearly a month before the close of the session Scott made combinations by which he was enabled to pass the bill through the house by a fair majority, but he was deadlocked several weeks thereafter in the senate, where the senate stood 16 positively for the bill, 15 as positively against it, and 2 in doubt. They were Senators Shindel, of Lehigh, and Blood, of Jefferson. Shindel was a Lutheran minister and believed that the bill ought to pass, but his constituents were overwhelmingly against it, and his doubting associate, although representing the then largely undeveloped wilderness of his section of the State, pleaded the same excuse for his hesitation. After halting the measure for several weeks, during which time the two undecided senators had many conferences with Scott, as they had decided to act together either for or against the measure, they were finally persuaded

to vote for the bill, which gave the friends of the measure 18 votes in the Senate to 15 in opposition.

As the session was nearing the close the friends of the bill held a caucus and decided to pass it through second reading during one night session. It was decided also that debate should not be restrained; that the opponents of the measure should be permitted to speak indefinitely, but that the session would not adjourn until a final vote was reached.

The opposition was very ably led by Senator Penny, Republican, of Allegheny, and Senator Clymer, Democrat, of Berks, and they were both notified of the purpose to continue the night session until the second reading was completed. They did not complain of it, as they had full liberty of debate, and the speeches in favor of the bill were limited by arrangement.

It became generally known that the measure was to come up, and when the evening session opened the hall of the senate was crowded to the uttermost. Nearly all the seats belonging to spectators were occupied by ladies, and many of them were seated on extra chairs on the floor of the senate and around the cheerful open fires in the chamber, while a dense crowd of standing men filled every vacant space.

As soon as the senate was called to order the title and first section of the bill were read, and Senator Penny opened the debate with altogether the ablest and most impressive of the many able speeches he delivered during his senatorial career. My seat was in the front row, and he was immediately behind me, and I confess that I felt some alarm at the effect of such a speech coming from a man of his high character and attainments and ability to mold cherished prejudices into the most plausible arguments.

When he had spoken about thirty minutes the senator from Jefferson, one of the new recruits for the

bill, crossed over to my side of the chamber, and, while apparently stooping in front of Penny, the speaker, to prevent interrupting his view of the chair he was addressing, he whispered to me that I must answer Penny. I told him that I could not, as I was not to speak. In the arrangement of time to be occupied in debate by the friends of the bill several had prepared speeches, and felt that they must deliver them and have them published to vindicate their vote, and I was not of that number, but I was expected to be on the skirmish line if occasion called for it.

The senator passed on to a little side room in the old senate hall, where Scott was holding his little court and viewing what he regarded as the battle of his life. Some ten minutes later "Pap" Shindel, as he was affectionately called by his senatorial associates, crossed over to my side, stooped down and informed me that if I did not answer Penny he would not vote for the bill. I told him that it was impossible; that the best way to answer Penny was to let him alone. He passed on to Scott's room, and soon thereafter a page brought me a note from Scott saying: "It is most important for you to answer Penny." I answered in a brief note that I would answer Penny whenever it was wise to do so, but I certainly did not then expect it would be wise to answer Penny at any time during the debate on the tonnage tax bill.

Penny was one of the most dignified and chivalrous of the very able galaxy of senators then in session. He delivered his speech because he believed it to be his duty to himself and his constituents, but when that duty was performed he was not likely to be felt again in the conflict unless provoked by an attempt to answer him, and if thus aroused he was altogether the most dangerous man in the body. The most important thing for the friends of the measure to

accomplish was the diversion of the senate from Penny's powerful protest against the measure, and I directed my attention very earnestly to that end.

Fortunately Penny was succeeded by Senator Bound, the youngest member of the body, who had studied and practised law with Governor Pollock, and he started off in a very beautiful rhetorical address that had been carefully prepared. It was not difficult to puncture the sophomore by calling his attention to the official utterances of Governor Pollock on the subject and compelling him to quote them. He was unprepared for anything beyond his carefully written and committed speech, and when he was once side-tracked, I was careful to keep him there, as he had little knowledge of the details of the question and appeared at terrible disadvantage when called upon to answer vital questions of fact. This episode in the debate accomplished the most important result the friends of the bill needed to obtain, as the senate was entirely diverted from the great speech of Senator Penny. Several other speeches were made, when Senator Clymer arose to deliver the closing address against the measure.

It was Clymer's first year in the senate, and he had not yet learned how important it was in sober debate in a senatorial body of unusual ability for a disputant to be entirely familiar with the question he assumed to discuss. He was a man of unusual ability on the stump, but a stump speech that glitters the galleries into enthusiasm was out of place in a debate with trained senators. He had not studied the question beyond the superficial utterances of campaign politics, and the force of his speech was utterly broken as he was corrected from time to time by official records which were at hand in readiness. He forced me into open debate which I willingly accepted, as I had very

carefully and exhaustively studied the whole question in all its details, and he was amazed in confusion by the plain, unanswerable refutation of his most important statements from the official records of the State.

The debate thus ended, and the bill passed by a vote of 18 to 15. The bill passed finally within ten days of the adjournment of the Legislature, which enabled the Governor to hold it until after adjournment, which he did. It was a week or ten days after the Legislature adjournment when he gave the measure his approval, and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, thus placed upon equal footing with its competing trunk lines, has been enabled to create the greatest railway system of the world.

I cannot now recall any important measure before the Pennsylvania Legislature that aroused such general and vindictive opposition as did the passage of the bill releasing the Pennsylvania Railroad from tonnage duty. The bill made no release of money to the railroad, as the corporation was required by the law to reduce the freights in every instance to the full amount of the tonnage tax, but the great mass of the people simply saw in the tonnage tax a revenue of from three to four hundred thousand dollars a year that was likely to increase to half a million or more, and as the farmers were then directly taxed to support the State, every question that lessened the revenues of the Commonwealth met with sturdiest opposition from the agricultural and industrial classes.

The Democrats made most of the passage of the bill because it had been passed by a Republican house and senate and approved by a Republican Governor, although prominent Democrats in both branches had supported it, and the Democratic leaders readily adopted the war cry of the repeal of the bill releasing the tonnage tax as the slogan of the party to recover

political power in the State. But for the war, with the intense interest it excited throughout the people, there would have been but one question before the people of Pennsylvania, and that the issue of maintaining or repealing the bill taxing tonnage.

The Democratic leaders, with occasional Republican aids, denounced the measure as the spawn of corruption. "Pap" Shindel was repudiated alike by his Democratic constituents of Lehigh and by his church people, but the war furnished him a place of rescue, and he became chaplain in the army.

The intense and universal hostility to the measure can be best understood when I state that of the members of the house who supported the bill, but one outside of Philadelphia was re-elected in the entire State, and that was Mr. Cowan, of Warren, who was sustained in supporting the measure because it was regarded as aiding the completion of the Philadelphia & Erie Road. With that single exception, not one of the members of the body outside of Philadelphia who voted for the repeal of the tonnage tax obtained a re-election.

Philadelphia, with her vast interests in the railroad and in the commerce expected to be gained by the repeal of the tax, heartily supported all the men who favored the bill, but with all the power Philadelphia could exert, the new Legislature elected in the fall of 1861 had but nineteen members out of the hundred who were opposed to the repeal of the bill, and on that question the senate stood 22 in favor of repeal to 11 against it. Fortunately the bill had been carefully framed to make it an irrepealable statute. The act repealing the tonnage tax proposed a very carefully prepared contract with the State, by which, in consideration of the release of the tax, the company obligated itself to make different and increased pay-

ments to the State on account of the sale of the Main Line, and the title of the bill was "An Act relating to the commutation of tonnage taxes," etc. When the bill was approved by the Governor it became much more than a mere law. When it was formally accepted by the Pennsylvania corporation it became a solemn contract completed with all the solemnity of law. It was thus beyond the power of the Legislature to revoke the contract without the consent of the railroad corporation, but the Legislature was wildly bent on the repeal; passed it through the house almost with a yell, but it was fortunately halted in the senate by conditions and actions which have been explained in a previous chapter.

The popular prejudice against corporations prevailing in Pennsylvania at that time was the greatest obstacle to the achievement of what the opponents of corporations desired to attain. They had suffered from the failure of irresponsible banks. Beyond banks there were few corporations in the State, and only a very small proportion of them commanded public confidence. They little dreamed when they opposed the repeal of the tax upon tonnage because it would require that amount of taxes to be imposed upon the industrial interests of the State, as they believed, that the impetus given to corporations by the rapid strides made by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company extending its tributary lines wherever there was wealth to develop in the State, would so speedily open up the boundless wealth of Pennsylvania by corporate capital as to enable the Legislature to relieve real estate entirely of taxation for State purposes. They battled against corporations because few of the mostly feeble organizations of the kind in the State contributed materially to the revenues, and yet in defiance of their opposition to corporations to lessen

taxation upon themselves, as they regarded it, they were defeated in their ideas, and their defeat brought them the richest blessings for which they had long been struggling.

The growth of our great railroad system, and the rapid development in all industrial channels caused by the Civil War, led to the multiplication of corporations in Pennsylvania, until to-day they practically pay the expenses of the State government. It is not surprising, considering the many losses sustained by the people by the early corporations, that they regarded them as objectionable and as granting special privileges to favorite individuals, but that prejudice has long since perished, and the date of the advancement of our great Commonwealth in the development of her boundless wealth and in relieving industrial interests from taxation, was the date of the passage of the act relieving the Pennsylvania Railroad Company from what were always restrictive and at times prohibitive taxes on its traffic. From that time Philadelphia could command a fair share of commerce from the growing wealth of the West, new markets were opened for our great industrial products of Pennsylvania, and the most substantial basis of prosperity ever attained in our history was then irrevocably established.

XLV.

HASTY PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

The North Practically United by the Bombardment of the Starving Garrison at Sumter — Jefferson Davis' Views on the Subject — Secession of Virginia and North Carolina Forced by the Attack on Sumter — Both Sides Expected a Short War — General Patterson with a Number of His Officers Dines with the Author at Chambersburg — Their Views about the War — Only One Declared that if a Single Battle was Fought it Would be the Bloodiest War of Modern History — General Thomas Silent — Shock to the Loyal Sentiment by the Defeat at Bull Run — McClellan Called to Command — Discontent from Inaction of the Army in the Late Fall of 1861 — Curtin's Care of the Soldiers — Presentation of Flags to the Pennsylvania Reserves.

THE bombardment of Sumter accomplished the enforced secession of Virginia and North Carolina. The conventions of both of these States had previously refused to join in the secession movement.

Looking merely on the surface of the history of those times, the firing on Sumter appears as an act of midsummer madness, when General Beauregard, the Confederate commander, had the assurance of Major Anderson, commanding the little handful of the Union force in Sumter, that he would surrender the fort at noon two days thereafter if not supplied with provisions. It was this firing upon a starving garrison by order of the Confederate government that inflamed the North and gave it substantial unanimity in support of the war, and it was, as I have on several occasions stated, the death knell of the Confederacy.

In a conversation with Jefferson Davis, who was then President of the Confederacy, when I visited his home

some ten years after the war, I asked him whether political conditions had not controlled his decision to order the firing upon Sumter when its surrender was assured at a given hour. He declared very positively, however, that the order to fire upon Sumter had been issued solely because the Federal government had, as he believed, been guilty of a breach of faith by starting an expedition by sea to provision and reinforce Sumter. I reminded him that there was no intention on the part of President Lincoln to violate the faith of the government, as was evidenced by his notification to Governor Pickens that an expedition had been started to provision the garrison at Sumter, and with the notice the assurance was given that if provisions were allowed to be supplied to the fort, no attempt would be made to reinforce the garrison or supply munitions of war.

However, Mr. Davis may have been influenced by his belief that a breach of faith had been committed by Lincoln. I cannot doubt that Sumter would not have been fired upon but for the fact that Virginia and North Carolina could not be brought into the Confederacy without first precipitating civil war. Immediately after the surrender of Sumter and the call of the government for 75,000 troops to maintain the Union, the reconvened convention of Virginia, in secret session, adopted the ordinance of secession, and North Carolina followed. The Confederate government at once transferred its Capital to Richmond, and all that Virginia gained by reversing her verdict against secession, and making common cause with the Confederacy, was to make her soil the chief theater of civil war, with almost universal desolation within her borders.

Both sections immediately organized large armies. General Beauregard, who had commanded the bombardment at Charleston, was placed at the head of one army, and advanced to Manassas, a good strategic

point because of its railroad facilities, and General Joseph E. Johnson with another army took possession of the Shenandoah Valley. An army of some 25,000 men was organized at Washington to make the advance upon Manassas and Richmond, commanded by General McDowell, and General Patterson, who was in command of the Department of Pennsylvania, marched with an army of nearly equal numbers through the Cumberland Valley to meet Johnson somewhere on the other side of the Potomac.

General Scott continued as commander-in-chief and personally directed the movements of all the various military forces in the field, but he had outlived his ability to exhibit the great military genius which made his march from Vera Cruz to Mexico so lustrous in achievements, and his utter incapacity for his high command was clearly illustrated when McDowell and Patterson, both moving under his immediate orders, were kept far apart at the battle of Bull Run, while Johnson escaped from Patterson, joined Beauregard, and changed a Union victory into a most disastrous Union defeat.

The people of the North had become somewhat accustomed to the idea of civil war, as immense preparations for it had been going on for nearly three months, but nearly all cherished the hope that in some way, without knowing or pretending to know how it might be accomplished, war would be averted, or at least that a single battle would surely end the conflict and bring about the restoration of the Union on some basis of compromise.

When General Patterson with his army was marching through the Cumberland Valley to the Potomac, he encamped for several days on my farm on the outskirts of Chambersburg, and I had the principal officers to dine with me during their stay. Along with General

who was severely censured at the time for permitting Johnson to escape from the valley and join Beauregard at Bull Run, promptly demanded a court of inquiry at which he proposed to prove beyond dispute that he had literally and faithfully obeyed the orders of General Scott, and in that he was undoubtedly right. The court of inquiry was refused to him because, as the Department declared, it was not necessary for his vindication.

When McDowell's army was defeated and finally driven in utter confusion back into the defenses of Washington, the people of the North, and especially of Pennsylvania, for the first time began to understand the magnitude of undertaking to lock horns with the South to conquer its people into submission to the Union.

At first a tidal wave of despair swept over the North, but it was speedily dispelled as the people began to understand the duties and sacrifices they must accept. I then represented the Gettysburg district in the State senate, and was engaged nearly all the time with Governor Curtin at Harrisburg. He stood out before the State and the country as grandly vindicated by organizing the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps in the face of the protest of the National government, as it was that corps, enlisted for three years' service or during the war, that was the nucleus of the Grand Army of the Potomac that McClellan so completely organized after he was called into command.

The Governor gave prompt utterance to his patriotic convictions and purposes and inspired the loyal sentiment of the State to aggressive action. It was then known that we were face to face with actual sanguinary war between brethren of opposing sections, and all understood that such a war must be even more desperate than a war between opposing nationalities.

McClellan was called to the command of the Army of the Potomac, as he then stood alone with a record of victories in West Virginia, which a few years later would hardly have been regarded as skirmishes, but he had defeated or captured several regimental commands at different points, and as he was known to be one of the most accomplished officers in the army, it was natural, with his prestige of victories in West Virginia, that he should be called to the command of the Army of the Potomac with the very cordial approval of the country.

One of the amusing features of the early part of the war was the hesitation of the government to recognize a condition of war in the South and treat the Confederacy as a belligerent power. When General McClellan demanded the surrender of Colonel Pegram's regiment in West Virginia, he addressed Pegram as if writing a business note, entirely omitting Pegram's title, and General Andrew Porter, a gallant Pennsylvania soldier, and cousin of Horace Porter, who was on Grant's staff and is now Minister to France, informed me of the ludicrous scene when the first flag of truce appeared between the two armies. General Porter was provost marshal of the army, and when information came from the pickets that a Southern command had appeared with a flag of truce, it was brought to him, and the grave question of acknowledging the Confederacy as a belligerent power had to be decided at once. There was great hesitation about the attitude to be assumed, but it was finally decided that any communication from the Southern army should be received without any official recognition of her belligerent rights. The communication related simply to the exchange of some prisoners, and arrangements were made to carry into effect the request that was made, but with scrupulous care to avoid any official recognition as belligerents.

France and England had already recognized the rights of the Confederacy as a belligerent, and we could do nothing less without deciding that there should be neither capture nor exchange of prisoners, leaving the war to be conducted under the old-time laws of barbarism. The protection of the Union prisoners in the hands of the enemy compelled the government to treat with the Confederacy as possessing all the rights of a belligerent power, while we were very careful to avoid any form of distinct recognition. A regular cartel for the exchange of prisoners was agreed upon, and every belligerent right practically accorded to the South simply because it was an imperious necessity.

It was confidently expected that General McClellan, with the new Army of the Potomac, that very largely outnumbered the Confederate force between Washington and Richmond, would march upon Manassas in the early fall, and the belief was generally shared in the North that he would be in Richmond by the 1st of October. But McClellan was, first of all, a thorough disciplinarian, and he was unwilling to advance upon the enemy until he had his army thoroughly disciplined, and September passed and finally Ocober passed with the Army of the Potomac remaining at Washington, and there was profound disappointment throughout the entire North.

The fall elections, the most important of which were held in October, were seriously affected by the inaction of the Union army, and political interests as well as patriotic impulses demanded the advance of the Army of the Potomac. Fortunately, there were no State officers to be elected in Pennsylvania, but the Republicans would have lost the control of the popular branch of the Legislature had it not been for a combination made by which a number of War Demo-

XLVII.

MEREDITH ENTERS THE CURTIN CABINET.

Attorney-General Purviance Refused to Resign at the End of the Year—Coffee's Visit to Urge a Continuation of Purviance—Curtin's Prompt Notice that the Resignation must be Given, as Senator Finney was to Take the Place—Purviance's Sudden and Offensive Resignation—Finney Insisted that Curtin, Instead of Appointing Finney, Should Appoint the Most Eminent Lawyer of the State—He Named Meredith, and All at Once Approved—Meredith Twice Declined, but Finally when Curtin Met Him He Reluctantly Assented—How Meredith Met Great Emergencies—He Hears the Case of a Soldier Convicted of Murder—Bribery Charges in the Senatorial Election of 1863—The House Adopted Resolution Instructing Attorney General to Prosecute Cameron and Others—Cameron Calls upon the Author, Who Visited Meredith to Discuss the Prosecution of the Cases—Meredith's Tactful Reply.

IN a previous chapter I stated that Curtin, when inaugurated as Governor, had appointed a compromise cabinet, including ex-Congressman Purviance, of Butler, as attorney general, who was pressed for the position by the friends of Cameron. I also explained that the real reason for the appointment of Purviance was to carry out a plan conceived by ex-Senator Titian J. Coffee. Coffee, who had represented the Indiana district in the senate, but whose eminent ability as a lawyer justified him in locating in Pittsburg to practise his profession, and Purviance, who had just retired fom Congress, had formed a partnership with Coffee to locate in Pittsburg. As both were able lawyers and quite prominent in the politics of the State, such a law firm would have at once commanded a very large clientage. Senator Finney,

of Crawford, the ablest of all the Republican senators, was very earnestly wanted by Curtin as attorney general, but he had a year to serve in the senate, and was not eligible until his senatorial term expired. Coffee plausibly proposed to solve the cabinet problem by appointing Purviance attorney general for one year, which would give the new law firm of Pittsburg great prestige, and at the end of the year, when Finney would become eligible, Purviance would resign and Finney take his place. This programme was cordially assented to by Purviance himself, and he entered the cabinet with the full understanding on every side that at the end of one year his resignation would be tendered and accepted.

It happened that Senator Coffee, who had studied law with Edward Bates, of Missouri, was invited by Bates, when he entered the cabinet of Lincoln as Attorney General, to take the position of assistant, and Coffee committed the error of accepting. Had he remained in Pittsburg he would have been not only in the forefront of the eminent men in the legal profession, but would also have been a most potential political factor; while in Washington he drifted away from his Pennsylvania associations and attained no distinction worthy of his great ability. The result was that the law firm of Coffee & Purviance never got fairly under way in Pittsburg.

Purviance was a quiet man, well versed in the law, but not keen in perception or forceful in counsel. In the many councils held in the early part of the war, when questions of appalling moment were to be decided, he was always hesitating in his judgment, and was glad to have others lead for him to follow.

About the close of the year, when Purviance's resignation was expected, and Finney was ready to come at once to assume the duties of the attorney general-

ship, Coffee telegraphed me to meet him at Harrisburg. He called to see me at the hotel before proceeding to confer with the Governor, and explained to me his mission. He said that the law partnership of Coffee & Purviance, that promised so much to them a year before, had entirely fallen out; that Purviance would have to begin a new struggle to gain a profitable practice, and that he had come in obedience to the earnest appeal of Purviance to ascertain whether he could not be continued as attorney general.

Under all ordinary circumstances Coffee would have preferred Finney, as they were very close friends in the senate, but he felt under some obligations to his disappointed law partner, and frankly stated that he had come on rather to see whether a continuance of Purviance in the cabinet could not be amicably arranged, rather than to press it against the wishes of the Governor.

I told him that Purviance was not an important aid to the Governor; that the Governor greatly needed a strong, aggressive man in that position, and that it would be an act of unpardonable bad faith to Finney, who was eminently qualified for the position and in close sympathy with the Governor, to deny him the place that had been voluntarily promised him.

We proceeded to the Executive chamber, where Coffee presented the matter to the Governor as he had presented it to me, and I awaited the expression of the Governor without saying anything. As soon as Coffee had made the statement, Curtin promptly replied that Attorney Purviance was expected to tender his resignation at the close of the year, in accordance with the expressed promise given as a condition of his appointment. No further conference on the subject was necessary, and it was dismissed.

The meeting in the Executive chamber occurred in

the afternoon of the day, and Coffee at once notified Purviance that his resignation must be given in accordance with the agreement.

To the utter surprise of the Governor and the public generally, the Harrisburg "Evening Telegraph" published Attorney General Purviance's letter of resignation addressed to the Governor, before it had been received at the Executive department. It was a brief, curt letter not exceeding half a dozen lines, in which he stated that he tendered his resignation because his self-respect would not permit him to continue longer in official relations with the administration.

Such a letter going to the public without explanation suddenly convulsed the party throughout the entire State, and it came at a time when the factional opposition to Curtin, under the aggressive leadership of Cameron, was assailing him with unmeasured violence. He was charged with complicity in furnishing rotten blankets and shoddy clothing to our soldiers, with which he had no more to do than the man in the moon, but his assailants were tireless and unscrupulous, and the resignation of his attorney general, ostensibly on the ground that self-respect compelled him to sever his relations with the administration, was certain to add fuel to the inflamed factional sentiment that was assailing the Executive. A loan of $3,000,000 had just been advertised, the credit of the State was trembling in the balance, and the unfavorable political conditions which then confronted the Governor were the most perilous he was ever called upon to meet.

Senator Finney was in the city on his way to Philadelphia, where he expected to spend a few days before entering upon the office of attorney general. He did not know of the conference at the Executive office in the early part of the day, but immediately after seeing

the offensive letter of resignation in the evening paper, he hastened to the Governor's office, where he met Coffee, Secretary Slifer, Adjutant General Russell and myself.

Finney was a man of heroic mold, and he opened the conference by the positive declaration that under the circumstances he was not the man to be placed in the office of attorney general; that the only way in which the administration could meet so grave an emergency was to call the ablest and most respected representative of the legal profession to that position, and thus at once make Purviance's insulting retirement not only impotent but disgraceful to himself. He concluded by saying that the man for attorney general was William M. Meredith.

Curtin had great affection for Finney and was very reluctant to part from him as a cabinet officer, but Finney declared with emphasis that it was no time for sentiment; that the safety of the administration in Pennsylvania involved, to some extent at least, the safety of the National government and the credit of the State, and all accepted his suggestion that Mr. Meredith should be called to the cabinet if he could be induced to accept it. It was known that he was in delicate health, and that he would naturally be averse to entering the cabinet under the embarrassing circumstances which were presented.

I was charged with the duty of going to Philadelphia that night to present the matter to Meredith, with whom I was well acquainted. The mission was a most important one, and I had little rest after reaching the city at midnight, because of my anxiety as to the issue of my effort with Meredith. I called upon him early in the morning, presented the matter to him with all the earnestness I could command, and he heard me so patiently that I was hopeful of his acceptance, but

he answered that it was an utter impossibility for him to accept the duties of the office. I told him that he had an assistant, and would have additional assistants if necessary, to which he answered, with quiet emphasis, that he could accept no official trust whose duties he could not personally discharge. I appealed to him on the ground that his acceptance of a cabinet position would assure the acceptance of the loan then advertised, and I had the authority of the Governor to state to him that if he accepted, it was the Governor's desire that Meredith himself should name three men to make a thorough investigation of the charges made against the Governor in relation to clothing contracts, and, if such committee did not fully exonerate the Governor, it would be the right, as it would be the duty, of the new attorney general to resign his position because the administration was not worthy of his respect and confidence,

To all appeals Meredith was immovable. He said very frankly that he would gladly accept the position if he felt that he could do it in justice to himself and to the State, but that his feeble condition of health absolutely forbade it.

I said to him that I would not accept his decision as final, but would call again at three o'clock in the afternoon, and begged of him to give the subject serious consideration. In the meantime I had called upon Morton McMichael, Mayor Gilpin, J. Edgar Thomson, Edward Gratz and several other close friends of Mr. Meredith, explained the situation to them, and each one called upon Meredith and urged his acceptance. At three o'clock, when I returned, he received me most kindly, and said that he had very pleasant intercourse with a number of my friends during the day on the subject of the appointment, but he profoundly regretted that his ill health, that he did not hope to have permanently

improved, even with the utmost care, made it impossible for him to accept such a responsible trust.

I closed the interview by saying that I would not return his answer to the Governor as final, but would ask him to meet the Governor himself, and that I would have Curtin at Meredith's house at nine o'clock that night. Meredith in a very quiet way answered: "It will give me much pleasure to meet Governor Curtin at any time, but I want to say to you that it is not possible for me in my present condition of health to accept any official duties."

I telegraphed Curtin to come at once to the city, and at nine o'clock I accompanied him to Meredith's door, where I left him to confer with Meredith alone, and in less than an hour thereafter he rejoined me at the hotel and informed me that he had received Meredith's acceptance to entering the cabinet.

The appointment and acceptance of Meredith were announced in all the papers throughout the State and country the following morning, and the retirement of Purviance was speedily forgotten.

Meredith at once named three men of the highest character and business ability in the State to investigate the charges made against the integrity of Curtin's administration in dealing with the soldiers, and the most careful and exhaustive inquiry was made by the committee thus appointed, resulting not only in the unanimous acquittal of Curtin, but in the highest commendation of all his official actions relating to the organization and comfort of the Pennsylvania soldiers.

The reaction was almost instantaneous throughout the entire State, and the climax came a few weeks thereafter when the Governor announced that the three million loan had been entirely taken. In point of fact, the loan had not been fully subscribed, but it had been so nearly accomplished, and the conditions

in the State had become so much more favorable in a very brief time, that the banking houses of Drexel, Cook, Clarke, and others, authorized the Governor to announce the entire success of the loan, and they became responsible for it. But for Meredith's acceptance of the position in the cabinet, whereby all the scandals of faction which had been hurled against Curtin were summarily crushed, the loan would not have been taken, and the credit of the State would have been seriously impaired for the time.

It was not expected by Meredith that he would, or could, devote himself to the duties of the attorney general's office, but he soon became wonderfully fascinated with the work, and to his surprise he rapidly improved in health and held the position during the remaining five years of Curtin's service as chief magistrate. He found that what he thought would be most perilous to his health was really an important aid to his improved physical condition. Legal labors, outside of mere routine duties which could be performed by assistants, were mere recreation rather than exhaustive labor to a man of Meredith's wonderful mastery of the law, and he enjoyed the office to such an extent that it was difficult at any time to induce him to take a vacation.

Meredith had but little practical political experience. He had been in the Legislature in his early days, had served in the city councils, was a member of the constitutional convention of 1838, where he was the only man who ever unhorsed Thaddeus Stevens in debate, and he had been Secretary of the Treasury under President Taylor from the time of Taylor's inauguration until his death, nearly a year and a half later. He had never taken part in political leadership, and was an entire stranger to prevalent political methods. While his acceptance of the position of attorney general

was most heartily welcomed by the Governor and his friends, grave apprehensions were felt that he would be likely to embarrass the administration in some of the sudden political evolutions which became enforced necessities by the advent of the Civil War and the general overthrow of ordinary regulations. Political as well as military movements had to be made in those terrible days as sudden emergencies dictated, and it was generally accepted that they would be likely to startle a man of Meredith's fixed plans and purposes of life. Strange as it may seem to many, when an emergency arose requiring irregular methods to reach indispensable results, it was only necessary to have the facts frankly presented to him, and if his department had any relation to the matter he could be confidently trusted to find the best way of attaining the needed result.

A pointed illustration of his methods of administering the duties of his office in harmony with political necessities, was given in the case of a young soldier of Johnstown, who had volunteered in the army, leaving an attractive young wife behind him. A man who dishonored the ministerial cloth became fascinated with the soldier's wife, and soon created a public and grievous scandal in the community, as both the infatuated lover and the wife seemed to have lost all appreciation of the offensive notoriety they had attained. The soldier was advised of the scandal, obtained leave of absence, returned home inflamed to fury, and publicly declared his purpose to kill the man who had brought dishonor upon his home. The declaration to kill the minister was made openly and repeatedly. In a short time he met the minister on the street and shot him dead on the spot. He was tried for murder before Judge Taylor and convicted of murder in the first degree,

John Scott, of Huntingdon, afterward United States Senator, was counsel for the prisoner, and he at once made application to Governor Curtin for a pardon, and Curtin fixed a day for the hearing. On the day before the hearing was to be had an affair of outposts in the Army of the Potomac, in which some Pennsylvania soldiers were engaged, called Curtin at once to the field, as he always subordinated every official duty to the care of the Pennsylvania soldiers. He gave hasty directions about things to be done in the office during his absence, and was starting in a hurried way to make the first train to Washington when it occurred to him, just when he had reached the door, that the next day had been fixed for the hearing of the pardon case of the convicted soldier, and he turned to Meredith and asked him whether he would not hear the case. Meredith promptly replied that he would if the Governor desired it. The Governor was about to rush out of the door when Meredith called him back and said: "Governor, if I am to hear the pardon case, it might be well to know how you think it should be decided." Curtin, in his impulsive way, said: "Damned if I'll hang the soldier." Meredith bowed and Curtin departed.

On the following day, when Scott found that Meredith was to hear the case, all his hopes of success perished and he appeared before Meredith (who sat with the dignity of a Lord Chief Justice of England), profoundly apprehensive that his case was lost. Scott opened the case for his client and was followed by the district attorney, who declared that there could not be a case of more deliberately premeditated murder, and sustained his position by quoting many declarations made by the prisoner of his purpose to kill the minister. When Scott rose to conclude the argument for the pardon Meredith appalled him by asking in the most sober and judicial manner whether it was undis-

puted that the prisoner had made repeated declarations of his purpose to kill the man. Scott naturally assumed that Meredith had gone to the very marrow of the case and he had to admit that this man, broken-hearted over the shame brought upon his home, and inflamed beyond the measure of responsibility by drink, had declared and repeatedly declared his purpose to take the life of the man who had wrecked his family altar, to which Meredith replied, "Well, I think the preacher should have left town."

Scott was at once relieved of the terrible apprehensions which had oppressed him, as he saw that the severe judicial line that he supposed he was up against did not mean the death of his client. After some delay, of course, the soldier was pardoned.

Another important occasion I recall when Meredith exhibited not only his willingness to acknowledge the mastery of political necessity, but his skill in meeting an emergency. It occurred in 1863 after Mr. Buckalew was elected to the Senate by one majority. Cameron claimed that he could command a Democratic vote and thus secure his election if supported by the Republicans, and Wilmot, whose term had expired, confessed that he could not command any Democratic votes and doubted whether Cameron could, but was unwilling to stand in the way of Cameron and gave him the field. A political scandal resulted, involving Representative Boyer, Democrat, of Clearfield, who was expected to vote for Cameron, but who finally declared that he had been approached on the subject but had rejected the proffered bribe. The feeling was intense among the Democrats and it was openly proclaimed that no apostate could leave the hall alive.

A committee of investigation appointed by the House reported a resolution that was adopted, directing the attorney general to prosecute Cameron,

Boyer and others for bribery. Cameron was naturally much alarmed at the prospect of Attorney General Meredith appearing in court and prosecuting the case. He called at the room at midnight of the day the resolution was adopted and stated that he had come to consult about the proposed prosecution. Although continuously in political hostility, our personal relations were never interrupted, and we many times conferred on political questions in which we both were interested. He asked me to see Meredith and explain what such a prosecution involved: that it meant the personal destruction of Cameron; that if successful it meant the destruction or peril of the Republican power in the State, and as neither faction was entirely clear of political offenses such a prosecution would lead to retributive prosecutions and overwhelm the party.

I did not approve of the house resolution, as it was purely a partisan measure to force the two factions of the Republican party into a desperate battle with each other. I called upon the attorney general early the next day, and told him in the frankest manner what had occurred between Cameron and myself, what both of us had said, and that I had agreed to urge him, if he could do so consistently, not to proceed with the prosecution.

Meredith heard the statement very patiently without exhibiting the remotest sign of approval or disapproval, and instead of answering that he would or would not prosecute, he remarked in his quiet way: "I wonder that it did not occur to you to say to General Cameron that the attorney general of the State had vastly more important duties to perform than to prosecute cases in the quarter sessions." The answer was just as distinct in meaning as if he had given a positive statement, and Cameron was informed of Meredith's attitude.

The resolution directing those prosecutions to be made yet remains on the Journal of the House, but no one ever called the attention of the grand jury or the court to the mandate of the popular branch of the Legislature, and there are few living to-day who will remember that any such prosecutions were contemplated.

Meredith retired from the attorney generalship in much better health than he enjoyed when he entered the office, and lived to represent Philadelphia in the constitutional convention of 1873–4. He presided over the body with the great ability and dignity which always characterized him in every position, and fell in the harness long before its deliberations were finished, and died as widely beloved as he was known.

XLVIII.

THE HOPKINS INVESTIGATION.

How it was Conserved by Adding Five Able and Dispassionate Men to Hopkins and Williams—John Cessna an Important Factor in Shaping the Results—His Unique Contest for a Seat in the House—How He was Able to Obtain It—He was an Aggressive Candidate for the Democratic Nomination for Governor—Re-Elected and Made Democratic Speaker—Communication Between Hopkins and the Author—The Political Feature of the Investigation Eliminated—Hopkins and the Author Met Frequently, and Ten Years Later Served Together in the Senate, but the Investigation Never was Alluded To—Popular Prejudice Mastered by the Severe Strain of War and the Wonderful Development of Our Industries.

THE Democrats of the Legislature of 1862 were guided in their political movements solely with the view of regaining power in the State and choosing a Democratic Governor to succeed Curtin. John Cessna, of Bedford, was a very much more important factor in controlling some of the most vital political movements of the Legislature than was ever known to the public. He was a man of much more than usual ability, and tireless in prosecuting all his undertakings. He was one of the best trial lawyers in southern Pennsylvania, and practised in most of the counties in that section of the State.

He was an aggressive Democrat before the war, and aggressive in all his political movements. He had won his way into the Legislature a dozen years before, and was speaker of the house in 1851, with the honor of being the youngest presiding officer who had ever been chosen for the body. He was an aggressive candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor, as was Hopkins, of Washington, who

led in the investigation of the passage of the tonnage tax, and he was not willing that Hopkins should get up an investigation tidal wave that would land him in the gubernatorial office.

When civil war came Cessna was positive in his declaration in favor of prosecuting the war. His county of Bedford was associated with Somerset by the Legislative apportionment, and elected two members of the house. Cessna was nominated by the Democrats of Bedford with a Democratic colleague on the ticket in Somerset, and he made a most exhaustive battle, especially in his own county, speaking in almost every school house and at many a cross-roads, and in all of his speeches he not only declared himself in favor of prosecuting the war, but he made no criticism upon the war policy of the National government. He insisted that the Democrats were loyal, and that when the military power of the Confederacy was broken the Union would be restored on a conservative basis. His courage in supporting the war brought to his aid a very large proportion of the Republicans of Bedford County, and he received some 1,200 majority in that county over the lowest of the two Republican candidates; but Somerset, with her 2,000 Republican majority, defeated him.

Cessna decided to contest the election on the ground that Bedford had a constitutional right to choose a member of the Legislature. The county of Bedford had been created by law before the adoption of the first Constitution of Pennsylvania, and one of the provisions of that Constitution was that each county then in existence should always have the right to a representative in the popular branch of the Legislature. The question had never been raised before, but Cessna presented an argument not only plausible and forceful, and that seemed unanswerable, declar-

ing that as Bedford was entitled to a member of the house by the mandate of the Constitution the person receiving a majority of votes for that office within the county was its constitutional representative.

I had known Cessna at the bar and in politics for a number of years, but our relations at the time of the meeting of the Legislature in 1862 were severely strained because of a violent personal assault he made upon the integrity of my law partner and myself as assignees of the Easton estate, that was then the largest individual estate in the county. He had been misled into accepting the trial of the case by assurances that irregularities or frauds could be proved on the part of the assignees, but Cessna's professional pride overbalanced his sense of justice, and when the testimony closed and his error was apparent, instead of frankly submitting the facts to the jury, he delivered a most vindictive and defamatory speech against the defendants, to which the jury promptly responded by making their verdict in precise accord with the balance sheet presented by the assignees. I felt that Cessna had wantonly violated professional ethics, and our intercourse thereafter never exceeded the severest formal courtesies.

When the Legislature met in January, Cessna was present and most desirous to win his seat, and on a technical ground that had never before been presented to either branch of the Legislature. As political passion was then at its zenith, it goes without saying that the Republicans were next to solid in declaring that Cessna's contest was a mere invention of a cunning lawyer, and the Democrats were ready to sustain him. Had the issue been reversed, the Democrats would have been solid against Cessna's interpretation of the Constitution, and the Republicans would have been as earnestly for him.

William Hopkins

With a doubtful house, and with the delicate movements necessary to control its organization with the aid of the War Democrats, I had given no attention whatever to Cessna's contest, and felt little or no interest in it. If he were admitted I had confidence that he would be on the loyal side of the war issue, and I knew that his ambition to be Governor would make him a very dangerous man in the house to lock horns with the investigation movement that was expected to enable Hopkins to distance all his Democratic competitors in the race for the next gubernatorial nomination.

Cessna and I passed many times during the first week of the session without any more than a nod from each other, but he finally stopped me in the rotunda and said: "There are some things here that you know I want; there are some things that I know you don't want; and I think we could be of service to each other."

I answered with an invitation for him to call at my room that evening. At the appointed time he was my visitor, and at once proposed that we be entirely frank with each other. He said that he wanted two things; first, to be admitted to the house on a contest, and second, to have a bill passed by both branches and signed by the Governor separating Bedford from Somerset as a legislative district, and he added that I could help him to both. On the other hand, he said that I needed some one within the inner Democratic circle to conserve the Hopkins investigation movement, with which he had no sympathy, and against which his political interests were arrayed.

I told him that I believed he was lawfully entitled to the seat, that I had no personal or partisan objections to him obtaining it, that I could see the way clear to pass the amendment to the Legislative appor-

tionment that he desired, but I wanted to know in detail just what he proposed to do in the investigation movement that was then made a strictly partisan measure, and was expected to enable the Democrats to regain control of the State.

He understood the situation perfectly in all its details, and proposed a programme himself that I could not have improved in any measure. Our understanding was complete, and the agreement was carried out to the letter on both sides.

Contested seats were then decided by a committee drawn by the clerk from a box containing the names of the members written on small slips of paper. It was a perfect lottery, and with a house nearly equally divided politically, the chances were about even that the committee thus drawn would be Democratic or Republican. I gave Cessna the names of ten Republican members of the house, and told him that he could safely accept any of them, if necessary to accept any Republicans, in drawing his committee. He naturally inquired whether I knew of their views on the question, to which I answered that I did not, but all of them were in a position that made it important for them to protect themselves, and that Cessna would be in the best attitude to render them service. Not one of them was ever spoken to on the subject, as Cessna had the accidental fortune of drawing a distinct Democratic committee; but if he had failed in getting a Democratic committee, he could have accepted one or more of the Republicans named and been entirely safe in his admission.

The agreement to amend the Legislative apportionment by a special act making Somerset and Bedford separate legislative districts, was not spoken of to any one by either Cessna or myself, until near the close of the session, when he passed the bill in the house

with a large Republican support, and when it came to the senate it was advocated by the Democratic friends of Cessna, and explanations were made to the Republican senators that made most of them join in passing the bill. It was promptly signed by the Governor, and Cessna was elected to the house the following year, and as the house had ten Democratic majority, he was again elected speaker.

Cessna was one of the shrewdest of our Pennsylvania politicians, and from the day he entered the house until the session closed, he carefully studied how to weaken Hopkins, all the time keeping inside the Democratic breastworks, and Cessna more than any other person in the body made Hopkins practically forgotten as a hopeful candidate for Governor by the time the session ended. He did not show his hand in open hostility to Hopkins until the session was about to close, when a motion was made to permit the committee to continue its investigation during the recess. Cessna took the floor, denounced the proposition as utterly unwarranted, and carried a large majority in the house with him in requiring the committee to make its final report before the adjournment and end its duties.

Cessna's re-election to the house in 1862, and his successful contest for the speakership made him still hopeful that he could win the Democratic nomination for Governor, and had he been nominated it is quite likely that he could have been elected, as Curtin would not have been a candidate, because of his apparently hopelessly broken health, if the Democrats had presented as their nominee a man of positive loyalty in support of the war; but before the close of the session of 1863, it was quite evident that Cessna would be no more acceptable as a candidate for Governor than Hopkins, and he felt that his want of availability

before the Demoratic State convention was his loyalty in support of the war.

Judge Woodward, afterward chief justice of the State, was made the Democratic candidate for Governor on a platform that was offensive to the loyal Democrats of the State. Cessna retired from active participation in the campaign, and it was an open secret that he voted for Curtin, although he made no public expression on the subject; but the following year in a commencement address before Franklin and Marshall College, he declared himself distinctly in favor of supporting Lincoln, and was soon thereafter received into full Republican fellowship, and one year later, in 1865, he was made chairman of the Republican State committee. In 1868 he was elected to Congress as the Republican candidate, defeating Judge Kimmell, and in 1870 he was defeated by Benjamin F. Meyers, Democrat, who was in turn defeated by Cessna in 1872. His last political effort was disastrous, as he was defeated for president judge in the Bedford and Somerset district by Mr. Baer, Democrat.

He rendered very important service to the Republican party when he was acting with it as a full-fledged Republican partisan, but the greatest service he ever rendered to any party was the unseen and generally unknown service he rendered to the Republicans in the memorable turbulent Legislative session of 1862.

Hopkins was an experienced legislator and a man of unfaltering integrity. He was not playing the mere political demagogue in his movements to investigate the tonnage tax legislation. He would have made that investigation regardless of any interest he had in his party or in his own nomination for the office of Governor, but he was naturally inspired in his work by the hope and belief that a tidal wave of prejudice

against corporate enterprise generally, and especially against the Pennsylvania Railroad, would lead to,a political revolution that could not fail to give the Democrats success, and he believed that his prominence in the sensational exposures he expected to make would be a great aid to him in his contest for the Democratic nomination. He had been prominent in the Legislature nearly half a generation before, and was speaker of what was known as the Hopkins house in the bloodless farce known as the Buckshot War, in 1838.

He was thoroughly equipped to manage his movement on safe political lines, and he was soon surprised, after his investigation got under way, to learn that five of the seven members of his committee conserved him in every aggressive movement, and he was forced to narrow his investigation to lines entirely outside of politics. He also felt a quiet but very effective restraining power in his movements within his own Democratic circle in the house. It was not until near the close of the session that he discovered its source, and he was dumfounded when he learned that Cessna was its inspiration.

Cessna was a consummate political strategist, and Hopkins found himself sidetracked time and again without being able to see from what source the jolt had come, but he was wise enough to appreciate the fact that he had nothing to gain by violent or revolutionary measures, and he quietly accepted the situation and made the investigation a substantial success in vindication of his movement, but entirely stripped of all sensational features.

At an important stage of the investigation, when he had fully discovered that he was not master of the policy of his own committee, and did not feel safe in venturing to assert his mastery in the house,

he brought to Harrisburg a close personal and political friend, who, after a conference with Hopkins, called upon George V. Lawrence, Republican member of the senate, with the request that Lawrence should bring Hopkins' friend to me to vouch for his absolute reliability, as Hopkins desired to communicate with me through his friend on several matters relating to the investigation, and the communications to be sacredly confidential between ourselves.

Senator Lawrence, while politically opposed to Hopkins, was his personal friend, although not in sympathy with his investigation movement that was accepted on all sides as a violent partisan measure.

I assured Hopkins, through his friend, in the presence of Lawrence that any communication from him would be received in confidence and answered frankly, the answer to be regarded with equal sanctity as between ourselves. The result was that I received many personal communications from Hopkins and answered all with perfect frankness. He knew that the political feature of the movement was practically destroyed, and all he desired was that he should not be hindered in obtaining testimony that would warrant him in making a report justifying the public accusations he had made that unlawful measures had been employed to accomplish the passage of the repeal of the tonnage tax.

I did not seek to hinder him in attaining that end. Indeed, I would have been glad if many of the blackmailers who had fastened themselves upon Colonel Scott in his desperate battle for a liberal commercial and industrial policy in the State could have been sent to prison if done without involving others who yielded to more than questionable methods only from imperious necessity to accomplish indispensable legislation.

For several weeks before the close of the investigation his messenger visited me every evening, and finally brought me a rough draft of the report prepared by Hopkins for the committee. It was temperate, but fully sustained Hopkins in demanding the investigation, and it was returned with entire approval. During that time I met Hopkins in and about the Capitol, but in no instance did either allude to the investigation.

Ten years later, when I entered the senate from Philadelphia, Hopkins was a member of that body. At that time I was admitted to the senate on a contest, and before my admission, when my petition was pending in the senate, a Republican senator, who believed that they had then adopted a party policy that would positively exclude my admission, criticised me with some bitterness on the floor of the senate, to which Hopkins replied in my defense with great earnestness. We served together in that body for two sessions, and always aided each other when support was needed, but the one subject that never was alluded to was the investigation of 1862.

The struggle to disarm the partisan features of the Hopkins investigation of 1862 was not the most important feature of that duty. It was good politics to control the investigation as it was controlled, but there was a much higher and far-reaching issue involved. It was the first successful battle that was made against the narrow, illiberal flood-tide of prejudice cherished throughout Pennsylvania against everything approaching liberal progress and the development of the boundless wealth of our great Commonwealth; a prejudice that was the plaything of every demagogic political movement, and that held the richest of all the States in the Union bound in leading strings of ignorance and bigotry; and had the

Hopkins investigation been permitted to fan the flames of popular prejudice that then prevailed in the State, the Pennsylvania Railroad would have been remanded back to destructive tonnage taxes; the commerce of Pennsylvania would have been driven to great marts of commerce outside of the State, and our untold millions of slumbering wealth would have been denied a liberal policy for its development for a decade or more.

Fortunately the Civil War quickened our industries and invited corporate interests to harvest millions from our oil, our coal, our iron, our lumber and other channels of industry, and the battle against the liberal progress then inaugurated, that has since added billions to the wealth of Pennsylvania, was never thereafter seriously renewed. It was the last struggle of Pennsylvania to rescue herself from a suicidal policy, and our great State in a single decade thereafter advanced more in the development of wealth, the diffusion of education, and in prosperity throughout all the channels of industry and trade, than it ever before advanced in half a century.

XLIX.

THE STATE DRAFT OF 1862.

Difficulty in Furnishing Troops—Volunteering had Ceased—The Altoona Conference of Loyal Governors Suggested by Curtin—That Meeting Enabled the President to Obtain All the Troops Needed—The Author Called to Take Charge of the Draft in Pennsylvania, a Most Laborious and Complicated Task—Political Interests Openly Disregarded in the Selecting of Draft Officers—Rebellion of the Molly Maguires—They Riotously Drove Conscripts From the Cars in Schuylkill County—Stanton Ordered the Author to Hurry Troops to the Molly Maguire Region and Enforce the Draft—Lincoln's Sagacious Method of Avoiding a Conflict in the Enforcement of the Draft—Philadelphia Evades the Draft.

EIGHTEEN hundred and sixty-two was an eventful year in the history of the war. Grant had achieved important Union victories in the Southwest, capturing Forts Henry and Donaldson and Nashville, the capital of Tennessee, followed by the final victory of his army at Shiloh, after having suffered a costly and humiliating defeat on the first day of the battle. Missouri was in a state of anarchy, the supporters and opponents of the Union making it a death struggle even between neighbors. In the East bloody battles had been fought, all of which were disastrous to the Union cause, with the single exception of Antietam, that was practically a drawn battle. McClellan had been defeated in the Seven Days battles on the peninsula, and the combined Union armies were again defeated on the old Bull Run field under Pope, suffering great loss of prestige for the Army of the Potomac and a fearful sacrifice of life. The Union sentiment of the State was greatly chilled, and the political situation was most embarrassing for the Union party.

A large increase of the army was an imperious necessity for the successful prosecution of the war, but President Lincoln hesitated to issue a call for additional troops because he feared it might result in organized opposition to the further prosecution of the war. Indeed, only the few who had accurate knowledge of the situation had any conception of the grave peril that confronted the administration. Our great army in the East had been defeated in repeated battles, its numbers were greatly reduced, and only by speedy and large reinforcements could the tide of disaster be turned to victory. Governor Curtin was then prostrated by a malady for which he could find no relief except in a very serious surgical operation. He was utterly exhausted by his continued efforts to sustain the government, but he was finally compelled to go to New York, under the strict orders of his physician that no official business should be permitted to reach him.

The President and cabinet had given very careful consideration to the question of raising additional troops, and they decided that it would be unsafe for the government to venture upon a call for the 300,000 additional soldiers needed without having an appeal made to the government by some highly responsible and representative class of men in the North. The scheme worked out by the cabinet was for Secretary Seward to proceed to New York and summon a conference of the mayors of the prominent cities of the North, with a view of having them unite in an earnest request to the President to hasten the conclusion of the war by summoning a large increase of troops for the army, to enable it to hasten the overthrow of the military power of the South.

Seward went to New York and made his headquarters at the Astor House. Fortunately, Thomas A. Scott

was with him, and he suggested to Seward that Governor Curtin was in the city, and as Pennsylvania was the most important State to be consulted, it might be well for the Secretary to confer with Curtin. Scott was sent to present the matter to the Governor, and he was soon almost entirely forgetful of his illness, and in defiance of the protest of his physician, he accompanied Scott to the Astor House, where Secretary Seward unfolded his plan.

Curtin at once said: "You are not assured of the loyalty of all the mayors of the prominent cities of the East, but you have an unbroken circle of loyal Governors in the Northern States, and they could make a demand upon the government for a speedy and large increase of the army, with vastly more force than could the mayors of the cities."

Seward gladly accepted the suggestion, and within a few hours Curtin had responses from a large majority of the Governors of the North cordially approving the proposition for a general conference, and on the 14th of September, 1862, the following call was issued for what is now known in the history of the war as the Altoona conference:

> We invite a meeting of the Governors of the loyal States to be held at Altoona, Pa., on the 24th inst.
>
> A. G. Curtin, Pennsylvania.
> David Todd, Ohio.
> F. H. Pierpont, Virginia.
>
> *September, 14, 1862.*

The call was responded to by nearly all, and I believe quite all of the loyal Governors of the North, with the single exception of Governor Morgan, of New York, who declined for reasons that were never given to the public. After the call had been issued, but before the meeting was held, the battle of Antietam was fought

that gave the semblance of victory to the Union army, and the preliminary emancipation proclamation had been issued by the President, who had personally conferred with a large number of the loyal Governors on the subject, and it was well understood that the Altoona conference was not only called for the speedy and large increase of the army, but to indorse the emancipation policy of the government.

The address to the President was written chiefly by Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, assisted by Governor Curtin, and after it was adopted it was decided that the members of the conference should call upon the President in person to give the greatest possible effect to their action.

This conference, with the earnestly patriotic tone of the utterances made by the Governors, and of the formal address they presented to the President, at once lifted the North out of the slough of despair, and Lincoln was entirely clear to call for 300,000 additional troops. It was, in fact, the turning point of the war, and but for the precaution taken to educate the loyal sentiment in the North up to the point of accepting the fearful sacrifices necessary to sustain the Union, it is doubtful whether the government could have been successful in replenishing the broken lines of our army.

A call had been made for 300,000 troops on the 7th of July, 1862, and the quota of Pennsylvania was about 17,000 or 18,000, and it was evident that the quota could not be furnished by volunteers. The bounty system that was soon thereafter inaugurated, and that later grew to fearful proportions, had not then been resorted to, and a draft to fill our quota became an imperative necessity.

The National conscription act did not become operative until 1863, and there was no authority in the

government to draft men for a period exceeding nine months. To organize and execute a draft in a great State like Pennsylvania was a most appalling task, as it involved the most careful visitation to every household in the State to ascertain the names of those who were subject to military duty, and to ascertain, also, how many volunteers were then in the service from each township or ward. After such enumeration an exhaustive tabulation of the conscripts due from each of the two thousand districts in the State was necessary, and, after the draft, each conscript had the right to appeal to a commissioner and surgeon of the county to claim that he had lawful reasons for not accepting military service. The draft had to be made by State officers, and their compensation depended upon individual settlements with the National government.

When the Legislature adjourned in the spring of 1862 I had given five years of continuous service in one or the other branch, and for more than two years, with my duties as chairman of the State committee, and the exhaustive duties required at Harrisburg, I had practically no time to give to professional, personal or private interests. I announced at the adjournment of the Legislature that I would not be a candidate for re-election to the senate, and would not continue as chairman of the State committee. I greatly needed rest, and long-neglected business interests demanded my attention. I felt a most gratifying sense of relief when I went home, believing that I could have a season of rest with no more than the ordinary business interests to be cared for.

When Curtin found that a draft was a necessity, he well understood the magnitude of the movement, and how easily it could be made disastrous in alienating loyal Democratic sentiment if the draft had even the

semblance of partisanship in its execution. He sent for me and made an earnest appeal to me to take charge of the draft, but I could not entertain it. Just when I had hoped for a season of rest from the most wearing labors, I was confronted with the proposition to accept the most responsible and delicate duties that could be presented. He was very positive in urging my acceptance, but I was resolute in declining, and he could not but confess that I had good reasons for it.

I returned home happy in the belief that I had escaped a fearful responsibility; but the next day I received a telegram from the President and proceeded to Washington. He informed me that Curtin had presented the situation in Pennsylvania to him, and said that he had sent for me to urge as a personal service to himself that I should take personal charge of the draft in Pennsylvania. It was not possible to refuse the President, and I most reluctantly acceded to his wishes.

The mere matter of making the enumeration in the State and calculating the quota of each district was not the alarming feature of the new duty I had accepted. Competent men could be employed for the performance of all such duties, but with the Democratic party only partially loyal to the government and the Republican party disheartened to the verge of despair, it was an imperious necessity that the draft should be executed at every stage and in every feature with open and absolute freedom from all partisan or personal interests.

I reported to the Governor and told him that I had agreed to take charge of the draft without commission or compensation, requiring only that I should be allowed to select two thoroughly competent clerks who should be paid by the State $100 a month. That was accepted and I had most competent and faithful

service from ex-Senator James M. Sellers, of Juniata, and ex-Representative John McCurdy, of Cumberland.

A commissioner and surgeon of the draft were required to be appointed in each county of the State. Under the law it was the duty of the commissioner to appoint proper canvassers to make the enumeration of each township, and the surgeon and commissioner, who constituted the board, had power to discharge any conscript upon proof that he was not subject to military duty, or for any other reason for which he was ineligible for the service.

I knew that the small politicians of each county would make an earnest struggle to control the commissioner and surgeon in their respective counties to wield the power to assure the discharge of conscripts where it would serve political ends. The selection of these officers was therefore a most important duty, and I knew how the Governor would be importuned to appoint men who had rendered service to the party, and who would be likely to render service to their party friends in deciding appeals for release from conscript service.

I said to the Governor that only on one condition would I take charge of the draft, and that was that in every other county of the State but his own county of Centre I should be entirely free to appoint the commissioner and surgeon for each county without consulting any one. I told him why I made the demand; that I believed it to be absolutely necessary to have these commissioners and surgeons one of each party in every county and men who would be accepted at once as entirely beyond the reach of political influence to favor conscripts who desired to escape from the army.

Curtin not only promptly assented to this, but said he would be glad to be able to say to all who came to

him that the matter was not in his hands, and that the appointments would be made solely with reference to the military service. I was then quite familiar with the public men in every county of the State, and within twenty-four hours I had made out a list of commissioners and surgeons for each county.

The Governor had given me the names of the persons for his own county, but beyond that he did not know of another appointment that was to be made until I presented the list, and when he saw it he was delighted, as it at once disarmed all apprehension as to partisan manipulation or other interference in the execution of the draft.

I made William Henry Allen, Republican, then president of Girard College, commissioner for Philadelphia, and Dr. Gerhard, a man eminent in his profession, and a pronounced Democrat, the surgeon. In Montgomery I made James Boyd, then a prominent lawyer and Democrat of Norristown, and until his death the honored nestor of the bar, commissioner, with a Republican surgeon of the highest character; and in Lancaster I appointed James L. Reynolds, a prominent Democrat, and brother of General Reynolds, who fell at Gettysburg, the commissioner for that Gibraltar of Republicanism.

When the list of appointments was announced, showing that the commissioners and surgeons had all been selected with the single reference to their ability and integrity, and both parties equally represented, public sentiment throughout the entire State was at once disarmed of all apprehension as to any partisan aims in the execution of the draft, and we thus had a clear field for the important task that was before us.

While it was accepted on all sides, after the commissioners and surgeons of the draft had been announced, that partisanship had been entirely eliminated in the

execution of the draft, there were serious danger signals in several sections of the State. It is due to the truth of history to say that at that time there was not a dominating public sentiment in Pennsylvania that heartily supported the war. They did not want to accept the dismemberment of the Union, but they were hopeful, even in the face of clearly apparent impossibilities, that in some way the war might be ended by compromise, and many of the sincerely loyal men of the State gravely doubted whether the military power of the Confederacy could be broken, and the seceding States brought back into submission to the Union. That sentiment, however, was really the creation of the failure of our army in the East to make successful progress in the prosecution of the war, and it was evident that Union victories in the field would restore Pennsylvania to aggressive loyalty.

The hesitating, doubting sentiment relating to the war was not the most to be feared. In several of the mining districts there were positive indications of revolutionary disloyalty, and it was especially manifested in Schuylkill, where the Molly Maguires were then in the zenith of their power. The center of their power was in Cass Township, where thirteen murders had been committed within two or three years, and not a single murderer brought to punishment. They successfully dominated the politics of the county, and made even the judges and court officers and jurors fear them. They had a very compact secret organization, and, as was developed in the later remarkable trial and conviction of the leaders by Mr. Gowan, they many times decided on the murder of an individual, drew lots as to who should commit the crime, and in nearly or quite every instance the chosen victim suffered a violent death. They were implacably hostile to the Republican party, and to the loyal sentiment

that demanded the prosecution of the war, and they openly declared their purpose not to submit to the conscription that was about to be enforced.

I had chosen Benjamin Bannan, one of the most prominent and sagacious citizens of the county, then editor of the Pottsville "Journal," as commissioner for that county, not only because of his high character and admitted ability, but because of his intimate knowledge of all the political ramifications of the Commonwealth, including the Molly Maguires. He was very reluctant to accept the position, but when the needs of the case were explained to him he finally agreed to assume the task, and it was a task of appalling magnitude. He selected with the greatest care the men who were to make the enumeration of these districts, and although they were hindered at every stage in the immediate Molly Maguire region, they managed to get a fairly accurate enumeration without provoking any outbreak.

Cass Township had an agricultural section in it that was entirely different from the Molly Maguires who ruled the mines, and the residents there were generally loyal. Of course, such a township would not have an excess of volunteers in the service, and an unusually large quota was officially returned to Commissioner Bannan with directions to fill the same with conscripts, and on the 16th day of October the list of conscripts was drawn for every district in the State, and it included a few of the agricultural people of Cass Township, and a much larger number of miners, all of whom were under the absolute influence of the Molly Maguires. The conscripts were ordered to start for Harrisburg on a given day, and those of the agricultural portion of Cass Township appeared at the depot to take the train for Harrisburg, but the Molly Maguire conscripts, with a number of their friends, appeared also, and not

only refused to respond to the call of the State by going to Harrisburg, but riotously excluded the willing conscripts from the car.

The facts were promptly telegraphed me by Bannan, and in turn I promptly communicated them to Secretary Stanton, of the War Department. Stanton was strenuously loyal and at times impetuous when confronted by open disregard of law. He at once telegraphed me, assigning a regiment in Harrisburg and another in Philadelphia to be subject to my orders to be sent at once to Schuylkill County with orders to enforce the draft at the point of the bayonet.

After consultation with the Governor he urged that a conflict between our own troops and rioters opposing the execution of the draft would be most disastrous in its consequences, not only at home, but throughout the country, and in accordance with his views I prepared an answer to Secretary Stanton suggesting that haste should be avoided in forcing a conflict between the troops and the Cass Township insurgents.

He promptly answered repeating his order that the regiments should be started at once to Schuylkill County, and the draft enforced without parleying. The troops were ordered to prepare at once to be transported to Pottsville in accordance with the directions of the Secretary of War, and they arrived in Pottsville on the following day, but no orders had been given to them beyond going to that point.

After further conference with the Governor I prepared a dispatch in cypher to President Lincoln, giving the Governor's views as to the peril of provoking a conflict with the Schuylkill rioters and asked for an early answer. This despatch was sent some time in the afternoon, and we were greatly disappointed that no answer came to it, although I waited until two o'clock in the morning, hoping to receive it. I slept little

and was up early in the morning, and when I entered the breakfast room at the hotel I saw Assistant Adjutant General Townsend at the table, and he at once beckoned me to come and join him.

I was well acquainted with him, and was greatly gratified at seeing him, as I did not doubt that he had some official instructions for me. He at once informed me that he had been sent by President Lincoln to see me and to deliver a personal message, saying that he did not know to what the message related. He said the President had instructed him to inform me that he was desirous, of course, to see the law executed, or at least to appear to have been executed, to which he added: "I think McClure will understand." General Townsend said: "I have no knowledge as to the subject matter of this communication that I have delivered exactly as instructed."

Without waiting for breakfast I sent a despatch to Commissioner Bannan to come to Harrisburg at once, and he was there very soon after noon, and we at once went to the Executive chamber and discussed the situation with the Governor. Lincoln's message was well understood. Bannan was most desirous for a peaceful solution of the problem, and he said that the draft could not be executed in Cass Township without a bloody conflict with the Molly Maguires, and he could conceive of no method by which there could be given the appearance of executing the law.

I told him that there was but one way in which it could be done; that several districts in the State had shown conclusively that their quota had been entirely filled by volunteers, some of whom had enlisted in county towns or in the cities and had not been properly credited to the township as the law required. Where the facts were made clear I had at once revoked the order for the draft, and I said that only in that way

could the Cass Township problem be solved if it were practicable.

Bannan made no reply, but took his hat, hastened to the train and reached Pottsville the same evening. On the following evening he was back in Harrisburg with a large number of affidavits regularly executed before a justice of the peace or notary public, proving on their face that the quota of Cass Township had been filled by volunteers, chiefly by men connected with the mines who had enlisted from the towns or cities where companies or regiments were being formed. The affidavits were carefully tabulated and they made the quota of Cass Township entirely full. They were undisputed, and I at once issued the order releasing the conscripts of Cass Township from reporting for duty because the quota had been filled with volunteers.

Commissioner Bannan did not proffer any explanation as to how the affidavits had been obtained, nor did the Governor or myself make any inquiry. The law appeared to be executed, although all connected with its execution were entirely satisfied that the affidavits were fictitious, but it was an imperious necessity to avoid a conflict between the Molly Maguires and the troops, and that was accomplished by Commissioner Bannan furnishing the required affidavits that were clothed with all the ceremony of law. The troops were at once ordered back from Pottsville, and the draft was executed in every other district in the State without trouble.

It is not the exact truth to say that the draft was executed in every other district in the State outside of Cass Township. It will astound many of the citizens of Philadelphia to be told that this loyal city did not fill its quota of troops as shown to be due by the quotas issued for the draft. Philadelphia was short of her quota some 3,000 men, and I issued the order

for a draft on Philadelphia just as it was issued for all the other districts of the State. It aroused the greatest anxiety among the political leaders of the city, as they were entirely convinced that a draft for 3,000 men made in Philadelphia would defeat the Republicans at the coming election, although the actual draft was not to be made until a few days thereafter. Philadelphia was regarded as the one great loyal city of the Union, and an order for a draft in Republican Philadelphia, when Berks and Lehigh, the Democratic Gibraltars of the State, had promptly filled their quotas to the last man by a regiment of volunteers from their own people, was regarded as fatal to Republican mastery in the city.

Colonel Mann was a candidate for re-election as district attorney, and was the undisputed political leader. The Union League was not then completely organized, and it was not felt in the effort to reinforce the army as it was later in its magnificent movements by which regiment after regiment was raised and hurried to the front.

There were experienced "lightning calculators" in those days, and they were assigned the task of showing that Philadelphia had sent an excess of her quota in volunteers to the front, and on one basis it was susceptible of the clearest demonstration. Philadelphia had sent in companies and regiments marching from the city to the field many more than her full quota, but several thousand of them were men who had come from adjoining counties to join companies in the city, all of whom had been credited to their proper districts at home. Armed with this plausible balance sheet, a formidable political committee was sent to Washington to wrestle ostensibly with the Provost Marshal General, but in fact with the political leaders who had access to the citadel of power. They insisted that they had

filled their full quota, and that to compel them to send additional troops would be very unjust and result in political disaster.

The result was that I received official instructions from Washington to revise the quota of Philadelphia and revoke the order for the draft. I doubt not that the political leaders were entirely right in the assumption that a draft in Philadelphia would have assured Republican defeat, as the Republican majority in the city was only 2,500. The political situation was thus saved in Philadelphia, but the army lost nearly 3,000 reinforcements.

L.

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.

The Author Hindered in Forwarding Conscripts from Harrisburg—Military Officers in the Interest of Contractors—President Lincoln Appoints the Author Assistant Adjutant General of the United States with a Rank that Made Him Commandant at Harrisburg—How the Troops Were Promptly Mustered and Forwarded—The Preliminiary Emancipation Proclamation a Death Blow to Republican Success—The Author's Appeals to Lincoln on the Subject—New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois Elected Democratic State Tickets and Democratic Delegations to Congress—Speaker Grow Retired from Congress by a New Apportionment—A Number of Other Republicans Defeated.

AT the time the draft was made in October, 1862, there was a decidedly improved loyal sentiment inspired in Pennsylvania, notwithstanding the disastrous defeat the Republican party suffered at the October election, when the entire Democratic State ticket was elected, with a majority of Democrats in the congressional delegation.

The effect of the Altoona conference and the aggressive attitude assumed by the loyal Governors of the North, demanding that our army should be made overwhelming in numbers, inspired confidence that military success would be achieved and the overthrow of the rebellion accomplished at an early day.

The response of the Pennsylvania conscripts was generally very prompt, and Camp Curtin soon became thronged with an unorganized conscript mob. I was exceedingly anxious to get the men into the service because I expected my labors to cease as soon as they were mustered, but the military officers at Harrisburg who had charge of the mustering seemed

to be much more interested in the contractors who supplied the camp than in speedily reinforcing the army, and when a thousand or more men were coming into camp each day the mustering officer organized two companies a day. I called upon him and made an earnest appeal for him to send off at least a regiment a day, as I would be able to supply him with that number of men for two weeks or more, but he treated my appeal not only with indifference but rather with contempt, and continued to muster but two companies a day. The result was that in a few days I had a mob of five or six thousand soldiers in camp without organization, restless and boisterous, and I telegraphed Secretary Stanton urging him to send me a mustering officer.

A new officer appeared on the following day and mustered a regiment himself, but the next morning he was relieved from duty and ordered elsewhere, by what authority I never knew, and the mustering was again reduced to two companies a day.

That process would have kept from five to ten thousand troops in camp for six weeks or two months, and as they were presumably in my immediate custody until they were mustered into the United States service, and as the government greatly needed the troops at the front, I decided to make a direct appeal to President Lincoln to have them promptly mustered.

I telegraphed the President that I would call upon him in Washington early the next morning, and met him according to appointment. I told him that I had given more than two months of labor, often day and night, and never less than fifteen hours out of the twenty-four, without compensation, to make the draft successful in Pennsylvania and furnish troops to the government; that there were then from five to six

thousand troops in camp, and that they were accumulating much more rapidly than they were being mustered. I assured him that a regiment a day could be forwarded to the army from Harrisburg for two weeks or more; that if he would order a mustering officer to hasten their organization and forward them to the front, I would gladly remain until the work was completed, but that if the mustering could not be hastened I would abandon the work at once and go home.

Lincoln was much distressed at the Harrisburg situation. He knew that political influences had chosen the military officers assigned to duty at Harrisburg, as was common elsewhere throughout the State, and he knew that the summary removal of an officer would probably cause offense in a quarter that might later do him much harm. He said that the troops must be forwarded at once, and he would have it done, but he said he thought he had a better way of doing it than to remove any of the Harrisburg officers. I told him it mattered not how it was accomplished so that the work could be completed, the government get the troops and I relieved of further exacting and profitless labor. Without making any explanation he rang the bell and ordered his messenger to summon the adjutant general of the army. In a few minutes Adjutant General Thomas appeared, and the President asked him what was the rank of the senior officer on duty at Harrisburg. Adjutant General Thomas replied that he was a captain. The President then instructed the adjutant general to bring him at once a commission for me as assistant adjutant general of the United States volunteers with the rank of major, and the adjutant general took his leave.

As soon as he had left the room I said to the President that I could not consent to enter the military

service, as I was not used to military orders, and could not comply with military regulations without serious inconvenience to myself. To which he replied that I need not worry about that, as he would have an order issued assigning me to report to Governor Curtin, that the commission would make me the ranking officer and commandant at Harrisburg, and he supposed that, being under Governor Curtin's orders, there would be no greater restraint in the military service than if I were not in it. He assured me also that no order would be issued assigning me to duty elsewhere, and that as soon as my work was completed at Harrisburg, and I desired to retire from the service, my resignation should be forwarded to him, and it would be promptly accepted. He insisted that I should continue to hold the commission after the troops were mustered until all the many complicated accounts relating to the draft could be settled between the State and the National government. He suggested that I should, on my return to Harrisburg, call upon the commandant there to muster me into the service, and he certainly believed that there would be no difficulty about having troops mustered thereafter.

I returned to Harrisburg the same evening, and the next morning requested the commandant to call at my office in the Capitol. He naturally supposed that I had taken the liberty to send for him to importune him further as to the mustering of the troops, and he came into the office in the most supercilious way and asked to know why I had sent for him. I handed him my commission, requesting him to muster me into the military service, and also handed him the order assigning me to duty at Harrisburg. His arrogant manner was at once transformed into pitiable obsequiousness, and he mustered me into the service,

After being mustered, I said to him, in the mildest way I could command, that I knew nothing about military regulations, and did not expect to interfere with him in any of the routine duties, but that there must be a regiment of troops mustered and forwarded to the army each day until Camp Curtin was empty. I told him that so far as I was concerned I had no desire to be known as the military commandant of the place, that I would wear no uniform nor attempt in any way to exploit myself as a military officer, and indeed very few of those connected with public affairs in Harrisburg ever knew that I was the commanding officer at the Capital.

I never had occasion to summon the captain for either suggestion or orders, and I do not recall that I ever had further conference with him. His duties outside of mustering were never interfered with, and the people of Harrisburg generally never knew that there was a change in the military commandant.

After the troops were all mustered and the regiments sent to the front, I found that I had on hand another very complicated and difficult task—that of gathering in, revising and tabulating the various accounts arising from the draft. It required more than a month of energetic effort to get the claims in any sort of shape, as they embraced the pay of the many hundreds of enumerators who had enrolled the districts of the State, and the many different expenses incurred in each county in making the draft, and after they were gotten into shape it required several months to get them advanced in Washington to the point of settlement.

The National departments were all overworked; the Treasury was in a condition that required the Secretary to pay as sparingly as possible, and final settlement was naturally delayed as long as possible.

After everything had been done that could be done beyond simply importuning the government to make payment, I resigned the office of assistant adjutant general, leaving to the proper State authorities the duty of finishing the work of obtaining money from the government.

My commission was issued October 27, 1862, but ante-dated September 5, and my resignation was accepted and I was discharged from the service February 27, 1863.

The political situation became very unpromising in 1862, not only because of the failure to prosecute the war successfully, but also because of the Emancipation Proclamation, for which the more conservative element of the Republican party in the State was not prepared.

The preliminary proclamation was issued on the 22d of September, 1862, and from that day those who had intelligent understanding of the general political conditions had little hope of carrying any of the debatable Northern States at the fall election of that year.

The Republicans of New England and of the far West were fully up to the high-water anti-slavery mark, and ready to sustain the destruction of slavery by any practicable method.

While earnestly anti-slavery in conviction, I was very positive in opposition to the Emancipation Proclamation, and it was the only question that I very earnestly disputed with the President.

It was an open secret for some months before the proclamation was issued that an emancipation policy in some form was inevitable, and I was thoroughly convinced that the conservative Republican sentiment of the great Middle States would not sustain it. I could not see how it was possible for the adminis-

tration to prosecute the war with the great Middle States against it, and in all of my visits to the President, when opportunity presented, I took occasion to admonish him as to the peril of such a movement.

I looked at the greatest of all the questions ever presented to the ruler of the Republic from the mere standpoint of political expediency, and I predicted that an Emancipation Proclamation would defeat the administration in all the great States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. Lincoln did not dispute the assumption that political disaster was possible, and he was most carefully reticent as to any indication of his purpose.

I urged him to issue a military order as the constitutional commander of the armies of the Union, declaring that every slave brought within the Union lines should be forever free, and that slavery should be abolished in every rebellious State when brought within the control of our military authority.

I stated, what was indisputable, that the mere proclamation would not liberate a single slave, and that only by the success of the army could the proclamation be made effective. Lincoln had given the subject most anxious thought, but withheld his purpose from all, even the members of his cabinet, until he had decided to act.

The political disaster that I predicted was more than fulfilled. New York and New Jersey elected Democratic Governors, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois were carried by the Democrats, and all of these great Middle States sent Democratic delegations to Congress, but the South was excluded from representation and New England and the far West saved the House to the Administration, and the Emancipation Proclamation, the sublimest act of any

American ruler, was sustained by Congress, and finally heartily sustained by the people of the North.

Lincoln, in his careful consideration of the subject, admitted the force of political expediency that forbade an Emancipation Proclamation, but he realized the higher and holier duties of his position, and within a year thereafter I had learned how grandly he had faced all the arguments of expediency to give to human freedom its supreme achievement in the history of nations.

But for the extraordinary efforts made by the concerted action of the Governors of the North, resulting from the Altoona conference, and the inspiration given to the loyal cause by the retreat of Lee from Antietam, Pennsylvania would have voted largely Democratic.

The Union State convention met in Pennsylvania long before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, but it was generally believed that the issue must be met in that campaign. I attended the convention at Harrisburg as a delegate. It was an unusually able and thoroughly representative body, but all were shadowed with the cloud of defeat. The failure of the army, the enforcement of the draft, that then made even the most loyal of our people shudder, as it indicated a want of willingness on the part of the people to sustain the war, were important factors in aid of the Democratic party. Thomas E. Cochran, who was about closing a term as auditor general, and who was conspicuously fitted for the position alike in integrity and qualifications, was unanimously nominated for re-election, and Henry Souther, of Elk County, who was then serving as surveyor general by appointment, was chosen without opposition as the candidate for that office. Both were men of ripe experience in State affairs, having served with

conspicuous credit in the State senate, and the ticket had all the strength that individual merit could give it. The platform of the convention heartily sustained the administration and the vigorous prosecution of the war.

The Democrats nominated Isaac Slenker, of Union, for auditor general, who had also served in the senate some years before, and James P. Barr, editor of the Pittsburg "Post," and one of the ablest of the Democratic leaders in Pennsylvania, for surveyor general.

The platform of the Democratic party was cautiously drawn to commend itself to the Republicans who were doubting or despairing in regard to the war, but it proclaimed absolute devotion to the Union of the States.

The Republicans thus started in the campaign fearfully handicapped at an election where a whole delegation to Congress was to be chosen and the Legislature then elected was to name a United States Senator.

After the Altoona conference there was some indication of the political tide turning in favor of the Republicans, but it was not strong enough to enable them to hold power in the State, and the Democratic State ticket was elected by about 4,000 majority.

The congressional delegation elected in 1860 contained seventeen Republicans, exclusive of Hendrick B. Wright, of Luzerne, and Joseph Bailey, of Perry, who were War Democrats, making nineteen of the twenty-five earnest supporters of the war; but the new delegation elected in 1862 contained eleven Republicans and thirteen Democrats.

Galusha A. Grow, speaker of the first War Congress, and who had been in Congress for ten years, was defeated by Charles Dennis. He was in a new district composed of Susquehanna and Luzerne instead

of his own district of Susquehanna, Bradford and Wyoming, and he was overwhelmed by the Democratic vote of Luzerne County.

The Dauphin district, one of the strongest Republican districts of the State, was lost by 500, William H. Miller, of Dauphin, defeating John J. Patterson, ex-State representative from Juniata. Edward MacPherson, who had been twice elected in the Franklin district, was defeated by some 500 majority by General A. H. Coffroth, of Somerset; Archibald MacAllister of Blair defeated Steele Blair of the Blair district; and John L. Dawson, of Fayette, one of the ablest of the Democratic leaders, carried Covode's district, defeating Andrew Stewart.

Of the Congressmen elected by the Democrats Joseph Bailey, of Perry, was an out and out War Democrat, and James T. Hale, of Centre, was an Independent and thoroughly loyal Republican, making the delegation practically about even on the issue of supporting the administration.

The Democrats concentrated their efforts to a great extent upon the control of the Legislature, and the Republicans left no available means unemployed to save the house. They had the assured control of the senate, as the sweeping Republican majorities of several years before had left the senate nearly two-thirds Republican, but the Democrats were inspired by the confidence of victory, and their organization was then very compact and under the most skilled leadership. Every debatable legislative district was exhaustively contested by both parties, and the Republicans were greatly humiliated when the final returns presented a Democratic majority of one on joint ballot.

The Senate stood twenty-one Republicans to twelve Democrats, but the house had fifty-five Democrats

to forty-five Republicans, giving the Democrats the control of the house by ten majority and the United States Senatorship by a single vote.

In several instances members of the house were lost by one of the two parties by less than half a score of votes. In Perry County John Magee, Democrat, afterwards member of Congress, was elected by nine majority over Amos Barnett, Republican, who later served ten years as president judge in the district. Both parties had so carefully watched the campaign in the closely-contested districts that there was no reasonable prospect of a contest on either side, and all quietly settled down to the fact that the Democrats had the Legislature and would have the Senator.

When the smoke of the battle cleared away and it was ascertained that the Republicans held control of the National House of Representatives, notwithstanding the defection in the great Middle States, the Republicans were very much encouraged for future battles, and the close of the year 1862 found our people and State in very much better condition to support the war, after having gone through many months of sore depression often verging on despair.

LI.

THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM.

General J. W. Palmer's Preliminary Achievements as a Scout—Then Captain of Anderson's Body Guard — The Author Remained in Chambersburg and Directed Movements of Palmer and His Fifty Odd Men as Scouts — All Important Information of Lee's Movements Furnished by Palmer to the Author, Repeated to Curtin and Promptly Sent to McClellan Through the War Department — Expected Invasion of Pennsylvania — General McClellan in Dispatch to the Author Directed Him to Delay Lee's Movement Until the Union Army Could Overtake Him and Give Battle — The Author with McClellan on the Battle Field — Burnside's Appeal for Reinforcements — McClellan's Reason for Refusing — McClellan Believed that Lee had 120,000 Men — Palmer Repeats His Scouting after Antietam, and is Captured and Convicted as a Spy — How He was Saved by Manufactured Washington Dispatches in the Philadelphia Newspapers.

WHILE I was engaged in getting Pennsylvania enrolled for the purpose of making the draft, the battle of Antietam was fought, and when Lee had advanced to Boonboro, in Maryland, I was called to my home in Chambersburg because of the general disturbance caused by the apprehension that Lee's army was likely to invade our State.

Captain J. W. Palmer, who afterwards became a general in the army with a very conspicuous record for gallantry, was the private secretary of President J. Edgar Thompson, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, but he was ambitious to enter the service, and when General Anderson was assigned to the command of Kentucky, Palmer obtained authority from him to raise a company to be known as the Anderson Troop for duty at the headquarters of the general in Kentucky.

Palmer located at Carlisle Barracks and was rapidly enlisting a company of picked young men. He had then between forty and fifty of his company at the barracks and expected to have it completed and regularly organized within a few weeks. Curtin asked him to take what he had of his company and report to me at Chambersburg, to act as scouts on the border and watch the movements of Lee. He promptly came to Chambersburg, and after we had carefully examined the various lines on which Lee might advance he at once sent his entire command to the border, scattered over a line of some twenty miles. With Captain Palmer was William Bender Wilson, who is yet living in Philadelphia, and has long been connected with the Pennsylvania Railroad. He was an expert telegrapher, one of the few of that day who could carry a battery in his satchel, attach it to a telegraph line anywhere in the field and send dispatches.

On the second day after Palmer had left me for the border, I received a despatch from him stating that he had been within the lines of the enemy during the night at a particular point and ascertained pretty accurately the location of Lee's army.

General Howell Cobb's division had extended nearly to Hagerstown, and for several days the only reliable information that General McClellan received of Lee's movements came from the despatches which Palmer and Wilson sent to me at Chambersburg, after Palmer had entered the enemy's lines night after night, which I immediately repeated to Curtin, and they went directly to McClellan through the War Department. During an entire week Palmer entered Lee's lines at some point disguised in various ways, and reported to me early in the morning.

Finally when Cobb had marched as far north as

Hagerstown, Palmer spent the night in Cobb's command and reported to me soon after daylight the next morning that the universal expectation of the Confederate officers was that they would enter Pennsylvania within twenty-four or forty-eight hours. McClellan received the despatch from Curtin by ten o'clock that morning, and in the afternoon I received a despatch from McClellan directed to the military commander at Chambersburg, where there was not a single soldier on duty. The despatch was brought to me and it contained the order of General McClellan that he had reliable advices of the probable advance of Lee's army into Pennsylvania, and that should such movement be made the commander at Chambersburg was to advance, harass and delay Lee's army as much as possible until he overtook Lee and gave battle. I was not even in the military service myself, and the squad of less than fifty scouts which I had had on duty were scattered over twenty miles, and none of them within fifteen miles of Chambersburg.

It is due to General McClellan to say that General Reynolds had been ordered to Pennsylvania to rendezvous at Chambersburg the emergency militia that had been called out, and he supposed that some part of that force was there, but none of the militia had arrived.

After careful reflection, I concluded that it would not be wise to undertake to harass and delay Lee's army myself, and as I had not even a corporal's guard to assist me, I telegraphed a copy of McClellan's order to the Governor, and told him I had decided not to offer any personal interference with Lee's movements.

Thaddeus Stevens was in the Governor's chamber when he received McClellan's order that I had sent to Harrisburg, and it gave an opportunity for him to exhibit his bitter contempt for McClellan. He said

to Curtin that as for McClure he would do something; that if he couldn't do anything else he would instruct the old lady who kept the toll gate not to let Lee's soldiers pass through, but he said: "God only knows what McClellan would do."

All of the movements of the different commands of Lee's army were carefully and precisely gathered by Captain Palmer, and McClellan was guided chiefly if not entirely in his following of Lee to Antietam by the information that came from Palmer to me and reached McClellan through Curtin and the War Department.

Finally Palmer ascertained definitely that Lee was concentrating at Antietam, and the day before the battle was fought I started for the field accompanied by George H. Moore, then clerk of the quarter sessions of Philadelphia. We mounted two good horses and reached the position of some Pennsylvania regiments on McClellan's extreme right the night before the battle. We were hospitably entertained by Quartermaster Hoyt.

It was generally expected that the battle would be precipitated the day before, and it was not doubted that it would begin early on the morning after our arrival. We had early breakfast and were sitting under the comfortable shade in front of Hoyt's tent enjoying it about six oclock in the morning, when the first gun was fired, and in a few minutes the fearful battle that Hooker precipitated on our right was in progress.

If the attack had been made simultaneously as Hooker made it at that early morning hour, there is little doubt that Lee could have been dislodged from his strong position, as he was largely outnumbered, and Jackson had not yet reached the field from Harper's Ferry, where he had captured 10,000 men and

sixty guns the day before; but there was little fighting on the center and left until after Hooker's attack had ceased.

It was the most fierce and bloody feature of the battle of Antietam. Hooker fell soon after the battle opened severely wounded, and Mansfield, who succeeded to the command, was killed soon thereafter.

It was some two miles distant from where we had breakfast to the scene of the battle, and Moore and I hastened on foot to get as near to it as could be ventured with any reasonable degree of safety. We soon met the pitiable throng of wounded, many of them supported by their friends trying to get them to the hospital, and before we reached the line the fight had ceased. We first struck the headquarters of General Joshua Owen, and with him was Colonel Biddle Roberts. They expected the fight to be renewed at any time, but, strange as it may seem, the right wing of McClellan's army was not seriously engaged thereafter during the entire day.

After spending an hour or so with soldier acquaintances on our right, we moved toward the center and finally halted with a reserve battery to watch the gallant efforts of the Irish brigade to capture the Sharpsburg road. General Meagher repeated the charge three times within an hour, but was each time repulsed. They would crawl up to a reasonably close distance to the road, firing all the time, then rise up and charge, but the enemy had a strong force behind the fences and compelled the Irish brigade to retreat. I could see the movement distinctly with the naked eye, although beyond musketry range, and I remember remarking to an artillery officer, when the brigade rose and made the charge in the face of a terrible musketry fire from the enemy, that Lee's men seemed to be poor marskmen, as so few of the Irish brigade

fell. I naturally supposed from the hail of bullets that was sent forth from the enemy in the lane that the Irish brigade would be annihilated in a few minutes, but the artillery officer explained it by saying that no troops had ever yet been trained to fire down hill effectively. The charge was made up a steep hill, and even with all the care that soldiers would be expected to take in aiming for the enemy, three-fourths of all their bullets went high over the heads of the charging force.

General Meagher abandoned the charge after the third attempt and withdrew his command, but another movement was made interesting to one that had never witnessed a battle.

A small forest on a high point at Lee's left had several batteries of artillery which were constantly annoying the Union forces, and a command of infantry, probably a division, was ordered to make a detour into a forest that was divided from the forest in which Lee's batteries were employed by an open field. The Union force moved through the forest until it came to the field, when it stretched out in line of battle and marched deliberately across the field to charge the batteries. To my surprise not a gun was fired until they were more than half way across the field, when a volley belched forth at comparatively short range, but only a small number of the Union men fell, and they then charged and succeeded in getting possession of the point and captured some of the guns. It was amazing to me that so few men fell even when fired upon on level ground and at short range. Certainly not one in ten of the enemy's bullets struck any of the assaulting force. I understood this feature of the war better when the report made by some officers who had made a careful investigation of the battle of Gettysburg stated that the average height at which

George B. McClellan

the bullets of both sides had struck trees in the various forests at Gettysburg was twenty-two feet, with as many above as below that height.

About noon I reached the headquarters of General McClellan. They were located on a prominent point on the east bank of the Antietam Creek, where the cliff rose up almost perpendicular from the banks of the stream. From this position there was an excellent view of the entire battlefield, with the exception of our extreme right. The entire left and center, with a part of the right of our army, were in full view, and along the entire center and left the battle was fought on an undulating incline.

As Lee's line was on the top of the ridge, Burnside's battle on the left could be seen distinctly with the naked eye, and after I reached McClellan's headquarters there was no serious fighting on our right.

I knew McClellan very well and appreciated his great capabilities as an organizer and strategist, and confidently hoped that he would win a decided success on the Antietam field and make him the acceptable commander of the Union forces. He was a man of the gentlest manner, kind and genial in temperament and as lovable as a woman. That he was thoroughly loyal and would have given his life for his country in the line of duty, no man who knew him could reasonably doubt. I knew how Lincoln felt about McClellan. He knew that the army was always safe with McClellan, that it would not be sacrificed; that it would be handled with consummate skill, but he was apprehensive that McClellan had not yet learned, and might never learn, the Napoleonic feature of striking the enemy in advance of expectations rather than later.

McClellan received me very kindly, but of course I did not attempt to engage him in conversation, as he

and his staff were wholly absorbed in the progress of the battle. I stood within ten or twenty feet of him during the remainder of the day until the battle closed at sunset, and witnessed all the fighting that occurred during that period.

Burnside had crossed the Antietam bridge after fearful delay, when he should have forded it early in the morning and struck Lee's right which he could have overwhelmed, as Jackson had not yet arrived on the field.

During the entire afternoon the battle raged on a wide plane from Antietam up to Lee's base, and it was evident about two o'clock that Burnside was halted and could not turn the enemy's right. Had he been able to do so, as he could have done early in the morning, he would have flanked Lee on his right and compelled his retreat from the field, but after Jackson's arrival, with the enemy holding the vantage ground, Burnside was checked, and soon thereafter one of Burnside's aids came dashing up to McClellan's headquarters, his horse foaming at the mouth, and delivered a message to the General. I was greatly disappointed that McClellan did not promptly answer, but instead he exhibited the most painful hesitation and after considerable thought refused the reinforcements Burnside had called for. Half an hour later another aid galloped up to headquarters with a like request from Burnside for reinforcements, but it was also refused.

After the second aid had gone, General McClellan came up to me and inquired what force General Reynolds had at Hagerstown, which I had left the previous afternoon, and what condition the force was in. I had been with Reynolds on my way to Antietam and found him there with a mob of Pennsylvania militia that with great difficulty he had persuaded

to cross the State line, and that was fearfully demoralized.

These regiments had been hastily gathered up and thrown together and were entirely without discipline, and had only the semblance of organization, and it would have been utterly impossible for any officer to lead them where they might get into action with Lee's veterans. I told General McClellan that Reynolds had five or six thousand men, thoroughly demoralized, threatening to return within the State and utterly useless for any aggressive military movement. Hagerstown, on a straight line, was not a very great distance from Lee's left, and I said to the General that the only possible use he could hope to make of the Pennsylvania militia would be to march them toward Lee's left, and that it could be done only if the assurance were given that they would not be brought into action.

As the opportunity then offered, I took advantage of it to ask General McClellan why he had not reinforced Burnside, as Porter's entire corps and altogether some 13,000 men were lying idle in the ravine along Antietam creek and never fired a gun during the entire action. He exhibited no hesitation in frankly stating the situation in which he was placed.

He said that he was largely outnumbered by Lee on the field, a statement that greatly surprised me, and that proved afterwards to be a very serious mistake, as Lee's effective force on the field after the arrival of Jackson was fully one-third less than McClellan's.

He spoke of the danger of taking the risk in this action, as the Army of the Potomac was the only barrier between Lee and the Capital. He gave me Lee's force at 120,000, taking the entire roll, and he told me that his entire roll numbered 96,000, giving

him something over 60,000 muskets. He handled his army with most consummate precision, as no man in the army was his superior as an organizer or in handling troops, but his extreme caution, doubtless dominated by his apprehension that Lee largely outnumbered him, and that his fight was rather for the safety of the army and the Capital than for the destruction of Lee's army, made him direct his movements on that field chiefly or wholly on the lines of safety. The battle raged until about sunset, when suddenly it ceased and there was entire quiet from that desperately fought and bloody field.

I hastened back to my hospitable friend, Quartermaster Hoyt, and there was little time for sleep, as the tragic events of the day made all forgetful of the need of rest, but in the early morning, after an hour or two of sleep in coat and boots, I hastened back to the rear, as I understood that Humphrey's division was on its way to Antietam and was likely to arrive during the night. In the front of that command I found Colonel Quay, whose regiment had made a forced march all the day before and a good part of the night and had arrived in the early morning hours.

Some ten or fifteen thousand reinforcements had reached the field by the morning after the battle, and the reinforcements with the 13,000 of McClellan's veterans who had not been in action gave him fully 25,000 fresh troops who had not been engaged the day before. The fresh forces on the field the morning after the battle were fully half the number of Lee's entire army, and with the troop which had been engaged the day before, as all of Lee's forces had been engaged, McClellan could have opened the second day's battle outnumbering Lee nearly quite two to one; but although the reinforcements were placed in position early in the morning, the entire day passed

without any attempt on either side to renew the conflict, and that night Lee quietly and safely retreated across the Potomac river into Virginia.

I met Captain Palmer at Antietam when the battle was in progress and had a very interesting account from him of his various incursions within the enemy's lines, which he entered every night for a week. He was an extremely reticent man; it was difficult to make him talk about himself, and it was only by pressing the question that I obtained the information as to his various daring movements. I said to him that of course there would be no further need for him to enter the enemy's lines after the battle, and I hoped that he would not attempt it.

He gave an evasive answer. Soon thereafter we separated, and I did not see him again until months afterwards, when he had gone through the trying ordeal of being arrested as a spy, and escaped summary execution only because he managed to raise some plausible doubt as to his identity.

He went into Lee's lines the first night after Lee had crossed the Potomac, and reported to the advance of McClellan's army that was commanded by General Fitz John Porter. The next night he returned to the enemy's lines, and when he had been absent for several days grave apprehensions were felt that he had been detected as a spy, and when ten days had elapsed without hearing from him it was accepted as certain that he had been arrested and his execution was more than probable.

He was saved by an invention of Colonel Scott, for whom I prepared a special Washington despatch for each of the Philadelphia morning papers, telling of the arrival in Washington of Captain Palmer, who had been on scouting duty, and giving some meager accounts of what he had discovered, adding that

the important information he had brought to the War Department would not be given to the public.

The despatches were all varied; I delivered them to the morning papers in person, and they all appeared. That information was in the enemy's lines within twenty-four hours after its publication, and the plausible statement magnified the doubt in Richmond as to Palmer's identity. An exchange of prisoners was effected about that time and one of the prisoners to be exchanged had died. The prisoners to be released managed to get Captain Palmer in their circle and respond to the name of the dead soldier. He was thus saved from execution as a spy.

I doubt whether any one during the entire war rendered more important service or executed more daring feats than did William J. Palmer before the battle of Antietam. Anderson remained in Kentucky only a very brief period, and Palmer took the field with his command, where he won distinction, and now possesses the medal of honor for heroic action in battle.

LII.

A NIGHT WITH STUART'S RAIDERS.

How the North and South Misunderstood Each Other—A Most Interesting and Instructive Entertainment at the Author's House with a Number of Raider Stuart's Officers as Guests—Their Sagacity, Without Opportunity of Conference, in Withholding Their Names and Refusing to Recognize the Author—They had Asked Hospitality and Received It Generously, Knowing Soon after They Entered the House that They were Under Orders to Take Host as Prisoner to Richmond—The First Advent of the Confederates into Chambersburg—Interview with Wade Hampton—Hugh Logan Notifies the Author that He is to be Taken Prisoner—Midnight Visit From Col. Watts and a Squad of Stuart's Command—The Entire Night Spent in Discussing the War in the Most Earnest and Courteous Manner—The Identity of the Guests Not Discovered Until Ten Years Later.

I THINK it entirely safe to say that had the Northern and Southern men known the qualities of each other as well before the war as they did when the war closed, there would have been no fratricidal conflict.

Both sides confidently counted on an easy victory if it came to a clash of arms, and the strangest of all the errors of that time was the generally accepted idea, both North and South, that the other side would not accept the sacrifices and desolation of war.

That such erroneous ideas should be entertained seems unaccountable when we consider the history of both sections from the heroic sacrifices of the Revolution to the achievements of the War of 1812 and the triumphs of the Mexican War, in which the Northern and Southern soldiers were side by side in every battle, and both exhibited the highest qualities of heroism.

They were of the same blood, had grown up under the same free institutions, stood shoulder to shoulder in every trial that came to the country, and that both sections should have so gravely underrated each other after the records that both had written seems now utterly incomprehensible, but it was none the less the truth.

After the surrender of Sumter, in a Republican legislative caucus held in the hall of the house at Harrisburg with closed doors, I was hissed by many of my fellow Republican legislators because I said that if civil war came it would be one of the most desperate and bloody struggles of history.

Speeches were made in that caucus by members of the Legislature declaring that the Southern people had degenerated into bombastic insolence and that if they attempted war the women of the North could sweep them from the Potomac with their brooms.

In like manner Howell Cobb, who had been Speaker of Congress, and a man of unusual culture and ripe experience in intercourse with the people of the whole country, declared in a public speech in the South that if the North resisted secession the Southern planters would be enabled to call the roll of their slaves on Bunker Hill.

Each section believed that the other would in the end decline the arbitrament of the sword, as the agitators North and South constantly declared that such must be the end of the controversy. How sadly both sides were mistaken was proved by the hundreds of thousands who fell in the most desperate battles of the world's history, and, however the generalship of the Northern and Southern armies has been criticised, there has never yet appeared a line in either section imputing the want of sublime heroism to the other.

We were entirely unprepared for the war, and in that

regard the people of both sections were alike. The South was fortunate in having Secretary of War Floyd, who transferred to the Southern arsenals a vast amount of arms and munitions of war to be captured as the States seceded, but beyond that neither side had any preparation for war.

There was little or no military training from the lakes of the North to the Southern gulf, and the Mexican War was remembered only as an insignificant military episode that did not require so much as a regiment from each of the States then in the Union, while Pennsylvania furnished during our Civil War in organized and equipped regiments, including emergency men called out for temporary service when the State was invaded, 387,284 men. Had we been involved in a foreign war it would have been accepted by the people generally with little disturbance, but a war with our own people made the bravest men shudder, for all knew that the most desperate and bloody of all wars are those arising from internecine strife.

The sacrifice of life in battle, such as occurred many times in the later years of the war, would have chilled the hearts of the people to despair in the early days of the struggle.

I remember meeting General Burnside at Washington late in the fall of 1861, when the whole country was impatient at McClellan's delay in marching upon Manassas and Richmond. I shared the feeling that was universal in the North, believing that McClellan had an army quite capable of defeating the Confederates at Manassas and capturing Richmond, which all then believed would end the war, and I expressed impatience to Burnside at the hesitation of McClellan to advance. He was a frank, manly soldier, and when he informed me that he could march upon Manassas and defeat the enemy and capture Richmond, but

that it would cost the sacrifice of not less than 10,000 men to accomplish it, I was silenced.

The sacrifice of such a number of men seemed so utterly appalling that it could not be entertained, and yet more than ten times 10,000 men fell in the struggles between the Rapidan and Richmond before the Confederate Capital was captured.

There are many yet living who recall how the North was convulsed from center to circumference when the announcement was made that a single Union soldier had been killed at Alexandria. Colonel Ellsworth had rushed with his command to the cupola of a hotel in Alexandria to haul down the stars and bars and hoist the Stars and Stripes, and was shot dead by the proprietor of the house, who in turn was riddled with bullets by Ellsworth's enraged soldiers. His body was brought to Washington and lay in state in the White House.

For the first time the country realized what war meant, and the sacrifice of the life of one man, well known to the country, had brought sorrow mingled with measured despair to every household.

I recall also when two officers under Patterson, when he first advanced from the Cumberland Valley to the Potomac, in the spring of 1861, were captured on a scouting expedition. It was discussed with bated breath throughout the North. Naturally the inquiry was what would be their fate.

The South was very generally regarded by the North as inflamed to fiendish fury, and the same feeling was cherished by the South as to the North. There was no recognition of belligerent rights and therefore no assurance that prisoners would be treated according to the rules of civilized warfare.

In my own community of Chambersburg, one of the most intelligent and law-abiding of any section of the

State, it was with the utmost difficulty that Colonel Thomas B. Kennedy and myself saved a captured Confederate squad, after Antietam, from violent assault on the street. They were unarmed, and we had to hurry them to prison for safety.

We complained violently of what was called the appalling brutality of the Southern people, but they were after all our own people and quite like ourselves. They had the war in their own country and around their own homes, while we rarely felt the presence of an enemy.

The most interesting and instructive lesson that I had on the subject of the necessity of the Northern and Southern people understanding each other, came from a night that I spent with the Confederates in my own home in October, 1862. The battle of Antietam had been fought about a month before, and McClellan's line extended from Hagerstown to the southern side of the Potomac. As Lee's army had retreated to Virginia, and as McClellan's larger army was on the border, there was a general feeling of security among the border people, succeeding the apprehensions which had convulsed them for some weeks while Lee was on his Maryland campaign.

I was engaged at the time in preparing the State for a draft, and occasionally returned to my home in Chambersburg to give an evening or a day to my family and business duties. There was no special strain on us at Harrisburg, and I went home to enjoy a day or two of rest.

When I stepped out of the car on to the platform of Chambersburg, the telegraph operator beckoned me to come into his private office, and he exhibited several despatches he had received from Mercersburg, stating that a Confederate force of 2,000 or 3,000 had entered Mercersburg and was moving toward Chambersburg.

I naturally assumed that it was a raid across the upper Potomac for the purpose of capturing horses, supplies, etc., and at first felt little apprehension that any small force of the enemy would place itself directly in the rear and within easy reach of a large portion of McClellan's army by entering Chambersburg. I took the precaution, however, to advise the commanding officer at Hagerstown of this movement of the enemy, and suggested that he send several regiments of troops to Chambersburg as a measure of precaution. They could have been brought from Hagerstown to Chambersburg in an hour, but the Union general commanding at Hagerstown treated the proposition with utter contempt, and in a rather insolent manner advised me not to bother him with any such absurd suggestions. I remained with the telegraph operator, and an hour later he received despatches giving the startling information that the Southern cavalry were on the turnpike at St. Thomas, eight miles northwest of Chambersburg, and moving in our direction. I repeated the information to the Union commander at Hagerstown, only to receive another notice not to bother about any such ridiculous idea as the possibility of the Southern force coming into Chambersburg.

The Southern command was moving very slowly and with extreme caution, but steadily toward Chambersburg. I went home, took a hasty dinner, and then went to my law office to await events. There was no military force of any kind in the town, but I still hoped that the small body of the enemy would not attempt to get so far from its base and so nearly in touch with McClellan's overwhelming force as to venture into our town. It seemed much more reasonable that they would retrace their steps and recross the upper Potomac with their horses and other plunder.

Telegraph communication was cut off when they

reached the turnpike, and we had two hours of painful suspense. A cold drizzling rain had been falling during the entire day, and while sitting by a comfortable fire in the office just about dark four or five soldiers dressed in rather dilapidated gray, with a dirty white rag tied to a stick, entered the office.

When they reached the town they inquired for the military commander, but were informed that there were no military in the town, and they then asked where they could go to confer about occupying the town, and they were sent to my office. Judge Kimmell and Colonel Kennedy came in about the same time and joined me in receiving our first visit from the Confederates. The spokesman of the party said that they were sent with a flag of truce to ascertain whether they could enter the town without conflict, and they were informed that as there was no military force in the town there was nothing to hinder them from marching in.

I asked them what assurance could be given to our people as to the treatment they would receive from the Confederate soldiers. The answer was that they had no authority to give assurances on the subject, but that satisfactory assurances would doubtless be given by the commander of the force. I asked who the commander was and where he could be found, and the answer was that the information could not be given. I then inquired whether they would take us to the commander and assure our safe return, to which they promptly answered that they would.

Kennedy, Kimmell and myself obtained horses and rode out along the pike for nearly a mile and were finally brought up before what could be barely distinguished as a crowd of men. It was so dark that no one could be distinguished from another.

General Wade Hampton rode to the front and greeted

us and was informed that we were citizens of Chambersburg who had come out to confer with him as to what assurances should be given to the people when his troops entered the town. He very promptly and cordially assured us that the citizens could all go to their homes with absolute confidence, that they would not be disturbed; that no property would be taken except such as was absolutely necessary for the command; that they wanted horses and supplies, and that they could be had without disturbing the people. I had just been commissioned as assistant adjutant general of the United States a few days before, and it occurred to me that I should make some inquiry as to what might be the fate of the Union officers. I said to General Hampton that there were probably some Union officers in the town, on recruiting or other duty, and asked what would be done with them. He answered that they would be paroled unless there were special reasons for not doing so, but he strictly enjoined us not to give information to any of them so that they might escape. He then directed us to turn about and lead the command to Chambersburg, which we did.

General "Jeb" Stuart, altogther the most accomplished cavalry leader of the Confederacy, was in command, with part of the brigades of Generals Wade Hampton and Fitz Hugh Lee, but Lee was not along in person.

A considerable portion of the command entered the town and swarmed through the square in the center that was lighted with gas, while squads scattered off in every direction in the immediate neighborhood to obtain horses.

While walking across the square that was then filled with the raiders I was suddenly slapped on the back, and when I turned around I recognized Hugh Logan, who had lived in the South Mountain before the war,

but who joined the Southern army immediately after the war began, and he was then a captain, and of course the guide in the movement, as he was thoroughly familiar with all the roads and especially the mountain passes through which Stuart had to make his escape.

Logan had been a client of mine, and I had successfully defended him in a kidnapping case. He was one of the rugged mountaineers in whom you will often find the most devoted personal friendship. He at once informed me that I had no business there; that a list of some twenty of the prominent men of Franklin County had been made out to be captured and taken to the Libbey Prison, in Richmond, to be held as hostages for a number of citizen prisoners who had been captured by General Pope in his bombastic meandering during his brief and disastrous campaign in Virginia. He informed me that they had seven of them, among whom was Perry A. Rice, who died in Libbey Prison; that my name was on the list, and that it would be a great disappointment if I were not taken with them. I told him that I was an officer, and repeated what Hampton had said about paroling officers. His answer was in these words: "Hampton's a gentleman, and if you could get to him he would parole you, but 'Jeb' wants you d——d badly." I reminded him that I was under obligations not to notify any officer to leave the town that night, and that if I escaped and they discovered that I was an officer they might do great injury to my property. He advised me to go out to my home, some distance from the center of the town, and if taken to come along quietly, with the assurance that he would put me out of the line the next night, and I doubt not that he would have done it, even if it imperilled his own life.

I walked out to my home, and found that the ten horses on the farm had been captured an hour before.

I supposed that as the horses had been taken I would be likely to escape further visitation, as the command could not long remain in Chambersburg with five or ten times the number of Union troops in Hagerstown and only an hour distant by rail.

I reached home about eleven o'clock. The house stood a hundred feet or more back from the road, and I closed the windows so that no light was visible outside, and sat down on the porch.

Some time about midnight I heard the clattering of hoofs and the jingling of swords on the turnpike out beyond me, and in a little while a hundred or more of Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry halted in front of the house, as they were then just at the edge of the town and within touch of their lines. On one side of the road was a field with corn in shock, and they hurriedly threw an ample supply of corn to their horses, while another portion commenced tearing the paling off the fence to start a fire. I saw that I was up against them, and at once walked down to the gate and said that if they wanted to make a good fire there was plenty of wood a few feet around the corner, and that right behind it was a short way to water for the horses.

They received the information very kindly and at once desisted from tearing up the paling, and soon had an ample supply of wood ready for a fire. They crowded around it with great impatience, as they had been riding all day in a cold rain without overcoat or blanket, and were stripped of everything that would retard rapidity of motion. They were all wet and chilled and the fire was very welcome.

One of them who seemed to be in command asked me if I lived there and whether I had any coffee in the house. I told him that it was my home and I had coffee, but I had no way to make it, as my servants were colored and had escaped. He said that they were

not hunting negroes, and that if I could find my servants and get them coffee he would assure absolute protection to all of them and to everything in the house. He had no idea where he was, nor to whom he was talking, and least of all did he suppose that he was addressing one whom he was ordered to take as a prisoner to Richmond. I told him that I could find my servants, and the little lot of officers, embracing probably half a dozen, were invited to come into the house and have their coffee, which they very gladly accepted.

There was a bright fire burning in the library and the New York and Philadelphia papers were on the table with my name on them, and the officers seized upon them at once to see what was told about the war. They were not a minute in the room until they discovered that they had asked for hospitality and were about to receive it from one whom they were ordered to arrest as a prisoner and take to Richmond. They had no opportunity for conference, as we were scattered around in a single well-lighted room, but they intuitively took in the situation and acted in perfect accord.

They had to assume that they did not know or suspect who I was, for if it became known in the South that they had supped at my house and failed to capture me they would have been liable to severe penalty, and in like manner they intuitively understood that no name of any of them should be spoken, so that I could give no information as to who had been my guests and failed to arrest me.

They were all men of more than ordinary intelligence, one of whom had been a delegate to the Democratic National convention of 1860, and they were very courteous and genial in manner. I had a bountiful supper prepared for them as speedily as possible, which they enjoyed heartily, and we sat an hour at

the table discussing the various questions relating to the war with a degree of seriousness and earnestness that was most impressive to all.

They, of course, knew who I was· knew something of my relations with the State government, and spoke with the utmost candor mingled with the highest measure of courtesy on the various questions relating to the war. I shall never forget the earnestness, the eloquence and pathos of one of the officers who reminded me that their command was then armed with the best cavalry weapons captured from our forces, that the second year of the war was drawing to a close and we had not yet fought a successful battle with the Confederate army of Virginia. He inquired how we could hope to prosecute a war that in nearly two years had won no victories, and that even under the most favorable conditions the North could never conquer the Southern people.

There was no trace of bombast or arrogance in the expressions of the Southern officer. He felt that he was speaking in courtesy and candor to one who understood the situation North and South as well as he did. I answered him that he had overlooked the most vital consideration, one that would compel the North to continue the conflict even if the Confederacy was finally to be established. I reminded him that we were 20,000,000 to their 8,000,000, and that since war had begun there was no hope for the unity of the North unless it asserted its military mastery over the South.

To be defeated by inferior numbers would simply demoralize and disintegrate the North, and instead of having a Northern republic it would break into a series of petty principalities and practically anarchy. I told him that, assuming that the Confederacy was not to be overthrown, its existence could be recognized only when the North had vindicated its power to defeat

the military forces of the South when separation, if inevitable, might come with some semblance of honor to both. He bowed his head in sadness and said that it was the only forceful reasoning he had yet heard for the continuance of this cruel war. He spoke of the emancipation measure, and asked whether I favored it. He insensibly shuddered when I told him that I did, and that I might complain of it, but that he could not, as the South had absolved itself from all relations with the general government that gave it the power to maintain slavery.

Wine and liquors were offered in abundance, but they indulged very sparingly, and when the bugle sounded for boots and saddles just at the break of day, they shook hands with me most cordially, thanked me for the hospitality they had received, and very earnestly expressed a hope that we might meet some time under sunnier skies.

It was not until ten years afterward that I learned who these officers were. One was Thomas W. Whitehead, of Lynchburg, Va., who saw me in the hall of the House of Representatives at Washington, of which he was then a member, and asked Mr. Clymer to introduce him to me. I then learned the whole story; that Lieutenant Colonel James W. Watts commanded the detachment, and that Captain Tebbs and himself, with Lieutenant Kelso and two others, whose names he did not recall, were the officers who were my guests on that occasion.

It was never discovered in the South that they had been in my house, and as they were all unknown to me the names were never given to the North. I thus had a most interesting and impressive night with the Confederates, whose sense of chivalry made them refuse to obey the order to arrest me because they had entered my home in quest of hospitality.

LIII.

THE STREET CAR IN PHILADELPHIA.

The Old Omnibus Lines Radiated Through the City Proper from the Commercial Exchange—The Initial Street Railway Charter Passed in 1854 Lay Dormant for Several Years—Experience as a Legislator in Granting the Leading Street Railway Charters of the City—The Author Visited Philadelphia and Quietly Inspected the Lines—Residents on Arch, Chestnut and Walnut Streets Almost Unanimously Protested Against the Street Railway, and an Overwhelming Majority of the People of Market Street—Owners of the Charter Afraid to Enter on Market or Chestnut for Months after the Bill had Passed—Wonderful Growth of the Street Railway System—Now Carries 400,000,000 Passengers a Year—Objection to Sunday Cars—The Race Issue Another Most Serious Embarrassment—Many of the Whites Refuse to Ride in the Same Car with the Negroes—Violent Hostility to the Introduction of the Trolley System—The Mayor Bows to the Popular Protest and Vetoed the Measure—Passed Over His Veto—and is Now the Great Monument of His Administration—P. A. B. Widener.

A CONNECTED history of the politics and progress of Pennsylvania would be incomplete if it did not note the transformation of local transit in the City of Philadelphia. I well remember early visits to the City of Brotherly Love, when the only means of transit in the city outside of livery or private carriages was by the omnibus lines, which made a pretense of carrying passengers with the Commercial Exchange as their base to different parts of the city.

The accommodations were fairly good within the active business circles, but if a passenger desired to reach any place outside of the city proper, then bounded by the rivers east and west and by South and Vine Streets, it was very difficult to obtain inviting accommodations.

I recall many morning walks which I made from the business part of the city to visit the then country residence of Mrs. Rush, now the Aldine Hotel, and I have often taken a long walk to Willington, then the country home of Edward Gratz, with its immense grounds, west of Broad and north of Master, rich in the choicest fruits and foliage, but now solidly built up and not far distant from the heart of the city.

There was then little business west of Sixth, and even as late as 1860 I recall an invitation from Dr. Jayne to go with him to view two large commercial houses he was then about finishing on the north side of Chestnut below Seventh, when he expressed serious apprehension that he was quite in advance of the time and that such structures would not be profitable within his lifetime.

When the Girard House was opened in the early 50's it was generally regarded as a wild venture. The streets when paved were laid in cobble stones, and there was little invitation for driving. The Jones House, now the "German-Democrat" Building, and the United States, nearly opposite the Custom House, were the first-class hotels of the city, while the Merchants, on Fourth below Market, with the veteran Chambers McKibben as host, was the center of commercial interest.

The people of Philadelphia had long complained of the want of accommodations for local transit, but the omnibus lines had their franchise from the city, and they were run in the interest of the owners rather than in the interest of the public. Finally, the idea of tram railways became the subject of discussion, and on April 4, 1854, a charter was granted to the Philadelphia and Delaware River Railroad Company to lay passenger lines on the streets and operate them with horses, but the omnibus lines, like the Conestoga wagon

interests in earlier days when the construction of railroads threatened to retire them from business, made organized and desperate effort against the introduction of the street railway.

The public generally had no knowledge of the character or convenience of street railways, and it is a remarkable fact that every street railway laid in Philadelphia from 1858 to 1860, when the street railway was generally introduced, was most earnestly and often violently opposed by the residents of the streets.

The initial charter granted in 1854 lay dormant for four years, when its name was changed to the Frankford and Southwark Passenger Railway Company, and it was put into operation in 1858, when fifteen cars were run on the Fifth and Sixth Streets line.

The convenience and comfort of the street car caused a very general desire for the extension of the system, and on our main streets pretty much all the people were in favor of the street car line to go in front of everybody's door but their own.

I was a member of the house in 1858, when the tidal wave was reached in street car franchises, and I well remember the intense earnestness with which the people of the leading streets of the city protested against permitting cars to run upon them. Every charter that was presented to the Legislature was opposed by committees of citizens who appeared before the committees of the Legislature and declared that the construction of the road would greatly diminish the value of their homes and that they would be a constant source of discomfort and annoyance.

Philadelphia was then just as much opposed to innovation as it was nearly a generation earlier when Horace Binney, then the greatest of Philadelphia lawyers, and one of the most beloved and respected of citizens, joined in a protest to councils against the

introduction of gas for illuminating purposes, because of the danger it would bring to health and property.

There were bills before us in Harrisburg for railway charters on Arch, Market, Chestnut and Walnut Streets, with many others reaching out through the city, but the great battle was made against the right of the railway company to occupy the four streets I have named. I well recall the protests which were presented to the house signed by from three-fourths to nine-tenths of the citizens who were residents on Arch, Market, Chestnut and Walnut, appealing to the Legislature not to impair the value of their property and expose them to the annoyance of cars before their doors every hour of the day and most of the night.

The members of the Legislature who had visited Philadelphia knew how unsatisfactory was the service of the omnibus lines, and it was difficult to understand why people were so earnestly opposed to the substitution of street railways which would certainly make less noise than the rattling of omnibuses over cobble stones and afford a vastly more comfortable and cheaper local transit. I was a member of the Legislative committee before which these bills were discussed by the friends and opponents of the system, and without communicating with any one outside of ourselves, a number of the committee decided to visit Philadelphia and make a trial of the street railways. We found them very comfortable, more rapid than the omnibuses, and the rails, as then laid, so far from obstructing the street, made a perfect tramway for carriages and every other form of wagons.

The friends of the new system had no knowledge of the purpose of our visit, and we obtained all the information we needed under our own personal inspection and trial of the new method of transit.

From that time during six years of Legislative service

I favored every street railway charter that provided for the assent and proper control of the city, leaving the question to be one entirely between the city authorities and those who asked for franchises.

The people of Arch Street were in open rebellion as the franchise for that street authorized a double track, and most of the people seemed to be profoundly impressed with the threatened destruction of their street for either home or business purposes. The protest against that charter was signed by nineteen-twentieths of the residents along the entire street between the two rivers, and their representatives appeared at Harrisburg to be heard before the committees of the Legislature and were vehement in their opposition to it.

Market Street being largely the business street of the city, with unusual width, did not present the same hostility to the new transit system, but even there most of the business men were violent in their opposition. They could occupy as much of the street in front of their places as they chose, and the omnibus would have to go out of its way, but the street car would have its right of way clear, and that was regarded as an invasion of the commercial and business rights of the city.

The storm center of this hostility was exhibited by the people on the Chestnut and Walnut Streets line. They were the delectable streets of the city where fashion had its home, and the delectable shops where the unwashed were unknown as patrons.

So fierce and revolutionary was the hostility to the occupation of Chestnut and Walnut that it was many months after the charter had been granted before those who owned it felt safe in attempting to take possession of the streets.

After long waiting until the tempest of passion had somewhat abated, the owners of the charter secretly perfected an organization to cover entire possession

P. A. B. Widener

of Walnut and Chestnut between the rivers, beginning at midnight, and when the people came out the next morning they discovered that the railway line was practically upon the streets. There were much grumbling and here and there threats of violence, which had been very carefully provided for by an abundance of police, and the line was then completed without hostility. So strong was the public prejudice against all street railways in Philadelphia that it forced those who applied for franchises to accept the condition that they must buy out, at full valuation, the omnibus lines which traversed the streets. That was the last battle the anti-innovators of Philadelphia were enabled to make in favor of the old omnibus lines.

There was a tidal wave of applications for charters, and no less than eleven distinct charters were granted by the Legislature of 1858, with five more granted in 1859. A long-drawn out and desperate battle was made by Mr. Singerly, father of the late William M. Singerly, who was a man of broad gauge business ideas, and was among the first to understand that a passenger railway to Germantown would be a very valuable charter, and when he applied for it he was confronted by the Green and Coates Company, and the Legislature was convulsed for weeks by these opposing interests, but Singerly finally won out as he well deserved. Thus by 1860 there were passenger railways running east and west on all the important central streets, and running north and south as far west as Seventeenth and Nineteenth streets.

Labor and materials were then cheap, and these lines were generally constructed by a very small percentage of payments on the capitalization, and all became great money makers.

The tempest that resisted the street railway innovation gradually subsided, and finally perished, and

thereafter the only clamor on the subject of railways was for their extension to the remote points of the city. Additional charters were granted after 1860 wherever profitable lines could be constructed, until 1883 when the Philadelphia Traction Company was incorporated, and inaugurated the policy of concentration. Finally, in 1895, the Peoples Traction Company and the Electric Traction Company continued the policy of concentration that was followed in 1895 by the Union Traction Company, and these three organizations practically controlled the entire local transit of the city, with the Union Traction Company as the survivor of the fittest. Its sway continued until 1902, when the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company combined in one great organization the entire street lines of the city and assumed the task of an underground line on Market street.

The magnitude of its business will be understood when it is stated that the number of passengers carried during the last year by this corporation was nearly 400,000,000.

The hostility to the possession of the Philadelphia streets by the residents was not the only difficulty that confronted those who brought about the revolution in local transit. They were denied the right to run their cars on Sunday, and as the omnibus had served its purpose and passed away, there was no method of transit in Philadelphia on Sunday except by private conveyance. An agitation at once began for running the cars on Sunday, but the churches generally took it up most aggressively and thundered their anathemas against such open-handed immorality.

It was declared from the pulpit that the people could not worship on the Sabbath without being constantly annoyed and interrupted by the noise of the street cars passing the doors, and the religious sentiment of the city was aroused to most aggressive action.

The Legislature was appealed to time and again to grant street cars the right to run on Sunday, but it was some years before they could obtain the right under severe limitations.

One of the lines made the desperate experiment of running its cars on Sunday with mail boxes attached to the rear of the car in which persons could deposit letters for delivery at the post office, and it was claimed that it would be unlawful to interfere with the United States mails.

The agitation about Sunday cars was very general and invaded the pulpit and the secular and religious press. It was forcefully declared by the friends of Sunday car service that the pulpits did not declaim against their wealthy parishioners who employed their coachmen and horses to bring them to church and take them home, while they denounced the only opportunity that was given to the masses of the people with their families to attend church without expending more money than they could afford. Slowly but steadily the opposition to Sunday service faded away, and finally it became common for ministers themselves to enter the Sunday car to reach their own pulpits.

The dusky African also presented one of the bitterest conflicts in which the early street cars were involved.

The race issue was even stronger in Philadelphia than in the South in old slavery times. While the people of Philadelphia were largely opposed to slavery they were not in favor of anything approaching fellowship with the negro. The slavemaster of the South could sit in the same seat with his colored man servant in the car without regarding it as a degradation, but the average Philadelphian was implacably hostile to riding in the same vehicle with the negro. The result was that the colored people were at first excluded from the cars, but that aroused very earnest opposition,

and the appeal in behalf of the negro to ride in the street car strongly impressed all who cherished a sense of justice. Finally the cars were prohibited by law from discriminating against passengers on account of color or race, and that precipitated a most violent exhibition of race prejudice. It was not uncommon to see both men and women waiting at the corner for a street car and refusing to enter it because they saw a colored passenger within, and the conductors, who shared the general prejudice against the black man as a rule, made it a special point not to notice a negro who waited at the street corner for admission.

The law was mandatory that the rights of whites and blacks were entirely equal in the street cars, and the studied efforts to exclude the negroes aroused them to the most vindictive actions. They felt that injustice and indignity were put upon them, and they made organized effort to appear on every car that was on the street. They could not be excluded, as the cars were compelled to stop because white passengers were waiting for them, and in such cases the negro generally managed to get on first, and it was only natural that a race less intelligent than its oppressors should resent the effort to exclude them from the car by the most ostentatious and often offensive assertion of their rights.

It was not until after the Civil War began that the colored people achieved their final triumph by the passage of a severe law making the conductors amenable for misdemeanor if they refused to stop their cars for the admission of colored passengers. That prejudice, like all others relating to the advance of the street railway, was gradually effaced, and to-day none take pause for a moment to inquire whether they shall sit next or opposite to a white or black person on the street car.

Philadelphia is criticised as primitive and unwilling

to accept advancement. There is a measure of truth in the criticism, but her people have not made any resistance to any innovation in the line of advancement that has not been supplemented in nearly all of the other leading cities of the Union.

New York resisted for many years after every leading street in Philadelphia had its street railway the introduction of cars on Broadway. That crowded thoroughfare was filled with omnibuses, greatly embarrassing both commerce and pleasure, but the people of New York clung to the omnibus on Broadway long after Philadelphia had welcomed the street railway in every section of the city.

There was some semblance of excuse for the pride of the old Philadelphians resisting the street railway on Chestnut and Walnut, but there was no excuse whatever for continuing a mob of omnibuses on Broadway until nearly every other leading city of the Union had consigned their omnibus lines to history. Our people are slow to innovation, chiefly because Philadelphia is pre-eminently the city of homes, and it is the quiet and sanctity of home life that is ever averse to innovation.

The last notable instance of this feature of Philadelphia was exhibited when the trolley was about to be introduced in the city. I recall my first lesson on the trolley system. Mr. Widener had been to Boston to witness a test of the trolley system, and was of course profoundly impressed with its economy. He called at the "Times" office and explained his desire to introduce it only on the line to Germantown, that was largely rural and where the poles would not be especially offensive. He had no idea at that time of the general introduction of the trolley, but he thought it very important for long distance lines. It was introduced, and soon it became a necessity to have its introduction